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Stellingen 
1. De huidige ontwikkelingen in de politieke économie waarbij microfundering en 
wiskundig-theoretische 'innovaties' voorop staan, contrasteren scherp met de noodzaak 
van - en de in dezelfde politieke économie geuite wens naar - degelijk empirisch 
onderzoek teneinde aan politiek-economische modellen ontleende hypothesen te 
toetsen. (Dit proefschrifi) 
2. Van de gangbare politiek-economische modelbenaderingen verdient de méthode van 
Gardner (1987) en Sarker et al. (1993) voor de Verklarung van landbouwbeleid de 
voorkeur. Deze benadering schiet echter tekort in het verklaren van veranderingen in 
de beleidsinstrumentkeuze. (Dit proefschrifi) 
3. De keuze voor de welvaartstheoretische driedeling consumenten-producenten-belasting-
betalers in een empirisch georiënteerde politiek-economische verklaring is zonder 
inzicht in en een ex ante toetsing aan de werkelijke politieke krachts- en machtsver-
houdingen niet alleen arbitrair, maar kan bovendien misleidend zijn bij het trekken van 
conclusies. (Dit proefschrifi) 
4. Voor een juiste politiek-economische interpretatie en verklaring van de ontwikkelingen 
van het EG-landbouwbeleid dient behalve het Gemeenschappelijk Landbouwbeleid 
(GLB) ook het landbouwbeleid van de lid-staten in beschouwing te worden genomen. 
(Dit proefschrifi) 
5. De vraagstelling in enquêtes over het Gemeenschappelijk Landbouwbeleid in opdracht 
van en gepubliceerd door de Europese Commissie, is veelal zodanig algemeen of 
multi-interpretabel dat het gebruik van hierop gebaseerde enquête-resultaten noch in 
het wetenschappelijke, noch in het politieke débat gewenst is (vlg. de 'Eurobarometers' 
van februari 1988, resp. juni 1991). 
6. Hoewel theoretische en empirische lessen uit het verleden wijzen op de economische 
suprématie van het model van de 'vrije' markteconomie boven dat van de planecono-
mie, is de vraag onbeslecht of een democratische rechtsorde naar westerse snit voor 
deze suprématie een noodzakelijke, structurele voorwaarde is. 
7. In de discussie over studeerbaarheid leidt de eenzijdige aandacht voor de tekortkomin-
gen en gebreken aan de aanbodkant van het Nederlands academisch onderwijs af van 
de vraag hoe het gesteld is met de kwaliteit van en de academische interesse aan de 
vraagkant. 
8. De negatieve gevolgen van 'derde geldslxoom'-onderzoeksfinanciering aan universitei-
ten, zich uitend in opgelegde beperkingen ten aanzien van publikatie-inhoud en tijdstip, 
oneigenlijke (prijs)concurrentie tegenover commerciele research- en adviesbureau's, 
en schemerige financiele afrekeningen binnen de universiteit, pleiten voor een 
aanmeldingsplicht op facultair niveau en marginale toetsing door een onafhankelijke 
commissie. 
9. Economenmoppen op Internet zijn vooral sterk in het relativeren van het deductieve 
en axiomatische karakter van de neo-klassieke economie (zie bijvoorbeeld htip://www. 
etla.fi). 
10. De gedachte dat de economie geen onderdeel (meer) zou uitmaken van de sociale 
wetenschappen berust op een ernstig misverstand. 
11. De teloorgang van een typisch Europese cinema - zo deze ooit bestaan heeft - zegt 
meer iets over de verschuivende voorkeuren en de filmbeleving van de doorsnee 
Europese filmbezoeker dan over het bestaan van Amerikaans cultuurimperialisme. 
12. De verhouding 'zinnigeV'onzinnige' Stellingen in een 'gemiddeld' proefschrift is een 
indicatie van de preoccupatie van de betreffende wetenschapper met zijn vakgebied. 
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PART 0. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N A N D D E L I N E A T I O N 

C H A P T E R 1 
INTRODUCTION 
"Farming is a classic example of production under competitive conditions. It would appear that 
production is controlled by competition and accordingly government programs should be 
unnecessary; certainly it should reduce them to a minimum. Instead, we find a grand array of farm 
legislation, and administrative agencies with a large and expert personnel (...) This far-reaching 
and impressive machinery of government authority would seem to offer all the conditions required 
for a state-controlled and managed farm economy with little or no room for private enterprise. Why 
these two seemingly inconsistent impressions? Which is real and which merely apparent?" 
Theodore W. Schultz (1945:164) 
1.1 The subject of this thesis 
The explanation of the role of government in the economy and the determination of 
government policy have engaged the attention of the economics profession since its earliest 
days. A number of alternative explanatory paradigms have emerged, ranging from radical 
(Marxian) economics to neo-classical economics. Within neo-classical economics two 
extreme perspectives on policy formation have developed, the social welfare maximisation 
perspective and the (new) political economy perspective. 
Within contemporary agricultural economics the social welfare maximisation perspective 
is the dominant mode of research. Studies in this tradition implicitly regard agricultural 
policy as a deliberate, purposeful response to market failures by a benevolent government. 
Although this research has yielded important insights in the functioning and particularities 
of agricultural markets, it cannot explain why government intervention has become so all-
embracing and why support patterns have taken forms opposite to what one would expect 
on the basis of conventional neo-classical economics theory. Close observation of existing 
'real-world' agricultural policy patterns and policy dynamics shows that the conception that 
agricultural policy interventions can be considered as a well-considered apt response to 
solve inherent market failures cannot be upheld. Rather agricultural policy formation has to 
be regarded as a political process in which various interests ranging from farmers, food 
processing industries and agricultural supplies industries to capital and land owners and 
consumers, try to co-determine the policy outcome. Agricultural policies are defined 
broadly as "those measures taken by a (central) government that are aimed at influencing, 
directly or indirectly, agricultural factor and product markets" (e.g., Josling, 1974:229). 
Hence, agricultural policy formation refers to public choices regrding the mix and level of 
agricultural policy instruments. 
While most agricultural economists have recognized the importance of politics and have 
often taken a broader view on policy formation than most mainstream neo-classical 
economics theorists, most of them have tended to keep these political considerations and 
observations a separate, non-formal subject of their analyses. Part of the lack of 
explanatory content of conventional theory can be assigned to the neglect of political actors 
and their behaviour in formal theoretical and empirical economic analysis. By taking a 
political economy perspective, this thesis aims to integrate the motives and activities of 
interest groups, politicians, voters and bureaucrats involved in agricultural policy formation. 
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It intends a positive - "what is" - account of the policy-making process and the underlying 
motives and activities of political-economic agents. It does not give any prescription as to 
how 'government' should intervene in the (agricultural) economy. 
The political economy perspective can be seen as an extension of the economics 
methodology to the domain of politics and policy-making. However, this extension does 
not in any way alter the formal object of economics being "the science which studies 
human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative 
uses" (Robbins, 1952:16). It employs the same basic three presumptions (premises) as the 
neo-classical microeconomics research programme: (i) agents are assumed to behave 
rationally and being motivated by self-interest; (ii) individuals' preferences are stable, at 
least in a static-comparative sense; and (iii) the interaction between politico-economic 
actors tends towards equilibrium states of the world. Self-interested behaviour should not 
be confused with narrow egoistic behaviour. It is an open concept which may relate to pure 
altruistic behaviour, forms of other-directed behaviour (such as sharing, giving, helping or 
cooperating), or pure self-interested behaviour (for a review, see Monroe, 1994). The 
rational choice postulate implies procedural rationality and has two essential ingredients: 
"1. Actors are able to order their alternative goals, values, tastes, and strategies. This means 
that the relation of preference and indifference among the alternative is transitive ... 2. 
Actors choose from available alternatives so as to maximise their satisfaction." (Riker, 
1990:172). Procedural rationality is to be distinguished from (Weberian) substantive 
rationality, which relates to judgements about goals selected by the analyst and therefore is 
of a normative nature. The three fundamental premises of the neo-classical economics 
approach rational-choice / stable-preferences / equilibrium-structures-of-interaction are the 
starting point of this thesis. 
The aim of this thesis is twofold: 
(i) to critically review the different strands within political economy theory and, 
more specifically, to evaluate the empirical applicability and relevance of 
formal political economy models for the analysis of agricultural policy 
formation (at a certain point in time) and agricultural policy developments 
(comparative-statically or dynamically) in industrialized democratic market 
economies, and 
(ii) to investigate whether formal political economy models can be used to explain 
agricultural policy formation and agricultural policy developments in the 
European Union. 
The empirical focus on agricultural policy formation in the European Union (EU) in this 
thesis serves a dual purpose: not only does it try to fill a gap in empirical political 
economy research, but it also serves to illustrate what potential analytical difficulties the 
political economy analyst might come across. 
Chapter 1 5 
1.2 An outline 
This thesis consists of three parts. Part zero includes this introduction and a discussion 
of the 'conventional' neo-classical economics perspective on agricultural policy formation. 
Part one, covering the chapters 3 to 7, contains a critical review of existing political 
economy theory and a general assessment of the applicability, the potential explanatory 
power and flexibility of existing political economy models to account for agricultural 
policy formation. The results of this first part should be regarded both as an elaborate 
discussion of the empirical explanatory power of political economy models with respect to 
agricultural policy formation in democratic industrialized market economies and as an 
explorative search for a political economy model to explain agricultural policy formation in 
the EU. The first objective might offer conclusions with respect to the politico-economic 
modelling of agricultural policy formation which may prove to be less applicable to the 
case of agricultural policy formation in the European Union. Why such divergence might 
occur is a question that is addressed in part two. This second part - which covers the 
chapters 8 to 11 - focuses explicitly on agricultural policy formation in the European 
Union. It provides a detailed analysis of the formal and informal side of EC decision-
making, and evaluates the possibilities for applying political economy models empirically. 
The contents per chapter are as follows. The next chapter discusses the conventional 
social welfare maximisation (SWF) approach and its shortcomings with respect to the 
'explanation' of policy formation. It argues that the basic idea of an optimal economic 
policy as a technical instrument-objective choice has serious limitations, given the existence 
of political agents. Chapter 3 provides a general survey of the political economy (PE) 
approach. It discusses the three basic strands in politico-economic modelling - voting 
models, interest group models and models of bureaucracy - and addresses some basic 
political economy notions essential to the analysis of agricultural policy formation. The 
survey serves to further delineate the research aims and issues of this thesis. Chapter 4 
discusses the fundamentals of voting models and evaluates their suitability for policy 
analysis. Chapter 5 examines the empirical applicability of voting models, as well as the 
usefulness of the farm vote concept in the context of agricultural policy formation. Chapter 
6 discusses Olson's (1965) theory of collective action and its impact on existing interest 
group explanations of agricultural policy formation. It also identifies the minimum 
requirements for a consistent interest group-based explanation of agricultural policy 
formation. Chapter 7 examines the four basic interest group models and evaluates its 
applicability for the explanation of agricultural policy developments. Chapter 8 discusses 
agricultural policy developments in the European Community (Union) since the late 1950s. 
It describes the Common Agricultural Policy's (CAP) objectives, its original instruments 
and its subsequent 'reforms', and addresses the scope for and coverage of 'national' 
agricultural policies. Chapter 9 provides a detailed account of EC agricultural decision-m-
aking, and in particular the role of and interaction between the major decision-making 
bodies. Chapter 10 discusses the structure of the EC lobbying arena and the potential 
influence of interest groups on agricultural policy formation in a non-formal way. In 
chapter final conclusions are drawn with respect to the empirical applicability and 
relevance of political economy models for the explanation of agricultural policy formation 
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in the European Union, on the basis of the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of political 
economy models (part i) and the empirical - 'real world' - evidence shown in part n. 
C H A P T E R 2 
CONVENTIONAL NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS AND THE ANALYSIS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 
2.1 Introduction 
Government intervention in the production and marketing of agricultural goods is a 
universal phenomenon. Several patterns of government policies in agriculture are common 
across countries, irrespective of their cultural, historical or sociological heritage or 
geographical location. There exists a general tendency to discriminate against farming in 
poor countries and to subsidize fanners in rich countries (see, e.g., Bale and Lutz, 1981; 
Binswanger and Scandizzo, 1983; World Bank, 1986), with the food-exporting countries of 
Australasia and some food-importing developing countries (e.g., South Korea, Nigeria and 
Mexico) as notable exceptions (Anderson and Tyers, 1988). Government policies can be 
sector-specific or economy-wide. In developing countries the effects of economy-wide 
policies, like trade, exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policies, often overshadow those of 
sector-specific policies (World Bank, 1986; Krueger, Schiff and Valdez, 1988). In 
industrialized countries sector-specific policies tend to dominate, although over time the 
impact of economy-wide policies on the agricultural sector seems to have gained in 
importance. 
This chapter investigates the economic rationale behind government intervention in the 
agricultural economy. It discusses the alleged arguments for government intervention in the 
agricultural and food economy (section 2) and the 'farm problem' model which has for 
long dominated agricultural economists' views on the role of government (section 3). 
Section 4 specifically deals with the neo-classical economics diagnosis of the agricultural 
economy and describes the government in its role of treating physician. In essence this role 
consists in finding solutions to market failures and redistributing income on equity grounds. 
Section 5 discusses the Tinbergen-Theil theory of economic policy as most illustrative for 
this view. Section 6 evaluates whether or not the implicit presumptions of the theory of 
economic policy can stand up to close scrutiny. The chapter concludes by advocating the 
more inclusive political economy framework for the design and evaluation of agricultural 
policies. 
2.2 Alleged arguments for government intervention in agriculture 
Often-propagated arguments for government involvement in agriculture in industrialized 
market economies range from the need for food security; the need for adapting agricultural 
structures prompted by the more general objective of economic growth in other sectors of 
the economy; the support of farmers' income; the stabilization of food markets in order to 
reduce uncertainty; and the maintenance of acceptable consumer prices and - relatedly - a 
low inflation rate to, inter alia, the necessity to preserve our rural communities; to prevent 
environmental damage to the countryside; as well as to protect the traditional system of 
family farming. Many of these arguments have successfully been employed in the political 
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debate and some have reached the status of official legislation1. 
In the first decades of the post-World-War-II period the need for agricultural policies -
defined2 as those measures taken by a (central) government that are aimed at influencing, 
directly or indirectly, agricultural factor and product markets - have been almost 
unquestioned politically. Especially in the 1980s and 1990s, however, agricultural support 
has increasingly become the object of criticism. From an economic point of view this 
criticism was mainly triggered by the huge budgetary outlays on agricultural support and, 
more importantly, the highly distortive effects of this support on the allocation of resources 
in the economy a as whole. In most western industrialized countries the concomitant 
welfare losses were felt to be disproportionately high. Criticism was also fuelled by a more 
general - ideological - trend towards deregulation and privatization. Agricultural 
commodity dumping practices, moreover, had a disturbing impact on the international 
political climate with the threat of trade wars constantly lurking in the background. In 
some countries the critical attitude to agricultural support policies was also fed by an 
increasing awareness of the problem of negative externalities in agricultural production 
caused by the intensive use of variable inputs. 
2.3 Industrialized market economies: the farm problem view 
The functioning of agricultural markets and the question whether or not governments 
should intervene in the agricultural economy have been of great interest to the agricultural 
economics profession. In the first decades after the World War II the dominant view on 
government intervention in industrialized market economies is aptly put by Brandow (1977: 
237), viz.: 
"Particularly among agricultural economists, however, experience with 
depression and droughts in the 1930s had created a common belief that a wholly 
free market policy would be defective in ways that required supplementary action 
by government. Departure from strictly laissez-faire views was also stimulated by 
observation of obstacles to resource mobility that helped to keep the agricultural 
sector chronically out of equilibrium both internally and with the rest of the 
economy". 
Although some differences of opinion remained as to the degree to which the 
government should actually interfere in the market, most agricultural economists agreed on 
For example, the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community states five 
agricultural policy objectives, viz. (a) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by 
ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum utilization of the factors of 
production, in particular labour; (b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in 
particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture; (c) to stabilize markets; (d) to 
assure the availability of supplies; (e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices (see also article 
39[1]). 
2 See, for example, Josling (1974: 229). 
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the diagnosis of the farm problem. In the farm problem view3 structural characteristics in 
the production and consumption of agricultural commodities cause that the economic 
development of the agricultural sector is bound to diverge significantly from the rest of the 
economy. In principle, most agricultural product markets resemble the perfect competition 
'idealtype' with many small (atomistic) producers operating as price takers in a 
homogeneous product market. Probably more than in any other sector of the economy, 
producers are faced with the laws of nature in the form of biological constraints and 
variable weather conditions. In the short term, the per farm or per hectare production is 
relatively fixed and price inelastic, given the limited possibilities to interim adjustments in 
production. This is not only due to the fixity of production factors (capital, land, and 
labour), but also because of the biological growth cycle of the agricultural product 
concerned. Moreover, other factors such as the susceptibility to diseases as well as soil and 
weather conditions (sunshine; wind; temperature; and precipitation) are only to a certain 
extent controllable4, which causes uncertainty with respect to the quality and quantity of 
the final product. 
In the short term, total demand for most agricultural commodities, especially staples, is 
inelastic as well. With low price elasticities in both supply and demand, prices can be 
assumed to be highly volatile. With a considerable time lag between the production 
decision and the decision to market agricultural produce, the market will tend to behave 
cyclically5. 
In the longer term, the demand for food in industrialized countries appears to have 
increased slowly, which is the result of both Engel's Law and a low population growth6. 
On average supply has grown at a more rapid pace due to technical change and human 
capital improvements. The result is a relative decline in farm product prices over time and, 
ceteris paribus, a decline in farm income. In the longer run, therefore, one would expect 
production factors to move out of agriculture. However, mobility of agriculture factors of 
production is low which causes that agricultural production factors earn less than 
comparable factors employed elsewhere in the economy. For this phenomenon two 
different explanations have been advanced in the literature (Gardner, 1992: 74). The first 
explanation focuses on the fixity of agricultural assets and related irreversibilities in capital 
investment. The fixity and irreversibility problem is mainly due to a relatively large 
difference between acquisition value and salvage (disposal) value of agricultural capital 
3 The mainstream view on the farm problem can be traced back to Schultz (1945). For a general 
discussion, see Gardner (1992). 
4 The controllability and manipulability of agricultural production processes, casu quo production 
conditions, have increased considerably in the post World War II-era. Think, for example, of the variety of 
possibilities for disease management in controlled production environments (greenhouse and indoor animal 
farming) and the rationalisation and 'improvements' of plant and animal reproduction methods (viz. artificial 
insemination, gene transplantation) with high-yielding varieties as a result. 
5 Known as the cobweb theorem. For a mathematical formulation, see Ezekiel (1938). 
6 Engel's Law states that as income per capita rises, the proportion of income spent on food will fall. 
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combined with a chronic decrease in demand for agricultural assets over time. In some 
periods, however, commodity price rises are sufficiently high to trigger investments. The 
second explanation takes factor-market disequilibrium as a short-run labour cost adjustment 
problem. According to this view, lagging income developments in the longer run is 
determined by non-pecuniary preferences for farming, as well as age and skill differences. 
To solve, or at least alleviate, the farm problem the government could attack the 
underlying problems ('failures') of agricultural product and factor markets by targeted 
policy actions, and to the extent that market failures cannot be cured and the specific 
character of agricultural markets still leads to persistent income disparities vis-a-vis other 
sectors in the economy seek to compensate farmers. Equity arguments are frequently 
advanced as the dominant force behind agricultural support. The following statement from 
Johnson (1991:4) can be seen as exemplary for this view: 
"(W)hether stated explicitly or implicitly, the farm policies of the industrial 
countries are intended to reduce or eliminate the disparity in income between 
farm and non-farm people." 
2.4 Market failures and agricultural policy 
Much of the post-World War II research in agricultural economics has focused on the 
alleged peculiarities of agricultural markets and has addressed the causes of and remedies 
for the farm problem. From a theoretical perspective these analyses explicitly or implicitly 
build on the principles developed in welfare economics, public economics, and/or the 
theory of economic policy7. What these neo-classical economics analyses have in common 
is their implicit view of the government as an omniscient benevolent dictator who 
interferes in the economy to correct for market failures in order to increase social welfare. 
This so-called welfare maximisation perspective which emanates from the work of Pigou 
(1932) "stresses the reasons why the market economy fails to function properly in 
allocating and distributing resources, and suggests that governments intervene in the 
private economy in certain policy-specific ways (taxation) to correct such market failures 
or distributional shortcomings. In the Pigovian approach the state is a productive entity 
that produces public goods, internalizes social costs and benefits, regulates decreasing cost 
industries effectively, redistributes income Pareto optimally, and so forth" (McCormick and 
Tollison, 1981:3). In a Pigovian world the (ex post) occurrence of non-optimal policies is 
assumed to be due to a lack of knowledge or poor management. 
The conventional neo-classical economics rationale for government intervention is most 
succinctly caught by the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics which holds that, 
in the absence of government, if (i) households and firms act perfectly competitively, 
7 For the state of the art in welfare economics the reader is referred to Just, Hueth, and Schmitz 
(1982) and Boadway and Bruce (1984). The state of public economics is well described in Musgrave and 
Musgrave (1989); Boadway and Wildasin (1984); and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). Thorough accounts of the 
theory of economic policy are Chow (1975); and Preston and Pagan (1982). For a rigorous treatment of the social 
welfare maximization approach to agricultural policies, see, e.g., Gardner (1987a). 
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taking prices as given (i.e. parametric), (ii) there is a full set of markets, and (iii) there is 
perfect information, then a competitive equilibrium, if it exists, is Pareto-efficient (Arrow, 
1951; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980: 343; Varian, 1984: 220-221). Under specific conditions 
the problems of distribution and allocative efficiency can be separated: the second theorem 
tells that if households' indifference maps and firm production possibility sets are convex 
and if lump-sum transfers and taxes can be carried out costlessly, then, given a full set of 
markets, any Pareto-efficient allocation may be achieved as a competitive equilibrium with 
appropriate lump-sum transfers and taxes. 
The conditions underlying both the first and the second welfare theorem are rather 
stringent. Violation of each of these conditions implies the occurrence of a market failure 
and in principle forms a pretext for government intervention. From the perspective of the 
first theorem of welfare economics the three basic market failures are the absence of 
perfect competition; the absence of a full set of markets; and the absence of perfect 
information. In order to solve market problems the government can manipulate prices by 
tax and subsidy schemes, can reassign property rights or take care of the provision of 
certain goods (i.e. establish (part of) a missing market). 
If one or a few firms can exert considerable market power the condition that actors in 
the marketplace behave competitively, i.e. act as if they cannot affect prices, will not be 
satisfied. At the primary production level the (small) family farm is the dominant unit of 
production, operating in an atomistic market with prices being taken as given. However, in 
other stages of the agricultural production process, notably at the input supplies and the 
food processing industry level, the market power of individual firms often is considerable. 
The concentration of market power is not only found in agricultural commodity markets, 
but also in some agricultural factor markets. Think, for instance, of the difference between 
large landowners, peasants and small tenants. While imperfect competition has formed an 
argument for government interference (e.g., competition law; land laws protecting the 
rights of tenants; state owned agricultural land), perhaps an even more important argument 
for government intervention is the absence of certain markets. This missing markets 
justification captures both public good and externality considerations. Public goods in 
agriculture include food security, food quality, agricultural R&D, protection against plagues 
and animal and plant diseases, irrigation, drainage, reparcelling and even market 
infrastructure, but also the conservation of nature and wildlife. Some of these goods, 
however, are at least partly excludable.8 This quasi-public good character makes that 
government intervention in these cases is not strictly necessary since the good may also be 
provided privately. Well-known externalities9 in agriculture are the pollution of air, soil 
A pure public good is characterised by non-rivalness and non-excludability. Pure non-rivalness 
entails that the consumption by one individual does not affect the use and therewith the welfare derived by others. 
Non-excludability means that those who do not contribute in providing the good cannot be excluded from its 
benefits. 
5 Technological externalities are defined as the indirect effect of a consumption or production activity 
on the consumption set of a consumer, the utility function of a consumer or the production function of a producer. 
By indirect is meant that the effect does not work through the price system and concerns an agent other than the 
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and water and erosion as the unintended by-products of agricultural production.10 Like 
the rest of the economy, the agricultural sector faces the consequences of the absence of 
certain mtores-and-insurance-markets. Generally, farmers cannot insure themselves against 
production failures due to unexpected biological events (e.g., plagues of locusts or other 
insects, various types of animal diseases) or extreme climatological circumstances (frost, 
drought, heavy rainfall, storm). While some financial risks can be covered by trade in 
agricultural futures (hedging), only for a few agricultural commodities well-functioning 
futures markets exist (e.g., grain, cocoa, potatoes). 
The absence of perfect information can form a pretext for government intervention as 
well. Both the missing markets argument (especially missing futures-and-insurance 
markets) and the fact that households and firms may not act perfectly competitively are 
characterised by the existence of imperfect information. Actors can be imperfectly 
informed about future states of the world, and some actors may be better informed than 
others (asymmetric information). 
The market failure perspective on government intervention in the agricultural economy 
is somewhat broader than the 'farm problem' perspective in that it includes externality 
issues and is somewhat less focused on temporary and structural income disparity between 
agriculture and the rest of the economy. In this jense both perspectives have to be 
regarded as partly overlapping, partly complementary. What both perspectives have in 
common is that they both abstract from the fact that government, like the private sector, 
consists of various actors with different motivations which may not parallel the objective 
of solving the 'farm problem' or market failures in the most appropriate and efficient way. 
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, private actors may try to influence (manipulate) 
government activities by emphasizing and embroider the negative impact of failures in 
order to get more than they objectively need. The implicit notion behind the market failure 
view is that government can costlessly and instantly identify and remedy the market 
failures and is not subject to failure itself. However, the government as 'actor' in the 
economic process is subject to incomplete and imperfect information itself. Furthermore, 
the eventual choice and level of market-failure-solving policy instruments diverge from the 
'objective' choice needed because of political motives and activities. 
2.5 The theory of economic policy 
A fundamental notion underlying the social welfare maximisation perspective is that the 
government has the power to correct market failures and redistribute income and that the 
primary role of government in the economy is a managing one. Studies in this tradition 
typically assume an exogenous government and generally focus on the behaviour of 
producers, consumers, and taxpayers, either to devise incentive structures for optimal 
one exerting the economic activity (e.g., Laffont, 1987:112). 
1 0 Related to the externality issue is the role of government as a provider of merit goods. These may 
be considered as goods provided by policy-makers as a response to (i) a conventional externality, (ii) a 
consumption externality, and (iii) mistaken ('wrong') preferences of citizens (e.g., myopia) (Barr, 1992:148). 
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taxation or to calculate welfare gains/losses from specific, exogenously given, government 
measures in a comparative-static supply and demand framework. While welfare economics 
theory, public economics theory as well as the theory of economic policy all, at least 
implicitly, take the government as a rational economic agent that 'complements' the 
actions of other agents in the economy, the conception of the government as an agent that 
consciously employs instruments to attain well-defined objectives has been most explicitly 
formalized in the theory of economic policy". 
The theory of economic policy (Tinbergen, 1952; Theil, 1958) holds the normative 
premise that the government can pursue an optimal economic policy by operating a set of 
instruments and by fme-tuning the instrument levels in order to reach a priori well-defined 
targets. The basic ingredients of an analysis in the Tinbergen tradition involve (i) a vector 
of instrument variables (x e X) controlled by the policy-maker (the government), where X 
is the set of all available policy instruments, (ii) a vector of endogenous (policy) target 
variables (y) and a vector of remaining, noncontrollable as well as non-target (exogenous) 
variables (s), (iii) a formal model describing the relationship between the variables 
concerned, and possibly (iv) constraints on target, instrument and/or other variables (see, 
e.g., Van Velthoven, 1991: 61; Hughes Hallett, 1989: 195). The following simplified linear 
specification of the model serves as an example: 
y = Rx + Zs 
where R and Z are reduced-form matrices of coefficients. If the number of target variables 
equals the number of instrument variables, and if matrix R is non-singular, it is possible to 
express x in terms of y 
x = ir'[y* - Zs] 
where y* can be interpreted as the vector of optimal target levels. In the original instru-
ment-target (means-end) Tinbergen formulation this level was chosen ex ante. The vector x 
denotes the levels of the policy instruments under the optimal solution. Policy solutions are 
to be found only if the number of instruments (n) is equal to or larger than the number of 
targets (m). When the number of instruments is smaller than the number of targets, the 
targets cannot be met simultaneously. When different (sets of) instruments are available to 
attain the same target levels, the Tinbergen approach offers no selection criterion. The 
rigid nature of the original framework which was, inter alia, due to the setting of fixed 
targets was subsequently relaxed by introducing of the flexible target model (Tinbergen, 
1954). It involves the maximisation of a social utility or welfare function which depends 
on target (y) as well as instrument variables (x) 
W(x,y) = W(xv..xn,yv..ym) 
which is subject to the restrictions imposed by the workings of the economy (represented 
by the economic model, cf. the first equation). The use of such a social welfare or 
Subsequently refined in optimal control theory (e.g., Turnovsky, 1977). 
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criterion function W makes explicit the policy-makers' preferences with respect to the 
levels of targets x and instruments y. By rewriting the first-order condition (differentiating 
with respect to x) to this problem, so-called optimal reaction functions can be derived 
which describes the policy-maker's optimal values x* and y* as functions of the 
coefficients of his constraints (see Theil, 1958: 429). 
General accepted targets of (macro-)economic policy are, inter alia, full employment, 
price stability ('zero' inflation), balance of payments or current account equilibrium, 
economic growth, an equitable income distribution, and an acceptable environmental 
quality. In nature these targets have an economy-wide impact. Policy targets can also be 
sector-specific. For the agricultural sector these relate to, for instance, agricultural income 
support, food security, increasing agricultural productivity, preserving the family farm 
system, preventing environmental damage to the countryside, and the like (see section 2.2). 
The set of economy-wide policies includes the level and composition of government 
expenditure and taxation; monetary and trade policy, wage and price policy, and all kinds 
of (de-)regulatory policies, including property rights policies. Sector-specific policy 
instruments are tailored to and intended to influence production and/or consumption 
conditions in a specific sector of the economy. Frequently employed agriculture-specific 
policy instruments are product-tied domestic support measures (e.g., intervention buying 
against a minimum price, deficiency payments) and protection at the border (e.g., tariffs, 
import quota). Direct income support has been less popular as a form of support, at least 
in the past. While this first category of policy measures has been predominantly directed 
towards product markets, a second category of agriculture-specific policy measures has 
been deployed to improve the functioning of agricultural factor markets. This category 
includes a wide spectrum of instruments, ranging from infrastructural improvements, 
human capital investment and education to the setting up of marketing structures. For a 
more inclusive overview of instruments employed in the agricultural policy domain, see 
appendix 2.1. 
The theory of economic policy requires that the set of policy instruments includes only 
those variables under the direct control of the policy-maker. For example, one should 
specify the tax (tariff) rate instead of the tax (tariff) revenue, and the discount rate instead 
of the interest rate. Moreover, instruments should be independent, in the sense that the 
effects of any one instrument on the targets are not proportional to those of any other 
(combination of) instruments (R nonsingular). Thus the independence of instruments 
determines their policy effectiveness. That this is not always obvious is shown by Tobin's 
(1990: 91) common funnel theorem which states that "the consequences of a given volume 
of aggregate demand, on the one hand, for output and employment and, on the other, for 
money prices and wages are independent of the sources and composition of that volume of 
demand." Suppose, for example, that a government aims at full employment and price 
stability (two targets) and disposes of both monetary and fiscal policies (two instruments). 
However, both monetary and fiscal instruments affect the target levels only indirectly, 
through aggregate demand. They are "poured, along with demands from all other sources, 
into a common funnel", in other words, they are collinear instruments with respect to the 
targets. Thus, instruments which are seemingly independent, need not necessarily be such 
Chapter 2 15 
and, as a result, do not guarantee optimal or effective targeting12. 
Targets and instruments may also coincide. For example, the level of government 
expenditure can be regarded both as an instrument controlled by the government, and as a 
target provided in the form of a public good. It may be difficult to determine whether a 
variable is a target or an instrument in the first place. Starting from the concept of a utility 
function, one would expect private and public goods and services to turn up as the targets 
of economic policy rather than as derived targets such as the balance of payments and 
price stability which in fact are no more than constraints (Van Velthoven, 1991: 66). 
An important conclusion of Tinbergen's theory is that policy-makers should not try to 
assign instruments to targets on a partial - one to one - basis. Such one to one assignments 
could lead to targets overshooting or oscillating due to the side effects of other 
instruments; the latter may be small individually but large in sum (Hughes Hallett, 1989: 
197). 
2.6 A critique of the theory of economic policy 
The theory of economic policy has been generalised to include elements neglected in 
the original Tinbergen formulation. Theil (1958) explicitly pointed at the sub-optimality of 
picking a solution which aims for arbitrarily chosen y* values given numbers of targets (m) 
and instruments (n). His criterion function approach was intended to solve this and to 
enable handling the insufficient instrument (n<m) problem. Another serious neglect relates 
to uncertainty with respect to the vector of noncontrollable (exogenous) variables (s) and 
the matrix of coefficients (R). The stochastic nature of the vector s is accounted for by the 
certainty equivalence principle (Theil, 1958). Assuming that everything else is known with 
certainty, s can be approximated by its expected value E(s)13. The problem of uncertainty 
about the R matrix may be lessened by resorting to a portfolio of instruments aimed at 
each single target, as Brainard (1967) has shown. The argument is that by employing more 
instruments the target's coefficient of variation will be reduced (Makin, 1976: 726)14. The 
static nature of the original Tinbergen framework was relaxed by extending it to policy 
targets in uncertain and dynamic systems and assuming dynamic controllability (see 
Hughes Hallett, 1989: 199). 
A more important drawback of the theory of economic policy is its neglect of changes 
in the economic structure as such. Although Tinbergen (1952; 1954:45) distinguished 
between quantitative economic policy - "manipulating certain quantitative parameters 
Independent instruments, i.e. generating separate effects with respect to targets. 
1 3 Meaning that with additive shocks, a linear economic model and a quadratic loss function, policy 
instruments should be chosen as if there were no uncertainty. 
1 4 Earlier Tinbergen (1952: 41-42) had put forward other reasons for employing a portfolio of instru-
ments " (..) By a multi-instrument policy a 'distribution of pressure' may be obtained which is (a) fairer to those 
experiencing hardships, i.e. account can be taken of more special circumstances and the pressure may be 
distributed more evenly over the various social groups; and it will at the same time be (b) more efficient in that 
the extent to which each parameter has to be changed will generally be smaller and hence the tendency to evade 
the regulation less strong". 
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(instruments) appearing in the equations describing the economic structure" -, and 
qualitative economic policy - "admitting changes in the nature of equations" -, i.e. the 
introduction of new policies and the establishment of new institutions, the focus of the 
theory of economic policy has been mainly on the former15. The neglect of qualitative 
policy is unsatisfactory per se, given the fact that the selection of a different instrument set 
is an often-observed phenomenon in real-world policy practice, especially in the agricul-
tural policy domain. This is even more so since the choice of an alternative set of policy 
instruments could in certain respects be considered as a substitute to (a change in the 
setting of) quantitative economic policy measures. 
The theory of economic policy can be criticized for the neglect of both decision-
making (political feasibility), and monitoring and enforcement costs (administrative 
feasibility). Both cost categories can be considerable in everyday policy-making practice. 
Especially monitoring and enforcement costs can differ widely between instruments. Thus, 
substitutability of instruments with respect to the attainment of a certain target need not 
imply substitutability from a policy implementation cost perspective. In the agricultural 
policy domain such differences in implementation costs are mainly related to the point of 
application of specific policy measures, which can roughly be the product output or 
production factor input volume (e.g., labour- or land-oriented policies). 
Implicit in the theory of economic policy is that the policy-maker must either correctly 
assess, or somehow know the impact of each of the available policy instruments on each 
of his targets (the R-matrix). This implies the rather strong assumption of perfect 
information and certainty about the underlying model of the economy. An incorrect 
perception of this relationship on the part of the policy-maker, or a closer-to-correct 
perception (compared to the policy-maker) of such impacts by the researcher, will lead to 
incorrect inferences regarding the tastes of the policy-maker. Indeed, in such cases the 
policy-maker's behaviour may seem irrational, while in fact he only faces a situation of 
limited or imperfect information (e.g., Makin, 1976: 724-725). A related problem is that in 
'real-world' policy practice instruments may not be applied simultaneously for political 
reasons and, due to lack of information, adequate (re-)action by the policy-maker may be 
delayed. As a result targets may not be met, and may even worsen market failure, cf. the 
pro-cyclical effects of fine-taning under a Keynesian demand management policy. 
In a more general vein, policymaking must be regarded as a sequence of actions taken 
over a longer period of time rather than as one single, discrete action. Related to this 
sequential nature of policymaking is the debate on rules versus discretion, and the 
existence of time inconsistency-problems (for a concise overview, see Sachs and Larrain, 
1993). An attack which touches on the foundations of the theory of economic policy is the 
Lucas' critique. Lucas (1976) showed that the structural model (equation 1) will not be 
stable under changes in policy rules, because private economic agents adapt their own 
A further distinction with respect to the latter is between reforms ("equivalent to changes in 
foundations"), qualitative policy - "changes in structure, that is the less essential aspects of social organisation" 
(Tinbergen, 1956:7). 
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behaviour to that of the government16. This effectively means that the model underlying 
the economic theory of policy cannot be used to study alternative policy regimes. Lucas' 
econometric policy evaluation critique applies at two levels, cf. Blanchard and Fisher 
(1989: 367): 
"On the first level, estimated distributed lags may be convolutions of expecta-
tional and other lags so that the change in policy changes the -way expectations 
are formed, and thus the distributed lag itself. On the second, even if the first 
problem is eliminated, for example because expectations are observable, the 
coefficients themselves may be Junctions of policy." 
The Lucas' critique also undermines the reaction function-concept since the underlying 
assumption of the latter - that the coefficients of the economic model are invariant to the 
policy rule - appears problematical. New Classical macroeconomists have gone even 
further by arguing that if the private economic agents know the true model of the economy 
and form their expectations accordingly, policy ineffectiveness will result: systematic 
attempts by the government to influence (stabilize) the economy will have no effect; only 
unexpected policy movements will matter. 
2.7 The limitations of the social welfare maximisation perspective 
The conventional neo-classical economics perspective has yielded useful insights in the 
functioning of agricultural markets. Welfare economics, public economics and the theory 
of economic policy have proved to be instrumental in providing arguments for attaining 
economic policy aims in consistent and efficient ways. At the same time, the conventional 
perspective has some important limitations. It cannot explain why certain policies are 
chosen and other policies are neglected, and why certain policies remain and persist to 
exist, despite neo-classical economics 'proofs' of their inefficiency and ineffectiveness. 
'Real-world' policy practice shows a striking regularity in policy patterns over time and 
across countries not consistent with or contrary to what one would expect on the basis of 
neo-classical economics theory. 
Most conventional modelling focuses on agricultural commodity demand and supply as 
conditioned by governmental policy instruments and the state of the economy at large. 
Whenever government behaviour is modelled endogenously, this is usually done in an ad 
hoc way. Conventional economics analyses build on the premise of government as a 
sophisticated single agent who has superior knowledge of what is 'best' for society from a 
social welfare point of view and chooses policy instruments accordingly. The analytical 
construct of government as a benevolent dictator with superior information vis-a-vis other 
agents and the state of the economy denies that policy is primarily formulated in a political 
environment. The single-actor assumption neglects the fact that the government comprises 
more than one actor, denies any opposing or conflicting interests within government, and 
Note that the distinction between qualitative and quantitative economic policy captures part of the 
Lucas' critique, although not explicitly stated in terms of expectations. 
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does not account for any outside forces influencing the formation of government 
policies17. Furthermore, the usually implicit notion that government action reflects well-d-
efined social goals is unsatisfactory from a motivational actor-oriented point of view. 
Government consists of politicians who attempt to secure their political survival ([re-
jelection) and bureaucrats who are interested in promoting their careers. While this may 
not be the only motives which drives the policy supply side since politicians and 
bureaucrats may have other-regarding (and) 'public interest' objectives as well, with a 
pluralistic government view the benevolence property of the social welfare maximisation 
perspective effectively loses its strength. The analysis of the 'behaviour' of this pluralistic 
government and its impact on policy formation is part of the political economy approach. 
1 7 Notably, contrary to his contemporaries, Tinbergen (1954;1956) has already pointed at the 
importance of the presence of multiple policy-makers and interest groups. 
Appendix 2.1 An overview of agricultural policy instruments1 
Policy category Type of instruments 
Agriculture-specific policies, 
aimed at altering market prices 
and/or quantities in product 
markets 
May relate to non-factor inputs as 
well as final goods 
Price, outputs 
deficiency payments 
intervention buying 
price controls (minimum or maximum) 
domestic (producer / consumer) levies 
export subsidies / tariffs 
import tariffs / subsidies 
Price, non-factor inputs 
taxes / subsidies 
Quantity 
export / import quotas 
export licenses / VERs / preferential trade agreements 
domestic production quotas 
Miscellaneous 
non-tariff barriers (e.g., phytosanitary measures) 
value added tax exemptions 
Agriculture-specific policies, 
payments not linked to product 
volume or price, but directly 
aimed at fanners 
'Decoupled' income transfers 
Diversion payments 
set-aside / afforestation 
Disaster relief payments 
Tax exemptions 
Agriculture-specific policies, 
aimed at improving functioning 
of factor markets 
Research and development (R&D) 
Extension 
Agricultural education / training 
Rural infrastructural development 
Irrigation / drainage 
Farm consolidation 
Farm building / equipment 
(subsidies / loans / lower interest rates) 
Market infrastructure / organisation 
credit 
insurance 
grading / inspection 
storage 
transport 
Regional assistance: 
less favoured areas 
hill / mountain areas 
Environmental policy 
Economy-wide policies Exchange rate 
Social security 
Fiscal policy 
Monetary policy 
This overview does not intend to offer an exhaustive account of all policy instruments in the agricultural policy 
domain. For the difference between policy-wide and sector(agriculture)-specific policies, see earlier this chapter. 
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T H E POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY FORMATION 1 
3.1 Introduction 
The explanation of the role of government in the economy and the determination of 
government policy has engaged the attention of the economics profession almost since its 
inception. A number of alternative paradigms have emerged, ranging from radical 
(Marxian) economics to 'mainstream' neoclassical economics. Within neo-classical 
economics, two extreme perspectives have developed over the years. On the one hand, 
there is the conventional welfare maximisation perspective that sees government as a 
benign (benevolent) dictator. Market failure and the importance of allocative efficiency in 
the economic market are the central themes, and government is essentially seen as a 
sophisticated, 'omniscient' actor. On the other hand, there is the political economy 
approach which is essentially a reaction to the Pigovian approach. It rejects the all-knowi-
ng, benevolent government view and questions the assumption of correcting market 
imperfections in a perfect and costless manner: in trying to correct market failures, 
government will find itself subject to 'failure'. Government is no more than a collective 
term for a number of legislative and executive bodies that have powers and goals of their 
own. Political economy theorists focus on the allocation of public resources in the political 
market and have emphasized the self-interest-motivated behaviour of politicians, voters, 
interest groups and bureaucrats. Specifically, the political economy approach seeks a 
scientific understanding of how government agents - given the institutional environment2 -
behave in order to explain the divergencies between economic prescription and 
governmental practice (McCormick and Tollison, 1981). 
The origin of political economy can be traced back to the work of Downs (1957) on 
voter and politician behaviour; the theories of Buchanan and Tullock (1962) on supply and 
demand of government policies; the theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen, 1971); Olson's work 
on interest groups (1965, 1982); the theory of rent-seeking (Tullock, 1967; Krueger, 1974) 
and Directly Unproductive Profit-seeking (DUP) activities (Bhagwati, 1980; 1982); and 
Stigler's (1971) and Peltzman's (1976) theory of regulation. The more recent political 
economy literature tries to formalize, combine or apply one or more of these theories and 
to justify them empirically. 
This chapter gives an overview of the recent developments in the field of political 
economy and serves as methodological starting-point for the rest of this thesis. Its contents 
are as follows. Section 2 shortly describes the methodological fundaments of the political 
economy approach as the economic approach to politics. Section 3 shortly discusses the 
three major branches in political economy modelling: voting models, interest groups 
This chapter partly draws on Swinnen and Van der Zee (1993). 
2 The institutional environment is aptly defined by Davis and North (1971:6-7) as "(..) the set of 
fundamental political, social, and legal ground rules tha: establishes the basis for production, exchange, and 
distribution. Rules governing elections, property rights, and the right of contract are examples of the type of 
ground rules that make up the economic environment." 
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models, and models of bureaucracy. Section 4 addresses the political economy of 
protection. The sections 5 to 9 address some important topics and recent developments in 
political economy theory which are judged relevant for the explanation of agricultural 
policies. This includes the issues of social concerns and self-interest (section 5), policy 
instrument choice (section 6), policy determination in multi-tier governments (section 7), 
partial and general equilibrium (section 8), dynamics, credibility and institutions (section 
9). Section 10 concludes with a research agenda for the remainder of this thesis based on 
the findings of this chapter, and in the light of the research aims as defined in chapter 1. 
3.2 Political economy and methodology 
Political economy or public choice3 can be defined - following Mueller (1989:1) - as 
"the economic study of nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of 
economics to political science". The common thread in political economy literature is that 
(i) agents are assumed to behave rationally and self-interested: actors are supposed to 
maximise an objective function subject to politico-economic constraints; (ii) that 
preferences are assumed to be stable, and (iii) that the interaction between actors leads to 
or tends towards equilibrium outcomes. The rational choice postulate - which forms the 
central tenet of methodological individualism - is essential to the economic approach as 
"(...) a method of analysis, not an assumption about particular motivations" (Becker, 
1993:385). Rational behaviour holds that subjects choose among alternative ends on the 
basis of a given set of preferences and a given set of opportunities or alternatives (e.g., 
Harsanyi, 1976: 93) is almost undisputed within the economics profession4. Less 
undisputed within the economic profession is the motivational assumption of self-interest. 
Some neo-classical economists start from the assumption that individuals are motivated 
solely by selfishness or material gain. Other economists have taken a broader view on the 
nature of human motivations than the narrow egoistic behavioural postulate. Exemplary 
here is the view of Gary Becker (1993:386) that"(..) individuals maximise welfare as they 
conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic." Actors 
behave in such a way as to maximise their utility. 
The presumptions of rational choice, stability of preferences and (the tendency toward) 
equilibrium structures of interaction can be typified as the hard core - the invariable 
component - of the neo-classical microeconomic research programme (Eggertson, 1990:4-
7; see also Lakatos, 1970)5. The political economy approach differs from 'conventional' 
Political economy is sometimes referred to as 'neoclassical' political economy or 'new' political 
economy, to distinguish it from both 'Marxist' and the 'old' political economy. 'Public choice' is another 
predicate for the same field. 
4 The economic concept of rationality should therefore not be confused with its meaning in common 
parlance ('use of reason or logic in thinking out a problem'); its psychological meaning (sound mind, sane), or its 
mathematical meaning (a rational number; a ratio of two integers). 
5 It should be noted, however, that the fundaments of the neo-classical economics methodology are 
not beyond criticism outside the neo-classical economics mainstream. For instance, following Simon (1957) one 
could argue that politicians and bureaucrats show satisficing rather than optimising behaviour since cognitive 
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neo-classical economics in (i) the type of situational constraints faced by the actors; in a 
politico-economic market setting actors face economic and political constraints, ranging 
from formal and informal political rales to economic (budget and income) constraints, 
including property rights; (ii) the type of information agents (seek to) have (presupposing a 
rational trade-off between costs and the benefits of information), and (iii) the type of 
interaction that is studied, i.e. between politicians, political parties, interest groups and/or 
bureaucrats instead of the conventional neo-classical economics triplet producers, 
consumers and taxpayers. The triplet '(types of) situational constraints, information and 
interaction' makes up the Lakatosian protective belt of the neo-classical microeconomics 
research programme. 
Political economy analyses focus on the allocation and distribution of public resources 
in the political market and emphasize that policy formation is the result of self-interest 
motivated behaviour of politicians, bureaucrats, voters, and interest groups. Political 
economy analyses of policy formation implicitly or explicitly view the political process as 
a process of market exchange. Demand for and supply of political goods (policies) is as 
quintessential for the political economy approach as its individual-actor rooted explanatory 
perspective. However, the supply of policies differs from 'normal' market processes in that 
the government has the legal monopoly to coerce, hence the power to tax and, therefore, 
can choose to employ tax resources to benefit some (citizens or special interest groups) at 
the expense of others, and that the political setting is predominantly a non-proprietary 
setting as compared to the proprietary 'economic' market setting. 
There is a strong interaction between both markets: economic markets can create 
wealth, which can enhance political power; political markets on their turn can redistribute 
wealth, which can result in economic power in the form of rents or otherwise. Actors are 
usually active in both 'political' and 'economic markets'. For instance, a firm active in the 
economic product market can also be active as a lobby in the political market in order to 
influence its profitability in the economic market. Positions in economic markets as 
reflected by the ownership of production factors (capital, labour and land), relationships 
with other segments in the product chain, and the kind of activity pursued (consumption or 
production; import- or export-oriented production) are therefore important politically. 
Political activity might be triggered by (expected) changes in economic positions due to 
future measures or changes in exogenous economic variables. The linkages between the 
economic system of commodity demand and supply and the political system constitute the 
pivot of an endogenous policy modet. Political economic models postulate agents' 
behaviour in both the political and the economic market and derive policy preferences 
competences and therefore rationality is bounded; or, following some political scientists (e.g.,Dunleavy, 1991) 
one could advance that political tastes are not fixed, but can be changed in the process of and due to electoral 
competition, thereby rejecting the stability-of-preferences presumption. 
6 In analysing agricultural markets Rausser and De Goiter (1988) distinguish between forward and 
backward linkages. A forward linkage refers to governmental policies affecting agricultural markets, a backward 
linkage to the impact of agricultural markets on government policy. If backward linkages operate conventional 
modelling approaches no longer suffice (see Swinnen and Van der Zee, 1992). 
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endogenously. A politico-economic equilibrium occurs where the marginal political gains 
and marginal losses for the actors involved in the political-economic process balance. 
The traditional counterfactual of the perfectly competitive market as a (performance) 
benchmark for calculating allocative efficiency significantly changes if political market 
elements are added on to the analysis. The question of what is politically efficient and 
what is not, is the subject of an important debate between the Chicago political economy 
school and the Virginia political economy school (see, e.g., Mitchell, 1989; Tollison, 1989; 
Mitchell and Munger, 1991; Pasour, 1992). Chicago political economists conceive 
efficiency from a comparative institutions perspective: given the institutional (transaction-
cost) constraints, the polity is efficient, which implies that if a Pareto superior move were 
possible it would be enacted7. Both Chicagoans and Virginians agree that groups try to 
capture rents -i.e. 'artificially contrived transfers' - created by government and therefore 
expend scarce resources (Tollison, 1982:578). Virginian political economists focus on the 
inefficiencies created by special interest group behaviour and the phenomenon of rent 
seeking. Inefficiency occurs as a result of rent dissipation in the rent-seeking process: rents 
involve competition among groups and the overall outcome therefore need not be a 
positive-sum game, but is at best a zero-sum if not a negative-sum game. According to 
Virginian political economists, what is, given institutional constraints, need not be efficient 
and is "not necessarily the best what can be done in the political process" (Pasour, 
1992:159). 
Contrary to 'traditional' political science accounts of politics and policy formation 
which can be typified as descriptive, sometimes comparative, and frequently of a case-
study nature, political economy analyses take a generalising, formal-theoretical perspective 
with rational self-interest motivated behaviour as the methodological point of departure. 
For public choice scholars the lack of behavioral underpinning holds a serious criticism of 
the traditional political science perspective. Illustrative in this respect are the somewhat 
derogative words of the Chicagoan political economist Posner (1974:341): 
"(..) political scientists have developed some evidence of the importance of 
interest groups in the legislative and administrative process, but unfortunately 
their work is almost entirely devoid of theory. They do not tell us why some 
interests are effectively represented in the political process and others not, or 
under what conditions interest groups succeed or fail in obtaining favorable 
legislation"} 
According to Chicago political economists the government has to be viewed as a mechanism used 
by rational economic agents to redistribute wealth. The production of real goods and services has to be viewed as 
the by-product of effective wealth transfers (Tollison, 1989:293). The Chicago political economy view is that 
politicians are driven by constraints, not by preferences: "ideology does not impact on political outcomes" 
(Tollison, 1989: 294). It is the underlying economic interests that count (Lowenberg 1990; Pasour, 1992:157). 
8 Most political scientists would reject Posner's claim that their work "is almost devoid of theory". 
What theory is or should be, however, is not easily answered. 
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In general, political science explanations of policy formation describe - 'explain' - the 
structure of relationships between collectivities (parties, interest groups) by factors such as 
stability, resource dependencies, actors' values, and the intensity and distribution of power. 
Most research uses a case study type of approach. In the absence of any general 
theoretical- formal model, however, hypotheses or predictions regarding the behaviour of 
certain actors or the outcome of the political process are hard to verify or test empirically. 
The rational choice approach to politics aims to fill this gap. 
From the perspective of conventional neo-classical economics theory, the merit of the 
political economy approach is that it explicitly addresses the behaviour of governmental 
agents in relation to the allocation of public resources, which had been one of the most 
neglected topics in economic theory so far. By seeking a scientific understanding of how 
government agents function under various institutional arrangements the political economy 
approach attempts to explain the divergencies between conventional economic 'pre-
scriptions' and governmental practice. As such it is a positive - explanatory - field of 
analysis. By its focus on agents' incentives and objectives in the political sphere, the 
political economy approach is better equipped than conventional neo-classical economics 
theory for 'predicting' the implications of policies for the behaviour of actors in both the 
political and the economic market. With its analytical 'tool-kit' filled with statistical and 
econometric methods and techniques, the political economy approach in principle offers a 
powerful perspective to the analysis of agricultural policy formation. Thus, it can help us 
to devise efficient systems of support that keep rent-seeking and policy-evasion activities 
to a minimum. As such political economy analysis could have an important impact on 
future agricultural policy design - in this sense it has a normative content. 
Agricultural policy formation 
From an empirical political economy perspective, the definition of agricultural policies 
as "those measures taken by a (central) government that are aimed at influencing, directly 
or indirectly, agricultural factor and product markets" provided in chapter 1 appears -
while not incorrect - less useful. For 'conventional' general equilibrium arguments tell us 
that forward and backward linkages exist between different sectors in the economy, and 
that any type of policy in principle alters agents' incentives and, thereby, directly or 
indirectly, affects the functioning of agricultural factor and product markets. An empirical-
analytical distinction that also makes sense from a political economy - politician/interest 
group/voter - perspective is between sector-specific and economy-wide policies (e.g., 
Pelkmans, 1980; Krueger et al., 1988; OECD, 1994). The essential difference between 
sector-specific and economy-wide measures is the extent to which particular policy 
instruments can be targeted (by politicians) at a specific sector in the economy, or more 
specifically, at specific groups within a sector (e.g., producers, consumers). For instance, 
tax expenditures in favour of the farming community should be counted as a sector-
specific policy measure, but general income tax measures that apply to all citizens as 
economy-wide. Sector-specific policies usually have strong direct effects on sectoral agents 
and only indirect 'filtering through' effects on the rest of the economy. Economy-wide 
policies do not discriminate across sectors of economic activity. Agriculture-specific 
28 The political economy perspective 
policies are intended to directly affect the behaviour and/or welfare - or narrower the 
income and wealth - situation of one or more of the following actors: farmers, agricultural 
input and food processing industries and consumers of agricultural and food products. It is 
assumed that the impact of other sector-specific policies, such as targeted support to the 
aviation and shipping industry, on the functioning of the agricultural and food economy 
can be regarded as negligible. 
3.3 Political economy models: a general overview 
Political economic models - i.e. models of endogenous policy formation - range from 
interest group or lobbying models to voting models and models of bureaucracy. They are 
similar in that agents are assumed to be rational and are supposed to maximise an 
objective function. Yet they differ with respect to assumptions on the behaviour of the 
different agents and on the institutions for revealing political preferences. 
Voting models take the electoral and legislative process as their main focus, treating 
politicians (political parties) as actively seeking (re-)election by formulating government 
policies in exchange for political support from voters. Voters are assumed to have explicit 
policy preferences for policies can affect their utility or welfare level (Downs, 1957; 
Stigler, 1971). Voting, however, is not without cost. According to the rational voter 
ignorance hypothesis (Downs, 1957), it is rational for voters not to inform themselves 
completely on electoral issues as the costs of information-gathering may outweigh the 
benefits of being informed. Within the group of voting models, one can distinguish 
between two specifications that have very different characteristics, i.e. deterministic (dis-
crete) voting and proportional voting. Deterministic refers to the all or nothing ( 0 - 1 ) 
specification of the voting process. Each person has one vote, which can be cast in favour 
or against a proposal or a politician, but has no means of expressing the intensity of his 
feelings. Deterministic voting models deal with majority voting and median voter issues. 
Proportional voting models assume that voting, or rather 'individual political support', is 
more than-merely filling out a ballot and reflects the intensity of the individual's political 
feeling (Swinnen and De Gorter, 1992a). In this way political support is similar to pressure 
in interest group models. 
Interest group models focus on the activity of interest groups and their influence on 
policy formation. Interest group theorists within this tradition assign a central role to 
interest groups on the demand side of the political market. In a market setting interest 
groups have either an indirect role as intermediaries - like a kind of visible hand - between 
politicians and voters, or a direct role as political agents lobbying for favourable 
government policies in exchange for political support. The supply-demand scheme for 
policies differs from a 'normal' market process in that money in the political market does 
not have the equilibrating - invisible hand - function. In general, interest groups cannot 
buy beneficial policies in exchange for direct money transfers; only under specific 
political-institutional settings interest groups may legitimately employ campaign 
contributions to influence the policy position of candidates or to increase the probability of 
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election of favoured candidates9,10. Following Olson's (1965) theory of collective action, 
interest group models generally stress the importance of organisation costs and free rider 
effects. Pure interest group models ignore the impact of politicians or political parties: they 
are assumed to passively transmit the interest of active groups. A characteristic feature of 
these models is the use of an influence function to represent the supply of government 
policies in response to group pressures. For example, Becker (1983) assumes that each 
group's influence depends on the group's production of pressure by spending resources, on 
other groups' pressures and on an (exogenous) political-institutional structure, with groups 
being involved in a politico-economic game. Other interest group models allow for groups 
that contribute to political campaigns in order to increase the probability of election of 
favoured politicians (Austen-Smith, 1987; Hillman and Ursprung, 1988; Coughlin et al., 
1989) or model the interaction (game) between the government and interest groups by 
treating pressure as transmission of information (e.g., Potters and Van Winden, 1990, 
1992; Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992, 1994; Ball, 1995). Magee et al. (1989) integrate 
lobbying groups within a framework that includes voters (citizens) and political parties. 
The integration of lobbying and voter models could result in a 'split personality' approach 
to the political process. As in economic modelling, in which producers and consumers -
while often the same person - are modelled separately11, the agents in the political market 
can be active, informed lobbyists, passive uninformed voters, or even political candidates 
at one and the same time. Citizens can reveal their political preferences through their 
lobbying contributions in order to influence politicians and/or to influence the uninformed 
voter through political advertising. 
An important distinction between models which incorporate lobbying behaviour and 
those which do not is that the former explicitly account for the resources invested in the 
political process: the time and money that is 'wasted' in rent-seeking (Krueger, 1974) or in 
'Directly Unproductive Profit-seeking' (DUP) activities (Bhagwati, 1982). The literature on 
DUP activities can be seen as the follow-up to the work of Krueger (1974)12. The DUP 
tradition includes, inter alia, analyses of monopoly seeking (licensing and/or quantity 
restrictions, e.g., Krueger, 1974), revenue seeking (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1980), tariff 
seeking (Brock and Magee, 1978; Bhagwati, 1980). Activities are defined directly 
unproductive when "they yield pecuniary returns but produce neither goods and services 
Compare, for instance, the role of Political Action Committees (PACs) and, more specifically, the 
role of political money in the U.S. political system. 
1 0 It is assumed that a political 'black market' in which political bribery and corruption function as 
equilibrating mechanisms does not exist. 
" Another example of a 'split-personality' approach is the distinction between taxpayers and 
consumers. 
1 2 Confusingly, while Krueger was the first to coin the term rent-seeking, her work is in the DUP-
tradition, not in the rent-seeking tradition. Rent-seeking can be defined as "(...) behavior in institutional settings 
where individual efforts to maximize value generate social waste rather than social surplus" (Buchanan, 1980). 
For a discussion on the differences between the rent-seeking and the DUP-tradition, see, e.g., Brooks and Heijdra 
(1988) and Rowley (1988). 
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that enter a conventional utility function directly nor intermediate inputs into such goods 
and services" (Bhagwati et al., 1984:292) with activities seen as tantamount to a 
contraction of the availability set of the economy, defined on goods and services entering 
the utility function (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1983). Contrary to the rent-seeking literature 
which takes the political process as endogenous to the rent-seeking process, the DUP 
literature analyses the nature of competition over predetermined transfers or the underlying 
restrictions, with the government being essentially exogenous to the process of competition 
(Rowley, 1988:18; Tullock, 1993:26)13. Waste in the DUP-literature is viewed from a 
partial equilibrium perspective: expenditures on DUP-activities are valued with respect to 
attaining the goal of securing the rent, which make them wasteful by definition. By 
contrast, waste in the rent-seeking literature is the outcome of a rent-seeking process and 
not an assumption built into the analysis. As Rowley (1988:19) points out 
"(t)he methodology of DUP analysis is markedly more formal and less intuitive 
than that of public choice, essentially bereft of institutional detail (...). The 
approach is general equilibrium, and the institutions through which it operates 
are for the most part treated as given, at least with respect to form, even when 
the revenue magnitudes that they generate are themselves endogenized." 
The amount of resources invested in lobbying not only depends on the potential 
benefits for the interest group, but also on the activities and resources invested by other 
(counter) interest groups. One can easily imagine two competing interest groups ending up 
in a Prisoners' Dilemma in which both are worse off with than without lobbying, but in 
which lobbying is still a dominant strategy for both. In such a framework, there is no 
simple direct relation between the amount of resources invested in DUP activities and the 
benefits (losses) resulting from it. Lobbying activities can use an important amount of 
resources. There are conditions under which there is no upper limit to redistributive 
lobbying and virtually all of the economy can disappear into a 'black hole' (Magee et al., 
1989). According to Olson (1982) redistributive lobbying leads to a fall in GNP over time 
because resources are being transferred from productive activities and because perverse 
policies lead to economic sclerosis and inefficiency. Under certain circumstances, however, 
lobbying can also be efficiency-enhancing (see, e.g., Becker, 1983). 
Interest group models generally assume that the level of pressure depends not only on 
organisation costs but also on the size of the benefits or losses. The basic result of this 
assumption is that people who have 'more to gain or to lose' from a certain policy will be 
more politically active and have a greater influence on the political outcome14. In this 
way, proportional voting models and interest group models have more in common than 
1 3 Note that competition for rents is not the same as competitive rent seeking. The latter phrase is 
used to indicate that monopoly rents are exactly dissipated. 
1 4 Potters and Van Winden (1990) show in a game-theoretical setting involving an incomplete 
informed government, that even in the absence of any actions by a pressure group designed to influence govern-
ment, it can have an influence on government behaviour. 
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they seem to have at first sight. Becker's (1983) definition of 'political pressure' - for 
which he refers to Bentley (1908) •• is actually very close to that of models of 'political 
support'. What is different is the institution through which political preferences affect the 
political decision-making process and the costs involved. What is similar between interest 
group models and proportional voting models is that a political equilibrium occurs where 
support/pressure is balanced at the margin. 
Most of the interest group literature has modelled the political equilibrium, rather than 
the political process. Questions concerning the existence and stability of the equilibria are 
generally ignored. The underlying assumptions are that political competition is sufficiently 
strong to force convergence to an optimal strategy and that the ensuing equilibrium is 
stable (Hettich and Winer, 1988). This is not obvious. For example, Young (1982) demon-
strates that Findlay and Wellisz's (1982) interest group model has multiple equilibria. A 
general property of deterministic voting models is their equilibrium-problems: voting 
models often lack equilibria or have unstable or multiple equilibria. 
Voting models and interest group models principally take policies as the output of a 
legislative process and ignore the administrative process of policy supply. Models of 
bureaucracy explicitly focus on the administrative stage of the policy process. Policy 
output is seen as the equilibrium outcome of demand and supply by the legislative and 
administrative branches of government. The majority of models in this tradition builds on 
Niskanen's (1971) economic theory of bureaucracy. Niskanen depicted the policy output as 
the outcome of a bilateral monopoly relationship between an active budget-maximising 
bureau (agency) and a passive political sponsor (legislature) under asymmetric information. 
Bureaus typically are "nonprofit organizations (..) financed, at least in part, by a periodic 
appropriation or grant" (Niskanen, 1971:15). For this budget, the bureau is dependent on a 
sponsor which can be a government or governmental agency, a minister, a chief executive, 
or a committee of the legislature. Since budget maximisation is positively correlated to 
most goals" of a bureaucrat, such as "salary, status, perquisites of the office, public 
reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau (..)" (Niskanen, 1971:38), it can be used 
as a general, 'encompassing' behavioural motive. Information is asymmetrically distributed 
among the actors by assumption as follows (e.g., Bendor, 1988; Breton, 1995): it is 
assumed that the bureau has full information on the sponsor's utility function and therefore 
knows the sponsor's demand for its services (reflected by the latter's willingness to pay) 
and has complete information about available technologies, inputs and factor prices. The 
bureau is not required to reveal a complete cost schedule, but instead can make all-or-
nothing, take-it-or-leave-it offers to the sponsor, with the only restriction that the bureau 
must deliver the promised quantity. For his part, the sponsor can costlessly observe the 
output produced by the bureau, but has no information or knowledge about the bureau's 
production technology, input quantities or input prices. As a result, the bureau is able to 
maximise his budget beyond the point where marginal costs equal marginal public 
benefits, which implies Pareto sub-optimality from the sponsor's perspective: both the 
1 Not all goals are positively correlated with budget size; think, e.g., of the ease of making changes, 
and ease in managing the bureau (Mueller 1989: 252). 
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bureau's budget and output tend to become too large. Niskanen's model was extended by 
Migué and Bélanger (1975) by a more general objective function in which the 
discretionary budget - the difference between the total budget and the minimum production 
costs - instead of the budget sec appeared as the main motive. The fact that the sponsor is 
faced with take-it-or-leave-it choices implies that agenda control by the bureau is based on 
formal authority instead of on superior knowledge and expertise (Bendor et al., 1985). 
Thompson (1973) was the first to note that bureau behaviour consistent with the 
information structure of Niskanen's model would entail the misrepresentation of 
information rather than authority-based take-it-or-leave-it strategies (Breton, 1995:427). 
Another fundamental assumption of the Niskanen model is that the sponsor is essentially 
passive. Breton and Wintrobe (1975) have convincingly argued that the sponsor may 
actively seek to redress information asymmetries by monitoring devices, overlapping 
bureaus, duplication of procedures, and by gathering information about the bureau's prices 
and production technology from other sources. A pathbreaking contribution in modelling 
an active sponsor - active bureau relationship with information-based agenda control is 
Miller and Moe (1983). They account for the fact that the sponsor need not always reveal 
its true demand for the bureau's services. The sponsor can force the bureau to announce a 
per-unit price at which it will supply output, instead of passively responding to the 
bureau's all-or-nothing offers16. 
The power of models of bureaucracy for explaining policy formation empirically is 
rather limited. Its main message is that budget maximisation combined with (assumptions 
about) asymmetric information can lead to sub-optimal provision levels. Both the actual 
detection of information asymmetries and the measurement of bureaucratic output are 
difficult problems, which make that the hypotheses derived from Niskanen's discretionary 
power model are hard to verify empirically. It can also be criticised on more theoretical 
grounds as (aforementioned) successive extensions and refinements of the model make 
clear. Bureaucrats are assumed not to have policy preferences of their own17 which 
makes them passive responders to the sponsor's policy demands. The policy demand side 
itself is not an object of further analysis. The choice for policy instruments is taken as 
given. It is assumed that constituent preferences are accurately reflected through the 
legislative process. Models of bureaucracy therefore do not offer any hypotheses regarding 
the type of output, i.e. the content of policy programmes, the bureau will eventually 
deliver. 
In fact, Niskanen's model can be seen as an early example of a principal-agent model. From a 
more general perspective all relationships between actors in the political domain can be analysed from a principal-
agent, imperfect information perspective. Principal-agent models fall outside the scope of this study. 
" This is contrary to empirical evidence that bureaucrats do have programmatic preferences and that 
bureaus tend to develop a sense of mission. 
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3.4 The political economy of protection 
Voting models, interest group models and models of bureaucracy, while all belonging 
to the political economy research programme, have mostly been developed along separate 
lines of thought and independent from each other. A fourth more or less 'independent' line 
of political economy research can be found in the international trade literature. The 
observation that trade distortions are a universal rather than a rare phenomenon - which is 
contrary to what one would expect on the basis of two centuries of free trade recom-
mendations - has caused trade theorists to go beyond their traditional Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson and welfare economics framework. Some have questioned the relevance of the 
underlying assumptions of small country and perfect competition and their policy 
implications [see Krueger (1983) for a survey]. Others have argued that free trade policy is 
not Pareto optimal because of imperfect insurance markets (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981) or 
that free trade is not a time consistent policy (Staiger and Tabellini, 1987). However, the 
political economy of trade policies has attracted most interest. Several models have been 
used to show that an integrated political and economic analysis of trade results in positive 
equilibrium levels of trade intervention (Findlay and Wellisz, 1982, 1983; Mayer, 1984; 
Magee et al., 1989; Hillman, 1989; Van Long and Vousden, 1991). 
Much of this literature18 attempts to provide an explanation for the striking 
observation that certain sectors, often representing a minority of the population, are 
protected by favourable trade policies. Representative is the approach taken by Baldwin 
(1976, 1985) who analyses a number of crucial assumptions regarding the economy (small, 
open economy; perfect competition; perfectly mobile production factors) and the polity 
(full information, absence of voting costs, and direct majority voting). Combined, these 
starting assumptions always yield free trade as the political equilibrium. However, if one 
of the assumptions is relaxed the political equilibrium might - depending the state of the 
political economy - shift towards protection of certain (small) groups in society or 
economic sectors. For example, protectionist policies benefiting small groups are obtained 
by assuming voting costs (Mayer, 1984), imperfect information among voters (Magee et 
al., 1989), and proportional voting (Hillman, 1982). The bottom line for all these cases is 
that if benefits per capita are larger than losses per capita from protection (in absolute 
terms), those who gain have a larger impact on the decision-making process than those 
who lose. Other explanations rely on interest groups and organisation costs (e.g., Pincus, 
1975; Findlay and Wellisz, 1982) to obtain the same outcome. 
3.5 Social concerns and political self-interest 
Baldwin (1989) has emphasized that a general theory of government behaviour needs to 
include elements that incorporate both extreme points of view: the self-interest approach 
and what he calls the social concerns approach. Similarly, Mueller (1989) refers to 
Rodgers (1974) and Plotnick and Winters (1985) in arguing that the best model of 
government activity is one that combines elements of both normative and positive political 
1 8 For an overview of the political economy of trade policies and protection, see Hillman (1989); and 
Vousden (1990). 
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economy choice theories of redistribution. They both refer to empirical studies that 
indicate preferential policies for low income, low skill sectors in the economy as support 
for their social concerns (Baldwin) or altruistic motivation (Mueller) approach. However, 
Swinnen and De Gorter (1993) argue that the empirical observations that Baldwin and 
Mueller argue to be the outcome of social concerns in government decisionmaking are 
consistent with a fully self-interest-motivated government. 
In this discussion, a distinction has to be drawn between cause and initiation of 
policies. The cause of policies is endogenous in a political economy approach: it lies in the 
political activities of a self-interested individual, interest group or politician who acts to 
maximise his/her objective function. The initiation of policies - what triggers the activity 
of agents in politics - can be largely due to exogenous events. A protectionist reaction is 
likely to occur if a sector faces a sudden price decrease. In agriculture, for example, 
exogenous changes in world market prices, the influence of domestic weather changes or 
technological innovation may induce endogenous political effects that partially offset the 
initial economic effect19. An implicit insurance motive might therefore provide for an 
explanation as to why there is protection. On the one hand a sudden economic change 
favouring the returns to a factor reduces the political activity of its owner. Sudden drops in 
income on the other motivate actors to demand political protection. This illustrates the 
empirical observation that political involvement increases when market returns fall, and 
decreases when economic rewards rise. Magee et al. (1989) refer to this as the 
compensation effect. These results are also found by Hillman (1982) and Swinnen and De 
Gorter (1993) Bullock (1992) emphasizes the countercyclical nature of government 
transfers to agriculture in the us. Hillman indicates that the decline of world price induces 
two (offsetting) effects: the political activity of the industry increases, but the decline of 
the industry reduces its political power. In Swinnen and De Gorter's approach the political 
insurance is driven by politicians' interventions to exploit differences in welfare impacts of 
policies. This leads to beneficial policies for declining industries, such as agricultural 
sectors. 
Empirical support for the phenomenon that low income, low skill sectors tend to 
receive beneficial government policies is summarized in Magee et al. (1989), Baldwin 
(1989) and Mueller (1989). Gardner (1987), De Gorter and Tsur (1991), Bullock (1992; 
1994a) and Swinnen (1994) all show that government support for agriculture is inversely 
related to farmers' income. 
3.6 Policy instrument choice 
An important distinction in the analysis of policy formation is between the determina-
tion of policy instrument levels, which essentially is a continuous choice problem, and the 
choice of the policy instrument mix, which is a discrete choice. Within public choice the 
discussion generally focuses on how the equilibrium level of a single policy variable is 
" E.g., Lindbeck (1985:112) argues that the wave of agricultural protectionism in Europe at the end 
of the nineteenth century was driven by a drastic fall in the living standards of the farming population due to the 
terms-of-trade deterioration for European agriculture. 
Chapter 3 35 
reached rather than on the type of policy output - the policy instrument choice - as such. 
The explanation of policy instrument choice has not received much attention so far; it has 
generally been ignored in the literature on the political economy of agricultural policies. 
The political economy of trade policies has recently begun to emphasize the issue. 
However, much of the positive trade policy theory is better at explaining why governments 
may bestow special favours to certain sectors than at explaining why these favours tend to 
take the form of trade restrictions. This is a serious deficiency in view of the normative 
presumption that subsidies are a more efficient way of satisfying non-economic objectives 
than are tariffs (Rodrik, 1986; Mayer and Riezman, 1987). Traditional welfare analysis has 
ranked policies in accordance with their associated welfare effects. Bhagwati (1971) has 
argued that direct policies are more efficient than indirect ones. The most efficient way to 
help labour would be a labour subsidy, the next best way a production subsidy for labour-
intensive industries, then a tariff on imports of labour-intensive goods, followed by a quota 
on labour-intensive imports; the least efficient way would be a voluntary export restraint 
(VER) agreement by foreign suppliers of labour-intensive goods. What we observe 
empirically is virtually the reverse of Bhagwati's ordering. The relevance of the traditional 
approach can be severely questioned (Rodrik, 1986:297): 
"the conventional literature on distortions, welfare and trade policy yields 
possibly misleading normative conclusions when distortions - whether 
policy-induced or not - are at least partly endogenous. With distortions arising 
from the workings of the system itself, the usual welfare analysis might be at best 
irrelevant and at worst harmful. The latter is quite general and has widespread 
applicability". 
The first attempts to explain the choice of trade policies have stressed the effects of the 
policy form and market structure on political incentives. Cassing and Hillman (1985) show 
that a domestic monopoly is likely to prefer a tariff to a quota, because at the same 
product price their profits are higher. Rodrik (1986) compares a tariff and a production 
subsidy and argues that the crucial difference is the public-good nature of the tariff (which 
makes it underprovided) and the private-good nature of firm-specific subsidies. Lobbying 
behaviour will therefore differ and the size of the difference depends on the market 
structure. Hillman and Ursprung (1988) model lobbying by domestic and foreign interest 
groups for domestic trade policies. They conclude that no support maximising political 
candidate will prefer tariffs if a voluntary export restraints are a policy option. 
Magee et al. (1989) have advanced a more general theory on policy instrument choice 
by stressing the role of information. Their principle of optimal policy obfuscation attempts 
to explain why indirect and economically inefficient policies are chosen over more direct 
and efficient ones20. On the one hand, greater obfuscation makes it more difficult for 
The policy obfuscation hypothesis is strongly related to the fiscal illusion hypothesis which 
presumes that the legislature can deceive its citizens about the true size of government. The notion underlying 
both policy obfuscation and fiscal illusion is that politicians have an incentive to understate the costs of various 
public programmes and to overstate their benefits. 
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voters to notice redistributive policies, which has a positive effect on their support. On the 
other hand, the more indirect policies are, the greater their degree of obfuscation, but the 
lower the level of redistribution (due to higher deadweight costs associated with more 
indirect policies). This in turn reduces the support (contributions) of the lobbies. The 
trade-off between the two is supposed to lead to a vote-maximising optimum. The policy 
obfuscation theory crucially depends on the assumption of rationally ignorant Downsian 
voters. With increasing voter sophistication, parties must disguise their redistributive 
activities more effectively. The better informed voters are, the more non-tariff barriers will 
arise, because they are more indirect and increase voter support for protectionist 
politicians. Simultaneously, however, the equilibrium level of distortions will rise: the 
voter information paradox. Lindbeck (1985) supports the obfuscation argument and 
advances an additional explanation: tariffs provide non-budget methods of redistribution, 
which are politically superior to production subsidies and consumption taxes. 
The importance of imperfect information in explaining the choice of policy instruments 
is also emphasized by the Virginia school of political economy (e.g., Nelson, 1976; 
Tullock, 1983; Crew and Rowley, 1988; Crew and Twight, 1990). Lack of information 
about the effects of policies on the part of voters will lead politicians to favour 'sneaky' 
methods of redistribution over more transparent efficient mechanisms. 
The obfuscation argument is refuted by Becker (1976, 1983) and Wittman (1989). 
Becker argues that competition among interest groups favours efficient methods of taxation 
and that 'seemingly inefficient taxes' will turn out to be efficient taxes if everything is 
taken into account: 
"I find it difficult to believe that most voters are systematically fooled about the 
effects of policies like quotas and tariffs that have persisted for a long time. I 
prefer instead to assume that voters have unbiased expectations, at least of 
policies that have persisted. They may overestimate the dead weight loss from 
some policies and underestimate it from others, but on the average they have a 
correct perception. This assumption is consistent with the recent emphasis on 
'rational' expectations." (Becker, 1976:246-8) 
Becker's view is representative for the Chicago political economy perspective which 
holds that political competition will ensure that the most efficient method of redistribution 
available is chosen, i.e. those policy instruments with the lowest deadweight costs, given 
the institutional constraints. Elasticities of supply and demand implicitly are critical 
variables in the political calculus of politicians. The essence of the argument can already 
be found in Stigler (1971) in his explanation of why the oil industry faces quotas instead 
of tariffs. Along the same line of thought Gardner (1983) has shown that acreage restric-
tions are more efficient than output subsidies in raising the incomes of established farmers 
when the supply of farmers is elastic21. Gisser (1993) demonstrated that the combination 
Gardner uses the concept of the surplus transformation curve (STC) to demonstrate the welfare 
trade-offs of changes in policy instrument levels in income transfer programs. Bullock (1992a) generalists the 
STC-approach for the analysis of multiple instrument use. 
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of target price and acreage controls in US agriculture is even more superior from an 
efficient redistribution point of view. 
Contrary to the Chicagoan "what is, is efficient" view on instrument choice stands the 
Virginian position that lack of information on the part of voters may favour inefficient 
'sneaky' forms of redistribution, through disguised transfer mechanisms and transfer 
policies with concealed costs such as quotas (e.g., Tullock, 1983; Crew and Rowley, 1988; 
Crew and Twight, 1990; see also Magee et al., 1989). Recently, Coate and Morris (1995) 
have shown that asymmetric information about both the effects of policy and the intentions 
of policy candidates ('politician uncertainty') may result in inefficient methods of 
redistribution due to politicians' reputational concerns. 
Joint policy determination 
A useful distinction for the analysis of agricultural policy formation is between 
productive (PERT) and predatory (PEST) government policies (Rausser, 1982)22. 
Productive policies reduce transaction costs in the private sector by correcting market 
failures or providing public goods; at least in design policies of this type are welfare-
increasing and have neutral distributional effects. Predatory policies are directed to 
redistribution of wealth from one social group to another group, and opposite to productive 
policies not explicitly concerned with efficiency. The distinction between productive and 
predatory policies shows some similarities to the more conventional neo-classical 
economics distinction between public good and redistributional policies. Some political 
economists have argued that all government expenditures have a redistributive component, 
and should therefore be analysed as such (Aranson and Ordeshook, 1981; Stigler, 1971; 
Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983). That the interpretation of the nature of (agricultural) 
policies may have important implications for their explanation is shown by De Gorter and 
Zilberman (1990). They have argued that the differential redistributive impact on 
producers and consumers of certain public good policies in agriculture - such as 
agricultural R&D - may be the explanation for their underinvestment due to different 
political weights of both groups. 
Rausser (1982), Rausser and De Gorter (1988), Rausser and Foster (1990), Foster and 
Rausser (1992), De Gorter et al. (1992) and Rausser (1992) have stressed that generally 
governments formulate (i.e. change or initiate) a set of productive and predatory policies. 
The conception that different policies can be analysed in isolation which assumes strict 
separability, ignores that in reality policies are - implicitly or explicitly - linked in package 
deals and that log-rolling is a frequently encountered phenomenon. Analyses based on the 
policy separability assumption may yield important differences in policy interpretation. 
Predatory policies could play the role of compensation schemes in the establishment of 
productive government policies. Rausser and Foster (1990) argue that since productive 
(PERT) policies may harm certain interests, compensation in the form of predatory (PEST) 
PESTs is the acronym for Political-Economic-Seeking Transfers; PERTs stands for Political 
Economic Resource Transactions. Note that the acronyms have a normative tenor. 
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policies often serves to make PERT policies viable politically23. Rausser and De Gorter 
(1990) analyse the joint determination of CAP commodity price subsidy policies and 
research & extension policies. An interesting result is that the social savings due to 
decreased price supports are likely to be offset by a loss in social welfare due to reduced 
research expenditures under joint determination. Swinnen and De Gorter (1992a) show, in 
a model in which the political weights are derived endogenously, that in a world without 
transaction costs, governments will fully offset the differences in welfare effects induced 
by productive policies. This endogenous distribution scheme allows the government to 
increase its investment in public goods. Elsewhere, Swinnen and De Gorter (1992b) show 
that in a dynamic framework a Pareto-optimal policy combination is politically time 
inconsistent. Empirical research in this area is just starting and mostly focused on the 
'complementarity hypothesis' that increases in productive investment are positively related 
with increases in transfer policies (Alston and Pardey, 1991; De Gorter et al., 1992). 
3.7 Policy determination in multi-tier government systems 
The interaction between politico-economic actors takes place within a specific politico-
institutional setting24. Part of this institutional setting is the scope of authority or policy 
competence within which a government acts. In most countries, government consists of 
multiple layers or tiers, with each layer having a different scope of authority within a 
specified jurisdictional boundary. Most wide-spread is a governance structure in which 
policy responsibilities are divided between the local (municipal), the regional (provincial), 
and the national (state) level. Some countries are characterised by an additional (top) 
governmental level of decision-making (e.g., us; Germany; Switzerland). The 
'supranational' European Union can be characterised as a multi-level governance structure 
in which national and subnational units retain their legitimacy and political viability 
(Scharpf, 1994:227), although its characteristics diverge somewhat from the federalist 
ideal-type. 
The analysis of policy formation in a multiple-tier government environment differs in 
two respects from policy formation by a unitary nation state government. First, the fact 
that both jurisdictional boundaries and policy competences between tiers of government 
differ causes that decision making can involve different societal groups at different levels. 
Some interests within a jurisdiction at the subnational (state) level may be overrepresented 
and other groups may be underrepresented in size when compared to the national (federal) 
level. This may not apply to the size of groups (vote number; number of interest group 
members), but also to the 'passionateness' of their (policy) preferences and the degree of 
group organisation. As a result policies decided at a lower governmental level may reveal 
different policy preferences than those decided at the highest - state or federal - level. 
Tweeten and Coggins (1992) criticize the Rausser and Foster interpretation of PEST price policies 
as a compensation for losses to producers from PERT research investments. 
2 4 The terms (politico-)institutional setting, context and environment are used to indicate the same; see 
for a definition section 2. 
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Ruling politicians in jurisdictions at a lower state level may - driven by subnational (state) 
interest groups, voters - take complementary policy measures in anticipation of policies 
formulated at the higher level, or at least try to change economic conditions within their 
jurisdictional boundaries into a favourable direction as to optimally benefit from policies 
formulated at the highest (national or federal) level. The political economy implications of 
multi-level policy formation and the endogenous policy interaction effects have so far not 
received much attention in the literature yet. 
The public economics and public finance literature predominantly stresses the potential 
competition among jurisdictions at the same level of authority. Different labels have be 
given for what essentially is the same phenomenon: institutional competition (e.g., Van 
Long and Siebert, 1991; Siebert and Koop, 1993); interjurisdictional, intergovernmental 
competition or competitive federalism (e.g., Dorn 1990; Dye, 1990; Weingast, 1995); or -
in a more specific context - fiscal competition (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1991), and tax 
competition (Sinn, 1990; Verbon, 1990). The essential prerequisite for interjurisdictional or 
institutional competition is the mobility of residents or factors of production: people will 
vote with their feet to locate in those regions where consumption or production conditions 
are most optimal. At the core of interjurisdictional competition lies the principle of 
locational arbitrage. 
In the literature three different interpretations of interjurisdictional competition can be 
found (Oates and Schwab, 1988: 325-326). As an early - almost implicit - notion 
interjurisdictional competition appeared in Tiebout's (1956) voting-with-the-feet model 
which can be regarded as one of the cornerstones of the theory on fiscal federalism. In a 
Tiebout world citizens who are not satisfied with the level and/or quality of public good 
provision of their locality will move to another jurisdiction which better suits their needs. 
Whereas Tiebout's original model primarily referred to the possibility for consumers to 
vote with their feet to express their preferences for local public goods and services, the 
model can be easily generalised to include both production and consumption 
households25. For production households voting-with-the-feet primarily applies to 
choosing the most favourable production environment regarding taxation (low taxes, tax 
expenditures), social insurance (cf. 'social dumping' in an EU-context), physical infra-
structure, environmental standards, health care and/or the education level of the population. 
Although the Tiebout model presumes that local governments are passive, it implicitly 
values competition as beneficiary from a social welfare maximisation perspective: the 
resulting provision of local public goods will be Pareto efficient. 
A second branch of literature, inspired by the work of Brennan and Buchanan (1980), 
interprets interjurisdictional competition primarily from a political perspective. Competition 
here is conceived as a device to constrain "Leviathan", an effective means to tame - or at 
2 Voting-with-the-feet models require the following conditions to ensure global optimality of 
excludable public goods (Mueller, 1989:155): (a) full mobility of all households; (b) full knowledge of the 
characteristics of all households; (c) availability of a range of options spanning the full range of public good 
possibilities desired by households; (d) no spill-overs across jurisdictions; (e) absence of scale economies; (f) 
absence of geographical constraints on individuals with respect to their earnings. 
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least control - the revenue-maximising role of government. Since interjurisdictional 
competition among lower level governments limits the level and impact of rent-seeking 
efforts and distributional coalitions, it can generally be regarded as welfare-enhancing 
(Weingast, 1995:6). However, the positive-sum character of interjurisdictional competition 
is not undisputed. A third position is that interjurisdictional competition is similar to the 
process of 'cut-throat' competition among firms in oligopolistic private markets and could 
lead to serious underprovision of public goods. 
3.8 Partial versus general equilibrium models 
While the first political economy models used partial equilibrium specifications, a 
consensus seems to have emerged on the general equilibrium modelling of the economic 
sector. A Ricardo-Viner or specific factor model is used by several authors in analysing the 
political economy of trade and finance policies (e.g., Findlay and Wellisz, 1982, 1983; 
Mayer, 1984; Staiger and Tabellini, 1987; Roe, 1991a). A Ricardo-Viner model assumes 
two inputs for each industry, one input is perfectly mobile, the other is specific and fixed. 
Empirical research suggests that this model is appropriate due to the inherent short term 
nature of the political process (see especially Baldwin, 1984, and Magee et al., 1989). 
Following the political economy of trade tradition, most recent analyses of the political 
economy of agricultural policies have used a Ricardo-Viner model for the specification of 
the economic structure (Anderson, 1991; Swinnen, 1991; Gray et al., 1991). Other general 
equilibrium analyses include the interest group models of Yeldan and Roe (1991), Roe and 
Graham-Tomasi (1990), Roe (1991b), and Fafchamps et al. (1991). 
The specific factor model indicates the political importance of factor mobility and 
resource distribution in political economic explanations. The impact of mobility and 
distribution of factors on the distributional effects of domestic price increases have been 
thoroughly studied in international trade literature during the 1970s-80s (Jones, 1975; 
Mussa, 1974, 1982; Hill and Mendez, 1983; Panagariya, 1981,1983). In the political 
economy framework these analyses take on a new importance. The explicit political 
modelling shows that the distribution and mobility of factors of production have important 
impacts on the political equilibrium. It is the amount of sector specific capital rather than 
the number of individuals that reflects the 'vested interest' of an economic sector. 
Increasing mobility of capital between sectors would reduce the political activity of the 
agents whose income depends on the returns to sector-specific capital. In the extreme case, 
perfect mobility removes all incentives for lobbying or political pressure. In this case the 
problem reduces to a standard Stolper-Samuelson model, a result already derived by Mussa 
(1974)26. 
Based on this, Gray et al. (1991) argue that providing all citizens with identical asset portfolios in 
Eastern European privatization schemes would reduce rent seeking. In the same line of thought, Swinnen (1992) 
argues that privatization in Central and Eastern European agriculture would increase the demand for agricultural 
protection. 
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3.9 Dynamics, credibility, and institutions 
Virtually all political economy models in the agricultural economics literature are static. 
This contrasts strongly with the burgeoning political economy literature on macro-
economic policies (for a survey, see Persson and Tabellini, 1990). This literature focuses 
explicitly on the intertemporal aspects of government policies and the political and norma-
tive implications. The concept of political business cycles is not new (Nordhaus, 1975; 
Lindbeck, 1976), but recent contributions have incorporated it in a broader framework. 
Rogoff (1990) emphasizes how asymmetric information between politicians and voters 
induces political business cycles. Tabellini and Alesina (1990) show how incumbent 
politicians use government debt strategically in order to influence future economic policy. 
Policymakers typically choose policies sequentially over time. Policies with desirable 
long-run properties may therefore suffer from serious credibility problems27, because 
private agents realize that policymakers may want to deviate from these policies in the 
future. At the core of the credibility problem are the political pressures that may bring 
policymakers to reverse a previously announced programme. When the policymaker has an 
incentive to change a policy in a later period when it is no longer an optimum, the policy 
is said to be 'time-inconsistent' (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). Once private agents take 
policymakers' future incentives into account in forming their own expectation and making 
economic decisions, the resulting outcome may be much worse than that of policies that 
are desirable but not credible. 
Several authors have stressed the importance of the institutional framework in this 
integrated political economic setting: institutions that make policy reversal more difficult 
enable policymakers to make stronger commitments to future policies and, thereby, 
enhance their credibility (Rogoff, 1985; Kotlikoff et al., 1988). Examples of credibility-
enhancing institutions are a strongly independent central bank (Alesina, 1989) or 
international agreements (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988). 
3.10 A research agenda for this thesis 
The preceding sections have introduced the theoretical background and recent 
developments in political economy theory which constitute the contours of the rest of this 
thesis. They enable a further delineation of the two principal research objectives, which 
entail (cf. chapter 1): (i) a critical review of the different strands within political economy 
theory and their empirical applicability and relevance for the analysis of agricultural 
policy formation and agricultural policy developments in democratic industrialized market 
economies, and (ii) a critical evaluation of existing formal political economy models for 
the use of explaining agricultural policy formation in the European Union. In a political 
economy framework policy instrument levels and policy instrument choices are the 
variables to be explained. Its structure should be based on coherent politico-economic 
micro-foundations, which account for the motives and activities of the major players 
involved as well as involves an assessment of the prevailing politico-economic market 
27 For a survey of credibility and time consistency of policies, see Sadoulet and de Janvry (1991). 
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structure. By assumption, voters, interest groups, and politicians act as optimizing actors. 
What is needed is a clear picture of what these constraints and objectives of the major 
actors. 
There are no clear-cut criteria for making a conscious choice between the different 
classes of political economy models in order to explain 'real-world' policy formation. 
Neither has the development of a set of criteria received specific attention in the political 
economy literature so far. From a methodological point of view, the distinction between 
the invariable component - the 'hard core' - and the variable component - the 'protective 
belt' - of the neo-classical economics research programme could well serve as an 
instrumentarium for making such choices. The protective belt not only allows us to 
distinguish between the political economy approach and 'conventional' neo-classical 
economics analyses in the social welfare maximisation (SWM) tradition, but also permits a 
classification among the different strands within political economy modelling. The type of 
interaction - the first distinctive element of the protective belt - is primarily determined by 
the type and number of actors, their motives and activities. In conventional economics 
analyses the type and number of actors involved is limited; usually a distinction is made 
between three large homogeneous aggregates of actors, notably producers, consumers and 
'the government' (or taxpayers). This a priori clear-cut division of society does no longer 
hold in a political economy context. The analysis of linked economic and political markets 
should therefore start with a thorough identification of actors. Incomplete actor 
identification could easily lead to misspecification errors. In a political economy 
framework situational constraints - the second distinctive element of the protective belt -
not only refer to budget or income, but also to political-institutional constraints (formal 
and informal procedures: e.g., voting and decision rules). The third distinctive element, the 
type of interaction between politico-economic actors, is no less important and relates to 
how actors behave and how the process of political competition is resolved, both in the 
'real world' and as an acceptable approximation of reality (Cournot-type or Stackelberg-
type behaviour28; cooperative or non-cooperative game structure). Subsequent research 
has shown that the concept of partial equilibrium in which supply and demand are 
considered in one or a few interconnected markets at a time - ceteris paribus -, makes less 
sense from a political economy perspective. 
A political-economic model of agricultural policy formation should therefore satisfy at 
least two criteria: the model (i) should include a basic structure for the (micro)behaviour 
of the politico-economic actors involved in policy formation, and (ii) should account for or 
provide a solution for the underlying politico-economic game for policy influence with the 
policy outcome as the endogenous variable. Once we know the appropriate model and 
have formulated a set of testable hypotheses, we enter the second 'craftmanship-type' stage 
of empirical modelling itself, which involves the actual construction of the model, the 
search for data, and the confrontation of empirical figures with our theoretical results. Our 
Cournot-type behaviour implies that each actor treats the actions of other actors as given (fixed) at 
each stage of the process. Stackelberg-type behaviour implies that each actor treats the reactions of other actors as 
given. 
Chapter 3 43 
point of departure here is that empirical research in the political economy tradition can in 
principle be done in a similar methodological fashion as encountered in applied 
agricultural economics, i.e. by means of econometric time-series and/or cross-section data 
analysis. 
The economic theory of bureaucracy - which can be regarded as the third major strand 
in political economy theory - is only marginally addressed in this thesis, primarily because 
it ignores the issue of policy instrument choice - what type and kind of output - the bureau 
will eventually deliver. What the Niskanian perspective learns us is that the administrative 
branch of government due to informational advantages is able to maximise its budget and 
that the resulting level of provision can be sub-optimal. The research tradition of the 
political economy of trade policies is not followed because agricultural policy have to be 
interpreted as covering much more than (protectionist) trade policy alone - tbink for 
instance of extension, R&D, educational and infrastructure policies aimed at influencing 
agricultural factor markets - so that the trade perspective appears much too narrow to 
explain agricultural policy formation. 

C H A P T E R 4 
VOTING MODELS: PRESUMPTIONS, METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 
"Clearly, people with an interest in some policy are more likely to base their votes upon it alone 
than are those who count it as just another issue; hence government must pay more attention to 
the former than the latter. To do otherwise would be irrational." (Downs, 1957a: 141) 
4.1 Introduction 
The political economy literature offers three avenues for modelling the forces and 
motives underlying government intervention in the economy: voting models, interest group 
models and models of bureaucracy. This chapter focuses on the first type of models. 
Voting models view policy as the outcome of a legislative process; the legislative process 
is strongly influenced by the presence of elections. Policies are thus seen as the result of a 
process of political interaction between voters and politicians. The contents of this chapter 
are as follows. Section 2 discusses the Downsian legacy and the standard spatial voting 
model of two-party competition. Section 3 deals with the possible extensions of the 
standard model, which involves, inter alia, multi-issue dimensions, abstention, and the 
more than two party case. Section 4 deals with the empirical applicability of the spatial 
voting model. Section 5 focuses on the available alternatives for the spatial model; it 
discusses the applicability of political business cycle models, of political budget cycle 
models, and of Stigler-Peltzman type of voting models. Section 6 concludes. 
4.2 The Downsian legacy 
Downs (1957) regarded the government not simply as a black box processing the 
preferences of citizens, but as an composite actor made up of politicians and voters, each 
with their own set of objectives and constraints. Both politicians and voters are rational 
economic men bent on maximising their utility. Downs' fundamental hypothesis is that 
"parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections to formulate 
policies" (p.28). In a Downsian world political candidates1 design policy packages in order 
to maximize their chances of (re-) election. Their primary goal is to maximise the 
(expected) number of votes over other candidates. Voters are rational - in the sense that 
they will cast their vote for the party that provides them with more benefits than any other 
party - and prospectively oriented. But voting also involves a cost: "Time is the principal 
cost of voting: time to register, to discover what parties are running, to deliberate, to go to 
the polls, and to mark the ballot. Since time is a scarce resource, voting is inherently 
costly." (Downs, 1957:265). As a result, a voter will compare the net policy benefits ('uti-
lity income') he is likely to receive over the coming election period from each of the 
parties and votes for the party from which he expects the highest utility. This implies that 
he forms expectations about what the parties would actually do should they come to 
power: he calculates a so-called expected party differential. However, mere comparison of 
It is implicitly assumed that candidates of the same party take a uniform position in the policy 
space. Therefore the terms candidate and party are used interchangeably, unless explicitly stated differently. 
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party platforms (party manifestos) is a poor basis for forming these expectations, for a 
rational voter knows that no party will be able to do everything that it promises. Therefore 
"(...) he must estimate in his own mind what the parties would actually do were they in 
power" (Downs, 1957:39). Assuming that policies have some continuity, the rational voter 
will take his current party differential as the basis for this hypothetical voting guide: the 
utility derived from the incumbent party's performance in the current period minus the 
utility derived from the opposition's hypothetical performance had it been in power in the 
current period2. As Downs pointed out, a basic outcome in a two-party system is that the 
competition for votes among political candidates will drive both candidates to the position 
favoured by the median voter. The further the candidate is from this position, the less 
desirable is his election in the eyes of a majority of voters. The fact that this median voter 
theorem holds in simple models of elections was already recognized by Hotelling (1929). 
However, Downs was the first to apply an explicit political version of Hotelling's model 
of spatial economic competition. 
4.3 The spatial voting model: theoretical foundations 
The standard spatial voting model3, which can be regarded as the formalisation of the 
Downsian model, represents the political competition among two political candidates 
(parties) along a single issue or ideological (left-right) dimension, the so-called policy 
space, denoted by the closed unit interval [0,1]. This issue dimension usually measures the 
level of public good production or expenditure. Each voter / is assumed to have single-
peaked, symmetric preferences over political alternatives along this spectrum. Single 
peakedness assures that each voter has a most-preferred (unique) point ^€[0,1], the so-
called ideal or bliss point ys. The single-peakedness condition is equivalent to (strict) 
convexity and unidimensionality (see also Kramer, 1977: 691). Thus voter's preferences 
can be translated into a symmetric, differentiable, (strictly) single-peaked utility function 
Ui(y)-
It is assumed that all individuals participate in the voting process (no abstention) and 
every voter votes sincerely, i.e. for the candidate whose platform is most preferred. Note 
that sincere voting is typical for the spatial theory of elections. In committee theory this 
assumption has been replaced by strategic voting, which has a game-theoretic foundation 
(Farquharson, 1969). The basic model furthermore assumes that there are two political 
candidates j (J= L,R) who both seek to maximise the share of the vote by adopting a 
Downs's terminology differed slightly from what is common today. He used the term 'utility of 
income' (1957:36-38) to describe voter utility. Utility of income is a broad concept and may account for narrow 
self-interest as well as altruistic voting motives. The term performance (see text) should not be confused with 
Downs's performance rating concept which reflects the implicit comparison of utility income one actually 
receives with the utility income one would receive if the ideal government were in power {ibidem: 43). 
3 Also called the spatial theory of elections, to be distinguished from the spatial theory of 
committees. The pioneers in the spatial theory of voting are Black (1948, 1958) and Downs (1957). Although 
Downs was the first to explicitly design a spatial theory of elections, Davis and Hinich (1966) provided its 
mathematical foundations. 
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platform in the [0,1] policy space, that candidates may reposition themselves without cost, 
and that zero-order conjectural variation applies (i.e. each candidate estimates the pay-off 
to relocating on the Cournot-Nash hypothesis that his or her competitors remain at their 
current positions (e.g., Mueller, 1989:180; Cox, 1990:181). 
If the assumption of single-peaked preferences holds for all voters, it is possible to draw 
an aggregate distribution of preferences for the electorate (see figure 4.1). Candidate 
positions are given by the point Xj. Each voter is assumed to vote for the candidate closest 
to his position as measured by the Euclidean distance. As shown in figure 4.1, candidate L 
in position x L receives all the votes of individuals lying to the left of x, the midpoint of 
xLxR. Candidate R on position x R receives all votes to the right of x. If x R and x L are the 
positions of the two candidates, R wins. However, both L and R can increase their share, by 
moving to the right and left respectively. They are both driven toward the position 
favoured by the median voter xM , which is the equilibrium of this 2-person non-cooper-
ative game. 
Figure 4.1 The median voter outcome 
Numbers 
ol voters 
L M R Positions of candidates 
4.4 Extensions of the standard spatial voting model 
The assumptions of the standard spatial voting model with respect to the behaviour and 
preferences of political agents are quite restrictive. Attempts to relax these assumptions 
have concentrated on (i) incorporating abstention, (ii) the extension to more than one issue 
dimension, (iii) allowing for uncertainty and imperfect information on the part of the 
candidates, (iv) allowing for uncertainty and imperfect information on the part of the 
voters, and (v) the extension to more than two candidates. 
(i) Abstention 
The assumption that all voters participate in the voting process clearly does not hold in 
reality. Voters may abstain from voting for reasons of (i) indifference, i.e. candidate posi-
tions are too close together to make voting worthwhile, or (ii) alienation, i.e. the nearest 
candidate position is too far away to make voting attractive. However, opposite to what 
one would expect neither indifference nor alienation will affect the tendency of two 
candidates to converge on the position most favoured by the median voter if the frequency 
48 Voting models 
distribution of voter preferences is symmetric and unimodal (Davis, Hinich, and Orde-
shook, 1970). Problems are likely to arise when the frequency distribution over voter 
preferences is either asymmetric or/and multimodal. In case of a unimodal, asymmetric 
preference distribution, the optimal position for each candidate is pulled toward the mode 
instead of the median. Assuming that the distance between the two is small, a significant 
shift in candidate positions owing to alienation is not likely to occur (Mueller, 1989: 182). 
In case of a bi- or multimodal frequency distribution of voter preferences there may be no 
solution to the election game. 
(ii) Multi-issue dimensions 
A serious deficiency of the spatial competition model is the occurrence of instability 
and/or non-existence of electoral equilibria when we move from a one-dimensional to a 
multidimensional world (e.g., Hinich, 1977). The existence of an equilibrium - loosely 
defined as a state of the world in which actors choose in the most advantageous way, 
given the choices of others and reach an outcome they would not wish to depart from - is 
important since they enable lawlike statements from which (predictive) hypotheses can be 
derived. In most cases cycling is the likely result: no matter what set of policy positions a 
candidate adopts, his political competitor can defeat him in a majority contest by adopting 
a different set of positions.4 When there is no Nash equilibrium of candidate strategies, 
there is no definite prediction of what will happen. For example, a candidate who presents 
a platform of extreme positions on several issues may be able to win the support of a 
sufficient number of minorities and, thereby, to defeat another candidate who takes median 
positions on all issues. A minority which supports a candidate on certain key issues is 
essentially trading away its votes on other issues to other (passionate) minorities. In 
absence of a majority rule equilibrium and as a result of vote trading (logrolling) cycling 
may result, especially over time (for an overview, see, e.g., Enelow and Hinich, 1990: 2-3; 
Mueller, 1989: 180-184). According to Coughlin (1990:161) 
"The only models with multidimensional alternative sets where majority rule 
equilibria have been shown to exist are ones where (i) the distribution of voters' 
preferences satisfies stringent symmetry assumptions (...), (ii) a closely related 
convexity assumption is satisfied (...), or (Hi) the majority rule comparisons are 
restricted to pairs of alternatives that differ in only one dimension and suitable 
assumptions about the voters' preferences are made (...)". 
(iii) Candidate motivation, information and uncertainty 
The standard deterministic voting model assumes that both voters and candidates are 
well-informed, which is appropriate for describing electoral processes in small commun-
ities and clubs (Coughlin 1990:173). It assumes that each candidate, once his decisions in 
An equivalent result is derived in the committee voting literature. When the set of alternatives is 
infinite and has two or more dimensions and individuals have strictly concave utility functions, there is almost 
never an unbeaten alternative under majority rule (cf. Coughlin, 1990:161). 
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the election race have been made, will be able to predict exactly what voters' decisions 
will be, no matter what strategies he or his rival may choose. However, for societies with 
a sizeable number of voters and with candidates who have to rely on polls to learn about 
voter preferences, it is not unreasonable to suppose incomplete information on the side of 
the candidates about at least part of the voters' preferences. A plausible modification to 
take incomplete information into account is the probabilistic voting assumption, developed 
by Hinich et al. (1969, 1972). Probabilistic voting models assume that voters' choices 
depend on candidate policy positions (common knowledge to all players) and on non-
policy factors such as race, religion, etc. (known only to the individual voters themselves). 
The non-policy factors are subject to probabilistic assessments by the candidates. If the 
probability functions are strictly concave, the equilibrium is uniquely defined. Thus 
probabilistic voting models may offer a way out of the earlier mentioned equilibrium 
problems of the two-party spatial competition model. Important is also candidate uncer-
tainty with respect to the abstention of voters, especially in case they are not indifferent 
between the candidates' policy proposals (Coughlin, 1990: 170-171). The stability of 
candidates' objective functions is highly dependent on the information available, especially 
between election periods. 
The assumption implicit in the standard spatial model that politicians can move freely 
and costlessly (i.e. with zero repositioning cost) in policy space plays down the impact of 
party performance records and neglects reputation as a means of securing and sustaining 
long-term voter appeal. Ideological concerns may be captured by assuming that politicians 
have policy preferences and are willing to take policy positions that reflect a trade-off 
between the utility of implementing announced policies and the probability of election 
(Wittman, 1983; see also Mitchell, 1987; Wittman, 1990).5 Another, related body of 
literature deals with legislator voting and shirking. A large portion of this literature is 
concerned with a politician's ideology affects his behaviour and whether or not this causes 
him to deviate from the interests of his constituents (e.g., Kau and Rubin, 1979; Kalt and 
Zupan, 1984). Peltzman (1984) assigns a much smaller role to ideology by arguing that 
much of legislative voting can be explained through economic interests of the re-election 
constituency (for a survey on legislator voting, see, e.g., Bender and Lott, 1996). 
(iv) Voters, information and uncertainty 
In spatial voting models citizens vote on the basis of the expected utility conditioned on 
the information they have at the time of the vote. Some models view the individual vote 
decision as genuinely stochastic. According to this (second) notion of probabilistic voting 
individual i will vote for party L over R dependent on the utility he derives from the 
policies they offer, but only in a probabilistic fashion: there may be unobserved or 
unanticipated random events at the time of the voting act, which can cause that individual 
i will vote for candidate R although he values the utility from the latter's policy position 
5 Enelow and Hinich (1982, 1984) have analysed the role of ideology in election campaigns using 
the Hinich and Pollard (1981) model. This model distinguishes between a 'predictive dimension' (the underlying 
dimension, e.g. ideological) and 'predictive maps' (issue positions which vary from voter to voter). 
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lower than the policy position of candidate L. Common examples of such stochastic vote 
decisions are (Austen-Smith, 1991:79): 
«.(/) 
n [i votes L over R] - u,(J) + u,(r) 
II [i votes L over R] = pIL [»,(/) - ut(r)], with piL> 0 
where IT. is the probability that individual i will vote for candidate L instead of R, and U; is 
his utility from policy / (r) offered by candidate L (R). Mueller (1989) shows how the 
assumption of strictly concave probabilistic voting assures that political competition leads 
to unique and stable equilibrium outcomes. He concludes (p. 199-205): 
"Deterministic voting models assume that voter choices gyrate schizophrenically 
as candidates move about competing for votes. (...) The probabilistic voting 
assumption cuts cleanly through the forest of cycling results". 
Early versions of the spatial voting model have implicitly assumed complete information 
on the side of the voters about candidate positions. Some more recent contributions are 
specifically concerned with incomplete or imperfect information (e.g., Calvert, 1986). 
Introducing voter uncertainty into a unidimensional model can lead to the disappearance of 
equilibria (McKelvey, 1980: 391-392) or, more generally, can lead to a different location 
of equilibria. McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985) address the question of how voters use 
shorthand devices, such as opinion polls and qualitative endorsements of interest groups, to 
save information costs in a political environment in which voters are ignorant about candi-
date positions, and both voters and candidates are ignorant about the distribution of prefer-
ences. The signalling game and information transmission literature has stressed that 
uninformed agents may infer useful information from the behaviour of other - informed -
agents, when the relevant variable itself is infinitely costly to observe (e.g., Banks, 1990). 
Another question relates to the kind of information used by voters. In the standard 
model voters are prospectively oriented. However, some models cast voters as retrospec-
tive, 'looking back' to the parties' past performances in office (e.g., Ferejohn, 1986; 
Ledyard, 1986; Slutsky, 1986; Collier et al., 1987)6. 
(v) Multi-party systems 
The multi-party or multi-candidate case can be conceived as a generalisation of the two-
party spatial model, in the same vein as its multiagent economic counterpart developed by 
Eaton and Lipsey (1975). Existing multi-party models commonly assume a unidimensional 
policy space (e.g., Cox, 1990; Hermsen and Verbeek, 1992)7. However, unlike its two-
6 In the traditional political science literature retrospective voting is a well-known concept (e.g. Key, 
1966). 
7 There are some exceptions, e.g. Wittman (1984). 
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party equivalent the multiparty case involves some major conceptual problems. Not only is 
the existence of equilibria in multiparty electoral competition models problematical, as is 
its two-party equivalent under multi-issue dimensions. But worse, the contest specification 
itself loses much of its credibility when there are more than two electoral candidates. As 
Shepsle (1991:4) advances "(v)ote maximizing in multicandidate contests may not advance 
either the office or policy objectives of electoral agents." Evidence shows (e.g., Cox, 1987) 
that in multicandidate elections under the plurality system, the desire of candidates to win 
the election no longer provides them with a clear and consistent incentive, as it does in the 
two-candidate case, to move to the middle of the political spectrum. Shepsle draws a 
parallel between market share maximisation in spatial economic competition and support 
maximisation in spatial political competition. Where in the former the profit motive 
implies maximisation of the market share, the 'instrumental objective' implied by the 
motive of winning office in plurality-rule electoral contests in a multiparty context is not 
clear8. One of the problems in a multiparty context is that the relation between voting and 
the policy formulation is less direct because of the need of forming and the existence of 
coalitional governments. 
On the side of the voters a multi-candidate environment implies electing a representative 
instead of selecting the policy advocated by one of the candidates. Downs (1957: 47-48) 
already pointed at the inherent problems of the sincere voting assumption in multiparty 
settings, witness: 
"(..) [A] rational voter may at times vote for a party other than the one he most 
prefers. (...) A rational voter first decides what party he believes will benefit him 
most; then he tries to estimate whether this party has any chance of winning. He 
does this because his vote should be expended as part of a selection process, not 
as an expression of preference." 
Thus a citizen's choice to vote does not merely rest on a weighing of his preferences for 
the policy platforms of the political candidates involved in the election game (sincere 
voting). Rather it is a strategic choice predicated on a sequence of stages (Shepsle, 
1991:78). Austen-Smith (1989) has, for a wide class of two-stage - electoral and legislative 
- structures investigated whether the use of the sincere voting assumption is legitimate. 
One of his conclusions is that even in case almost all voters vote sincerely and only one or 
a few vote strategically this fact in itself does not justify the sincere voting assumption as 
The generalisation of the simple Downsian goal of winning the elections includes, inter alia, 
expected plurality maximisation, expected vote maximisation, and the maximisation of the probability of winning 
(Riker and Ordeshook, 1973). For multiparty settings Cox (1987) suggests a number of plausible alternative 
instrumental objectives, to wit vote maximisation, plurality maximisation, and complete plurality maximisation 
(requiring a lexicographic rule). Shepsle (1991:26) argues that complete plurality maximisation is not appropriate 
when a single office is at stake. More generally, he objects to the idea of maximisation of the margin of victory 
(in fact it only needs to be positive), and to the idea that vote support need be maximised (it only needs to exceed 
that of any other agent). A better notion of winning in plurality contests therefore is rank maximisation (see 
Denzau, Kats, and Slutsky, 1985). 
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a reasonable approximation, for the strategic "(..) vote is pivotal and the final outcome is 
affected significantly by his decision." (Austen-Smith, 1989:297). 
4.5 A critique of the spatial voting model 
Despite the major attention for the spatial voting model in theoretical political economy 
research, its empirical applicability for interpreting ('explaining') policy is limited. The 
basic conception of the spatial voting model that politicians formulate policies to get (re-) 
elected presupposes a direct and straightforward relation between the electoral and the 
policy formation (legislative) process9. At the same time, the spatial model assumes that 
citizens vote for the policy outcomes they prefer. As Brennan and Buchanan (1984) have 
argued this is a rather fragile assumption: voting is not instrumental but merely an 
expressive act10. Important for evaluating the suitability of the model for the explanation 
of (the process of) policy formation are the generality and flexibility of its inherent 
assumptions regarding the behaviour and preferences of voters and political candidates, and 
the possibilities to extend the model to include other categories of political-economic 
actors. 
First, the median voter hypothesis which is central to the spatial voting model requires 
that voters - constituting the political demand side - (i) have well-defined, stable and 
symmetric, single-peaked preferences, and (ii) vote sincerely. However, in reality voter 
preferences may be asymmetric and multimodal, whereas citizens may vote strategically 
rather than sincerely, especially in multi-party settings. 
Second, this median voter result critically hinges on a political supply side that consists 
of two political parties. In the more-than-two-party case the instrumental objective of 
winning the elections does not provide political candidates with a sufficient incentive to 
move to the middle of the political spectrum per se [see 3 (v)]. Since multiparty systems 
and coalitional governments are the rule rather than the exception in most western 
democracies, the choice of a voting model is less obvious in most of the cases. Countries 
in which a one-party government prevails include the United States, New Zealand, Canada 
and Great Britain11. 
Third, the assumption of zero-order conjectural variation has to be judged as stringent. 
In combination with the zero-relocation-costs assumption it appears rather irrealistic. The 
assumption of zero relocation costs is linked to the notion of prospective voting in which 
only future policies matter with respect to the voter's choice. However, in reality elections 
9 The Downsian assumption has been seriously challenged by Wittman (1973, 1977) (see Mueller, 
1989: 179). 
1 0 Cf. "(t)he object of choice in the election context is not the electoral outcome but, rather, the vote itself 
(Brennan and Buchanan, 1984:188). 
" According to Bogdanor (1987: 123-126) the United States and New Zealand are the only western 
democracies which have a two party system with parties alternating in government. Austria (up to 1983), Canada 
and Great Britain have had alternating wing parties preferably without coalitions, whereas Australia and the FRG 
have had alternating wing parties with permanent coalition partners. 
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have to be regarded as repeated games - rather than one-shot games - in which reputation 
plays a major role. 
Fourth, it is assumed that parties and political candidates are one and the same: political 
parties are typically considered as teams consisting of political candidates with the same 
(homogeneous) motivation. However, apart from the short-term objective of winning votes 
or maximising plurality and gaining office, political candidates may have additional 
objectives which diverge from the 'party line'. For example, they may represent a voting 
district or region with specific goals, operate in parliamentary committee structures with 
own (ideological) goals [see 4(iii)], and have long-term career motives (which can 
generally be seen as 'hidden knowledge' to the party). Parties have to be regarded as 
enduring organisations, with long time horizons and multiple election contests (Shepsle, 
1991:91), for which reputation is perhaps more important than for the individual candidate. 
Fifth, the use of the spatial model is warranted only if the policy issue has the character 
of a pure public good. In case the elections entail issues of public provision of (poten-
tially) private goods, redistribution or regulation, the median voter hypothesis makes little 
sense, as Aranson and Ordeshook (1981:76-77) point out. Since private goods - whether 
they have significant public good aspects (e.g., education, highways, mass transit) or not -
can be made public by law, they can in principle also be placed in the spatial framework. 
However, as closer analysis by Aranson and Ordeshook (1981) shows such treatment 
usually leads to trivial results. If the number of beneficiaries of the good in such an 
election is fixed and smaller than the voting majority, the good will not be publicly 
provided. The opposite case in which the number of beneficiaries concerns a majority of 
the electorate must be judged rare in politics. If the number of beneficiaries and the 
production of the good are electoral issues, the model has two dimensions and an 
equilibrium need not exist [see section 2, point (ii)]. If the proposed level of public 
provision of the private good is fixed, and the electorate has to vote on the size (identity) 
of the recipient group, then a redistributional issue is at stake. 
Generally, if the election concerns the choice of a redistributional rule, the single-
peakedness condition of voters' preferences will not be satisfied. The alternative of embed-
ding the candidates' redistributional strategies in some multidimensional space cannot 
satisfy the regularity conditions on preferences either. Hence, "elections entailing issues of 
pure redistribution are ovewhelmingly characterised by disequilibrium." (Aranson and 
Ordeshook, 1981:77). Magee and Noe (1989) illustrate that, with endogenous (deter-
ministic) voter preferences, voting cycles and Arrow paradoxes will always emerge on 
issues concerning the redistribution of wealth and income among the voters. 
Regulatory policies can be readily interpreted in a spatial framework, provided the 
regulatory regime is already in place and can be quantified (e.g., the setting of air quality; 
food quality; utility rates of return). The spatial framework is less suitable for analysing 
the introduction of a regulatory regime. For this type of decisions take place in a multidi-
mensional issue space: the decision to regulate (yes or no) as well as the decision to 
impose a specific form of regulation (Aranson and Ordeshook, 1981:79-80). As has been 
elucidated before (see 2[ii]) the move from a one-dimensional to a multidimensional world 
will almost always result in instability and/or non-existence of electoral equilibria. Table 
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4.1 provides an overview of the explanatory power of the standard spatial voting model in 
a uni- and multi-dimensional context, based on the assumptions of single-peaked prefer-
ences, sincere voting, and complete information. The conclusion must be for the explana-
tion of policy formation in a multi-dimensional issue context the spatial voting model is 
not very suitable. 
Table 4.1 
The applicability of the spatial voting model to (agricultural) policy formation 
Issue dimension Type of issue Party structure and decision rule 
. two parties 
. majority rule 
. multiparty system 
. majority rule 
One issue public good 
redistribution; 
private good; 
regulation 
. equilibrium exists 
(median voter result) 
. no or instable 
equilibria 
. equilibria are rare 
. additional difficulties: 
. strategic voting 
. coalition formation 
Multiple issues 
(>=2) 
public goods; 
redistribution; 
private goods; 
regulation 
. no or instable 
equilibria 
Key: "-" indicates that given the properties of the model, (theoretical) research makes either no sense and/or 
has not been undertaken until now. 
Sixth, the straightforward relationship between the electoral and the legislative process 
is blurred because of the limited frequency of elections and other, specific politico-institu-
tional peculiarities. Voting options for citizens are limited since elections are held only 
infrequently. As a result policy-makers have a wider scope of action (discretion) than 
solely maximising their vote plurality: they may promote their own policy preferences or 
maximise their income and/or wealth. The European Community may serve as an example. 
While EC policy proposals are primarily formulated by the Commission whose members 
are selected by co-option instead of through country-wide elections, the final decision-
making takes place in the Council of Ministers. The ministers are chosen at the national 
level and accountable to their national parliaments, but only in an ex post way. With no 
effective electoral control at Community level, national ministers may try to deny or 
obscure their political responsibility for decisions taken at Community level, especially 
when decisions lead to policies with unfavourable economic effects for some groups in 
their home countries. They may effectively do so by making 'Brussels' (the Commission 
and/or the Council majority) the political scapegoat. Relegating policies with a negative 
domestic electoral impact to another - higher - decision-making level thus protects against 
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the harm such policies may inflict on domestic political reputations. As such the European 
Union offers politicians the opportunity to externalise political costs. 
Seventh, the exclusion of political agents other than voters and politicians significantly 
detracts from the model's power to explain policy developments found in the real-world. 
The activities of interest groups and bureaucrats and the existence of a another - policy 
implementation - stage in policy-making may considerably dilute the assumed straightfor-
wardness of the electoral-legislative relationship. 
4.6 Alternatives for modelling politician-voter interaction 
4.6.1 Political business cycles and political budget cycles 
Alternatives for modelling politician-voter interaction are scarce. One alternative, which 
has taken root in the macroeconomics literature, builds on the concept of the Political 
Business Cycle (PBC) (Nordhaus, 1975; Lindbeck,1976; MacRae, 1977). Its basic idea is 
that incumbent politicians seeking re-election stimulate aggregate demand before elections 
in order to increase output (create economic growth) and reduce unemployment at the cost 
of post-electoral inflation (see, e.g., Alesina et al., 1992). The PBC-concept essentially 
starts from an 'expectations augmented' Keynesian Phillips curve economy which is 
extended with office-seeking politicians and retrospective myopic12 voters. Since inflation 
and unemployment are inversely related and are by assumption the only variables in the 
voter's utility function, the issue dimension is reduced to one (i.e. the choice of the 
inflation or the unemployment level) and the median voter theorem applies. 
A general objection to PBC-models is their assumption of voter myopia which is difficult 
to reconcile with the assumption of rational behaviour of political agents. If we extrapolate 
the notion of rational expectations to politics, elections should be regarded as perfectly 
anticipated events. Therefore, any systematic accompanying rise in nominal money growth 
should not have any effect on the real sphere (Rogoff, 1990:33). Pre-election 
macroeconomic policy is a datum at the time of elections and plays no role for the voting 
decision if voting is strictly prospectively-oriented and dependent on expected welfare. The 
problem here is twofold. On the one hand, research data on voter expectations on future 
performance are not available which makes that current and past levels of macroeconomic 
performance are used as a proxy. On the other hand, the individual voter needs an 
informational basis to decide whether politicians' promises and party platforms can be 
trusted or not. He is likely to do so on the basis of recent experience, hence the retrospec-
tive myopic voting (cf. also section 2, Downs's current party differential). 
As a consequence of the strong focus of PBC-models on macroeconomic variables, their 
explanatory basis with respect to sector-specific policy formation is weak. Their 
macroeconomic focus indirectly raises the question which type of variables affect voters' 
choices. Do voters determine their choice on the basis of general macroeconomic perfor-
mance as reflected by national income (growth), the rate of inflation and unemployment, 
Myopic voting supposes that citizens vote for the government as if the combination between 
unemployment and inflation were sustainable (after the election). 
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or on the basis of microeconomic variables which directly affect their individual welfare or 
income? The question is whether the voter "vote his pocketbook" or not has been the 
subject of an interesting debate in political economy (see, for a more in-depth review, 
Mueller, 1989, pp. 296-301). Stigler (1973) and Hibbs (1981, 1982) are among the 
advocates of the 'pocketbook approach'. Stigler viewed competing parties as offering the 
same macroeconomic policies and concluded that macroeconomic conditions are 
subsequently ignored by voters: what matters are parties' redistributive policies. Hibbs 
hypothesized that different voter attitudes vis-a-vis macroeconomic policy issues drive an 
ideological wedge between parties, dividing voting support along class lines (Mueller, 
1989:299). While traditional PBC-models with their narrow focus on the political nature of 
the trade-off between (un-)employment and inflation offer no explanatory basis for the 
formation of sector-specific policy, the notion that governments (politicians) deliberately 
increase their expenditure or manipulate tax schemes for electoral, or more generally, 
political popularity reasons is intuitively appealing, at macro- as well as meso-level. 
Recently, Rogoff (1990) has advanced a microbehavioural framework for testing 
electoral cycles in taxes, transfers, and government consumption spending (political budget 
cycles). The microfoundations of this model seem more promising for analyses of sector-
specific policy formation. Although sector-specific taxation, and sector-specific 
redistributive and public good policies need not exactly follow the general patterns of their 
macro-equivalents, a comparison of these two could reveal policy biases in favour (or 
disfavour) of specific sectors in the economy. For example, one could test the H0-
hypothesis that agricultural policy budget expenditure follows a pattern between, before 
and after election periods which is similar to the general budget expenditure pattern, 
against the H,-hypothesis that the two differ significantly. The same exercise could be 
repeated for general vis-a-vis sector-specific redistributive policies, or general vis-a-vis 
sector-specific public-good policies (e.g., general R&D-expenditure versus agriculture-
specific R&D-expenditure). Significantly different patterns in agricultural-programme 
spending could reveal the preferences of the incumbent regime for farm programmes and 
indirectly reflect the importance of the farm vote for the reigning political candidate. 
Given sufficient time-series data measured in deviations from pre- and post-election 
means, such political budget cycles need not be difficult to test. An additional advantage 
of testing political budget cycles is that data for both state and local elections can jointly 
be used, which increases the available degrees of freedom (Rogoff, 1990:34). 
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4.6.2 The theory of regulation 
A second major alternative for modelling voter-politician interaction builds on the 
theory of regulation (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976)13. Voters generally have weak 
incentives to become informed and be politically active. The incentive to vote is stronger 
when the costs of voting are low and the electoral interest reflected by (potential) policy 
benefits is high. The theory of regulation assumes that political support from electoral 
groups depends on the net wealth transfers they receive. The fact that elections are held 
only infrequently increases the discretionary powers of incumbent politicians and make 
them susceptible to other forms of political support as well. They could use their discretion 
to pursue "own" policy preferences, whether altruistic or self-interest-motivated, in the 
form of special policy favours to specific parts of the electorate. In the Stigler-Peltzman 
framework such favours are assumed to be given in return for political support supplied by 
votes, political services, campaign contributions and the like14. According to Peltzman 
(1976) a regulator will try to maximise his political support formalised as 
5 = «, Ilj + n2 n 2 , with N = nx + n2 and 1*2, 
where S is political support; n, (i=l,2) is the number of potential voters in the group 
benefiting (losing) from policy x; and 11/ (II2) is the probability that a representative 
beneficiary (loser) will grant support (oppose).15 Peltzman (1976) assumed that the 
probability of support II, not only depends on the expected group benefits (positive wealth 
transfers) x„ but also on the group's expenditures on political campaigns and lobbying to 
mitigate opposition m„ and the cost of organizing support and efforts to mitigate opposi-
tion c,(n'). The latter is assumed to increase disproportionately with the number of group 
members n, due to free rider effects. The probability of support II, is denoted as: 
„ x, - m, - c,(n.) 
n, = n , ( g ) , with g = — !— 
Due to the hybrid character of the theory of regulation, it is usually discussed as part of the 
interest group literature (see, e.g., Mitchell, 1990; Mitchell and Munger, 1991; Laffont and Tirole, 1991). 
However, the supposed central link between the maximisation of political support, voting and group activity make 
this former distinction highly arbitrary. Because of the strong link between the Stigler-Peltzman model and the 
so-called voter-politician interaction models in the agricultural economics literature, it is discussed here. 
1 4 That regulation has a political price has first been expressed by Stigler: "the industry seeking 
regulation must be prepared to pay with two things a party needs: votes and resources. The resources may be 
provided by campaign contributions, contributed services (the business man heads a fund-raising committee), and 
more indirect methods such as the employment of party workers." (Stigler, 1988: 220). While Stigler's (1971) 
focus had primarily been on the demand for regulation by industry and the rents that could be gained by limiting 
entry, Peltzman (1976) generalised his argument to a wider class of problems. 
1 5 A generalisation of this model (Peltzman, 1976) is: Max S = S(Wi, Wj) , subject to R = W, + Wj, 
where S is the regulator's political support, Wj (Wj) is the wealth of group i(j), and R is a constraint on total 
wealth. The more wealth is transferred to a group, the more political support it will give. 
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where g is the per capita benefit. The transfer x, is generated by a tax t on the wealth W2 
of each member in group 2. The probability of opposition LT2 is assumed to depend on the 
per capita tax rate t on wealth W2 and the per capita education expenditures to mitigate 
opposition e: 
x m 
IL = EL (t,e) , with t = —!_, and e = —L. 
W2-n2 n2 
If the beneficiaries are producers, W2 can be approximated by the consumer surplus, with / 
representing the regulated price. Reversely, if the beneficiaries are consumers, Wj can be 
approximated by the producer surplus, t being the difference between the surplus 
maximising price and the regulated price. 
A more specific version of the model - generally referred to as the Stigler-Peltzman 
model of regulation - describes thé wealth transferring process between consumers and 
producers in a political support context. Wealth transfers can only take place as a result of 
the setting of a maximum (or minimum) price together with control of entry. The political 
support function is now 
S = S[a (p),p] 
where Q is the industry's profit function denoting producer wealth, p is the price of the 
good and serves as an indicator of consumer wealth, and S[Q,p] is a strictly quasi-concave 
function. The higher are the profits, the greater is the political support from industry-
specific interests, as reflected by dS/dQ = S^O. Consumers are assumed to have prefer-
ences for low instead of high prices, as reflected by Sp<0. In both cases political returns 
are diminishing to higher p and Q ( S ^ O and S^O). Intergroup political effects, i.e. 
group activity as a result of envy or vindictiveness are assumed absent (S^O) 1 6 . The 
regulator maximises his political support by choosing a price such that consumer and 
producer support are balanced at the margin with the resulting political equilibrium price 
lying between the competitive and the profit-maximising price: 
The Stigler-Peltzman approach specifically divides voters into different voter groups on the 
basis of their policy preferences. The approach presumes sufficient competition for the 
regulator's office, but does not explicitly focus on the electoral competition as such (cf. 
Peltzman, 1976:247). Rather it takes a partial perspective on single (policy) issues. 
Therefore, although it addresses the political support of political candidates, the Stigler-
Peltzman approach is sometimes regarded as part of the interest group theory of policy 
formation. Contrary to spatial voting models, Stigler-Peltzman type of models take account 
of the fact that voting options for citizens are limited since elections are held only 
infrequently. Between elections citizens may actively seek to influence the polity into a 
One could imagine a situation in which 5^,<0, e.g. the opposition of consumers increases, the 
more the industry has already benefited from higher prices (Hillman, 1982). 
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favourable direction. At the same time, the infrequency of elections gives policy-makers 
wider discretionary powers than the maximisation of their vote plurality alone: they may 
actively promote their "own" policy preferences. Political support in the Stigler-Peltzman 
tradition reflects the intensity of the individual's political preferences, and thereby 
resembles the pressure concept in interest group models (see chapter 7). The fact that the 
preference intensity is taken into account gives them a potentially richer explanatory basis 
than spatial voting models. The latter certainly holds in comparison with the class of 
deterministic voting models in which each citizen has one vote to cast for or against a 
politician (or proposal). Such discrete voting gives the voter no means of expressing the 
intensity of his feelings, at least no more than other voters can. Models in the Stigler-
Peltzman tradition also have an advantage over probabilistic voting models. A problem of 
the probabilistic voting assumption is that it "undercuts the normative authority of the 
preferences aggregated - for it presumes uncertainty on the part of candidates about voter 
preferences, or on the part of voters of candidate positions, or both. Indirectly, it raises the 
question of the quantity and quality of information available to candidates and voters." (as 
quoted from Mueller, 1989: 205). In its most specific - equation 3 - form the Stigler-
Peltzman model of regulation is proportional in welfare gains (losses); contrary to 
probabilistic voting models, the Stigler-Peltzman model of regulation generates unique and 
stable equilibrium results under perfect information (Swinnen and De Gorter, 1992a). 
However, its single issue focus tends to overlook the process of electoral competition 
which generally involves various policy issues; the policy issue analysed within the 
Stigler-Peltzman framework need not be an electoral issue. Furthermore, the Stigler-
Peltzman framework ignores the possibility that issues may be linked and simultaneously 
decided as (part of) a package deal. Finally, it is assumed that rather than explained why 
political support from citizens has a bearing on the policy outcome. 
4.7 Conclusion 
The question whether policy formation in a democratic society can be convincingly 
explained by means of a voting model cannot be answered unequivocally. For most 
industrialised market economies the use of voting models appears problematical, both for 
theoretical and empirical reasons. The majority of voting models takes the policy outcome 
as the result of an electoral-legislative process. While most models implicitly assume that 
the electoral and legislative stage are simultaneously determined, in reality the two have to 
be considered sequential in nature with the second - legislative - stage crucially depending 
on the first - electoral - stage. Following Austen-Smith (1989) the subset of political 
candidates that is successful in winning a seat in the legislature is determined by an 
election rule; the latter varies with the specific politico-institutional structure of the country 
under consideration. The rules by which the candidates' policy positions are translated into 
the final policy outcome can be described by a legislative outcome function. This policy 
outcome determines the voters' payoffs (see also figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2 Policy as the outcome of a two-stage electoral-legislative process 
Voters, candidates 
* Policy outcome 
Legislative output 
function 
Source: Austen-Smith, 1989, p. 289. 
Application of the spatial voting model to account for the formation of policies makes 
sense only if the country's politico-institutional structure (the type of government system; 
the type of electoral and legislative rules) and the type, behaviour and preferences of 
actors satisfy certain stringent conditions. The model yields some useful results in a two-
party system, one-party government, with a direct link between the electoral and the 
legislative (policy-making) process, plurality voting, and the absence of bureaucrats and 
interest groups as disturbing factors. Stigler-Peltzman type of voting models are more 
suitable for explaining sector-specific policy formation, since they take account of the 
broader concept of political popularity instead of voting. Their weakness is their presump-
tion of sufficient competition for office which makes the notion that policy formation is 
purely electorally driven a questionable one. The focus of political business cycle models 
on the politically driven trade-off between inflation and employment (growth) renders their 
explanatory power with respect to policy formation at the meso-level troublesome. As a 
concept the political business cycle might be interesting for the explanation of sector-
specific policy formation (cf. Rogoff s political budget cycle model). Table 4.2 gives a 
concise overview of the available options in modelling politician-voter interaction. 
The majority of voting models ignores the role of interest groups and bureaucrats within 
the policy process. This practice runs contrary to the overwhelming 'real-world' evidence 
that the scope and potential for interest groups to influence the policy process is consider-
able. Recently, some scholars have attempted to incorporate the behaviour and activities of 
interest groups in a voting model setting; the interest group influence in these models 
flows primarily via campaign contributions (for a discussion, see chapter 7). 
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Table 4.2 
Explanatory power of voting models in a two party system with majority voting 
Type of voting model Pivot Focus Explanatory 
width 
Methodology 
Spatial deterministic elections public good policy economy-wide micro 
Spatial probabilistic elections public good policy economy-wide micro 
Political Business Cycle 
Political Budget Cycle 
elections 
elections 
unemployment/inflation 
trade-off 
redistributive policy 
(taxes/transfers/budget) 
economy-wide 
economy-wide; 
sector 
macro 
micro 
Stigler-Peltzman single policy 
(assumes suffi-
public good policy 
redistributive policy 
economy-wide; 
sector 
micro 
cient political 
competition) 
Another important shortcoming of voting models is their overall neglect of the 
bureaucratic process. Once the policy decision has been taken (the end of the legislative 
stage), the policy is to be implemented by the administrative government. The actual 
policy output is supplied by bureaucratic agents, and it is this output that is perceived as 
the pay-off from voting by the electorate. The impact of the implementation phase on the 
final policy outcome can be huge [see, e.g., Wolf (1979]. A more realistic picture of the 
policy process therefore involves three-stages: an electoral, a legislative and an executive 
stage. 
The opportunities for interest groups and bureaucrats to influence policy-making are 
larger, the larger the discretionary powers of the reigning political party are and, as a 
consequence, the more limited the voting options of individual citizens. These opportun-
ities also crucially depend on the powers of the parliament in controlling the government. 
The scope for political influence of both interest groups and bureaucrats is thus strongly 
related to the politico-institutional features of the policy-making system concerned. 

C H A P T E R 5 
T H E FARM VOTE, VOTING MODELS AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY FORMATION 
5.1 Introduction 
Voting models are built on the assumption that both political candidates and voters 
show rational and self-interest motivated behaviour, with political candidates formulating 
policies in order to win political support and/or the elections, and citizens giving political 
support - by going to the ballot-box and by supporting candidates and/or parties through 
campaign contributions - in return for beneficial government policies. This chapter more 
specifically focuses on the explanatory value and empirical applicability of these models to 
explain agricultural policy formation. It discusses (section 2) and criticizes (section 3) the 
farm vote concept, it assesses the importance of agricultural policy preferences for the 
voting act of farmers and the general public. Furthermore, it examines the Downsian 
(section 4) and the Stigler-Peltzman framework for explaining agricultural policy forma-
tion (section 5). 
5.2 The farm vote: definitions and applicability 
An often-used concept to account for the apparent agrarian power in politics and policy 
formation is the farm vote. For agrarian economies under democratic rule in which the 
majority of the population is involved in agricultural production, the potential power of the 
farm vote is evident. For industrialised economies in which farmers constitute a minority 
of the working population, the power of the farm vote is less obvious: the influence of the 
farm vote on the electoral outcome and/or policy formation is difficult to determine. On 
the one hand there are scholars who conclude that the farm vote is insignificant from a 
numerical point of view (Haase, 1983:54; Doring, 1981:141; Smith, 1990:17). According 
to Hagedorn and Schmitt (1985:265) the redistributive nature of agricultural policies 
causes an inherent instability. A party strategy that assigns a pivotal role to the farm vote 
for supplying a (decisive) voting majority has therefore to be judged as unreliable. Other 
scholars have taken the stance that the farm vote is in principle homogeneous and 
mobilisable by agricultural interest groups. Mobilisation can take two directions: either it 
can imply voting for a specific party or (the threat of) refraining from voting. Their 
conclusion is that the farm vote primarily is of strategic importance (Scheele, 1990:17-18; 
Moyer and Josling, 1990:45). The threat of abstention seems particularly effective in 
parliamentary systems with proportional representation. There is some evidence that in 
two-party systems with plurality voting (e.g., the United States, Britain, Canada), regional 
concentration of the farm labour force and margins of electoral victory might be sufficient 
to lever the importance of the farm vote, despite its numerical minority position. Ehrensaft 
and Beeman (1990) advance the Canadian federal elections of 1988 as an illustrative 
example of the pivotal role of the farm vote. Their leverage result can indeed be regarded 
of some importance for first-past-the-post systems. However, its significance should not be 
exaggerated, especially when the aforementioned unreliable party strategy argument is 
taken into account. In systems of proportional representation the leverage result must be 
regarded as a coincidental exception rather than the rule. 
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Most contributions remain vague as to what exactly is the farm vote. Some equate the 
concept with the labour force engaged in primary - first-stage - agriculture (e.g., Ehrensaft 
and Beeman, 1990) or the 'agricultural population' (e.g., Döring, 1981). Others use an 
even broader concept ranging from the rural population to definitions which include those 
who appreciate the values and attributes of farm life and sympathize with the agricultural 
profession, such as pensioners with a professional agricultural background, people borne 
on farms, and people with a (vague) idealistic notion of agriculture and farm life. 
Representative for this strand are Moyer and Josling (1990:46) who define the farm vote 
as comprising "farmers and their families, but also (...) many others who work in the farm 
support sectors and those whose roots are in farming and who are sympathetic to the 
apparent plight of farmers. (...) The support for farming in public opinion, which 
legitimizes the power of farming organizations, derives in part from the rapid decline in 
the agricultural population in the recent past and the resulting 'rump' of non-agricultural-
ists who still have romantic and favourable, though often not accurate, views on the merits 
of farming." In the same vein Keeler (1996:130) argues that the part of the electorate with 
"a strong agricultural attribute" is far larger than the share of active farmers alone, and 
also includes "(..) retired farmers, spouses of farmers, voting-age children of farmers and 
former fanners now in other occupations". Together they cause a 'demographic multiplier 
effect'. This broad interpretation of the farm vote concept is also taken by Paarlberg 
(1980:11) who speaks of a "large body of 'ag alumni' - people who once farmed or who 
are only one generation or two removed from agriculture". 
This broad connotation of the concept captures both selfish (income) and altruistic 
(public interest; other regarding policies) elements. Although a sympathetic attitude 
towards agriculture, or altruism in general, can be a motive to vote in line with the 
politico-economic interests of farmers, the "all-inclusive" definition of the farm vote is too 
vague and elusive from an operational point of view in a voting context. The same holds 
for definitions that equate the farm vote to the rural population or the people engaged in 
the input supplies, food processing, storing and trading industries. Although agricultural 
policy measures may impinge on the welfare of the citizens employed in these industries, 
through the backward and forward linkages of these industries with the farming industry, it 
is difficult to maintain that the expected utility gains from agricultural policy (cf. Downs's 
[1957:37] utility-of-income concept) will have a decisive influence on the voting of 
political parties or candidates, whether measured on the basis of agricultural policy 
platforms (prospective) or their agricultural policy records (retrospective). The individual 
economic effects of agricultural policy measures depend, inter alia, on the type of policy 
measure, the type of market, the competitiveness and market power of individual firms 
within the industry and the position of individuals within these firms 
(owner/stockholder/manager/employee), apart from the initial income and wealth position. 
If the welfare effects of intended policy measures were calculable and therefore known ex 
ante, with perfect information available to all actors involved, they would evidently imply 
different incentives for different (groups of) people. 
The fact that (part of) public opinion is favourably disposed towards farmers needs not 
necessarily imply that their overall voting behaviour will be in accordance with their 
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opinion on agricultural policy. What distinguishes the farm vote from the rest of the 
electorate is the dominant impact of agricultural policy preferences on voting behaviour 
which effectively implies 'single issue' voting. Given the fact that most, if not all, citizens 
have other policy preferences besides agricultural policy preferences, the crucial question 
therefore is how agricultural policy preferences are weighted as part of the voting decision. 
In this sense, the farm vote concept can be viewed as a particularisation of Downs' theory 
of voting.' Implicitly the farm vote concept presupposes a strong linkage between the 
policy preferences and the professional background of the voter - as measured by his past 
or current involvement in farming, or broader, his economic position defined by his 
ownership or use of factors of production (labour, capital, land) - and his voting choice. 
The expected utility changes from agricultural policy can relate to expected changes in 
endowments and/or production possibilities. A very crude measure of (potential) farm vote 
strength is the share of agricultural employment in total civilian employment. In most 
industrialised market economies the agricultural employment share consists of family farm 
workers and the hired agricultural working force of age; together they make up only a 
small part of the electorate. In 1994, for example, the share of agricultural employment in 
the European Union (EU) averaged 5.4 per cent. But within the EU considerable differences 
existed: in Greece (20.8%), Portugal (11.5%), Spain (9.8%) and Ireland (12.0%) - the 
major upward-bound outliers - the potential influence of the farm vote on the electoral 
outcome in these four countries can still be regarded significant, at least when farmers are 
taken as a voter group with homogeneous policy preferences. 
A problematic aspect of the employment share as an approximation of the farm vote is 
that it - by definition - excludes those voters that are entitled to vote but are without a job, 
like the unemployed, those under training and the pensioners. When it is assumed that the 
agricultural policy preferences and related voting behaviour of the inactive part of the 
electorate do not differ from the policy preferences of the active employed part, the 
employment ratio can be used as a first indicative proxy for the farm vote size. Among the 
inactive part of the population there are certainly people who sympathize with farmers and 
farming life and are perhaps inclined to vote in favour of farmers' interests. For example, 
the group of pensioners can be expected to have a disproportionately large share of voters 
with policy preferences in favour of farmers' interests. Especially in countries where the 
agricultural working population has declined rather quickly over the years, one could 
expect a relatively strong latent farm vote. At the same time, it is rather doubtful whether 
this part of the population will still take agricultural policy as their guiding voting motive, 
and let altruistic motives dominate their voting choice1. 
A more sophisticated and empirically workable measure for the farm vote would include 
those professionally engaged in farming as reflected by the ownership or use of factors of 
production in agriculture. In most industrialised market economies the family farm still is 
How important and yet difficult the issue at hand is, is shown by the following example. In the 
US many farm land owners are retired farmers. Although they don't play an active role in farming as such, they 
have a great deal to win or lose from (changes in) acreage control programs, of which the net gains almost 
entirely flow to land owners and not to those renting the land (see also Gisser, 1993:606). 
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the dominant managerial and organisational form of production in agriculture. In the post 
World War II period the dominant appearance of the family (unit on the family) farm even 
has increased as a result the fact that the number of farm (wage) workers has strongly 
decreased in the post World War II era with the only exception of casual seasonal labour 
during peak - e.g., harvest - periods. One would therefore expect that the farm vote largely 
consists of family farm members (farmers, their wives, sons and daughters), supplemented 
by the number of farm workers. Large landownership - which in some countries such as 
Portugal and the United Kingdom still is an important phenomenon - is a negligible voter 
category from a numerical point of view. 
It should be noted that both proxies of the farm vote - labour employment as well as the 
number of people with factors of production being employed or used in primary agricul-
ture are grounded on the rather heroic assumption of homogeneity of agricultural policy 
preferences. There are sufficient a priori grounds to believe that the policy preferences are 
not as homogeneous as implicitly suggested in the literature. Farm managers can be 
expected to have different wage policy preferences than their employees, whether they are 
family farm owners or agricultural contractors. And think, for instance, of the differential 
impact of a change in land policy on the utility of tenants as compared to land owners. 
The fact that policy preferences may not be parallel and even be opposite is one of the 
major objections against the use of the farm vote as a conceptual device in analysing the 
apparent power of farmers in policy formation (see section 3). 
5.3 A political economy interpretation of the farm vote 
A central element of the rational-actor approach to voting is that citizens give political 
support to the political candidate that satisfies their political-economic preferences best, i.e. 
yields the highest (expected) utility pay-off. If voters' policy preferences solely depended 
on their political-economic interests based on the change in income and wealth position as 
derived from the use and/or ownership of production factors, it would be relatively easy to 
calculate the incentive to vote with respect to specific policy programmes. If it were 
assumed that the utility or welfare change induced by a shift in agricultural policy can be 
approximated by the expected policy-induced real income change, it would be possible to 
calculate a policy-induced voting incentive. In this line of thought, Tyers and Anderson 
(1992:92-94) have constructed "indicators of aggregate gross incentives to influence trade 
policy decisions". The calculation of such incentives consists of an economic part -
denoted by the elasticity of the group's real income with respect to a change in agricultural 
product prices - and a political part reflecting the group's share of votes, as approximated 
by the employment share2. The agricultural-policy-induced voting incentive fl>g for any 
voter group i can then be denoted as: 
2 Tyers and Anderson (1992) distinguish four groups: farmers, industrial capitalists, other capitalists 
and non-farm workers. Their results are based on a three sector general equilibrium model with hypothetical data 
for a poor agrarian and a rich industrial economy. 
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where Yf is the real income of group i; AYS is the agricultural-policy induced change in 
real income of group i; Pj is the original (composite) agricultural product price; Apj is the 
agricultural-policy-induced change in the agricultural product price; nj is the size of group 
i; N is the total number of voters; and the product between brackets is the elasticity of 
group's i real income with respect to the agricultural product price j . The voting incentive 
for the separate agricultural policy items can be calculated by taking Pj as the price of the 
(composite) commodity. Note that by nature the calculated income elasticity is valid only 
on a limited trajectory. 
The 'gross voting incentive'-concept is grounded on extreme assumptions which renders 
its practical use questionable. First, its empirical content presumes that each voter has 
perfect information with respect to the consequences of (future) policies. In reality, 
however, the information voters have on candidates' policy platforms and the conse-
quences of specific policies is incomplete and imperfect3. Following Downs (1957), the 
individual voter - confronted with the negligible probability that he can affect the voting 
outcome - is rationally ignorant, meaning that he will collect information until he judges 
that the marginal costs of searching political information equal his marginal benefits. 
Second, it denies the fact that in reality people have to vote for a 'pre-cooked' package of 
issues rather than a single issue policy. In the Tyers and Anderson set-up, all issues get the 
same weighting, the only difference being the real income elasticities. Third, the narrow 
focus on the expected policy effects on individual or group income neglects other-
regarding, altruistic voting motives. Furthermore, the voting incentive concept presupposes 
that society can be classified in voter groups with identical policy preferences which is a 
highly vulnerable assumption. While the former objections are - implicitly or explicitly -
also acknowledged by Tyers and Anderson, they ignore the fact that policy instruments 
with the same income effect for voters and politicians might still have differing political 
attractiveness. The instrument choice is assumed to be independent from (strategic) 
political considerations. It should be realised, however, that voters and politicians may 
have different preferences for types of instruments although they can have - in the short 
term - yield the same income effect. On the one hand, passionate, informed voters are 
likely to assess whether instruments are politically sustainable or not, contrary to the 
general public which is passive - i.e. rationally ignorant vis-a-vis the exact details of 
particular minority-specific policies. They may take the expected political robustness - the 
political 'life expectancy' - of the instrument into account. For instance, farmers might 
prefer indirect farm income support by means of price support (e.g., through intervention 
buying) to direct lump-sum income supplements. On the other hand, the incumbent 
The distinction between incomplete and imperfect information stems from game theory. A player 
faces imperfect information when he does not know what other players have done beforehand. A player has 
incomplete information when he does not know his rival's precise characteristics (preferences, strategy spaces). 
See, e.g., Tirole (1988). 
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government can only accomplish redistributive policies in favour of voter minorities when 
the redistributive mechanism is sufficiently obfuscated (Magee et al., 1989). Otherwise, a 
majority of the electorate could easily oppose and vote against the redistributive measure, 
supposing that absence of altruism and that voters can vote on each policy issue separately. 
The political robustness of policy instruments used to favour voter minorities therefore 
critically hinges on the existence of information asymmetries between the incumbent 
government vis-a-vis the general public. That is, informational intransparencies with 
respect to the effects of policy instruments could improve their political robustness. 
5.4 The farm vote: some conceptual weaknesses 
Although the farm vote is an appealing construct for explaining agrarian power in politics, 
closer investigation of the concept reveals some important conceptual weaknesses. It is 
usually assumed rather than investigated that the farm vote consists of citizens with 
identical or similar agricultural policy preferences who can be mobilised to vote for a 
specific programme, party or candidate. If we take the simple and straightforward 
definition of the farm vote as those people employed in agriculture, the homogeneous 
preference assumption can be severely questioned.4 Even if we take agricultural policy as 
the only electoral issue that matters and assume that all voters are perfectly informed, there 
may be considerable differences in expected utility from government policy between 
farmers depending on their initial income and wealth situation and, more specifically, the 
ownership / employment of factors of production. For instance, a large landowning farmer 
will have different politico-economic interests, and therefore preferences, than a small 
tenant or hired worker and as a consequence will have different incentives to vote. For the 
same reason voting incentives may also differ between a part-time farmer (who spends part 
of his working time in the services or industry sector) and a full-time farmer. In most 
western industrialised economies agricultural policy is a generic term for various support 
regimes depending the specific form and type of agricultural production. The fact that 
farmers' activities differ and not all farmers are eligible for the same support regime, 
causes that voting incentives of the farm electorate tend to diverge. There may be huge 
differences between arable crops and livestock programmes; between different arable crop 
regimes (e.g., oilseeds vs. grains); between livestock programmes (dairy vs. beef cattle; 
beef vs. sheepmeat); between input and output support. Together these factors may actually 
drive agricultural voters apart rather than unite them in one homogeneous farm vote. The 
idea that the electorate can be divided into classes or groups depending the professional 
background or production factor use and/or ownership of individuals presupposes that the 
individual's choice for a particular party or candidate is primarily determined by policies 
affecting his income and wealth position, and dependent on his position in the economic 
system. A necessary condition for the farm vote to have an influence on the election 
outcome is that parties have markedly different policy platforms and that agricultural 
4 Homogeneous is used here in the sense of identical or similar; it should not be confused with its 
mathematical connotation. 
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policy is one of out of a limited number of major electoral issues, which both are 
vulnerable assumptions. But even if agricultural policy would be a major electoral theme, 
its multidimensional character as a consequence of the variety in the type of agricultural 
production cause that political parties will take different positions in policy issue space to 
attract as many voters they can get. This not only leads to the well-known cycling result 
found in the spatial theory of elections, making the outcome highly unpredictable, but also 
causes a split in the farm vote itself. 
5.5 The farm vote: mixed empirical evidence 
The only evidence in favour of the farm vote is that in most industrialised economies, 
and especially in western Europe, farmers as an occupational group have a pronounced 
party preference: they identify themselves with established parties (Hagedorn and Schmitt, 
1985:264; Haase, 1983:170) and appear to have a clear preference for right-wing parties 
(e.g. Lewis-Beck, 1977:447; Averyt, 1977:11, 32-33; Smith, 1990:17). Most systematic 
evidence for this relative party attachment is based on public opinion surveys. For 
example, survey results (Commission of the European Communities, 1988) show a 
relatively strong inclination among agricultural voters in the European Union towards the 
centre-right of the political spectrum (see table 5.1; see also appendix 11.2). 
Table 5.1 Political preferences of farmers and the general public in the EU 
Pol i t i ca l pos i t ion Farmers ( in % ) Genera l pub l i c ( in % ) 
Extreme left (positions 1 and 2) 5 7 
Left (positions 3 and 4) 11 21 
Centre (position 5 and 6) 36 35 
Right (position 7 and 8) 20 17 
Extreme right (position 9 and 10) 9 5 
Don't know/no answer 19 15 
Key: Respondents were asked to scale themselves on a 1-10 left-right scale indicating their political 
position in response to the question: "In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right". How 
would you place your views on this scale?". 
Source: Commission, 1988, p.15. Results were based on two separate surveys, both held in 1987. The 
first survey included 1,000 respondents of 15 year and older for each member state, except Luxembourg 
(300) and the United Kingdom (1,000 + 300 for Northern-Ireland). The second survey specifically 
concerned the agricultural sector and concerned 300 farm heads of each member state. 
The political leaning to the right is especially strong in Denmark, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and Germany; in Spain the percentage of right-wing farmers is moderate, 
though twice as large as the general public. Only in Italy and Portugal the difference in 
political preferences between the population as a whole and the farmers is less distinct. In 
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most countries the percentage of fanners that considers itself to very or fairly close to a 
political party is larger compared to the population at large.5 The evidence that farmers 
have a specific inclination to the right of the political spectrum does not unequivocally 
support our arguments for a split farm vote. Yet if it is assumed that the farm vote consists 
of voters for whom agricultural policy preferences have a dominant influence on their 
choice in the ballot box, how do we explain the major differences between farmers in 
terms of initial endowments and market incomes if we assume that these are important 
voting incentives? And how do we explain the major differences in agricultural support 
across farm sectors? Both factors give rise to rejecting the notion of a homogenous farm 
vote. The position of farmers on the right part of the spectrum could perhaps better be 
explained by the valuation of free entrepreneurship or a strong positive valuation of the 
'country life' than their agricultural policy preferences per se. The pivotal and crucial role 
which is sometimes assigned to the farm vote is less determined by its voting power per se 
- being a minority compared to the rest of the electorate at least in the industrial market 
economies -, but more by the strong organisation of the easily mobilisable nature of 
agricultural interests in general. Regional concentrations of the farm vote might lead to a 
leverage result in electoral terms (e.g., Ehrensaft and Beeman, 1990), but are more 
dependent on the type of decision rules and the 'electoral formula' of a country (e.g., 
Keeler, 1996) than on the size of the farm vote from a numbers point of view. Other 
factors, for example the empirical fact found in the French case that active farmers have a 
higher voter turnout than other parts of the electorate (Keeler, 1996:130) seem to point at 
the ability to mobilise and deliver the farm vote by agricultural interest groups and the 
importance of farm organisations in this respect. Support for this type of explanation can 
also be found in Moyer and Josling (1990:45) who argue that "(f)arm organizations have 
demonstrated the ability to 'deliver' the farm vote, which strengthens their position with 
policy-makers."6 The agrarian power in politics reflected by the outcome of elections 
comes about in a political environment where "other political forces are relatively evenly 
balanced". 
5.6 'Downsian ignorance' and the vote of the general public 
Till now, we have disregarded the question whether or not, and if so, to what extent 
agricultural policy programmes influence the voting behaviour of the general public. The 
rest of the electorate was supposed to be indifferent, at least within certain 'bounds of 
acceptance', to parties' agricultural policy platforms or agricultural policy records and to 
derive its utility from other forms of policy. There is a close link between these 'bounds 
The survey (Commission of the EC, 1988:15) ascribes this phenomenon "mainly to the special 
characteristics of the sector of the population, which consists predominantly of men aged 40 and over, who are 
customarily more motivated when it comes to politics than women or young people." 
6 They even seem to allot a mutually reinforcing force to the existence of farm organisations and the 
farm vote, witness "(t)he influence of the EC farm lobby has been strengthened by the political importance of the 
'farm vote' (Moyer and Josling 1990: 45). 
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of acceptance' and the Downsian rational ignorant voter assumption7. On the one hand, 
the existence of such 'bounds' may explain why political candidates often choose among 
'local' options, i.e. policies within a small neighbourhood of the status quo, instead of 
large changes in the policy set. This behaviour is related to the prohibitively high cost of 
gathering information on voters' policy preferences, and institutional restrictions (e.g., 
Coughlin and Nitzan, 1981). On the other hand, the incentives of the general public to get 
informed about major reforms (a change in the policy instrument mix) will be stronger 
than to get informed about the gradual changes in the level(s) of policy instruments with 
negligible effects on welfare. The greater the expected utility impact, the stronger the 
incentive to get informed. Catalysts, like interest groups and the mass media, may play a 
crucial role in this respect. A well-timed mobilisation and manipulation of public opinion, 
either by political parties themselves or by interest groups, can lead to a voting turn-out in 
which candidates who advocate to redress agricultural policy programmes gain the 
majority, thereby harming the political-economic interests of farmers. The 'bounds of 
acceptance' therefore are not firmly fixed, but can be assumed to change due to informa-
tion flows. For instance, a strong protectionist policy in favour of agriculture at a high 
visible (budget) cost for other groups in society could mobilize a vote against such 
government intervention, making agricultural policy and the politico-economic interests of 
the agricultural sector a major issue in the elections, to the potential disadvantage of the 
agricultural sector. With more indirect forms of support which affect the price of agricul-
tural and food products, the sensitivity to farm support policies is larger for voters who 
spend a relatively large share of their income on food than those who spend a relatively 
small share on food as compared to other expenditure categories, ceteris paribus*. 
5.7 Agricultural policy formation and the spatial voting model 
The implicit gist of the farm-vote literature is that the farm vote is - or can be made 
into - a crucial factor for the election outcome. It presupposes a strong interconnection 
between the electoral and the legislative process which is very, similar to the Downsian 
conception that politicians formulate policies in order to win elections. The core question 
of this section is whether or not the Downsian model and its successor, the formal spatial 
voting model, can explain agricultural policy formation and account for the preferential 
treatment of the agricultural sector in democratic industrialised market economies. Is it 
possible to empirically analyse agricultural policy formation taking the spatial voting 
According to Downs (1957a:147) "(a) rational man can become well informed for four reasons: 
(1) he may enjoy being well informed for its own sake, so that information as such provides him with utility; (2) 
he may believe the election is going to be so close that the probability of his casting the decisive vote is relatively 
high; (3) he may need information to influence the votes of others so that he can alter the outcome of the election 
or persuade government to assign his preferences more weight than those of others; or (4) he may need 
information to influence the formation of government policy as a lobbyist". 
8On a macro-scale the same type of argument holds for low income - developing - countries and high 
income - developed - countries, respectively. 
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model as the point of departure? Can we test hypotheses about the relationship between 
elections and policy formation in partial or general equilibrium models of political-
economic markets, using time-series and/or cross-section empirical data as an integral part 
of the analysis, and not - as is often done - as a proforma and a posteriori justification of 
the theory? 
Earlier research by predominantly German agricultural economists has concluded that 
the Downsian framework offers a meaningful explanation only if farmers behave as 
floating or volatile voters ('Wechselwähler'), and therefore can play a decisive role in the 
voting process (Beusmann and Hagedorn, 1984; Hagedorn and Schmitt, 1985). Haase 
(1983:37) claims that "Ökonomische Wahlmodelle sind (..) nur zur Beschreibung der meist 
kleineren Teilgruppe der Wechselwähler geeignet" [i.e. "economic voting models are fit 
only for the description of the, mostly, smaller groups of volatile voters"] and seems to 
take the differences between 'Wechselwähler' and 'Stammwähler' (steady and party-loyal 
voters) as a decisive criterion for the use of a Downsian voting model9. According to 
Scheele (1990:15), the 'Stammwähler-Wechselwähler' dichotomy could serve as the basis 
of a bifocal electoral strategy for political parties. The 'Stammwähler'-strategy could 
supply political parties with a regular voting clientele and a higher degree of party identifi-
cation. For voters the 'Stammwähler'-strategy has two interrelated advantages: it offers a 
higher degree of 'calculability' of politics, and thereby lowers the costs of gathering 
information. The 'Stammwähler'-strategy enables political parties to secure a reliable vote 
share and to simultaneously address their 'operational potential' ("operatives Potential") to 
the smaller rest group of volatile voters. The prime way to gain this volatile vote is to 
offer it preferential treatment in the form of redistributive policies. Since the taxation cost 
of such policies can be born by the society at large, with a limited - seemingly invisible -
per capita burden due to the small numerical size of the 'Wechselwähler', such strategies 
will not provoke any changes in the voting behaviour of loyal 'Stammwähler'. 
Superficial inspection suggests that the beneficial treatment of agricultural producers can 
be explained by 'Wechselwähler' party strategies. However, the group of farmers - though 
small - is not as homogeneous as is sometimes assumed. The existing empirical evidence 
on party attachment could also be interpreted as that ideology and party reputations are 
important ingredients in the voting behaviour of farmers, which is an argument pro the 
'Stammwähler' rather and contra the 'Wechselwähler' hypothesis. Although the dichotomy 
between 'Wechselwähler' and 'Stammwähler' may be a useful criterion to distinguish 
between voters, it is not an integral part of either Downs's economic theory of democracy 
or its formal successor, the spatial voting model. The crucial assumption is not that voters 
are floating or steady and loyal, but instead that parties formulate policies (adopt policy 
"Wähler im allgemeinen setzen sich aus der Gruppe der Stammwähler und der Wechselwähler 
zusammen. Die grundsätzliche Zustimmung zu einer Partei ist bei Stammwählern von Faktoren abhängig, die 
sich nur langfristig ändern und von Parteien nur schwer gelenkt werden können; die sind nicht-ökonomische 
Faktoren. Die Gruppe der Wechselwähler ist dagegen eher durch kurz- und mittelfristig zu veränderende 
Faktoren zu beeinflussen." (Haase, 1983:37). 
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platforms) to attract as many voters as possible10. The spatial voting model pictures 
citizens as prospectively-oriented utility maximisers who can position themselves costlessly 
in policy space. It is assumed that political competition is impartial: voters have no loyalty 
to any party and, vice versa, parties have no loyalty to voters. Ideology plays a role in 
reducing the information gap on the part of voters. However, once a party "has placed its 
ideology "on the market," it cannot suddenly abandon or radically alter that ideology 
without convincing the voters that is unreliable" (Downs 1957a:142)u. In the Downsian 
conception the electoral support obtained by political parties is related to the extent in 
which policies affect the welfare level of voters. 
The spatial voting model can in principle be applied in single issue as well as multiple 
issue space. Multi-issue dimensions almost always lead to non-existing or instable 
equilibria characterised by cycling, especially when redistributional issues are at stake. The 
spatial model could yield a useful framework for explaining the formation of agricultural 
policy, if - and only if - agricultural policy could be depicted as a single electoral issue in 
policy space. It is clear that this supposition has cumbersome implications for the 
application of the spatial voting model to real-world agricultural policy formation, since 
agricultural policy programmes generally consist of a multidimensional package of 
instruments with both allocational and redistributional objectives. Sometimes one and the 
same instrument is used to reach both public good and redistributive goals which make 
them difficult to disentangle. Confronted with both the multiple-issue dimensionality and 
the redistributive content of agricultural policies, the explanatory basis of the spatial model 
seems particularly weak. The explanatory basis is even less suitable if it is taken into 
account that voters do not live in isolation but have preferences for other policy themes as 
well. This weighting of different policy preferences causes that it is not a priori sure that a 
voter will vote for the candidate that serves his agricultural policy preferences best. It can 
even be questioned whether farmers regard the expected utility changes from agricultural 
policy platforms as their dominant voting motive. 
The only way in which the spatial voting model can still yield meaningful results with 
respect to the explanation of agricultural policy formation is when agricultural policy 
preferences could be captured on an political-ideological left-right (us: liberal-conserva-
tive) scale. According to Downs (1957a:141) ideology is a "verbal image of 'the good 
society' and of the chief policies to be set in creating it". Downs saw ideology as a short-
hand device which in the light of pervasive uncertainty can help voters predict a can-
didate's actions, once elected: "(A) voter finds party ideologies useful because they remove 
the necessity for relating every issue to his own conception of 'the good society'" (Downs, 
ibidem). In line with this Kalt and Zupan (1984:281) have defined ideologies as "more or 
1 0 The spatial theory of elections draws a crucial distinction between politicians and voters. The 
relationship between voting and policy formation is more direct in the spatial theory of committees (see e.g. 
Enelow and Hinich, 1990:1). 
" A party cannot "change ideologies as though they were disguises, putting on whatever costume 
suits the situation". (Downs 1957a:142) 
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less consistent sets of normative statements as to best or preferred states of the world". 
Poole (1984:118) argues that left and right "are best understood as labels that have become 
attached to certain consistent patterns of political behaviour". Most empirical political 
economy research on these issues has focused on voters' ideological concerns for (unem-
ployment and inflation. Right-wing voters appear to be most concerned about inflation, 
while their left-wing counterparts are most concerned about unemployment (e.g., Mueller, 
1989:291 ff.). However, the interpretation of the left-right distinction as predominantly 
concerning 'grand' macroeconomic policy issues clearly is too restrictive for explaining 
sector-specific policy formation. For this type of questions the distinction between pure 
public goods, quasi-public goods, regulatory and redistributional policies seems more 
relevant (Aranson and Ordeshook, 1981; Knappe, 1980; Scheele, 1990). As Aranson and 
Ordeshook (1981) have explained the use of the spatial voting framework is sensible only 
if the policy issue has the character of a pure public good. Yet, it is difficult to depict 
public goods in a left-right policy space. The stated preferences of farmers for right-wing 
parties can perhaps better be explained by the notion of ideology advanced by Conover 
and Feldman (1981) who argued that there are at least two left-right policy dimensions: an 
'economic' dimension (e.g., pro or contra social security and minimum wages; pro or 
contra free enterprise) and a 'social' dimension (e.g., for or against human rights, abortion, 
or change in general) (see also Stevens, 1993:155). Translated to the agricultural policy 
domain the economic dimension could be interpreted as the perception of the electorate of 
the 'farm problem' as a form of market failure, and the social dimension as the valuation 
of farming and the attributes of farm life. While a two-dimensional scaling would clarify 
the different aspects involved, it greatly complicates the analysis in a spatial voting 
context. 
Whether farmers have a different set of values and a different image of the 'good 
society' compared to the general public, or reversely, whether farmers have an inclination 
to the right because certain parties or politicians would be more concerned with the fate of 
farmers, is unanswered. For instance, Scheele (1990: 16) regards the establishment of 
'internal lobbies' in political parties and the government based on stability, trust and ideo-
logical consensus as an important instrument of interest groups to influence agricultural 
policy-making. Haase (1983: 83) observes that the number of politicians who "have their 
roots in, have a feeling of solidarity to or are interested in the agricultural sector" is 
disproportionately high. Whether a polician's ideology affects his behaviour and whether 
or not this causes him to deviate from the interests of his constituents in favour of farming 
(or a sub-group of his constituency) could be tested along lines proposed by, e.g., Kau and 
Rubin (1979) and Kalt and Zupan (1984). 
5.8 Agricultural policy formation and the theory of regulation 
De Gorter and Tsur (1991), Swinnen and De Gorier (1992a), as well as Swinnen (1994) 
have taken a generalised version of the Stigler-Peltzman framework for explaining 
agricultural protection patterns. Contrary to spatial voting models where political support is 
interpreted strictly as the number of votes per candidate or party, political support here is 
conceived more broadly as "the probability that a member expresses support for the 
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government through votes, popularity and the like" (De Gorter and Tsur, 1991:1245). The 
explanatory framework is based on a division of society into two homogeneous groups 
with identical preferences. De Gorter and Tsur take the production factor ownership as the 
criterion to distinguish between a rural group (land owners) and an urban group (labour 
owners). Swinnen divides the population in those employed in the agricultural sector and 
those employed in the manufacturing sector, with labour employment as the distinguishing 
criterion. In line with the Stigler-Peltzman methodology it is assumed that the (incumbent) 
regulator maximises a political support function S, denoted by 
max S = max [n S" + n, 5"! 
where S "measures the intensity of political support from a group (z = s,t), n, is the number 
of individuals in each group, s is the rural group of land owners [the agricultural sector in 
Swinnen] and t is the urban group of labour owners [the manufacturing sector in Swin-
nen]. The intensity of support is reflected by the policy-induced change in income x (De 
Gorter and Tsur, 1991): 
S' = S'(x) 
and the expected policy-induced change in utility (Swinnen and De Gorter, 1993; 1992a; 
Swinnen, 1994), respectively: 
5 ' = S[v'(x) - v'(0)] 
where x is the transfer level and v is an indirect utility function. The specification of the 
political support function resembles Downs (1957); the models differ from Downs in that 
both politicians and voters have perfect information and voting costs are zero. An 
interesting feature is that De Gorter and Tsur by accounting for a relative and a re-
distributed income motive try to trace back the underlying motivation for giving support. 
The relative income motive expresses feelings of deprivation or satisfaction with respect to 
those with a higher (lower) income, whereas the redistributed income motive reflects the 
fact that voters prefer policies which transfer more wealth to them12. 
De Gorter and Tsur argue that the main determinant of agricultural protection lies in the 
decrease in the farmers' income relative to that of the rest of the economy. This income 
differential allows politicians to increase their political support by transferring income to 
farmers. They support their arguments with a regression analysis based on data from 
Krueger et al. (1988) indicating a positive correlation between rural-urban income differen-
The relative income motive depends on the relative income position of individual i, which is equal 
to the sum of the income differences vis-a-vis the other individuals summarized in the so-called aggregate income 
gap h,(x). In a society of two individuals i and j , the income gap is h,/x) = y/x) - y/x), where y denotes 
individual income. An increase in this aggregate income gap h,(x) increases the intensity of political support from 
member i. In the two-group case, the aggregate income gap of the rural group is h(x) • n „ and of the urban group 
-h(x) • n „ with h(x) - Y/x) - Y/x). The redistributed income motive reflects that individuals prefer policies that 
transfer more wealth to them as denoted by F(y,(x) - y/0)), where F(-) is an increasing and strictly concave 
function. In the two-group case the redistributed income motive is F[Y/x) - Y/0)] for the rural group, and FfY/x) 
- Y/0)] for the urban group, respectively. 
76 The farm vote 
tials and agricultural protection levels. Swinnen (1994) integrates the above framework 
with a general equilibrium specification of the economy to analyse the impact of structural 
economic changes on the level of agricultural protection13. Political weights are deter-
mined by the economic structure and the relative welfare levels, which are endogenously 
determined as a function of the transfer policy. Swinnen shows that as income in agricul-
ture falls relative to the rest of the economy, agricultural protection will increase. This 
hypothesis is strongly related to the insurance motive (see chapter 3, section 3.5) for 
government intervention and to the findings of Honma and Hayami (1986) regarding the 
impact of relative productivity ratios on levels of agricultural protection. The per capita 
transfers for each group equal: 
xs = [x - C%x)Vns 
x< = ~[x + C'(x)]/n, 
where C denote the deadweight costs associated with transfer x. An increase in marginal 
deadweight costs reduces equilibrium transfers. Swinnen's results support the earlier -
more ad hoc specified - hypotheses that agricultural protection increases as wage rate and 
industrial profit elasticities with respect to food prices decline (Anderson and Tyers, 1988) 
and as the share of food in total consumer expenditures declines (Balisacan and Rou-
masset, 1987). The model indicates that there is a negative relationship between agricul-
tural employment and the level of protection. Furthermore, if the industrial capital stock is 
sufficiently large vis-a-vis the capital stock in agriculture, an increase in the agricultural or 
industrial capital intensity will induce a higher equilibrium subsidy. 
The analyses of De Gorter and Tsur (1991), Swinnen and De Gorter (1992a), as well as 
Swinnen (1994) show some interesting theoretical insights with respect to the relationship 
between protection, political support, and the size of voter groups in a world of perfect 
information and identical preferences of all actors. But how useful is the Stigler-Peltzman 
framework for the empirical analysis of agricultural policy formation? The assumption of a 
clean-cut division of society in an urban and a rural group neglects the heterogeneity of 
policy preferences in general and that of the farm vote in particular, as was argued in 
section 3 and 4. Another objection refers to use of the political support concept as 
comprising more elements than voting alone, and - in particular - its specification as a 
strictly concave well-behaved increasing function of the change in utility (or income) 
reflecting the intensity of political support. Political support is thus used as a 'garbage can' 
concept, which obscures rather than illuminates the question why politicians maximise 
their political support as a goal per se, and hence lead away from the Downsian notion 
that "parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections to 
formulate policies" (Downs, 1957:28). But what the concept political support means in a 
multiple-issue context in which information is costly and politicians compete for votes in a 
world in which agricultural policy is one out of many electoral (or popularity) issues is not 
Swinnen employs a specific-factor model in which each sector uses one specific immobile factor 
in fixed supply (agricultural capital K A and industrial capital K„) and one perfectly mobile factor labour K L (split 
in L„ and I_A representing the quantity of labour in both sectors). 
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explained. In this sense, it is different from the original specification by Peltzman (1976) 
who explicitly accounts for expenditure on political campaigns, the costs of organising 
support and efforts to mitigate opposition. 
Furthermore, assuming perfect information on the side of politicians and voters is a 
rather heroical assumption, not only since the existence of asymmetric information seems 
an important factor for the way in which transfers are provided (Coate and Morris, 1995), 
but also since asymmetric information can be considered as one of the raisons d'etre 
behind the existence of lobbying and interest groups. One of the crucial insights of 
Downs' economic theory of democracy is the importance of imperfect information in 
politics which "allows the unequal distributions of income, position, and influence" 
(Downs, 1957a:141)14. In this respect, it should be noted that the means through which 
political support is given are fully neglected, in sharp contrast to the literature on interest 
group models in which information flows are seen as a crucial mechanism in politics (see 
chapter 7). Perhaps it makes more sense to view politician-voter interaction models as a 
reaction to explanations based on the competition among interest group, -witness "(t)he 
unique aspect of our approach is that we can obtain Becker's results without having to rely 
on lobbying, voting costs or costs of organizing pressure groups" (Swinnen and De Gorier, 
1993:286) - than as a framework for thorough empirical analysis15. 
Furthermore, although the incentives for giving political support are more explicitly 
traced back to individual voting behaviour than under the approach taken by Tyers-Ander-
son, they have a one-sided focus on income. This holds not only for De Gorier and Tsur, 
but also for its generalisation by Swinnen, and Swinnen and De Gorier in which individ-
uals are assumed to maximise an indirect utility function u(y'), with y ' = y1 + x ', with y 
denoting pre-policy endowment income and x the transfer. 
Apart from these more theoretical objections, the fact that the model has never been 
tested empirically can be regarded as a serious shortcoming of the model. De Gorier, 
Swinnen and Tsur (1990) in an application of the model to agricultural policy preferences 
in the EC admit "(A) rigorous empirical test of the hypotheses of this model is complicated 
by the difficulties of measuring the underlying 'policy preferences' across countries." 
Construction of reliable indicators of pre-policy endowments in an economy in which 
agricultural support for long has been so pervasive is perilous. As a result the empirical 
support for the model has a strong ad hoc character16. 
"Lack of information on which to base decisions is a condition so basic to human life that it 
influences the structure of almost every social institution. In politics especially, its effects are profound." (Downs, 
1957a:139). 
l s It should be noted that the fact that Becker's results are obtained without these elements is not 
highly surprising, given the fact that the political support is defined as "comparable to 'political pressure' in 
pressure group models" (Swinnen, 1994:3), modelled as a proportional function of policy-induced income change, 
and the fact that both politicians and voters have perfect information. 
1 6 This also holds for the support from the Krueger et al. data (see earlier). 
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5.9 Conclusion 
In general, focusing on agricultural policy issues is not a reliable strategy for a political 
party to secure its electoral success, predominantly because of the limited numerical 
strength of the agricultural voters as a percentage of the total vote in industrialised 
economies. Furthermore, the homogeneity of the farm vote - and therewith the use of the 
farm vote as an analytical concept - can be severely questioned in an electoral context. 
Even if the general public can be assumed to be indifferent with respect to agricultural 
policy issues, there are enough arguments to think of the farm vote as split rather than 
homogeneously united. The decision of a political candidate to take a certain position in 
policy space is strategically determined and crucially depends on his (probabilistic) beliefs 
and information about citizens' voting motives. For political candidates the ex ante 
selection of voting themes will be difficult, since information about voter preferences is 
imperfect and usually is unevenly distributed among political candidates. Changes in 
voting behaviour might be expected only if political candidates take strongly different 
agricultural policy positions in agricultural policy space compared to the last elections. 
However, this is not a credible strategy, for it may harm candidates' reputations. That 
reputation is important is shown by the tendency to seek a persistent voting clientele and 
to offer a higher degree of party identification by taking ideological standpoints. Neither 
the spatial voting model, nor the Stigler-Peltzman methodology employed by De Gorter 
and Tsur (1991), Swinnen and De Gorter (1993) and Swinnen (1994) seem to offer the 
'right framework' for explaining agricultural policy developments in which empirical data 
can be applied as an integral part of the analysis. Apart from the inherent model character-
istics and limitations, this conclusion is even more true in view of the fact that important 
actors encountered in the real-world domain of policy formation - notably interest groups 
and bureaucrats - are completely neglected. 
C H A P T E R 6 
T H E POLITICAL ECONOMY O F INTEREST GROUP FORMATION AND POLICY INFLUENCE 
" Pressure... is always a group phenomenon. It indicates the push and resistance between groups. 
The balance of this group pressure is the existing state of society. Pressure is broad enough to 
include ... from battle and riot to abstract reasoning and sensitive morality". Arthur F. Bentley 
(1908: 258-60) 
6.1 Introduction 
The second major research programme in political economy is concerned with the 
organisation of interest groups as well as the political activities and policy influence of 
interest groups. In most industrialised countries agricultural policies have been biased in 
favour of agricultural producer interests at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. Interest 
group scholars have frequently argued that this bias exists because of specific 
characteristics and activities of certain interest groups, in particular farmers' organisations, 
in the political market. 
Existing interest group research in political economy can by and large be divided into 
two categories: (i) studies which focus on the existence, formation and organisation of 
interest groups, highlighting intra-organisational patterns of behaviour such as free-riding 
and the availability of behavioural ('selective') incentives, and (ii) studies which focus on 
the relationship between policy outcomes and the political activities of interest groups and 
their characteristics. This chapter discusses the literature on interest group formation and 
deals with the function of organisation in establishing policy influence. The next chapter 
more explicitly focuses on interest group models of policy influence. The rationale for this 
bipartitioning is twofold. First, interest group models of policy influence build strongly on 
the concepts and ideas developed in the literature on interest group formation. Second, by 
focusing on organisational aspects such as membership and costs of collective action, a 
distinction can be made between the farm vote and the interest group concept. While the 
farm vote was primarily defined as an electoral phenomenon in which formal organisation 
played no role, it in principle covers the same category of individuals; both driven by the 
same kind of policy preferences, organisation is what determines the difference between the 
farm vote and farmers' organisations. A major topic in the political science literature on 
interest groups concerns the question whether organisation is a necessary and/or sufficient 
condition to exert policy influence. Especially empirical political economy accounts of 
policy influence suffer from conceptual vagueness on this point, which blurs the difference 
between interest groups as a collective of actors that attempts to establish policy influence 
by lobbying and providing campaign contributions and interest groups as a voter category. 
That the two need not coincide is obvious. At the same, it is clear that farmers' 
organisations could play an important role in mobilising the farm vote. 
Contrary to earlier chapters, this chapter draws on insights from both the political 
science and the political economy literature on interest groups. This is done not only to 
clarify the differences between the two research traditions, but also to explain the 
theoretical focus of political economy models of interest groups. The interest group 
perspective on policy formation has a rich and long-standing tradition in political science. 
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The majority of interest group analyses in the (older) political science tradition1 can be 
characterized as descriptive, inductive and case-study oriented, often rich of institutional 
detail and non-formal. In contrast, the political economy perspective on interest groups 
seeks to provide a more parsimonious explanatory framework with the premise of method-
ological individualism and the use of formal, deductive methods as its basic ingredients. 
Nevertheless, while most research on voting models can be seen as either a follow-up or a 
reaction to the work of Downs (1957), the political economy literature on interest groups is 
of a more scattered, diverse, sometimes casuistic and less mature nature and lacks a 
unifying 'standard model'. However, most of it can be seen as inspired or provoked by the 
seminal work of Olson (1965). The contents of this chapter are as follows. Section 2 
discusses prevailing typologies of interest groups based on interest content, membership 
and organisational characteristics. Section 3 shortly describes Olson's (1965) theory of 
collective action. Section 4 establishes a link between the phenomenon of collective action 
and the competition for policy influence with other groups. In section 5 competing views 
on policy influence and social waste in both the political economy and the political science 
literature pass in review. Section 6 concludes with some remarks on the explanation of 
agricultural policy formation from an empirical perspective. 
6.2 Typologies of interest groups 
Interest group studies in both the political science and the political economy research 
tradition have typically focused on questions as to why interest groups exist and how they 
influence the policy-making process. But how do we define an interest group and what are 
its characteristic features? Unfortunately, there is no consensus with respect to the content 
of the term interest group, its use as a research concept, the labels used to designate 
interest group activities - lobbying, pressure, rent-seeking, collective action - or even the 
use of the term interest group itself (viz. pressure groups, lobbies, organised interests), 
despite - or is this just because of - a long-standing research tradition in political science2. 
In order to circumvent conceptual confusion, the term interest group is deployed here to 
indicate 
a number of individuals with a common interest that is furthered by joint (collec-
tive) action with the aim of influencing government or governmental agents in 
pursuing that common interest. 
The label 'the political science perspective on interest groups' includes research in pluralist and 
corporatist political theory, as well as research in the policy network and the policy community tradition. It 
applies to interest group research in the domains of public administration, policy sciences, political sociology and 
political science (narrowly defined). It should be noted that rational-choice type explanations have also found their 
way in contemporary political science, especially in the U.S. Mainstream research, however, still reflects what it is 
called here the 'political science tradition'. 
2See, e.g., Salisbury, 1975; Schlozman and Tieraey, 1986; Grant, 1989; Wilson, 1990; Cigler and Loomis, 
1991; Zeigler, 1992. 
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The following section gives an indicative impression - rather than an exhaustive account 
- of possible typologies of interest groups is given for a better understanding, in general 
terms, of the activities and policy interests of interest groups in the agricultural policy 
domain. Starting point is Salisbury's (1975) distinction between typologies based on (i) 
interest content, (ii) organisational forms and (iii) membership types. 
(i) Typologies based on interest content 
With respect to interest content Salisbury (1975:182 ff.) observes a traditional diver-
gence in interpretation between American and English political theorists: while the former 
divide the interest group spectrum as predominantly determined by socio-economic back-
ground (sectional groups representing agriculture, labour, business, 'the professions'), the 
latter also take account of cause or promotional groups organised to express a particular 
belief, principle or policy objective on the other (e.g., Stewart, 1958; Grant, 1989:12). A 
similar distinction, found in the political economy literature, is between groups that 
"further the objectives of their members as factors of production or producers" (e.g. labour 
unions, professional associations, retail trade organisations, or industrial trade organisati-
ons) and groups that "seek to influence public policy or public opinion with respect to par-
ticular public good-externality issues" (such as peace groups, environmental groups, or 
abstainer movements) (Mueller, 1989:308). 
On order to make clear that group membership is not always driven by narrow 
economic motives, political scientists have attempted to categorise individual benefits from 
group membership. Following Salisbury (1975: 184) individuals may experience material, 
solidary and expressive (purposive) benefits from group membership. Expressive benefits 
are linked to the potential benefits of advancing a particular cause or ideology, while 
solidary benefits refer to socially derived, intangible rewards created by the act of associ-
ation, such as a sense of identification, fun, conviviality, status or prestige.3 The category 
of material benefits is linked to the tangible 'economic' rewards from group participation, 
such as income and services (see also, e.g., Clark and Wilson, 1961; Salisbury, 1969; 
Wilson, 1973). The exchange of benefits or values between group members is also the 
pivot of Weber's classic distinction between associative and communal groups. A social 
relationship is associative if "(..) the orientation of social action within it rests on a 
rationally motivated adjustment of interests or a similarly motivated agreement", whereas a 
communal relationship "may rest on various types of affectual, emotional, or traditional 
bases" (Weber, 1947:136-137). Olson (1965:6) draws a similar distinction between 
"organizations with a significant economic aspect", that are "expected to further the 
interests of their members" as opposed to "philanthropic and religious organizations". 
Obviously, most interest groups in the agricultural policy domain, whether farmers or 
(firms within) the input supplies or food-processing industries, can be classified as socio-
economic 'sectional' groups, with the exception of environmental groups which can be 
Note that in the broader interpretation of self-interest (comprising altruistic and narrow egoistic 
motives) which is common in political economy, the term 'economic benefits' may include solidary and 
expressive benefits. 
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typified as a 'cause' or 'promotional' group. Consumers and taxpayers are much more 
diverse as a group, with diffuse and frequently diverging interests. As will be discussed 
later, this greatly affects their ability to organise and to influence government policy. 
(ii) Typologies based on organisational forms 
To account for differences in the degree of organisation Pross (1986:5) - among others -
distinguishes between formal interest groups (pressure groups), solidarity groups, and latent 
interests. Formal interest groups are organisations whose members act together to influence 
public policy in order to promote their common interest. Formal interest groups can be 
further classified according to (i) whether the group is federally organised or a unitary 
group, (ii) group size, and (iii) the type of control relations within the group, ranging from 
'corporate' structures - in which a small stable oligarchy holds effective control - to more 
democratic forms of control (Salisbury, 1975:186). A solidarity group is made up of 
individuals who have joint characteristics, share some sense of identity, and as such may 
foster enough group feeling to yield a common voting behaviour or elicit a common 
reaction to public events. Prima facie the 'farm vote' could serve as an example. A 
solidarity group generally lacks a formal organisation that can consciously mobilize group 
effort to achieve policy goals. Latent interests are comprised of individuals that, although 
they have interests in common, have no sense of solidarity with one another. As 
individuals, however, they may be extremely active in protecting their interests. 
The degree of organisation of interest groups in the agricultural policy domain differs 
greatly between countries, although some universal general patterns can be observed. 
Throughout the democratic industrialised market economies farmers and other agro-
business interests, such as the input supplies industry, industries involving the processing 
and manufacturing of food and drinks, and industries involved in the distribution of 
agricultural and food products (trading and transportation) are generally well-organised and 
represented, and belong therefor to the category of formal interest groups. Traditionally, 
consumers and taxpayers have a relatively weak degree of organisation, which is usually 
attributed to the diverse, diffuse and dispersed nature of their interests. 
(iii) Typologies based on membership types 
The membership of interest groups can be restricted to individuals, but this need not be 
the case: corporations and other legal entities can constitute and/or form interest groups as 
well. Interest group patterns in society reflect at least three organisational levels (e.g., 
Wootton, 1970). The first level is usually formed by an 'operational unit' which has 
exclusively individuals as its members and represents and articulates the interests of these 
members. Some of the operational units are themselves organised in a superstructure of 
'second-order' groups. Peak associations - sector-wide organisations - operate at still a 
higher level of organisation. While this layer-type structure is common in most 
industrialised economies, it is especially widespread in federal and supranational 
government systems (see also chapter 10). Eligibility for membership and, related, 
conditions restricting membership of an interest group are not unimportant. Many 
organisations are so-called role-based organisations, i.e. based on formal roles in society as 
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defined by one's employment and municipality (e.g., professional organisations). 
The last two typologies both bear the implicit presumption that organisation is the pivot 
of collective action. Most interest group research in political science has concentrated on 
organisations as the archetypical form underlying collective action. However, some 
scholars have questioned the necessity of formal organisation for groups to be politically 
influential. For instance, the pluralist Truman (1951) took the frequency of interaction 
between individuals rather than organisation per se as indicative, and emphasized that 
formal organisation is nothing more than an indication (proxy) for a stage or degree of 
interaction; potential interest groups in the 'becoming' stage of activity must be rated 
among interest groups as well (Truman, 1951: 34-35; 51). In this respect Truman's view is 
not very different from the early pluralist Bentley (1908). According to Truman (1951:33) 
an interest group is "any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes 
certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or 
enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes."4 Although 
organisation is neither a necessary, nor sufficient criterion for interest group activity, the 
importance of organisation in the analysis of collective action is beyond doubt "particularly 
in the context of politics" (ibidem:36). The search for factors responsible for group 
organization, however, have long been neglected, and have only seriously been taken up 
with and after Olson's (1965) seminal contribution. 
6.3 A political economy perspective on interest group formation 
For long the basic premise of political science research on interest groups has been that 
interest groups arise spontaneously and individuals join voluntarily to pursue their shared 
interests. Olson (1965) was the first to seriously question these assumptions. By explicitly 
accounting for the rational calculus of individuals underlying interest group formation, he 
provided the impetus for a micro-behavioral underpinning of interest group theory. The 
main theme of Olson's work is not so much whether organisation is the sine qua non for 
collective action, but under which conditions collective action occurs, and whether and 
how collective benefits from collective action are optimally provided. 
The gains from collective action typically take the form of a public good: collective 
benefits cannot be withheld from anyone in the group5. Collective action also involves 
Shared attitudes are to be understood as common habits of response or norms which "afford the 
participants frames of reference for interpreting and evaluating events and behaviors." (Truman, 1951:33-34). He 
distinguishes between interest groups and political interest groups: "(...) an interest group is a shared-attitude group 
that makes certain claims upon other groups in the society. If and when it makes its claims through or upon any 
of the institutions of government, it becomes a political interest group." (ibidem, 1951:37). 
5 According to Olson (1965:14) a public good is "any good such that, if any person X, in a group X„ 
X„ X„ consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from the others in that group."Although Olson was aware 
of - at that time - recent developments in the theory of public goods [e.g. Head (1962), witness Olson's footnotes 
on pages 14 and 38], his definition differs from the usual definition which takes both 'technical' characteristics of 
non-excludability and non-rivalry (or jointness of supply) as distinguishing criteria. Non-rivalry in consumption 
entails that an individual's utility from consuming the good is not affected by the presence of other individuals, 
casu quo group members; congestion costs are zero. Non-excludability means that it may not be technically 
feasible to exclude consumption on an individual basis. Non-excludability can also refer to the absence of the 
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costs, notably the direct resource costs of obtaining various levels of provision of a 
collective good and the costs of organisation (communication and bargaining among group 
members, costs of creating, staffing, and maintaining any formal group organisation 
(Olson, 1965:47). The benefits and costs of collective action as well as the (potential) 
number of membership serve as the basis for his distinction between privileged, 
intermediate or latent groups. A privileged group consists of individuals of whom at least 
one has an incentive to provide the public good on his own, even if he has to bear the full 
burden of provision; the public good thus "(...) may be obtained without any group 
organisation or coordination whatever" (ibid.:50). Characteristic of an intermediate group 
is that no single group member gets a share of the benefits sufficient to give him an 
incentive to provide the good himself; organisation or group coordination hence is a 
prerequisite for public good provision. A latent group consists of individuals who "cannot 
make noticeable contributions to any group effort" and since "no one in the group will 
react if [t]he [individual] makes no contribution, he has no incentive to contribute" 
(ibid. :50). It is clear that the number of (potential) members is important from an 
organisational point of view. Thus, while the privileged group "may get along without any 
group agreement or organization", in the intermediate or oligopoly-sized group "there must 
be at least tacit coordination or organization". Or stated more generally "[t]he larger a 
group is, the more agreement and organization it will need" (ibid.:46). However, the 
number of membership and group size are not equivalent. Olson's notion of group size 
does not only reflect the number of membership of the group, but does also depend "on 
the value of a unit of the collective good to each individual in the group" (ibid. :23). Group 
size thus reflects the gain per unit of provision (Sandler, 1992:24). Privileged and 
intermediate groups are relatively small, which limits potential incentives to free ride on 
the contributions of other group members, since the behaviour of a single group member 
can be assumed to have a non-negligible impact on the conduct and performance of the 
group as a whole. Small groups offer good opportunities for monitoring member behavi-
our, whereas enforcement of social norms - impinging on social status and social 
acceptance - is relatively easy (Olson, 1965: 61-62). In large groups the opportunities for 
monitoring, social control and enforcement of group members are limited, which increases 
the probability of free-riding behaviour within the group. Unless a separate and 'selective' 
incentive is provided to act in a group-oriented way, a latent group will not be mobilized 
and hence fails to provide the public good. Thus, ceteris paribus the more numerous are 
the selective incentives available to a group, the easier is its mobilisation. Selective 
incentives typically have a private, non-public good character, and can either be positive or 
negative inducements6. Note that Olson's original definition was inextricably linked with 
the (potential) benefits of collective action; so is a positive inducement defined as "any 
possibility of rejecting (the consumption of) the good by individuals (e.g., Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989; Brown 
and Jackson, 1990). 
6 Note that free riding can also be controlled - voluntarily or compulsorily - by implementing rules 
for sharing benefits and costs (e.g., Groves and Ledyard, 1977; Tideman and Tullock, 1976). 
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reward that leaves an individual who pays his allocated share of the cost of a collective 
good and receives the reward, on a higher indifference curve than he would have been had 
he borne none of the cost of the collective good and lost the reward." (Olson, 1965:51). 
Examples of positive inducements are discounts in goods and services, insurance, or the 
exclusive provision of specialist journals. In the agricultural policy domain one could think 
of information and technical advice; marketing assistance; insurance; cheaper purchase of 
inputs (fertilizers, oil, chemicals, etc.); news publications. There is ample evidence that the 
growth of farmers' organisations and their attractiveness for 'potential' members has been 
influenced considerably by the presence of such selective incentives (see, e.g., Olson 
(1965) and Moe (1980) for the impact of selective incentives on the development of us 
farm groups). Latent groups may have large and powerful economic lobbies, but these 
have to be regarded as the by-products of the capacity to attract members by means of 
selective incentives: "[ojnly such an organization could make a joint offering or "tied sale' 
of a collective and a noncollective good that could stimulate a rational individual in a large 
group to bear part of the cost of obtaining a collective good." (Olson, 1965:134) 
Not only group size, but also the distribution of endowments within the group has an 
effect upon the provision level of the public good. The more unequal this 'size' of 
individual members is in terms of endowments, the less the tendency toward suboptimal 
provision. This counterintuitive result stems from the fact that the larger the fraction of 
benefits flowing to an individual member, the more passionate he will seek public good 
provision, and - as a result - the more disproportionate his share of the burden will be. 
Thus, within 'unequal' groups there is "(...) a systematic tendency for exploitation of the 
great by the small" (ibid.:29). Later research has shown that the exploitation hypothesis 
depends on rather strict assumptions, including linear costs, zero income effects, 
summation technologies, Nash behaviour, and marginal benefits positively related to the 
member's size. For example, with weakest link technology7, exploitation need not occur 
(Sandler, 1992: 56, 195). For a survey of empirical tests of Olson's theory, see, e.g., 
Mueller (1989); Magee, Brock and Young (1989) and Sandler (1992). 
6.4 Interest group activities, competition and policy influence 
Olson (1965) essentially provided the elements for a rational choice approach to interest 
group formation. The relationship between group size and the benefits and costs of public 
good provision - which form the pivot of Olson's analysis - leaves the question how the 
public good is obtained entirely open. Whether the group is able to provide the public 
good on its own or by means of the government is not explicitly analysed. The PE-interest 
7 When q' is the public good's provision level of individual i, n is the group size in terms of number of 
individuals in the group, summation technology refers to perfect substitutability between the q''s, holding that: 
Weakest link technology implies that Q - min (q',...,q"), i.e. the smallest provision level of the group determines 
the collective provision. Weakest link technology is contrasted by 'best-shot technology' represented by Q = max 
(q;...,q"). 
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group perspective on policy formation goes beyond the Olson framework in that it takes as 
its basic premise that groups seek to initiate or change the content of existing government 
policies into a direction that is to their direct benefit. From the perspective of the rest of 
society (the outsiders) special interest policies usually have a private good nature, with 
policy benefits accruing to the special interest group and the rest of society excluded (e.g., 
Aranson and Ordeshook, 1981:72; Dunleavy, 1991:36). From the perspective of interest 
group members (the insiders) the policy benefits from collective action have the character 
of a public good: each group member can claim consumption regardless of individual 
efforts employed in achieving the policy benefits. 
The common group interest furthered by collective action can take a variety of forms, 
ranging from the creation, preservation or change (in level or rate) of subsidies, taxes, to 
price and quantity controls (quotas and voluntary export restraints), product-safety, wage 
and (industry) entry regulations. Interest groups, however, may have clear preferences for 
particular types of government policy. For instance, Stigler (1971:4-5) argues in his classic 
paper on regulation that industries and occupational groups commonly prefer policies 
which (i) control entry with respect to new rivals, (ii) affect substitutes and complements 
of an industry's product, and (iii) fix prices. These policies are preferred over direct 
subsidy policies since - unless the number of rivals can be restricted by an acceptable 
device - these bear the risk of dissipation among a growing number of rivals. According to 
Stigler regulation - rather than serving the general public interest - enables groups to 
obtain special monopoly positions to obtain the associated flow of rents. In order to 
capture these "artificially contrived transfers" (Tollison, 1982:578) interest groups will 
employ rent-seeking activities. The decision of interest groups to allocate scarce resources 
to rent-seeking activities will be affected by expectations with respect to the behaviour of 
the governmental actor. The susceptibility of a governmental actor - whether politician or 
bureaucrat - to interest group pressures ultimately depends on his set of preferences and 
constraints underlying his activities. Attempts to influence governmental decisions can be 
targeted either directly at governmental agents, or indirectly, via other actors such as 
voters, other interest groups or the judiciary. Available means within the first category of 
influence attempts include political campaign contributions, the supply of political 
campaign personnel, and the provision of information and expertise to political candidates 
(parties) and bureaucrats, including threats to strike, physical blockades, and going to 
court. Important examples of the second class of influence attempts include the 
mobilisation of voting support during election periods, influencing the public's political 
attitude and perception of specific electoral issues, and the provision of information to 
other stakeholders. While the first and the last example can be made operational in a 
rational choice context, influencing the public's political attitude and perception is more 
problematic given the stability-of-preferences assumption. 
By spending resources in influence activities, an interest group can increase the 
probability of obtaining policy benefits. Because government resources available for 
special interest policies are limited by budget (tax capacity) constraints, competition among 
interest groups is a 'natural' result. As a result, competition among interest groups can lead 
to full dissipation or overdissipation of the available prize formed by the rent: the total 
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expenditure by firms to obtain the rent may be equal to or larger than the total value of 
the rent itself8. Rent-seeking activity may therefore be 'socially wasteful'. 
Lobbying activities can, but do not necessarily lead to policy influence: there is a 
difference between the lobbying activity and the lobbying outcome in terms of political 
influence. Lobbying or pressure activity can be seen as a production process in which 
inputs are transformed into lobbying output or 'pressure (see also figure 6.1). Lobbying 
output not only depends on the availability of inputs in the form of labour (lobbyists, 
organisational support) and capital resources (equipment, buildings, representation), but 
also on the organisation of the group as reflected by the availability and use of selective 
incentives and total number of group members. For generally there is a clear link between 
a group's organisational structure, the potential of - as political scientists put it -
articulating and aggregating the group members' common interests, and the capacity for 
influence. Pressure has to be regarded as an intermediate product with respect to the final 
outcome as measured by political influence. 
Figure 6.1 The pressure production process 
LOBBYING LOBBYING 
INPUT ^ THROUGHPUT 
RESOURCES PRESSURE 
PRODUCTION 
Lobbying activity - or what Potters (1992) has termed 'political influence attempt' - can 
be defined as "any action by an agent L intended to change the behavior of a govern-
mental agent G, relative to what this behavior would be, had agent L not acted or acted 
differently" (ibidem:26), where L is the interest group and G is a legislator, a bureaucrat, 
party or any other political decision-making unit. This policy influence attempt may be (i) 
unsuccessful and lead to a loss of prior obtained political influence, (ii) successful and lead 
to positive influence, or (iii) neutral in its effects, i.e. keep political influence at the same 
level. By definition, it excludes unintended influences on G of any other action by the 
lobbying actor L. In a dynamic game setting, it is possible that L does not act, but agent G 
still anticipates to L's reaction and acts accordingly, as a result of a (programmed) 
The value of the rent is measured by the Tullock rectangle which is equal to the income transfer 
that a successful monopolist can extort from his customers (not to be confused with the Harberger triangle 
measuring the welfare loss of monopolist pricing as compared to competitive pricing. 
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'Pavlov-type' action-reaction pattern. Such patterns of anticipated action as well as con-
straints on the behaviour of G not due to influence attempts are labelled structural 
coercion (Van Winden, 1983; Potters, 1992). Wherever in the remainder of this thesis the 
terms pressure and lobbying are used, they are employed in the sense of political influence 
attempt. The extent to which interest group goals are attained - i.e. in terms of policy 
outcome - is referred to as policy influence. 
Policy influence therefore is not solely determined by the lobbying output of the group, 
but also depends on (i) the competition for influence by other groups, (ii) the political-
institutional environment (e.g, voting arrangements, type of government (coalitional or one 
party), the governmental decision structure), and (iii) informational and other constraints in 
the politico-economic market. How the competition process for policy influence will 
evolve is difficult to judge beforehand. This is, inter alia, dependent on the political 
weight of the groups concerned, as measured by their size and their pressure capacity as 
well as the nature of the objectives: whether interest group members have intense, 
passionate preferences for a certain policy issue or not, and whether competing groups 
have rather similar or, instead, strongly opposite objectives (direction of policy demands). 
Often lobbying efforts are coordinated efforts, so-called coalitional lobbing (e.g., Wright, 
1990). For example, consumers generally prefer low to high expenditures on food, whereas 
farmers on contrary prefer high food prices since this increases their income ceteris 
paribus. Enhancing both goals is - though not impossible - difficult, for goals and hence 
policy measures are of a potentially conflicting nature. The direction of political influence 
attempts of groups therefore can be thought of to differ depending on their position in the 
economic process. Important criteria are the ownership of production factors (capital, 
labour and land); the kind of economic activity (consumption or production; import- or 
export-oriented; position in the product chain). It is clear that the right identification of 
groups and their objectives is of major importance for the outcome of a politico-economic 
analysis. 
6.5 Competing views on policy influence and social waste 
Some scholars hold that from a macro perspective competition for policy influence 
among interest groups promotes the democratic content of decision-making, channels 
available information more efficiently and has to be seen as the 'natural' consequence of 
the voluntary and spontaneous process of group formation at the micro-level. This idea 
underpins the work of many pluralist scholars in the political science tradition, with among 
them, Bentley (1908), Dahl (1956) and Truman (1951). Some have gone even further by 
arguing that whenever some interest group would tend to dominate or monopolise 
decision-making, this would automatically provoke the emergence of countervailing 
interest groups (e.g., Galbraith, 1952; Wilson, 1980) or, similarly that whenever an 
economic or political disequilibrium occurred in society, new groups would form to restore 
the balance (cf. Truman's (1951) concept of the 'potential group'). The government - often 
seen as pluralised itself - is assigned a largely passive role in this type of literature: it 
allocates resources and takes policy decisions that reflect the balance between interest 
groups within society. In pluralist systems, there are no monopolies of representation and 
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although there is a need for stability to guarantee sustained bargaining, pluralist systems 
are characterised by openness, competition and, therefore - find themselves almost 
continuously in a state of flux. Olson (1965) has adjusted the naive idea of group 
formation as a voluntary and spontaneous process in two respects. First, large groups in 
the absence of selective incentives will generally not form. Second, small 'special interest' 
groups have disproportionate power compared to large 'latent' groups.9 However, the 
pluralist idea of a multiplicity of interest groups at the macro-level was not totally 
abandoned. Within political economy two opposite views exist with respect to the presence 
and activities of interest groups on social welfare. According to one view, competition for 
policy influence is a potentially allocative efficiency- and, hence, welfare-improving factor 
(e.g., Becker, 1985); the argument is that only efficient policies - those with low 
deadweight costs - will be enacted since policies that decrease inefficient rents will be 
popular politically. In the opposite view, the presence of interest groups is considerably 
less favourable in terms of efficiency and welfare as it will increase transaction costs, 
increase the amount of public spending and taxes, have a negative impact on economic 
growth (e.g., Mueller and Murrell, 1986; Magee et al., 1989), and in the longer term will 
even lead to societal sclerosis (Olson, 1982). 
Opposite to the pluralist perspective, one finds the idea that one or a few interest groups 
are able to control or dominate the policy process. Here the political market exhibits 
monopsonistic or oligopsonistic tendencies in which the government ends up as the captive 
of or - less extreme - as the passive instrument of one or a few collaborating interest 
groups at the macro or meso level of policy formation. Most Virginian political economy 
work on rent-seeking and Stiglerian capture-type analyses of regulation take this view. In 
political science this view can be found in the early iron triangle-type, and the later 
corporatist (e.g., Schmitter, 1970; Lehmbruch, 1979; Lehmbruch and Schmitter, 1982; 
Pross, 1986), and policy community-type (e.g., Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Richardson, 
1982) literature on policy formation. This literature stresses that there may be almost 
insurmountable difficulties in the organisation of certain interests (e.g., consumers), leading 
to underrepresentation of some interests at the benefit of other, more easily organisable, 
interests. But even organised groups do not face equal 'treatment' by the government: 
some (insider) groups may be regularly consulted by government and be actively involved 
in policy formation, while other (outsider) groups struggle to get a foothold on the 
political agenda. The distinction between insider and outsider groups seriously questions 
the assumed passive role of government as a neutral coordinating mechanism for political 
influence. Governmental actors play an active role in establishing relationships with groups 
and have preferences for some groups over others. 
Pluralism and corporatism can be seen as two competing, but extreme idealtypical 
According to Olson (1971:127) "[t]he distinction between privileged and intermediate groups, on 
the one hand, and the latent group, on the other, also damages the pluralistic view that any outrageous demands of 
one pressure group will be counterbalanced by the demands of other groups, so that the outcome will be just and 
satisfactory." 
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conceptions of interest representation. Recent empirical research, under the general label of 
policy network theory (e.g., Marin and Mayntz, 1991; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; 
Schneider, 1992; Jordan and Schubert, 1992) has integrated both notions by placing 
pluralism at one extreme and corporatism at the other extreme in a continuum of policy 
network types as reflected by, inter alia, the number and type of actors, their (political) 
resources, the structure of relationships between actors (vertical or horizontal 
interdependence, stability, intensity, frequency of interaction), entry or access possibilities, 
and degree of continuity. An example of possible policy network characteristics 
('dimensions') can be found in appendix 6.1. This example is based on a distinction 
between policy communities and issue networks at both extremes of the policy network 
continuum. For a selective overview of definitions of corporatism, pluralism and policy 
communities, see appendix 6.2. 
The policy network approach offers a complex palette of conceptions of how organised 
interests operate and how interrelationships between actors are structured. Actors and 
stakes are identified, but at the same time such analyses do not provide us with more than 
just that. Nevertheless, most policy network theorists tell us what we already know10: that 
we live in a complex world, that interdependencies between multiple actors are the rule 
rather than the exception and that policies are the sum of complex bargaining strategies, of 
an (implicit) game in which many individuals and groups with differing values, 
perceptions and goals interact, the outcome being largely indeterminate. 
6.6 Conclusion 
An empirical political economy analysis of interest group influence in agricultural 
policy formation should start with a thorough identification of the players involved, their 
motives and, related, their (potential) stakes. The policy network and policy community 
concept could be taken as a useful point of departure in this process of identification and 
'charting'. 
Important criteria for group selection in the agricultural policy domain are the position 
(of the group's members) in the economic process, based on productive or consumptive 
activity, the use of production factors, the position in the production chain, whether they 
have an import- or export-orientation and, factor and/or income endowments. The degree 
of organisation of interest groups could provide us with a first rough indication of the 
degree of consensus, of the 'homogeneity' of policy preferences, of interests and serve as 
an operational criterion to differentiate between different types of interests among the 
broad and heterogeneous category of farmers. Bearing Olson's (1965) theory of collective 
action in mind, the number of group members could serve as an indication of free-riding 
and the ease of organising collective action, which may have an impact on the policy 
influence capacity. Yet the fact that a group is small not necessarily and automatically 
implies that its political influence is large, in an absolute or even relative sense. Large 
groups can also be (potentially) influential, not only as a result of their vote capacity, but 
There are notable exceptions, for instance the German network school (e.g., Marin and Mayntz, 
1991; Scharpf, 1993). 
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also as a lobby if only selective incentives are sufficiently available. 
Studies in the policy network tradition indicate that in most democratic industrialised 
economies the agricultural sector can be characterised as strongly corporatist, having a 
clear policy community nature. This is especially the case in Europe (see, e.g., Cox et al. 
1986; 1986a; Keeler, 1987; Smith, 1990; Grant, 1992; Frouws, 1993; Jordan et al., 1994; 
Collins and Louloudis, 1995; Grant, 1995). Arguments for the existence of such an 
agricultural policy community can also be found in the more qualitative political economy 
literature within agricultural economics. For instance, Schmitt (1984), and Hagedorn and 
Schmitt (1985) advance that the basis for the political acceptance, legitimization and 
implementation of the policy demands of agricultural minority interests is an implicit 
societal contract and an "abgeschirmten und abgesicherten agrarpolitischen 
Handlungsspielraum". This contract would enable politicians to give preferential treatment 
to the agricultural sector without considerable (marginal) voting opportunity costs. 
Halbherr and Miidespacher (1985: 65) and Scheele (1990:16) have advanced a similar 
argument. Haase (1983) points out that the interests of governmental (in casu bureaucratic) 
agents and agricultural producer groups often have a similar (parallel) direction. This is 
also reflected by the frequent job switching of functionaries of the agricultural producer 
groups to bureaucratic government and vice versa, as well as the similar habitus and social 
profile of leading bureaucrats and agricultural group leaders. The same statement also 
seems to hold for political candidates. For instance, Haase (1983: 83) observes that the 
number of politicians who "have their roots in, have a feeling of solidarity to or are 
interested in the agricultural sector" is disproportionately high. Not only do farmers' 
organisations and agricultural producer groups have close links with decision-makers, they 
also actively try to influence voters. In this respect, Hagedorn and Schmitt (1985: 254;256) 
argue that agricultural interest groups intensively "treat" (manipulate) the ideological 
values and conceptions of voters by stressing the role of agriculture in preserving essential 
societal values like continuity, stability, (food) security, solidarity and justice in order to 
convince the majority of the electorate that a redistributionally oriented agricultural policy 
is a justified end.11 
The dominance of agricultural producers over other, less well organised interests could 
be an explanation for the observed differences in support patterns within the agricultural 
sector itself and the transfers between agriculture and the rest of society. Yet, the stated 
studies lack a consistent framework to actually - qualitatively or quantitatively - test these 
and related hypotheses. In addition to the identification of players, motives and stakes we 
need therefore a theoretical-deductive model in which the process of competition for 
policy influence is accounted for and in which the policy instrument choice or level is the 
endogenous variable. Only this would enable us to derive empirically testable and 
scientifically valid and well-founded hypotheses. 
This is in line with Becker (1983:392) who argues that"[..] voter preferences are frequently not a 
crucial independent force in political behavior. These 'preferences' can be manipulated and created through 
information and misinformation provided by interested pressure groups". 
Appendix 6.1 The policy network approach: policy communities vs. issue networks 
Dimension Policy community Issue network 
Membership 
Number of participants 
Type of interests 
Integration 
Frequency of interaction 
Continuity 
Consensus 
Distribution of resources 
Within network 
Within participating 
organisations 
Power 
Very limited number, some groups 
consciously excluded 
Economic and/or professional interests 
dominate 
Frequent, high-quality, interaction of all 
groups on all matters related to policy 
issue 
Membership, values, and outcomes 
persistent over time 
All participants share basic values and 
accept the legitimacy of the outcome 
All participants have resources; basic 
relationship is an exchange relationship 
Hierarchical; leaders can deliver mem-
bers 
Balance of power among members. 
Although one group may dominate, it 
must be a positive-sum game if com-
munity is to persist 
Large 
Encompass range of affected interests 
Contacts fluctuate in frequency and intensity 
Access fluctuates significantly 
A measure of agreement exists, but conflict is ever present 
Some participants may have resources, but they are limited, 
and basic relationship is consultative 
Varied and variable distribution and capacity to regulate 
members 
Unequal powers, reflecting unequal resources and unequal 
access. Zero-sum game 
Source: Marsh and Rhodes, 1992a, p. 251. 
Appendix 6.2 Corporatism, pluralism and policy communities defined 
Corporatism and pluralism 
The concepts corporatism and pluralism have been used in many different ways and in 
different meanings. To circumvent conceptual confusion and evade a full discussion of 
possible meanings, we restrict our to an influential definition of both concepts made by 
Schmitter. According to Schmitter (1970:93-94; 1979:13) corporatism can be defined "as 
[being] a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into 
a limited number of single, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state 
and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in 
exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of 
demands and supports". Pluralism is "defined as a system of interest representation in 
which the constituent units are organized into a unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, 
competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or scope of 
interest) categories which are not specially licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or 
otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which 
do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories." 
(Schmitter, 1970: 85-86). See for a further discussion, e.g., Williamson (1989); Frouws 
(1993); Hemerijck (1993). 
Policy communities 
Like corporatism and pluralism, the policy community concept is not unambiguously 
defined either, which is illustrated by the following examples. Rhodes (1986:16) defines a 
policy community as a "network characterised by stability of relationships, continuity of 
highly restrictive membership, vertical interdependence based on shared service delivery 
responsibilities, and insulated from other networks and invariably from the public, 
including Parliament". Pross (1986: 98) defines it as "that part of a political system that -
by virtue of its functional responsibilities, its vested interests, and its specialized 
knowledge - acquires a dominant voice in deteirnining government decisions in a specific 
field of public activity, and is generally permitted by society at large and the particular 
authorities in particular to determine public policy in that field". Typically the rules of the 
game are set by the policy community. However, relationships within policy community 
are asymmetric. Smith (1990:46) characterises the policy community as "(..) a social 
arrangement for preventing the discussion of issues that threatens the community, and as 
"(..) a means of mobilising bias so that the agenda is controlled." 

C H A P T E R 7 
INTEREST GROUP MODELS: PRESUMPTIONS, METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
Olson's theory of collective action explicitly addresses the conditions for effective 
group organization and reveals why some groups are successful and others fail in 
organising themselves, with lobbying seen as a by-product of the capacity to attract 
members and to organise a group. The issue how interest groups secure policy influence, 
which had remained largely undiscussed in Olson's work, was taken up a few years later 
by the pioneering work of Tullock (1967), Stigler (1971), Krueger (1974). Deductive 
interest group models, the derivation of hypotheses, and their subsequent empirical testing 
could enable us to clarify the relationship between interest groups and their attributed 
policy influence in agricultural policy formation. The variety among interest group models 
of policy formation is, however, large: models have widely different foci, degrees of 
endogenisation and institutional richesse. Contrary to the class of spatial voting models of 
elections in which policy influence is assumed to flow via the ballot box, the way in 
which interest groups influence the policy outcome is much more intransparant and 
diffuse. Some studies have circumvented the explicit choice of a policy influence 
mechanism by focusing on the relationship between interest group characteristics and 
policy outcomes, with characteristics serving as proxies for activity. In this respect they 
resemble the 'structure-performance' approach used in the older industrial organisation 
literature (cf. Van Winden, 1983: 232). Olsonian variables like group size, the number of 
group members and the presence (number) of interest groups can be regarded as 
characteristics. While group characteristics can serve as proxies for group activity and lend 
themselves well for empirical - cross section and/or time series data - analysis, empirical 
models of this category usually have an ad hoc structure, with data availability constraints 
playing an important role in the model specification, and the risk of data milling lurking in 
the background. 
Theoretical interest group models have witnessed a strong development: the simple 
capture-type models of the early 1970s have been replaced by a new generation of more 
'full-fledged' formal models, with a stronger focus on political activities, and with a more 
explicit specification of the policy influence mechanism. In general, models in which 
policy influence is directly related to the political activity of interest groups have some sort 
of micro-behavioral (game-theoretic) foundation; in this respect they differ markedly from 
the structural-characteristics-policy-outcome type of literature. Most developed are interest 
group models involving the transmission of information. Less explicit about the policy 
influence mechanism are models involving an influence function in the tradition of Becker 
(1983) and models involving campaign contributions (for an overview of the latter, see, 
e.g., Morton and Cameron, 1992). Least developed with respect to the explicit inclusion of 
political activities and/or competition for influence are the 'composite utility' models 
which include the category political preference function (PPF) models frequently employed 
in agricultural policy analysis and the interest function models. 
The foregoing distinction between theoretical approaches in interest group modelling -
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which was originally made by Potters and Van Winden (1993)' - is the point of departure 
of this chapter. It discusses the relevance and empirical applicability of different types of 
interest group models for the explanation of agricultural policy formation. Its contents are 
as follows. Section 2 deals with the early empirical interest group models of agricultural 
policy formation in the Olson tradition. This is followed by a discussion of, successively, 
models with an influence function and Becker's model of 'competition among pressure 
groups' (section 3); models with a composite utility function (section 4); campaign 
contribution models (section 5); and models involving the transmission of information 
(section 6). Section 7 concludes with an overall evaluation of the use of interest group 
models for agricultural policy formation. 
7.2 Interest group influence and agricultural policy formation2 
Formal explanations on the favourable treatment of agricultural producer groups in 
industrialised market economies frequently refer to Olsonian arguments like their relatively 
small group size, the relative homogeneity of interests and the ample availability of selec-
tive incentives which would make agricultural producer groups more efficient in producing 
political influence compared to other groups in society. As a general characteristic, the 
independent variables employed in this early empirical work consist of a mixture of 
interest group structural characteristics - used to account for collective action such as 
group size; the number of groups; and geographical concentration - and variables that try 
to capture interest group motives in seeking support, the latter usually without a firm 
formal-theoretical basis. For example, Anderson (1978) in an analysis of support granted 
to Australian rural industries, employs apart from Olsonian variables such as the number 
of farms, variables like value-added share of output and labour intensity, which are 
assumed to have a negative, respectively positive effect on support. Guttman (1978), in his 
explanation of state financed agricultural research in the us, uses apart from the number 
and size of farms (proxied by 'sales per farm'), the variable 'proportion of owner-farmers' 
to account for differences in policy preferences between owner and tenant-farmers which 
reflects an income-motive in seeking support. Anderson (1978) finds empirical support for 
the hypothesized negative correlation between numbers and agricultural support; Guttman 
(1978), however, finds some support for a positive relationship between the two variables. 
The observation that in countries where farmers constitute the majority of the popula-
tion, agriculture is exploited, whereas in countries in which farmers constitute only a small 
minority, agriculture is subsidised (the numbers paradox) could be explained by an 
Olsonian type of argument. Recently, Olson (1985, 1985a, 1990) has argued that the 
policy switch from taxing to assisting agriculture in the course of economic development 
would be primarily caused by a decrease in the free rider-problem associated with the 
collective action of farmers. As the number of farmers declines over time, the political 
organisation of farmers becomes more efficient, relative to the diffuse and dispersed 
Appeared also as Potters and Van Winden (1996). 
Sections 2, 3 and 4 partly draw on Swinnen and Van der Zee (1993). 
Chapter 7 97 
consumer and industry interests. In addition, as the economy develops, transport and 
communication infrastructure, as well as education become more developed, which 
increases organisation efficiency and hence reduces the difficulties of collective action in 
rural areas and of farmers in particular. However, the explanation of the type and degree 
of government intervention in agriculture obviously requires more than an account of 
organisation costs and farm numbers. 
Olson's focus on organisation costs and farm numbers can be criticized for several 
reasons. First, it ignores the role of politicians in the formulation of agricultural policies. 
Second, some authors have argued that during the shift in agricultural protection far more 
is happening than merely a shift in numbers or an improvement in rural infrastructure and 
education, and that the numbers paradox is only one of them (Anderson, 1986; Anderson 
and Tyers, 1988; Swinnen, 1992). Some have gone as far as arguing that Olson's theory is 
not consistent with empirical observations (De Gorier and Tsur, 1991; Koning, 1990). 
Third, the empirical support for the relationship between numbers and geographical 
dispersion - as proxies for a group's collective action - and political influence, measured 
for instance by the policy outcome, is not unambiguous in other sectors and industries 
(see, e.g., Potters and Sloof, 1995). It is not obvious why agriculture would form an 
exception to this general pattern of mixed evidence. 
The first empirical extensions of Olson's model were provided in an ad hoc fashion. 
For example, Honma and Hayami (1986) argue that in the process of industrialisation and 
economic growth, comparative advantage shifts from agriculture to industry through capital 
accumulation. The greater the social costs borne by the rural population of intersectoral 
adjustments in terms of a increasing rural-urban income disparity and depopulation, the 
greater the demand for agricultural protection. Econometric evidence, based on data of 15 
industrial countries for the period 1955-80, supports their hypothesis. Balisacan and 
Roumasset (1987) combine Olson's notions of interest group formation with a Becker-type 
influence function approach (1983) [see section 7.3] and 'explain' the growth of agricul-
tural protection over time as the result of political influence attempts of agricultural 
producers, consumers and industrialists. Besides factors that account for organisation costs, 
they include other independent variables, such as supply and demand elasticities, the share 
of market surplus, the share of consumers' budgets spent on agricultural commodities, and 
the responsiveness of industrial profits to food prices. Their simple regression analysis 
shows that the nominal rate of protection (NRP) of major grains is positively correlated 
with per-capita income, the proportion of income spent on food, the capital-labour ratio, 
and the capital-land ratio. 
The ad hoc nature and the lack of theoretical support for the choice of additional 
explanatory factors of these and other 'early' explanations3 are criticized by Gardner 
(1989:1170): 
3 Other analyses with similar ad hoc type explanations are, e.g., Von Witzke, 1986; Gurkan and 
Kasnagoklu, 1989 
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"the results are typically suggestive but not as illuminating as one might hope. 
For example, several studies have found in cross-country econometric investi-
gations that increased GNP per capita leads to more protection of agriculture. 
But the underlying reason for this outcome is not clear, and such an income 
effect has not been a feature of the general economic theories of politics." 
In line with Gardner's plea for "more attention to jointly developed theory and 
empirical investigation" (ibidem), Anderson and Tyers (1989) have advanced a number of 
additional, more coherent hypotheses for why farmers are taxed in poor countries and are 
subsidized in rich countries. They argue that demand for protection is weak because 
lobbying benefits of higher prices are small in developing countries, not only because a 
relatively small share of the production of - predominantly subsistence - farmers is mar-
keted, but also because there are no other significant 'agricultural' lobbies (e.g., farm input 
industries). Supply side factors do not favour assistance either: the cost to the government 
of assistance in terms of political support lost from the rest of society is inversely related 
to the size of the supported sector or group. Moreover, policies that tax agriculture and 
keep agricultural prices down promote industrial activity through the impact of 
depreciation: reduced agricultural export earnings reduce the supply of foreign exchange, 
which raises the price in local currency of import-competing manufactures and thereby 
assist local manufactures. Low food prices also keep down the cost of living in urban areas 
and reduce the demand for labour in the countryside which both restrain industrial labour 
costs. In an industrialised economy, this situation is reversed and the above factors work to 
the advantage of agriculture. As a result of a relatively declining share of agriculture in 
GDP, the political cost of support gradually falls in an industrialising economy: net support 
costs per individual citizen will decrease and net support benefits per farmer will increase 
ceteris paribus. Moreover, the administrative cost of collecting direct taxes falls, which in 
principle gives leeway to more efficient ways of raising government revenue. Opposition 
to raising farm prices lessens as, with rising personal income, the price of food and 
associated total food expenditure becomes less important in total consumer expenditure 
(Engel's law) which makes that food price increases will evoke less pressure for wage 
increases. Furthermore, since the group of urban consumers grows in size, free-riding 
effects become more important and may hamper effective collective action. A 
formalisation of these arguments in a (non-empirical) specific factor general equilibrium 
model can be found in Anderson (1989, 1991). Anderson analyses how different structural 
economic features of poor agrarian and rich industrial economies - which include the 
relative importance of agriculture in output and employment, different consumption 
patterns, differences in the use of purchased (capital) inputs, diverging patterns of trade 
specialisation, and different tax structures - affect the gains and losses to the various 
groups. His simulation results show that the income distributional effects of price 
distortions caused by subsidizing agricultural production and taxing consumption are such 
that, on a per capita basis, the losers lose less relative to the benefits to gainers as the 
economy develops. Similar results on the impact of economic development and the decline 
of the rural population on agricultural protection have been derived under a politician-voter 
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interaction framework in the spirit of Downs (1957) and Stigler-Peltzman (1976) (see, e.g., 
De Gorter and Tsur, 1991; Swinnen and De Gorter, 1992a; and Swinnen, 1994). The latter 
category of models should - at least partly - be regarded as a reaction to the dominant line 
of empirical research on political economy of agricultural policies which takes Becker's 
(1983, 1985) model of pressure group competition as its point of departure. 
7.3 Models with an influence function 
7.3.1 Theory 
Becker's theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence can be 
seen as the archetype of an important class of theoretical interest group models (for 
references, see, e.g., Potters and Van Winden, 1993: 2). A pivotal element of these models 
is the use of a so-called influence function to reflect the policy demands of competing 
interest groups. Aggregate influence which is a function of the lobbying activities of 
interest groups, is assumed to equal the policy supply. Government is merely regarded as 
an arbiter or 'clearing house' for the demands of special interests and is not explicitly 
modelled, nor is the behaviour of politicians, political parties, bureaucrats and (rational 
ignorant) voters. The importance of the influence function approach as theoretical 
fundament of empirical explanations of agricultural policy formation calls for an 
elementary exposition. The more general part of the model is discussed first, which is 
followed by a 'Becker-specific' part on efficient redistribution. 
In a simple two group society, the level of the policy variable x is determined by an 
influence function. Total influence I depends on the pressure p' exerted by both groups (i= 
s,t) and on other, exogenous variables such as the constitution, judicial traditions and other 
aspects of the political structure of society (represented by the vector z) as follows: 
x = I(ps,p',z) , with — * 0 , — s 0 
dps dp' 
The level of pressure p' is assumed to depend on the group's expenditure in time, energy 
and money on political pressure activity, m', and its size n', and is captured by a pressure 
production function: 
p> = pXmW), with ^-=p^0; ^ = p „ ' s 0 ; m'^a'n* 
dm' dn* 
where a1 is the amount spent on pressure activities per group member. The level of 
pressure increases when a group spends more resources on pressure activities. Resource 
expenditure on pressure activities also has an impact on each group member's indirect 
utility since v ^ m ' ) . However, increasing group size has a negative impact on the 
production of pressure due to free-rider effects.4 It is assumed that groups compete for 
influence and that competition can be captured as a non-cooperative (Cournot-Nash) game 
If payoffs from political activities do not distinguish between identical members of s and t, x can 
be regarded a public good. Then there are strong incentives to share costs by exerting pressure collectively. 
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in expenditures. In other words, each group maximises its utility, taking the actions of the 
other interest group as given. First-order conditions enable the determination of optimal 
(equilibrium) levels of expenditure on pressure and the optimal levels of pressure (Becker, 
1985: 333): 
da1 da1 dx bp1 dm1 
The theory of regulation (e.g., Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976) - which was discussed in the 
chapter on voting models as the basis of proportional voting models of politician-voter 
interaction - can in a certain way be seen as the forerunner of Becker's model. In line with 
this older Chicago political economy thinking, Becker regards the government as a 
mechanism used by rational economic agents to redistribute wealth, with the production of 
(quasi)public goods and services regarded as the by-products of wealth transfers. His 
framework differs in three important respects from the older Chicago school of thought: (i) 
he presents his arguments in a general instead of in a partial equilibrium model, (ii) he 
explicitly addresses the issue of group competition for policy influence, and (iii) he adopts 
a notion of political-economic efficiency. Competition for influence causes that redistribu-
tion is efficient in the sense that the deadweight costs associated with the transfer are 
minimised given the amount of transfer called for by the political process (Becker, 1983; 
Gardner, 1983; Bullock, 1995). Deadweight costs can be introduced in the model by a tax 
revenue function F which accounts for the distortionary impact of taxes on taxpayers' 
choices, and a cost-of-providing-subsidy function G which captures the distortionary 
impact of subsidies on recipients' choices. The amount raised by all taxes on t which 
forms the total sum available for transfers to s can be written as: 
S = n*G(Rs)= n'FiR') 
with the tax paid (subsidy received) by each member of t (s) represented by Rl (Rs)-5 This 
budget constraint yields, combined with the fact that x = S = I, and with the assumption 
of zero aggregate influence the following crucial equation: 
I* = nsG(Rs) = -/' = n'F(R') 
As Becker (1983:378) shows rising deadweight costs from taxes and subsidies (F"<0 and 
G">0) cause the optimal pressure by one group to increase when pressure by the other 
group is increased. Furthermore, an exogenous increase in the marginal deadweight costs 
of taxes (F' goes down) raises the pressure of group t, whereas an exogenous increase in 
the marginal deadweight costs of subsidies (G' goes up) reduces the pressure of group s. 
This leads to the interesting result that an increase in deadweight costs reduces the 
equilibrium subsidy. At the same time, the fact that aggregate influence is zero causes that 
an increase in p' raises the optimal pressure by s, while an increase in p s -
counterintuitively - reduces the optimal pressure by t. A crucial assumption here is that 
With F(R") £ R', F'£ 1, F"S 0 and G(R"£ R", G'2: 1, G'M. 
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influence functions are not affected by taxes and subsidies themselves. If they were this 
would change the analysis significantly as Becker (1983:394) admits. Becker's results 
indicate that politically successful policies, such as agricultural price support programmes, 
are 'cheap' in terms of marginal deadweight costs, but also that taxpayers have an intrinsic 
advantage in influencing political outcomes, which can even lead to a 'tyranny of the 
status quo' (Becker, 1983:381). Groups seeking subsidies can overcome their intrinsic 
disadvantage with political appeal and efficiency. 
While Becker's model explains that deadweight costs are important factors in explaining 
the (choice of) type of agricultural policy instruments, the original model has difficulty in 
explaining why unfavourable market conditions in agriculture, for instance due to climatic 
conditions or natural disasters, lead to support and favourable market conditions appear 
have the opposite effect. What makes agricultural producers more powerful in times of 
(economic) hardship and what makes them less powerful in times of prosperity? As 
Bullock (1994a) points out, only if market conditions and deadweight costs of transfers are 
positively correlated, such countercyclicity can be explained without introducing some 
form of altruism. In a generalisation of Becker's model Bullock (1994a) advances the 
argument that taxed groups may also perceive benefits of transfer programmes financed by 
their taxes - for instance, they may have some positive valuation of the family farm -, and 
farmers as a subsidised group may perceive costs (in the form of guilt or shame) from 
transfer programmes. These additional benefits (costs) can be modelled as public goods. 
Despite the extension by Bullock (1994a), the use of interest group models with an 
influence function, of which Becker's model is an example, has two important theoretical 
limitations as Potters and Van Winden (1993: 6) point out: the kind of pressure activity is 
not specified and the impact of group pressure on the supply of government policies is 
assumed rather than explained. Furthermore, little or no attention is paid to the political 
conversion process and the role of political institutions. Like in the older Stigler-Peltzman 
political economy tradition, the role of politicians is to broker wealth transfers among 
relevant suppliers and demanders. They are driven by constraints, not by preferences which 
makes that "ideology does not impact on political outcomes" (Tollison, 1989: 294). This 
extreme policy conception of a polity passively responding to the wishes and needs of 
competing interest groups is unsatisfactory, since it ignores the fact that politicians actively 
formulate policies, who seek to be (re-)elected and may have objectives of their own as 
the ultimate decision-takers in the policy-making process. For these reasons some scholars 
have therefore questioned the suitability as an explanatory framework for agricultural 
policy formation. For instance, Rausser (1982:826) comments that 
"(..) Recent theory of political behavior advanced by Becker neglects voters, 
bureaucrats, and politicians, Becker assumes extensive voter ignorance and 
pressure groups which, in effect, 'purchase' favorable votes with their PEST 
activities. Politicians and bureaucrats simply enforce political rules: they are 
custodians of the political process. They do not try to outwit pressure groups 
but, instead, implement rules in a straightforward manner. In the case of the 
U.S. agriculture at least, such a framework appears too simplistic". 
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7.3.2 Empirics 
However, in the absence of more convincing theoretical frameworks, Becker's analysis 
has formed the fundament of empirical models of interest group influence on agricultural 
policy formation. Notably, Gardner (1987) has used a Becker-type 'efficient redistribu-
tion'- framework in which political elements constitute the demand side and economic 
constraints constitute the policy supply side. The policy demand side is represented by a 
simple Political Preference Function (PPF) of the form PPF = X PS (x) + CS (x) - T, where 
X is an exogenously specified weight (X>0), T are taxes, PS is producer surplus and CS 
consumer surplus, respectively. The use of a political preference function - which is 
extensively discussed in section 4 - gives Gardner's approach a hybrid character, at least 
from the theoretical-methodological perspective taken in this chapter. 
The policy supply side represents the government's set of choices of feasible 
combinations of producer and consumer surplus, summarised in a so-called Surplus 
Transformation Curve (STC) (Gardner, 1983). In the empirical part of 'his analysis the 
efficient redistribution framework is used to explain the producer gains from farm support 
programmes for 17 commodities across states in the us over the period 1912-1980. With 
equal political power of all producers, the price subsidies paid are higher for commodities 
with a low supply elasticity than for those with a high one, reflecting the deadweight cost 
- lower-cost-of-redistribution - argument advanced by Becker.6 With different political 
power there is still more reason for differing support. In line with Olson, Gardner argues 
that a commodity group's political power is largely determined by the costs of organising, 
formulating a common position, preventing free-riding and mitigating opposition. Indica-
tors of these costs are the number of producers per commodity, geographical dispersion (a 
Herfindahl index), and the stability of the industry. His empirical analysis confirms the 
hypothesis that variables associated with the cost to producers of generating political 
pressure as well as the social cost of redistribution are important in explaining intervention 
in us commodity markets. Some of the employed independent variables are, like in the 
earlier empirical work by Guttman and Anderson, chosen to capture interest group motives 
in seeking support, for example the commodity's importance to producer income and the 
size of the average production unit. The latter is hypothesized to be positively correlated to 
support since the size of the benefits per group member will be greater. The fact that the 
empirical analysis is based on state data (rather than aggregate federal data) and that most 
policy programmes have been in place since the early 1930s make the available degrees of 
freedom comparatively large, and enables the incorporation of a relative large number of 
independent variables without detracting the model's explanatory power. 
Other studies that use Becker's framework as their theoretical fundament are Carter et 
Assuming constant elasticities of supply and demand, it can be shown that a greater elasticity of 
supply and/or a less elastic demand lowers the deadweight costs of a production quota which causes the 
government to further restrict the quota. A lower elasticity of supply lowers the deadweight costs of a target price 
and causes the government to raise the target price, while a less elastic demand increases the deadweight and 
causes the government to lower the target price. For formal derivations, see Gardner (1987: 292-293); Bullock, 
1995:1243). 
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al. (1990); Miller (1991) and Sarker et al. (1993). The approach taken by Carter et al. is 
similar to Gardner's analysis and their application to government support programmes in 
Canadian agriculture - while useful - offers no new theoretical insights. The contribution 
by Miller (1991) is different in that she tries to explain nominal protection rates for 
agriculture of 6 developing and 28 developed countries using cross-section data. Despite 
the theoretical part of her analysis, which largely duplicates Becker, the choice of 
explanatory variables in the empirical part has the same ad hoc nature as the explanations 
without a proper theoretical model mentioned earlier. Apart from characteristics to account 
pressure capacity of producer interests (number of farms, and sales per farm), most other 
dependent variables are only indirectly related with the pressure capacity of the interests 
(e.g., agricultural share of GDP to account for the pressure capacity of consumers). Proxies 
used for the marginal deadweight costs of taxation (the share of government consumption 
in GDP) and total taxpayer costs of agricultural price policy (net exports per capita) suffer 
from the same problem and seem to have been primarily chosen for reasons of data 
availability. Without empirical data, the testing of hypotheses derived from theoretical 
models obviously is not possible. However, data availability should not by all means 
dictate the specification of one's model. 
More convincing is the approach taken by Sarker et al. (1993) who combine Gardner's 
(1987) framework and endogenously derived political power weights.7 Becker-type (non-
cooperative) competition among interest groups determines the relative political weights of 
the PPF. By adding a number of explicit assumptions to this theoretical framework, they 
neatly derive five propositions about the political bias of agricultural policies, which are 
subsequently tested in an empirical analysis of the political economy of wheat pricing 
policies of 12 developed and 13 developing countries using pooled cross-section and time-
series data. First, the implicit political weights are calculated from elasticities of supply, 
domestic producer prices and border prices. In a second stage, the political weights are 
used as the dependent variable and regressed - in a flexible functional form specification -
on variables reflecting agriculture's comparative advantage (measured either as a labour 
productivity or as a factor endowment ratio), the share of food in disposable income, 
agriculture's international terms of trade, agriculture's share in the economy, and imports 
financed by agricultural exports, with alternative specifications for the first two 
explanatory variables. Slope dummies were used for the EC to examine whether the 
formation of the EC caused structural changes in the political weight function. The first 
three variables appear most important in influencing the weights in developed countries; 
the factor endowment ratio, the terms of trade and the share of imports financed by 
agricultural exports are most important in developing countries. While most of their 
explanatory variables have also been used by Honma and Hayami (1986), the analysis by 
Sarker et al. is more convincing and less ad hoc, with theoretical and empirical analysis 
logically interconnected. 
7 It should be noted that studies in the Gardner (1987) line of research could also be categorised as 
part of the Political Preference Function (PPF) tradition. However, their focus is more on the explanation of 
policy rather than the determination of weights per se (see also section 7.4). 
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From a more theoretical perspective it should be noted that the variables used in the 
explanations advanced by Gardner, Miller, and Sarker et al. are still (proxies of) 
characteristics rather than activities. In this respect, they are not different from their 
predecessors. 
7.4 Models with a composite utility function 
The common element of models with a composite utility function is that policy is 
considered as the outcome of the maximisation of a weighted representation of the welfare 
of different groups. The weighted welfare or utility function can be depicted as (Potters 
and Van Winden, 1993:11): 
N 
x = arg max Xlv '(x) 
i = l 
In this section two categories of models involving a composite utility function are 
discussed: (i) models with a political preference function (also termed 'governing criterion' 
or 'policy preference' function); and (ii) models based on the interest function approach.8 
The popularity of the political preference function (PPF) approach in agricultural policy 
analysis justifies a lengthy, yet critical discussion here. This is followed by an exposition 
of the interest function approach which has - so far - not been applied in agricultural 
policy analysis. 
7.4.1 Political preference function models 
7.4.1.1 Theory 
A pivotal element in PPF models is the use of a metaphorical, abstract policymaker who 
monitors the policy influence attempts of various actors, calculates and assigns weights and 
chooses (levels of) policy instruments accordingly. The political preference function is 
assumed to incorporate both the political preferences and the influence activities of 
political actors and groups involved. The metaphor of the abstract policymaker who solves 
a maximisation problem resembles the social welfare maximisation (SWM) approach with 
its benevolent, omniscient dictator (see chapter 2). The political preference weights 
retrieved from revealed policy outcomes indirectly reflect the influence impact of various 
actors on governmental decision-making. In its simplist form, with two groups and one 
policy instrument x, the PPF maximisation problem can be represented as 
max PPF = X'w'Qc) + Xsw%x) 
X 
where X' is the policy weight of group i (i=s,t) and w* is group i's welfare level. Since the 
political preference weights X reflect the outcome of the decision-making process behind 
This division diverges somewhat from Potters and Van Winden (1993: 12) who distinguish between 
(i) models that explicitly use a cooperative solution concept (i.e. a sub-class of the PPF models), (ii) models that 
use an interest function approach, and (iii) probabilistic voting models. In the last category of models, interest 
groups have to be regarded identical to voter groups; these models have already been discussed in chapter 4. 
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policy formation, PPF methodology claims to reveal the interest structure underlying 
government choices. Like the influence function approach, the PPF approach assumes that 
current policies reflect a political economic equilibrium summarising all the relevant 
forces. In principle, there are five approaches to trace the arguments and weights of a 
preference function, namely: (i) the direct method in which the decision-maker is invited 
to write down the preference function directly, (ii) the interview method in which the 
expert establishes the function on the basis of hypothetical questions to policymakers 
concerning preference comparisons between alternative states or results, (iii) the imaginary 
interview method, according to which preferences are inferred on the basis of actual 
deliberations of decision-makers before policy decisions are made, followed or taken part 
in by the expert, (iv) the inference method in which the preferences are retrieved from 
planning documents, and (v) the indirect 'revealed preference' method (Johansen, 1974:42-
43; see also Rausser and Freebairn, 1974; Van Velthoven, 1991). By far the most 
frequently used methodology for deriving the political preference weights is the revealed 
preference method. Measurement of the preference weights is possible because they are 
'observable', i.e. indirectly revealed by policy outcomes. The nature and number of 
arguments and groups that can be included in the PPF is, in principle, unrestricted. In the 
multiple interest group case, the maximisation problem can be rewritten as (e.g., Bullock 
and Jeong [1994:202] and Bullock [1994:348]) 
max G (w[x]) 
X 
s.t. w(x) e F 
where G is the political preference function, w = rV is a vector of welfare levels 
of interest groups l,...,n, with each group's welfare depending on the level of each policy 
instrument and with G monotonically increasing in w; F represents the set of technically 
feasible policy outcomes: F = {w\w = w(x), x & X); x is a vector of policy instruments, 
and X is the set of policy instruments. 
This constrained maximisation problem consists of two parts: an unobservable 
substitution side involving the PPF and an observable transformation side, showing how the 
government can 'transform' the welfare of groups by changing policy instrument (levels). 
The boundary of F - which constitutes the Pareto frontier - is an essential element of the 
PPF approach, since it allows inference of the characteristics of the unobservable G. First-
order conditions imply that at the observed policy outcome, the contour of G must be 
tangent to the Pareto frontier of F. The political preference weights can be inferred by 
measuring the marginal rates of transformation along the Pareto frontier. Following 
Gardner (1987) and Von Cramon-Taubadel (1992), PPF methodology can also be described 
in terms of a concave surplus transformation curve (STC) - representing the locus of all 
Pareto-optimal combinations of producer and consumer surplus the government can 
'supply' -, and convex political indifference curves (P i c s ) representing the policy demand 
side. In accordance with the foregoing, global maximum conditions are satisfied, when the 
political indifference curve is tangent to the surplus transformation curve at the observed 
policy outcome (which implies a political trade-off in welfare levels between groups). 
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Second-order conditions imply that whatever the shape of the STC, the PPF contour should 
be more convex, which implies that the choice of a specific a priori determined functional 
form bears the risk of misspecification. PPF methodology in principle allows for different 
functional forms. However, the linear-additive form is most frequently used, apparently for 
reasons of mathematical simplicity. The arguments appearing in the PPF typically represent 
performance measures which reflect the economic well-being of each interest group. 
Performance measures can be welfare surplus measures, but also other performance 
measures, such as profits, net farm income, government budget expenditure, etc. Usually, 
the conventional welfare economics distinction between producers, consumers and 
taxpayers is maintained. Note that from a PPF perspective the traditional Benthamite social 
welfare function is a special case in a more general class of models; it involves a linear 
PPF with equal weights assigned to producers, consumers and taxpayers. For in-depth 
studies of PPF assumptions and methodology, the reader is referred to Love et al. (1990), 
Von Cramon-Taubadel (1992), Bullock and Jeong (1994), and Bullock (1994). 
7.4.1.2 Empirics 
The majority of PPF studies on agricultural policy analysis focuses on the derivation of 
political weights of different interest groups. The first empirical contribution is due to 
Rausser and Freebairn (1974) who estimated the political preferences involved in the us 
beef import quota scheme. In the same vein Burton (1985) analysed the adoption of the EC 
milk quota system. Lianos and Rizopoulos (1988) estimated the implicit weights involved 
in Greek cotton support, while Oskam and Von Witzke (1990) analysed us policy 
decisions on wheat. They used an alternative weight estimating procedure, which 
incorporates information on policy alternatives (see also Oskam, 1988). The US wheat 
sector was also studied by Oehmke and Yao (1990), who estimated a PPF with public 
research expenditure, target prices and sales from government stocks as policy instruments 
in a dynamic setting. They find a decline in weights for agricultural producers relative to 
consumers, comparing 1984 with 1977 outcomes. Oskam and Von Witzke found the 
producer income weight to be slightly higher than the weight assigned to budget 
expenditure, but lower than the weight assigned to exports over the period 1981-1990. In 
general, PPF studies of industrial economies indicate that weights attached to agricultural 
producers are considerably higher than the weights of taxpayers and consumers. Producer 
weights are highest in Western Europe and Japan, although 'traditional exporters' also 
distort their domestic markets (Tyers, 1990:1411). 
Recently, some scholars have applied estimated preference weights to the analysis of the 
political feasibility of alternative agricultural reform programmes (Tyers, 1990; Mah6 et 
al., 1991; and Johnson et al., 1991). Tyers applies estimated 'reference weights' to the 
welfare incidence of reform scenarios of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and 
evaluates their political feasibility. Critical and essential assumptions are that (i) the range 
of policy instruments and the marginal opportunity costs of their implementation are 
assumed unchanged by external pressure (e.g., technological and institutional changes that 
could alter policy implementation costs), and (ii) the implicit weights are not directly 
affected by external pressures stemming from trade negotiations. Mah6 et al., as well as 
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Johnson et al. combine the P P F approach with a non-cooperative game approach. They use 
a P P F to derive a payoff matrix for different U S - E C trade liberalisation scenarios (reform 
packages) and analyse their (political) feasibility. 
A second major focus of P P F studies in the field of agricultural policy analysis is the so-
called endogenous determination of policy instrument levels. Policy instruments analysed 
are, inter alia, producer support prices, deficiency payments, and import quotas. The 
instrument levels in this type of studies are generally derived from the maximisation of a 
linear-additive P P F structure with economic surplus measures and the government budget as 
its arguments. The analyses differ with respect to the number of countries and commod-
ities taken into consideration and the number of arguments included in the criterion 
function. Multicountry-single commodity P P F studies are Sarris and Freebairn (1983) and 
Paarlberg and Abbott (1986). Single country-multicommodity P P F studies are Riethmuller 
and Roe (1986) and Lopez (1989). The results of studies in the endogenous determination 
of policy instrument tradition indicate that the incorporation of a government behavioral 
rule can dramatically change the results of conventional welfare economics analyses. 
7.4.1.3 Micro-foundations 
Some authors have sought to incorporate a basic behavioral structure to account for the 
underlying forces striving for policy influence. For example, Zusman (1976) and Zusman 
and Amiad (1977) explicitly model the bargaining process among interest groups and the 
policymaker as a cooperative game in which weights are derived endogenously. The model 
consists of two types of actors, a policy-maker and interest groups. Each interest group i 
(i=s,t) has a so-called extended objective function V' that summarizes his (expected) utility 
v" from policy instruments XQ and his costs of influencing the policy-maker (cj as follows: 
V = v'(x0) - c' 
The extended objective function of the policy-maker V 0 captures both his own policy 
instrument preferences and his valuation of the influence attempts of interest groups as 
reflected by an additive strength function: 
^ = v , W +I>'(c ' ,8 ' ) 
where x„ is a vector of policy instrument levels and s! is the strength function of the i-th 
group over the policy-maker. Each interest group can either promise support (8-oc1) or 
penalise ('threat') (8-p1) the policy-maker. It is assumed that v(x) are feasible and convex, 
s"s are concave in c1, and all functions are twice differentiable, and that the actors have all 
the information relevant to the game9. The Nash-Harsanyi co-operative solution of the 
Complete information implies that a player's pay-off function - which depends on the actions 
chosen by the other players - is common knowledge among all the players. Perfect information implies that "at 
each move in the game the player with the move knows the full history of the play of the game thus far." 
(Gibbons, 1992:55). 
108 Interest group models 
ensuing bargaining game equals: 
71 ds' 
PPF = V0(XQ) + Y: Be' 
•v'(x 0) 
with ds'/dc' deteirnined at solution values c' = c*' and 8 -a of the game (see Zusman, 
1976). 
Two attractive features of models with a cooperative solution are (i) the clear, straight-
forward incentive structure of the agents participating in the political-economic game, and 
(ii) the fact that political strength or power weights X (= 8s'/8c') can be determined 
endogenously (see also, e.g., Aumann and Kurz, 1977; 1978). However, co-operative 
bargaining requires binding commitments of the players in the form of a potential threats 
to prevent the bargaining game from breaking down (Zusman, 1976: 454). Bargaining 
typically never breaks down since the commitment to carry out threats is anticipated by all 
players; hence Pareto-inefBcient outcomes are avoided (Potters and Van Winden, 
1993:12).10 Other studies that attempt to extend the behavioural underpinning of the P P F 
approach are Beghin (1990) who predicts the endogenous policy response to exogenous 
changes in the economic environment (e.g., the exchange rate and world market prices), 
combining a bargaining game model with behavioral equations; and Love et al. (1990) 
who present different game-theoretic specifications (Nash-Harsanyi co-operative, utili-
tarian), and methods to derive preference weights. By introducing uncertainty, they also try 
to make up for a major criticism of P P F work, i.e., the neglect of the stochastic nature of 
the estimated parameters. Rausser and Foster (1990) derive changes in weights by 
incorporating Olson's (1965) notion of political organisation costs. A cost decrease of one 
group relative to other groups' costs increases its marginal political power and thereby 
shifts wealth transfers in its favour. The group's weight itself, however, changes in 
response to changes in its collective welfare. 
7.4.1.4 Limitations 
The mainstream of P P F studies has four significant limitations as far as the objective of 
revealing the underlying forces in policy formation is concerned. First, the motives and 
activities of politico-economic actors and the process of competition for influence amongst 
them - which underlies the inference of political preferences - essentially remain a black 
box. Second, the assumption that government passively translates - 'processes' - the 
influence attempts of various societal interests into policy outcomes, as if it were a 
benevolent, self-effacing actor denies the existence policy supply side is actor-driven too. 
Only a few studies include the policy-maker's own policy preferences. The question what 
drives the policy-maker(s) is, however, not made an integral part of the analysis. Third, 
observed changes in P P F weights may be misleading where policy regime shifts and 
institutional change are at stake (Von Cramon-Taubadel, 1992:385). While political 
Pareto-efficiency of observed policy outcomes is, however, not a typical feature of PPF models a la 
Zusman, but is a fundamental assumption of all PPF studies as Bullock (1994a:348) has shown. 
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consensus on such discrete policy changes might have developed over a number of years, 
the implied change in political weights on a yearly basis might lead one to conclude that 
preferences have shifted shockwise. P P F methodology is essentially static and ignores the 
government's ability to intertemporally substitute among interest group welfares (Bullock 
and Jeong, 1994:205). Fourth, almost all P P F studies have a partial focus with the implicit 
presumption that linkages between markets do not exist, that policy measures in one 
market do not affect (the functioning of) other markets and that policy interactions are 
absent. Recently, Oehmke and Yao (1990) and Rausser and De Gorter (1991) have 
attempted to account for policy interactions between commodity policy, and research and 
extension policy. A last, more general comment is that the standard inclusion of the 
conventional welfare economics actor triplet consumers, producers and taxpayers may not 
be a proper choice in a political economy context. Omission of important actors can lead 
to serious misspecification problems, resulting in estimation errors and the unjustified 
assignment of weights to certain actors at the neglect of others (Von Cramon Taubadel, 
1992:382; Bullock and Jeong, 1994:202). This misspecification problem also exists where 
government itself is concerned, since no account is given of the fact that government 
consists of different actors (politicians, bureaucrats; competing bureaus) with potentially 
different objectives. 
The principal importance of studies in the P P F tradition lies in the extension of the 
traditional welfare economics framework by making the welfare weights an endogenous 
part of the analysis. In a full endogenous policy model, however, one should be able to 
trace the preference weights back to the micro-behaviour of the agents. 
7.4.2 Interest function models 
The interest function approach developed by Van Winden (1983) takes the politico-
economic interests of a social class, defined as a set of agents in an 'elementary' economic 
position, as its starting point (e.g., Van Velthoven and Van Winden, 1984, 1985, 1986; 
Renaud and Van Winden, 1987, 1988, 1991; Van Velthoven, 1988). Society is divided up 
into three social classes: public sector workers (politicians and bureaucrats), private sector 
workers, and capitalists, with each class having a so-called elementary interest function11. 
In its original formulation by Van Winden (1983) the elementary interest function 
incorporates real disposable income X j , a bundle of public-sector-provided goods x2, and 
the social class's numerical strength n. Numerical strength is included to account for the 
social class's ability to safeguard its position and realise its interests12. For empirical 
purposes the elementary interest function is defined as a Cobb-Douglas function: 
In some studies (e.g., Van Velthoven and Van Winden, 1985) dependants are included as a separate 
class. 
1 2 The elementary interest function can be regarded as an aggregate of individual utility functions, 
including of the members of a particular class, including their valuation for class-related activity. This can be 
advanced as an argument for the inclusion of class size. Ten Raa (1984:484) has criticised the inclusion of 
numerical strength as an argument in the class's interest function. 
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P' = P '(x,', x,', n ') = x,"" . * / " . n ^ , XM1>Q VA, 2 \ , = 1 
h 
where rij is the numerical strength of class i, XU is the relative weight attached to each of 
the three interests h of social class i. It is assumed that the class of politicians and bureau-
crats represents the government and therefore acts in accordance with the maximisation of 
a weighted representation of the interests of the social classes. The latter is captured by a 
complex interest function P c which summarizes the elementary interest functions P1 in a 
weighted multiplicative form: 
PC = n ; p / \ n f c > o v i , $ > f c = 1 
where u,ic denotes the weight assigned to the elementary interest function P1. As a first 
approximation for the relative weights u. the relative numerical strengths of the social 
classes can be used. Following Zusman (1976), the power coefficients can also be 
estimated by means of revealed preference methodology. As Potters and Van Winden 
(1993) make clear, a major problem here is the interaction between the parameters of the 
utility function and the power weights which makes it difficult to disentangle the power 
and preference effects in the estimations. In its original formulation the complex interest 
function resembles the Nash bargaining solution for cooperative games (e.g., Van 
Velthoven, 1988). However, the formulation is wide enough to incorporate non-
cooperative approaches as well. Potters and Van Winden (1993:14) depart from the 
original formulation by explicitly taking the political activities private sector workers (m1) 
and capitalists (m2) into account, with interest or utility functions denoted by v0(x,m), 
v'(x,m) and v ^ m ) . The policy x is determined by the public sector workers. Private 
sector workers and capitalists are involved in a Cournot-Nash non-cooperative game, in 
which each group maximises its utility function taking the actions of the other group and 
the government as given. The Nash equilibrium of the game incorporates me groups' 
actions as a function of the government's action m = (m',m2) = m(x). 
The a priori division of society in three social classes makes the interest function 
approach less apt for the analysis of agricultural policy formation. For example, family 
farm owners can be considered as capitalists and private workers at the same time. Yet the 
basic labour - capital distinction as the basis for a division of society is not very different 
from division encountered in some political economy studies on agricultural policy 
formation. Compare, e.g., the distinction between urban (labour owners) and rural 
population (land owners) employed by De Gorier and Tsur (1991). The methodology of 
the interest function approach and its drawbacks are basically similar to the PPF approach. 
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7.5 Campaign contribution models 
7.5.1 Theory 
Interest groups can influence the polity through lobbying, the provision of goods and 
services 'in kind', and campaign contributions. Campaign contribution models focus on the 
last aspect. The Chicago theory of regulation (Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1975; Peltzman, 
1976) can be seen as a precursor of this type of interest group models (see also chapter 4). 
The main thrust of the theory of regulation is that firms or industries - which can be 
regarded as groups - actively seek regulatory policies from the government in exchange for 
votes and resources. In Peltzman's (1976) model group support explicitly depends on 
expected group benefits, group size, political campaign expenditure and lobbying. It is not 
clear, however, how lobbying and campaign funding - represented by a cost function - are 
translated into political benefits: the political 'conversion' process and the role of political 
institutions are almost completely neglected. Recent interest group models have attempted 
to go beyond this ad hoc - black box-type - specification. There are two basic models in 
which campaign contributions play a role as transmitters of policy influence: 'service-
induced' models and 'position-induced' models (Morton and Cameron, 1992; see also 
Potters and van Winden, 1993; Potters and Sloof, 1995). 
Service-induced campaign contribution models assume that interest groups provide 
campaign contributions in order to affect the future policy position of a candidate and take 
his probability of election as fixed. The utility a group derives from a political candidate's 
behaviour is assumed to increase with the level of contributions. For the simple one-
interest-group two-candidate case, the interest group's utility function can be denoted as 
(Potters and Van Winden, 1993:7): 
V(x,ml,m2) = v(x) - mx - m2, with v'>0 and v">0 
where m1 is the contribution to party Gj (j= 1,2) by the interest group and x is the level of 
the policy or service provided to interest group i. Party Gj is assumed to implement a 
policy Xj once in office. The higher the contribution m*, the more favourable policy Xj is 
assumed to be for the interest group: 
Xj = Fj(mJ), with Fj>0, Ff<0 
The probability n-s that party Gj is elected is assumed fixed, with rc, = 1 - T ^ . A major 
drawback of service-induced models is that "it is assumed that, but not explained why, a 
candidate's policy position changes in response to campaign contributions" (ibidenvAQ). 
Furthermore, no explicit account is given of the demand for contributions by politicians: 
the supply of campaign contributions is modelled as a decision taken by interest groups. 
Service-induced models generally ignore the cross-effects of campaign contributions across 
interest groups and lack therefore the element of group competition (Morton and Cameron, 
1992: 88). 
In 'position-induced' models interest groups try to increase the probability of election of 
favoured candidates and take the (announced) policy position of the candidates as given. 
The main goal of interest groups here is to affect the composition of the (future) govern-
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ment and through this the formation of policies. The probability of election is 
endogenously specified as a function of the difference in expected percentage of votes for 
G, and G2 (Potters and Van Winden, 1993: 9): 
n = n(D), with it' > 0, and sign(n")= -signUD) 
It is assumed that D is a function of both the campaign spending of the candidates and 
their platforms, such that the vote function D = D ( X j ^ m ^ m 2 ) . In poisition-induced 
models interest groups focus on voters to increase the probability of (reflection of their 
favourite candidate. By its very nature, such activity is only a very indirect form of policy 
influence. Another problematic aspect of these models is that candidates will be driven to 
equivalent policy positions unless there some exogenously given difference (known as the 
'wedge'-problem; see, e.g., Austen-Smith, 1987). There is evidence that both the expected 
benefits from the candidate's victory - as measured by his expected policy position - and 
the expected impact of campaign contributions on the election outcome - as measured by 
the closeness of the vote - are important in explaining the direction and levels of campaign 
contributions (see, e.g., Mueller 1989:212 for references). Others have questioned the size 
of the impact of campaign contributions (e.g., Chappell, 1982; Welch, 1982; Wright, 1985; 
Austen-Smith, 1991). 
7.5.2 Empirics 
us empirical evidence indicates that in issues in which the economic benefits can easily 
be assigned to particularised interest groups, voting can be affected by campaign 
contributions. In the case of less particularised benefits there is little evidence for such a 
relationship. Moreover, some scholars (e.g., Jones and Kaiser, 1987; Schroedel, 1986) have 
found that the influence of campaign contributions is larger, the less publicly visible the 
issue concerned is (cf. Morton and Cameron, 1992: 81). Both factors make campaign 
contributions a potentially powerful means in agricultural policy-making. 
However, empirical campaign contribution models that try to account for agricultural 
policy formation are scarce. In an analysis of (US) senator voting behavior on the 1981 and 
1985 Farm Bill amendments, Vesenka (1989) finds that contributions from agricultural 
producer P A C S 1 3 to be significant only for the sugar and general target amendments14. 
While membership on the Standing Committee on Agriculture or the agricultural 
subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee is significant for the dairy, sugar, tobacco 
and peanut programme amendments, and dairy, sugar, tobacco P A C S contributed on average 
Political Action Committee which a registered lobbying organization under the 1974 Federal 
Election Campaign Act. (Bogdanor, 1987:436) describes a PAC as a "non-party fund of a sponsoring labour 
union, business, trade organization, or independent political group used to contribute money to candidates for 
public office". 
1 4 This consistent with evidence found by Harper and Aldrich (1990) - in a voting model without 
campaign contributions - that senatorial voting on the (US) sugar programme is related to the concentration of 
economic interests in the Senators' states, using per capita production by state, per capita deliveries by state, party 
affiliation (reflecting the shared constituency and re-election interests of members of the same party) and party 
unity (reflecting how often a Senator votes with the majority of his party) as explanatory variables. 
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twice as much to committee members as to non-committee members, the correlation 
appears non necessarily causal. Model results indicate that ideological shirking is more 
important in explaining senator voting behaviour than PAC contributions. Wright (1990) 
hypothesizes that campaign contributions and lobbying often occur together - as 
complementary activities - and therefore have to be analysed jointly, to evade overstating 
the influence of contributions. However, his empirical analysis of, inter alia, decision-
making of the us House Agriculture Committee on the 1985 Farm Bill wheat and grains 
provisions only provides weak support for the hypothesized relationship. 
While in the us campaign contributions are a common, well-registered and 'public' 
phenomenon under the 1971 (1974) Federal Election Campaign Act, in other countries this 
not the case. For example, in western European democracies campaign contributions by 
interest groups are either forbidden or, compared to the us, very limited in size. The 
European Union lacks an official code of conduct for interest groups, but functionaries 
within the Council and the Council are explicitly forbidden to accept gifts (bribes) of any 
kind. Even in those countries where campaign contributions are allowed, these are usually 
not traceable because of lack of transparency and registration which makes research on this 
issue difficult. The campaign contributions model therefore has no empirical content with 
respect to agricultural policy formation in these countries. But as theoretical and empirical 
evidence makes clear, even when campaign contributions are a legitimate and accepted 
device, it is doubtful whether interest group influence on the policy-making process stems 
mainly from campaign contributions to political candidates (parties). 
7.6 Models with asymmetric information 
While most interest group models account for the activities of interest groups by 
introducing some notion of resource expenditure on lobbying or 'influence activity', it is 
usually not clarified how these expenditures influence the behaviour of policy-makers. 
Neither influence function models, nor models with a composite utility function distinguish 
between different forms of influence activities. Campaign contribution models assume that 
rather than explain how policy influence is established and ignore the existence of other 
instruments such as lobbying. Models with asymmetric information attempt to overcome 
some of the shortcomings of this earlier literature by (i) endogenising the behaviour of 
policy-makers and interest groups, and (ii) incorporating the activities of interest groups in 
a more explicit way. The pivot of this class of models is the transmission of information 
from well-informed interest groups to incompletely informed policy-makers (e.g., Austen-
Smith and Wright, 1992; Potters, 1992; Potters and Van Winden, 1990, 1992, 1993; 
Lohmann, 1993; 1995; Ball, 1995; Sloof, 1996). More than the previously discussed 
models, models with asymmetric information use explicit game theoretical concepts in 
deriving hypotheses and (theoretical) results. Starting from a two-player context and a 
number of simplifying assumptions, this literature focuses on issues such as the sending of 
messages with fixed or endogenous cost, the discrimination between true and false 
messages, the credibility of influence attempts, and the reputational concerns of policy-
makers and groups and existence of sequential equilibria. While the principle idea that 
information flows determine to an important extent the lobbying power of interest groups 
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is confirmed by work of political scientists, empirical application of this type of models is 
difficult. Apart from the strong assumptions with respect to the behaviour of the actors, the 
problems of collecting data on information flows needed to test the theoretical-deductive 
hypotheses in the 'real world' seem almost unsurmountable. To circumvent the data 
problems posed by 'real-world' empirics, models involving the transmission of information 
have resorted to the use of laboratory experiments for hypotheses testing. 
7.7 Some remarks on the empirical application of interest group models 
The range and number of hypotheses regarding the formation of agricultural policies 
which has been based on interest group models of policy influence is rather impressive. 
Some of these propositions have been neatly derived from theoretically well-founded 
behavioral models; other hypotheses have been specified in a more ad hoc fashion with a 
loose grounding on theory. A selective miscellany of hypotheses is given below: 
Set of hypotheses 1 (cf., Olson, 1965, 1985a, 1985b; Anderson, 1978) 
Agricultural support will be higher, 
- the smaller the number of farmers is relative to the group of consumers and 
taxpayers 
- the larger the degree of organisation among farmers is 
Set of hypotheses 2 (cf., Honma and Hayami, 1986; Anderson, 1988; 1989; 
Sarker et al., 1993) 
Agricultural support will be higher, 
- as comparative advantage in agriculture decreases 
- as the international terms of trade of agriculture decrease 
Set of hypotheses 3 (cf., Honma and Hayami, 1986; Olson, 1985a,b; Sarker et 
al, 1993) 
Agricultural support will be higher, 
- the smaller the share of agriculture is in the total economy (as measured by 
total output or total GDP) 
- the smaller the share of food expenditures in total consumer expenditures 
Hypothesis 4 (cf, Gardner, 1983, 1987; Bullock, 1995) 
Existing agricultural policies reflect the most efficient method available to 
transfer income among political pressure groups, minimising deadweight costs, 
given the amount of transfer called for by the political process ('the efficient 
redistribution hypothesis') 
Hypothesis 5 (cf, Magee, Brock and Young, 1989; less formal also in Anderson, 
1978) 
Intransparent, indirect policy instruments engender less opposition than those that 
are visible, direct and targeted (the 'policy obfuscation' hypothesis) 
Hypothesis 6 (cf. Potters and Sloof, 1995) 
Groups that stand to gain and lose a great deal per capita tend to be more active 
politically and have a larger impact on policy 
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Hypothesis 7 (cf. Bullock, 1992) 
Agricultural support increases as income in agriculture falls relative to incomes 
earned in the rest of the economy 
Although the use of theoretical-deductive models provides an appeal of undisputable 
rigour and scientificity, the possibilities for testing the above hypotheses and the scope for 
refutation in a Popperian sense are - in the absence of a full-inclusive, flexible and 
tractable formal model cumbersome. But even from a less demanding perspective, the 
theoretical-deductive class of models shows a lack of generality and flexibility, especially 
with respect to the inclusion of multiple actors with different behavioural structures and 
the incorporation of unique political-institutional features. 
While interest groups typically employ lobbying and pressure activities - ranging from 
(the threat of) strikes and blockades to 'wining and dining' and the exchange of 
information in order to influence the policy outcome, these 'activity' variables have - with 
the exception of campaign contributions - found no direct application in empirical work on 
agricultural policy formation. In the absence of (sufficient) data, as a general rule 
empirical studies on agricultural policy formation employ structural group characteristics as 
proxies for political influence activities. Of the theoretical-deductive interest group models 
discussed in this chapter, the influence function approach and the political preference 
function (PPF) approach have had the most noticeable impact on the modelling of interest 
group involvement in agricultural policy formation. The mainstream of P P F studies has 
focused on the detennination of political influence weights, P P F studies can be regarded as 
an extension of the conventional welfare maximisation perspective, and the Benthamite 
welfare function in particular. Knowledge of political weights assigned to different groups 
may be useful as a reflection of the political strengths of the groups involved. However, 
this literature has not addressed the issue of the 'why' and 'how' of policy formation. 
More interesting from an explanatory point of view is the P P F approach with micro-
behavioural foundations in the tradition of Zusman (1976). Yet the cooperative solution 
concept used in this type of studies has the inherent problem that bargaining never breaks 
down since the commitment to carry out threats is anticipated by all players. The 
framework advanced by Gardner (1987) - in which the P P F approach is combined with a 
Becker-like competition for policy influence approach - has more explanatory potential. 
However, the empirical data requirements for this type of approach are considerable. Even 
though the Gardner framework and its extension by Sarker et al. (1993) are interesting and 
illuminating on some points, important questions remain unanswered. Most important in 
this respect are (shifts in) the choice of policy instruments. While some theoretical 
advances in this field have been made (e.g., Oehmke and Yao, 1990; Rausser and De 
Gorier, 1991; Coate and Morris, 1996), rigourous applied work on policy choice and joint 
policy determination has not yet emerged. Furthermore, the theoretical discussion on 
whether to use a non-cooperative or a cooperative solution concept overlooks the more 
empirically oriented issue whether groups are likely to compete for influence at all. That 
competition for influence is not always the right point of departure is shown by empirical 
evidence that interest groups may form coalitions and 'trade votes' to influence the polity 
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(e.g., Abler, 1989). Furthermore, the Chicagoan conception of politico-economic efficiency 
used by Becker is not undisputed (cf. the Virginian political economy literature, see 
chapter 3). 
The gap between theoretical reasoning and empirical support is still large, which led 
Rodrik (1994:4) to the general comment that: 
"The typical approach in the empirical work has been to regress some measure 
of protection on a number of economic and political variables. While the 
relevance of the included independent variables is typically motivated by 
appealing loosely to the theoretical literature, the links between the empirical 
and theoretical work have never been too strong in this area. Regression 
analysis takes the kitchen sink approach, with a large number of 'relevant' 
variables - some obviously endogenous - thrown in on the right-hand side." 
A striking feature of existing empirical political economy accounts of agricultural policy 
formation is the limited number of groups taken into account. Classifications often used 
are those between (i) agricultural producers (farmers), consumers and taxpayers (the 
standard welfare economics distinction, encountered in most P P F studies); (ii) consumers, 
agricultural producers and industrial producers (e.g., Balisacan and Roumasset, 1987); (iii) 
farm and non-farm population (e.g., Miller, 1991), or urban and rural population (e.g., de 
Goiter and Tsur, 1991); (iv) agricultural producer groups (farmers), and con-
sumers/taxpayers taken together (Gardner, 1987; Sarker et al , 1993). The prime 
underlying criterion for selecting these groups is the position of individuals in the 
economic process, based on productive or consumptive activity, the use of production 
factors, or factor and/or income endowments. Since most interest groups in the agricultural 
policy domain can be classified as Olsonian 'economic' interest groups furthering the 
common interest of their members as reflected by public good, regulatory and 
redistributional goals, this selection criterion seems acceptable. 
The advantage of using the familiar neo-classical economics consumer-producer-
taxpayer distinction or the other mentioned distinctions is that they can easily be applied to 
specific cases of - product or production factor - market exchange, and can easily be 
applied to derive weights in a political preference function context. However, the 
distinctions fail to take explicit notice of group organisation as such and the presence and 
activities of other groups; yet both may be important from a political influence 
perspective. The omission of certain - potentially - influential interests is perhaps the most 
serious of the two, since it may lead to misspecification errors. Most remarkable in this 
respect is the neglect of the interests of the agricultural input and food processing industry. 
This neglect implicitly presumes that either the political influence attempts and the actual 
political influence of these groups can be regarded as negligible, or that their interests 
parallel the interests of (the group of) farmers. However, the politico-economic interests of 
the agricultural input and food processing industry need neither be congruent with farmers' 
interests, nor have the same direction. Wherever farmers or their representative organisa-
tions are able to secure rents in the form of favourable (government) policies - in the 
absence of pure non-distortive lump-sum transfers -, other levels in the product chain are 
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affected; policy spill-overs may adversely affect the competitive position of firms in the 
input supplies and processing industry. Policies in primary agricultural commodity markets 
favouring farmers' interests may therefore affect - either parallel or conflict with - the 
interests of other actors as well. Since these can be expected to actively anticipate in the 
rent-seeking process rather than passively wait for a policy decision to be taken, 
competition among interest groups for influence may result. For example, the agri-food 
industry may lobby government to impose import barriers for processed food products, to 
establish non-tariff barriers (veterinary and phytosanitary measures may serve as such), or 
to auction export licenses rather than let the 'free market' prevail. But also within the agri-
food industry interests may differ greatly. For example, export-oriented firms can have 
other policy (influence) objectives than firms primarily producing for the domestic market. 
Even at the level of the individual firm interests may differ, for example employees' 
interests (labour) may be opposite to employers' interests (capital) within firms. 
Related to the striking lack of theoretical support for why some interest groups are 
included in the analysis and other - from an a priori point also influential - groups are not, 
is the fact that the majority of analyses takes a partial instead of a general equilibrium 
approach to the political-economic process, with the degree of partiality depending on 
whether a single commodity market, a composite commodity market (representing a basket 
of commodities, for example cereals; livestock; dairy) or the sector agriculture vis-a-vis the 
rest of the economy is studied.15 A major criticism here is that the functioning of a single 
commodity or factor market cannot be considered in isolation when political activities 
matter and are part of the analysis, since - again - important actors may not be included or 
be classified in the wrong actor category. For an empirically meaningful contribution, i.e. 
with the objective of a better understanding of 'real-world' policy formation, the ceteris 
paribus clause has to be 'stretched' in order to take account of (re)actions of other 
potential actors, since these may equally well have incentives to influence 'the 
government' for their own interest. 
While group organisation can be proxied by means of variables like group size, number 
of group members and geographical dispersion, incorporating - for example - the number 
of farmers or farms as an (exogenous) indication for their relative efficiency in the 
production of influence is not the same as the effective rate of organisation of farm 
groups. The unspecified and loose usage of the interest group concept makes that most 
analyses have the same flaws that characterize much of work in the older analytical 
pluralist tradition in political science which took the frequency of interactions rather than 
organisation per se as indicative for the ability to pressurise. This "lack of concern for 
organization" is an especially valid criticism with respect to the analysis of large economic 
groups which makes them "logically inconsistent" from a micro-behavioural perspective 
(Olson, 1965:129). Although interest groups in the agricultural policy domain differ 
a possible categorization is between dairy farming, arable farming, livestock production or 
horticulture, or any subdivision thereof. With regard to the latter an arbitrary differentiation with respect to the 
different classes of factors of production could be made (e.g., farmer-owners vs. tenant farmers; farm types 
[family farm labour or hired labour]; farm size in hectares or measured in units of physical capital). 
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greatly with respect to size and degree of organisation, most studies do not differentiate 
between privileged, intermediate, large latent or mobilised latent groups. In this way, no 
distinction is made between the aggregate of individual behaviour in the absence of 
(group) coordination, such as the individual act of voting on the one hand, and collective 
action as a positive sum game in establishing policy influence on the other. As a 
consequence, the interest group concept of agricultural producers is similar to the farm 
vote concept discussed in chapter 5. 
Most empirical interest group studies do not differentiate between voting, lobbying and 
campaign contributions as activities to influence the policy outcome. Yet in endogenous 
policy analyses voting may be one of the explanatory variables. At the same time, this 
neglect causes that the difference between explanations advanced by De Gorier and Tsur 
(1991), Swinnen (1992), and Swinnen and De Gorier (1992a) based on a Downsian-
Stigler-Peltzman type framework of politician-voter interaction is not as big as suggested. 
The use of a proportional voting function with political support conceived as "the 
probability that a member expresses support for the government through votes, popularity 
and the like" (De Gorier and Tsur, 1991:1245) is not very different from the concept of 
interest group pressure and support. It is therefore not surprising that the theoretical 
propositions and hypotheses found in this literature show a remarkable congruence with 
those derived from interest group models16. What is lacking in politician-voter interaction 
models is the lobbying activity part17. There is extensive, though casuistic, empirical 
evidence that lobbying matters for the policy outcome. Interest group models provide the 
theoretical arguments why this might be the case. 
7.8 Conclusion 
The use of interest group models has yielded interesting theoretical insights in and 
hypotheses on agricultural policy formation. The empirical application of interest group 
models, however, has some important limitations. Of the available frameworks the 
combined PPF-influence function approach taken by Gardner (1987) and extended by 
Sarker et al. (1993) offers the most promising framework for explaining policy 
developments over time. Studies in the mainstream PPF tradition are especially useful in 
getting an idea of the political strengths of groups involved in policy formation at a certain 
point in time. Both approaches do not explicitly include political activities for policy 
influence, however. The possibilities for empirical application of model categories with a 
more explicit political-behavioural structure, notably campaign contribution models and 
For example, De Goiter and Tsur (1991) and Swinnen (1994) hypothesize that agricultural support 
increases as income in agriculture falls relative to incomes earned in the rest of the economy. Swinnen (1994) 
finds that agricultural support will be higher, the greater is the fixity of factors of production (assets) in 
agriculture; the greater is the volume of fixed production factors employed in agriculture; and the higher are the 
capital intensities in agriculture and in industry. Note that the opposite argument is advanced by Anderson 
(1978:107), namely that agricultural support will be higher, the greater the labour-intensity. 
" A useful aspect of models in the tradition of De Gorter and Tsur, and others, is that they have 
relaxed the emphasis on agency capture by stressing that it is the interaction between active politicians and 
interest groups that ultimately determines the outcome of the underlying politico-economic game. 
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models involving the transmission of information, are small. Empirical application of 
campaign contribution models makes only sense if such contributions are actually used in 
political campaigns and if adequate registration exists which is accessible for research 
purposes. Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that the focus of these models may be 
too narrow for a full explanation of policy formation. Models involving the transmission 
of information may be tested in laboratory experiments. 'Real world' applications seem, 
however, too demanding from an informational point of view. 

PART n. 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY FORMATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
TOWARD A POLITICAL ECONOMY EXPLANATION 
The second part of this thesis deals with the search for a political economy model 
suitable to explain E U agricultural policy formation. This search can be viewed as 
consisting of two interrelated parts. First, it requires the selection of a formal-theoretical 
political economy model that enables the incorporation of the (dominant) actors involved in 
E U agricultural decision-making, their motives, activities, the main politico-economic con-
straints as well as the type of information available to each of them. This endogenous 
policy model should be consistent with existing political economy theory, have sufficient 
micro-foundations and be tractable. Second, in order to enable the empirical application of 
the theoretical model thus selected, reliable and adequate data series of (proxies of) the 
endogenous and exogenous variables should be available. 
The identification of politico-economic actors, their behaviour (as optimizing actors 
under constraints) and the way in which they interact are fundamental requirements for an 
endogenous policy model. The supranational decision-making structure of the European 
Community - which is the first of three pillars of the European Union - differs in important 
ways from decision-making structures and procedures generally found in the average 
democracy1. This specific character is also reflected in how political scientists and 
economists have generally approached the Community as a research object. On the one 
hand, political scientists have generally emphasized the uniqueness of E C decision-making 
and its political-institutional structure and have come up with sui generis theories to 
describe their evolution. On the other hand, while economists have generally recognised the 
importance of the specific character of the E C ' s political-institutional design, they have 
usually kept these considerations a non-formal, additional part of their analyses. The sui 
generis characteristics of agricultural decision-making in the European Union and the 
Community's political-institutional structure are important ingredients of an empirical 
endogenous policy model. The first three chapters therefore provide a stylised description 
of E C agricultural decision-making and the main features of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP ) . But agricultural policy formation in the European Union involves more than 
just the C A P , since the member states have some scope of autonomy to formulate 
complementary 'national' agricultural policies. 
Chapter 8 discusses the fundaments and objectives of the C A P ; it describes the C A P ' S 
original policy instrument mix and its subsequent reforms, and addresses the scope for and 
coverage of 'national' agricultural policies. Chapter 9 discusses the C A P ' S decision-making 
system. It describes the major E C decision-making bodies and their interrelationships, and 
takes the C A P ' S price review as an example of how decision-making functions in practice. 
The European Community is part of the so-called first pillar of the European Union, as established 
by the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, and is characterised by supranational decision-making. The pillar structure 
comprises (i) the European Communities, made up of the European Community (EC) [which used to be the 
European Economic Community before the Maastricht Treaty], the European Atomic Energy Community (Eurat-
om) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); (ii) a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
and (iii) cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs. For the second and third pillar intergovernmental 
decision-making applies. In the remainder of this thesis the term European Community is used to indicate the 
supranational nature of CAP decision-making. 
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system. It describes the major E C decision-making bodies and their interrelationships, and 
takes the C A P ' S price review as an example of how decision-making functions in practice. 
Chapter 10 discusses the potential impact of interest groups on policy formation and 
provides a first interpretation of policy developments during the C A P ' S existence, based on 
a survey among agri-Euro-groups, interviews and recent political science research on 
Community lobbying and policy formation. On the basis of this evidence and the results of 
part I , chapter 11 evaluates the theoretical and empirical applicability of endogenous policy 
models to agricultural policy formation in the E U . 
C H A P T E R 8 
A G R I C U L T U R A L P O L I C Y F O R M A T I O N I N T H E E U R O P E A N U N I O N : S T Y L I S E D F A C T S A N D F I G U R E S 
8.1 Introduction 
The construction of an empirical endogenous policy model of agricultural policy 
formation in the European Union requires a basic understanding of (i) both policy 
instruments and (stated) policy objectives, (ii) the E C ' s agricultural decision-making system, 
and (iii) the politico-institutional environment in which policy is formulated. This chapter 
provides a concise overview of the form and content of agricultural policies pursued within 
the European Community since 1958. It is meant as discussion of stylised facts and figures, 
not as a public choice interpretation of events. Although the chapter's structure is basically 
chronological, it does not take the form of a period-by-period discussion. Instead, a 
selection of topics is made which enables a clearer distinction between the different 
agricultural policy instruments and an assessment of whether and to which extent policy 
measures correspond to the Community 'ideal' as reflected by the original E E C Treaty. 
From a political economy perspective, the opportunities for individual member states to 
depart from or complement common policy measures are particularly interesting in that 
they reflect 'national' policy preferences. The chapter starts with a short discussion of the 
fundaments of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP ) , and discusses some of the 
underlying 'constitutional' constraints laid down by the Treaty of Rome (section 2). In 
section 3 an overview of the principles, and the basic market and price policy arrangements 
of the C A P is given. Section 4 discusses the problem of growing surpluses of agricultural 
commodities and their disposal, which has at least partly been evoked by the C A P ' S 
institutional design. Section 5 addresses the impact of non-market barriers and the agri-
monetary system on the functioning of the C A P . Section 6 discusses the subsequent 
proposals of the Commission to redress the surplus and disposal problems evoked by the 
C A P market and the actual reforms agreed by the Council. Section 7 deals with the 
structural policy component of the C A P . Section 8 discusses the potential and the legal 
boundaries for member states to formulate national agricultural policy. Section 9 
concludes.1 
It should be noted that neither the fundamental institutional reforms of the E E C Treaty, 
notably the 1986 Single European Act ( S E A ) and the 1991 Treaty on European Union 
( T E U ) , nor the successive enlargements of the Community in 1973 (Denmark, Ireland and 
the U K ) , 1981 (Greece), 1986 (Spain and Portugal) and 1994 (Finland, Sweden and 
Austria) are the subject of a full, separate discussion here. Yet, it should be clear that each 
enlargement has set a process of trade creation and diversion into motion, and thereby had 
not only an impact on the economic development of the agricultural sector, but also 
influenced the impact and effectiveness of existing agricultural policy arrangements. Both 
the institutional reforms and the accession of new members have influenced voting 
For other accounts of the development of the CAP, see, e.g., Harris et al. (1983), Neville-Rolfe 
(1984), Tracy (1989), Fearne (1991); De Hoogh and Silvis (1994), Colman and Roberts (1994), Moussis (1995), 
Swinbank (1996a). 
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relations and decision-making in the Community, and have also led to changes in the 
original policy instrument set of the C A P because new members showed different policy 
preferences. 
8.2 Agriculture and the EEC Treaty 
In March 1957 the governments of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands and West Germany signed the Treaty of Rome which created the European Economic 
Community (EEC) . Unlike the constitutions of the member states, the main concern of the 
E E C Treaty is economic policy. As Article 2 sets out: 
"[T]he Community shall have as its task by establishing a common market and 
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated 
raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the states 
belonging to it. " 
The establishment of the Common Market included the removal of quantitative restric-
tions and duties on intra-Community trade and the establishment of common external 
tariffs. The customs union - which came into full effect in July 1968 - was only the first 
stage in the process of integration. The Treaty also incorporated features of an economic 
union (part 2, title I) which would entail the free movement of persons, services and 
capital, and common rules of competition (Art. 3; part 2, title III). 
But what role did the Treaty - which entered into force in January 1958 - assign to 
agriculture? The Intergovernmental Committee, under chairmanship of the Belgian Foreign 
Minister Spaak, which had studied the possibilities of, inter alia, an Atomic Energy 
Community and a Common Market, had come to the conclusion that a Common Market 
without agriculture would be inconceivable (Comité Intergouvernemental, 1956). In the 
post-World-War-II years agriculture played a significant economic and electoral role in 
each of the member states. Furthermore, the safeguarding of domestic food supplies was 
felt vital in the post-war re-reconstruction throughout Europe. At the same time the net 
outflow of agricultural labour - due to the cessation of farming as a result of major 
productivity increases pushed by technological progress - also served as an important 
source of labour for the development of the industrial and services sector. Its electoral 
importance is reflected by the fact that agricultural employment as a percentage of total 
civilian employment was still considerable. For instance, in 1958, the ratio ranged from 
8.7% in Belgium, 12.6% in the Netherlands, 15.7% in Germany, 16.6% in Luxembourg, 
23.7% in France, to 34.9% in Italy (see also appendix l l . l ) 2 . 
Clearly, the Community offered important opportunities to exploit existing comparative 
advantage in agricultural production (e.g., France, the Netherlands) and in the production 
2 Data for Belgium and Luxembourg based on situation in 1960 and derived from Eurostat (1977) 
Social Indicators for the European Community: 1960-1975. Luxembourg 
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of industrial goods (e.g., Germany). As Tracy (1989:251) advances "agriculture was a 
sector where specialisation could bring important benefits and that [its] inclusion was 
necessary to balance trade advantages between the member countries". However, a compli-
cating factor was that agriculture was subject to government intervention in all six 
candidate member states, with strong divergences in support arrangements, not only in the 
type and level of instruments employed, but also in commodity coverage. Hence, the 
inclusion of agriculture in the Common Market was to be accompanied by a Common 
Agricultural Policy ( C A P ) (Treaty of Rome, Art.3[d]; Art. 38[4]). The objectives of the 
Common Agricultural Policy as laid down in Article 39[1] entailed "(...) 
a) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring the 
rational development of agricultural production and the optimum utilization of the 
factors of production, in particular labour; 
b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by 
increasing the individual earnings of the persons engaged in agriculture; 
c) to stabilize markets; 
d) to assure the availability of supplies; 
e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices." 
The Treaty did not specify any definite ranking among policy objectives; nor does it 
unambiguously state how a fair standard or rational use could be measured, how far the 
promotion of technical progress should go, which price levels were seen as reasonable or 
how the objective of reasonable prices for consumers is to be reconciled with a fair 
standard of living for the agricultural community. The link suggested by the conjunction 
'thus' between "increasing productivity" and "thus to ensure a fair standard of living (..) 
by increasing individual (..) earnings" is a doubtful one. From an aggregate sector 
perspective a productivity increase implies a decrease in aggregate farmers' income, since 
the outward shift in aggregate product supply causes equilibrium output prices to fall, 
given that demand and supply are price inelastic, ceteris paribus. The rational development 
of agricultural production and the optimum utilisation of production factors are strongly 
influenced by external developments such as productivity growth rates in the industrial and 
services sector, as well as world market supply and demand for agricultural commodities 
and therefore does not necessarily parallel the assuring-of-availability-of-supplies objective. 
Of the 248 Articles the Rome Treaty contains, 10 specifically apply to agriculture (part 
2, title III, Articles 38-47). Articles 40 and 42 concern the instrumental design including 
the establishment of Common Market Organisations (CMOS ) and possible exemptions with 
respect to the application of common rules of competition to agricultural production and 
trade. Article 41 calls for the coordination of measures in the fields of vocational training, 
agricultural R & D and extension, which may include commonly financed projects or 
organisations. It also opens the possibility of organising common actions to 'develop' 
consumption of certain commodities. The C M O structure and common agricultural prices 
were to be achieved gradually - as a step-by-step process rather than a 'shock therapy'-
type overnight reform - which necessitated transitional arrangements (Art. 44, 46). Article 
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43 provides the legal basis for most C A P legislation (see, e.g., Snyder, 1985; 1990). The 
Treaty had only sketched the general objectives of the C A P . For the further tailoring of the 
C A P it called for a Conference to compare the agricultural policies of the member states 
and to formulate a statement of their resources and needs. The general resolution of this 
Stresa Conference - held 3-12 July 1958 - was that, in order to be internationally competi-
tive and to enable a remuneration of agricultural labour and capital comparable to that 
obtained in other sectors of the economy, existing agricultural structures in the Community 
had to be overhauled. Therefore, policies aimed to manage the market were to be 
supplemented by structural measures to promote a rational allocation of resources and even 
out production costs. However, the family nature so characteristic of European farms 
should be preserved. Furthermore, a fair standard of living implied common farm prices 
set above world market prices. It was hoped that increased productivity would enable the 
application of price policy without encouraging over-production (Fearne, 1991:27; 
Commission, 1958). 
8.3 CAP market and price support: principles and basic mechanism 
Following the Stresa Conference of July 1958, the Commission submitted a final set of 
proposals regarding the future design of the Common Agricultural Policy to the Council in 
June 1960 (Commission, 1958a; 1960). The first decisions were not made until October 
1961 and, inter alia, concerned the acceptance of the principle of variable import levies 
instead of fixed tariffs, to be levied both on third country imports and - during the 
transition period - on intra-Community trade, and the use of target and minimum import 
prices as a means of harmonising existing policies (e.g., Fearne, 1991: 29). In January 
1962, as part of a major package deal the Agriculture Council adopted a series of 
regulations giving legal effect to the variable levy system and the establishment of a 
Common Market Organization (CMO ) for cereals and cereal-based livestock products 
(pigmeat, poultrymeat and eggs), wine, fruit and vegetables, which were to come into 
effect later that year.3 In the following years other CMOs were established for dairy 
products, beef and veal (fundamental provisions agreed in 1964, full regime in 1968) and 
rice (1964); olive oil (1966; 1978 revised); sugar (1967); tobacco (1970); seeds for sowing 
(1972); oilseeds (1967); soyabeans (1973; revised 1979); linseed (1976), castor seeds 
(1976); peas and field beans (1978); sheepmeat (1980). The 1962 package also stipulated a 
five-year transitional period during which existing national support schemes were to be 
further aligned. 
The common agricultural market and the C M O arrangements were built on three basic 
principles or pillars (e.g., Harris et al , 1983:39): 
(i) The principle of unity of the market, which implied the free movement of 
agricultural commodities within the customs union, a common marketing 
system and common (administered) pricing; 
Note that, while the CMO structure for fruit and vegetables was determined in 1962, actual support 
started from July 1968; a unified market for wine was not established until 1970. 
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(ii) The principle of Community preference, which was secured by the adoption of 
a system of variable import levies; 
(iii) The principle of financial solidarity, which held that expenses incurred as a 
result of the Common Agricultural Policy should be financed by the 
Community, and income generated by the policy - border levies - should be 
regarded as part of the 'own resources' of the Community. 
The fact that for each product category a separate commodity regime (CMO ) was 
established, with each C M O having its own set of legislation, measures and even 
terminology, make the C A P ' S market and price policies diverse, complex and far from 
transparent. The extent and the form of support differs strongly between commodities. A 
rough distinction can be made between commodity market regimes with a high degree of 
domestic support and border protection, and the more lightly structured commodity 
regimes.4 The first category, which is by far the most important in terms of E A G G F budget 
expenditure, covers cereals, oilseeds, protein plants, milk and dairy, beef, sugar, olive oil 
and wine. The second, more miscellaneous category includes commodity regimes in which 
border protection is the most important element (covering pigmeat, poultrymeat, eggs, 
fresh fruit and vegetables), commodity regimes with direct payments as their prime feature 
(covering, inter alia, processed fruit and vegetables, textile fibres, sowing seeds, tobacco), 
and regimes commodity regimes with a mixture of both (sheepmeat and goatmeat) (e.g., 
De Hoogh and Silvis, 1994: 51,64). In the following, the main traits of the archetypal 
commodity regime for cereals are described; for more detailed descriptions of this and 
other C M O S , the reader is referred to, e.g., Harris et al. (1983); De Hoogh and Silvis 
(1994); and the annual reports of the Commission on "The Agricultural Situation in the 
Community". 
The price support mechanism for cereals is based on three 'institutional' prices - a 
target price, a threshold price and an intervention price - which are all fixed on an annual 
basis. The target price can be seen as the pivot of the support mechanism. In theory, the 
target price reflects the product price that efficient farms have to earn if they are to 
achieve the 'fair standard of living' mentioned in Article 39 of the E E C Treaty. For cereals 
this target price indicates the market price to be received by farmers delivering grain in the 
Community's principal deficit region (Duisburg). The target price serves as a reference 
point for deriving the threshold and intervention price; the target price itself does not 
trigger any policy action. The threshold price represents the minimum import price and is 
set at such a level that the target price will not be undercut by third country imports5. For 
cereals the threshold price is derived from the target price by deducting transport costs 
4 A few commodities are not covered by a CMO structure. In 1987 this held for alcohol and alcohol 
vinegar, honey, bananas, fresh pineapple, coffee, chicory roots, cork, horsemeat, potatoes except potatoes for 
starch making (Commission, 1988:107). 
5 Minimum import prices serves as an example to illustrate the different terminology used in the 
different commodity market regimes; they have been termed 'threshold price' (for cereals, rice and dairy 
products); 'guide price' (for beef and wine); 'basic price' (for pigmeat, fruit and vegetables). 
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between Rotterdam - the main grain import port - and Duisburg. The threshold price 
serves to determine the variable import levy (the difference between the threshold price 
and the lowest c.i.f. price offered by importers). The third institutional price, the 
intervention price, ensures that when self-sufficiency - defined as domestic production 
divided by domestic consumption times 100 - approaches or exceeds 100%, domestic 
market prices can still be upheld: if market prices drop below this intervention price, 
national intervention agencies may buy products from farmers or traders in order to 
maintain previous price levels, thereby effectively providing a 'floor' in the market. Thus, 
while the target price forms the upper bound of the price band, the lower bound is set by 
the intervention price. As an alternative for intervention buying, traders can also be paid 
export refunds to enable them to 'compete' on the world market. The export refund by 
approximation covers the difference between the intervention price and the world market 
price (as denominated in us $)6. Day-to-day decisions regarding the (level of) variable 
import levies and export refunds are part of the Management Committee procedure (see 
chapter 9). The system of variable import levies and export refunds implies that E C 
agricultural markets are (almost) fully insulated from world market price influences. 
In order to cover the expenditures on domestic intervention measures, export refunds, 
and other common policy measures, a European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund ( E A G G F ) was established. In the early years of the C A P ' S existence, E A G G F 
expenditure was - roughly - covered by contributions from the member states in proportion 
to their net agricultural imports. From July 1967 all expenditures on market support were 
to be reimbursed from Community funds. Until 1970 these were based on member state 
contributions which depended, inter alia, on the proceeds of agricultural levies and 
customs duties of third country imports. As from January 1971 a 'definitive' system of 
financing was established which entailed three forms of 'own resources': (i) levies charged 
on agricultural imports from third countries and levies charged to domestic sugar 
producers7, (ii) customs duties charged on industrial imports from third countries, and (iii) 
a fixed rate 'not exceeding one per cent' of the harmonised value added tax (VAT ) base of 
the member states from January 1979. In 1984, at the Fontainebleau European Council, the 
maximum rate of V A T was raised from 1% to 1.4%. In 1988, at the Brussels European 
Council, a fourth ' own resource' was added which was based on the relative wealth of a 
member state as measured by the difference between its V A T base and G N P , with the 
overall ceiling of Own Resources set at 1.2% of E C G N P (e.g., Laffan and Schackleton, 
1996:79; Ardy, 1996).* 
The majority of export refunds have been set by tender. 
7 The sugar CMO differs from the 'standard' CAP commodity regime in that - from its inception -
domestic production quotas have been applied: basic 'A' quotas set close to domestic consumption; specialisation 
'B' quotas to which a flat rate levy applied (later also applied to 'A' sugar); and production outside the quotas 
( ' C sugar) without support provisions (for further details, see, e.g., Harris et al., 1983). 
8 The GNP percentage was increased to 1.27 as part of the 'Delors-2 package' at the Edinburgh 
European Council of December 1992. 
Chapter 8 129 
8.4 Surplus problems and the growth of CAP budget expenditure 
The level of common price support was subject to fierceful debate between the member 
states. National support prices differed considerably between member states with Dutch 
and French prices being at the lowest, and German prices at the upper part of the price 
range. The common price levels agreed in December 1964 were higher than the 
Commission had envisaged and were generally regarded as a German success: some prices 
were established at a level in between the highest and the lowest national prices (e.g., 
cereals, sugar beet, grain-fed livestock); for other products, notably dairy, the level was 
closer to the upper end of the price range (Harris et al., 1983: 40-41; Priebe et al , 1972). 
Common prices for cereals, cereal-based livestock products and oilseeds were applicable as 
from July 1967; dairy, beef and sugar followed in July 1968. 
The system of variable import levies, export refunds and intervention prices not only 
acted as a 'safety net' against the threat of world price fluctuations, but also acted as an 
incentive for farmers to increase production. The relative high price support levels 
strengthened rather than weakened this incentive effect. While aggregated self-sufficiency 
rates for the E C - 6 in the pre-Community era had already been considerable, self-sufficiency 
continued to grow under the C A P , especially for cereals (notably wheat and rye) and dairy 
(especially butter, concentrated milk, and milk powder) (see appendix 8.1 for figures).9 
Part of this rise in self-sufficiency could - like in the rest of the industrialised market 
economies - be attributed to steady increases in production as a result of ('autonomous') 
technological growth combined with a stagnating growth in consumption. Already in a 
very early stage the Commission had rightly diagnosed the potential problem: 
"In view of the fact that production of the major products is increasingly more 
vigorously than consumption, surpluses are appearing on the various markets 
and their disposal is causing serious difficulties and worries (Commission, 
1958a: 70). 
Yet the C A P ' S design - which ensured a relatively high level of support and had no 
built-in limitations to production eligible for support (except for sugar beets) - aggravated 
rather than softened the problem of diverging trends in aggregate supply and demand. The 
rise in self-sufficiency not only caused an increasing burden for the E C budget due to 
financial outlays for its disposal (intervention; export subsidies), but it also laid 
considerable pressure on trade relations with third countries. Export markets were used as 
a major outlet for domestic surpluses. Yet the ample use of export refunds to 'compete' on 
these markets not only made the E C a major player on several world commodity markets, 
but at the same time depressed world market prices and increased world market instability. 
Apart from export refund and intervention measures, additional measures - most of a 
temporary character - were taken to relieve the surplus problem during the 1970s. In the 
Since the consumption of some product categories (e.g., wine, dairy products) is subsidised as well, 
the growth in self-sufficiency may understate rather than overstate the impact of the CAP on internal production 
and consumption patterns. 
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beef and pigmeat sector private storage aids were introduced to reduce the pressure on 
public intervention. Other examples are the introduction of deratoing and incorporation 
payments for wheat used for animal feeding; consumer subsidies for butter, school milk; 
processor subsidies for butter in ice cream and bakery products; various disposal schemes 
for skimmed milk; and 'conversion' schemes to encourage farmers to convert to other 
forms of production (for a more detailed overview, see Harris et al , 1983). 
Table 8.1 Annual increases in 'institutional' common prices (in weighted average %) 
Year Commission 
proposal 
Council 
decision 
Inflation Year Council decision Infla 
tion 
UA or ECU UA 
or 
ECU 
Nation, 
prices 
U A o r 
ECU 
Nation, 
prices 
E-6 67/68 2.7 E-10 82/83 10.4 12.2 10.1 
68/69 -1.3 -0.7 3.2 83/84 4.2 6.9 7.8 
69/70 0 0 5.1 84/85 -0.5 3.3 5.8 
70/71 0.5 1.5 6.7 85/86 +0.1 1.8 5.1 
71/72 4.0 4.0 7.4 86/87 -0.3 2.2 5.5 
72/73 4.7 4.8 6.7 E-12 87/88 -0.2 3.3 4.1 
E-9 73/74 6.1 7.2 8.4 88/89 -0.1 1.6 4.4 
74/75 7.2 + 4.0< 15.5 17.8 12.3 89/90 -1.3 -0.2 4.9 
76/76 9.0 8.6 12.2 14.9 90/91 -3.2 -0.7 5.3 
76/77 7.5 9.1 12.0 10.8 91/92 -0.6 -0.2 5.4 
77/78 3.0 4.9 7.5 10.3 92/93 -1.0 -1.0 4.3 
78/79 2.0 2.4 7.5 8.9 93/94 -8.8 -1.9 3.6 
79/80 0.1 1.2 7.4 10.2 94/95 -6.8 -4.7 2.6 
80/81 2.4 4.9 4.5 12.6 E-15 95/96 2.8 
81/82 8.0 9.3 13.3 10.6 
Key: Weighted average based on shares in agricultural production. Changes in target prices (1968/69-
1981/82), and intervention prices (1982/83-1994/95), respectively. Figures not adjusted for inflation. 
Increases measured in national prices include (changes in) Monetary Compensatory Amounts. 
* = Second round of price fixing in October 1974. Inflation based on price deflator GDP at market prices 
in national currency. For period 1967-85: EC-10 data. For period 1986-95: EC-12 data. 
Source: Figures for price proposals by Commission based on Harris et a l , 1983, p.57. Figures Council 
decision 1968/69-1988/89 taken from CEC, various issues. Figures 1989/90 - 1994/95 taken from OECD 
(1988-1996), various issues. ^ 
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Though the common support prices had been set at relatively high levels compared to 
world market price levels, the Council did not make serious attempts to adjust prices in a 
downward direction in the years following 1967. Throughout the mid-1970s until the mid-
1980s the average yearly increase in 'institutional' prices agreed by the Council has 
exceeded the proposals by the Commission, as is shown in table 8.1. 
The divergence between annual support price increases stated in Unit of Accounts ( U A ) 
or European Currency Units (ECU) and increases stated in national currency is due to the 
existence of so-called Monetary Compensatory Amounts (see further section 8.5.2). 
Though institutional price increases are important from a policy perspective, they do not 
accurately reflect the producer price increases as determined by the market. Real 
commodity prices (except for sugar) have been rather stable until the 1970s (e.g., Tracy, 
1989:313; Commission, 1994:50). Since the late 1970s real producer prices have tended to 
decline. An overview of real producer prices for crops and animals and animal products is 
given in appendix 8.2. While producer prices within the Community had tended to 
decrease in real terms, real external prices of traded agricultural commodities have faced 
an even steeper decline. The rising nominal rate of protection which has been the result of 
these different trends is shown in table 8.2. 
Table 8.2 Nominal rate of protection and annual rate of change 1979-91, for EUR-12 
1979 (%) 1991 (%) Growth rate (%) 
Wheat 42 118 9.0 
Barley 86 111 2.1 
Maize 65 95 3.2 
Soyabeans 90 125 2.8 
Rapeseed 49 145 9.5 
Sunflower 64 169 8.4 
Milk 135 179 2.4 
Beef and veal 62 92 3.3 
Pigmeat 23 33 3.1 
Poultry 23 20 -1.2 
Sheepmeat 143 183 2.1 
Eggs 41 22 -5.1 
Key: Nominal rate of protection measures as the ratio between EC producer prices and external prices. 
Source: Commission, 1994, p. 50. 
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A more-inclusive measure of assistance to agriculture is the Producer Subsidy 
Equivalent (PSE) . Appendix 8.3 provides an overview of yearly changes in P S E S for 
aggregate commodity categories at the E C level in the period 1979-199410. The surplus 
problem and the high degree of price support resulted in an increase of E A G G F Guarantee 
expenditure of roughly one billion unit of account (UA) per annum in nominal terms 
during the 1970s, and even steeper increases during the early 1980s (for an overview of 
the budgetary aspects of the C A P , see appendix 8.4). In real terms total E A G G F expenditure 
has doubled between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, with an average growth rate of 
5.6% during the period 1973-1991 (Commission, 1994:14). It should be noted that is not 
the size of the associated budget expenditure that signifies the impact of a policy measure, 
but the effect of a policy measure on behaviour. It could well be that a policy decision 
with minor budgetary outlays has a large welfare impact. Think for instance of food 
legislation and environmental regulatory measures. 
Additional pressures toward 'overspending': the restaurant problem 
The principle of financial solidarity - which implies that the budget consequences of 
higher support prices and other measures taken within the framework of the C A P are to be 
borne by the Community at large - is said to have had an increasing effect on agricultural 
budget expenditure as well. The essence of the argument is captured by the 'restaurant 
bill' problem (Schmitt, 1984) which describes how the menu choice of restaurant table 
companions (i.e., member states) is influenced by the (ex ante) agreement on how to share 
the restaurant bill. From an individual member state perspective the marginal costs of a 
decision taken under the framework of the C A P do not equal the member state's 'real' 
share of the budget burden of the policy decision, but instead, to the member state's 
marginal contribution to the Community's system of own resources. According to Schmitt 
(1984), the principle of financial solidarity causes that agriculture-specific interests would 
tend to coincide with the overall economic interest of the member states, and therefore 
embody an intrinsic incentive toward higher overall spending. 
While the restaurant bill problem could be an explanatory factor for the propensity 
toward 'overspending', it should be borne in mind that C A P financing can be seen as 
repeated game with different properties than the 'normal' restaurant problem which 
typically is a 'one-shot' prisoner dilemma game. The menu choice is not only influenced 
by the principle of financial solidarity, but also by the dominant use of the unariimity 
rule11 in the Council. Unanimity implies that individual member states are not able to 
choose their menu autonomously: bargaining over the content of the group menu is a 
The PSE and CSE is not a welfare measure in the strict sense (see, e.g. Cahill and Legg, 1989). It 
is an indicator of the value of transfers from domestic consumers and taxpayers resulting from a given set of 
agricultural policies, at a point in time. It includes market price support, direct payments, measures which lower 
input costs, general services which in the long term reduce costs but are not directly received by producers, and -
in the case of the EC - measures by the member states. 
1 1 The unanimity rule has dominated Council decision-making until the mid 1980s (see also chapter 
9). 
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necessary ingredient for C A P decisions. A concomitant effect of the unanimity rule has 
been the frequent use of package deals which enabled satisfying the preferences of 
individual member states. The discretionary powers of the Agriculture Council to choose a 
menu without the prior consent of the Finance Council has been an additional factor in this 
respect. The package deals and issue linkages have gone at the cost of a rising overall 
menu bill, however. 
8.5 Infringements of the unity-of-thc-market principle 
In the absence of trade impediments and under conditions of perfect competition, 
efficient arbitrage would ensure uniform prices throughout the Community, allowing for 
transport cost differences (the 'law of one price'). However, both the existence of non-
tariff barriers and Monetary Compensatory Amounts have proven to be a barrier to price 
'equalisation' within the Community and have affected the unity-of-the-market principle. 
8.5.1 Non-tariff barriers 
By July 1968 all intra-EC customs duties and quantitative restrictions were eliminated 
and common external tariffs were established. The E E C Treaty had also called for the 
abolition of "all measures having equivalent effect" (Art.3[a]) and "[f]he abolition, as 
between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services and 
capital" (Art.3[c]). These objectives appeared too ambitious, at least within the time 
schedule set by the Treaty according to which the single market had to be reached within 
12 years (Art.8[l]) with a possible delay of three years after ratification of the Treaty. 
Throughout the 1970s the European economy remained highly fragmented and the 
Community was still far from being the Common Market it was commonly called. In 
agriculture various non-tariff barriers existed, which had a large impact on E E C internal 
and external trade. Most of these non-tariff barriers were of a technical nature, such as 
national veterinary and phytosanitary measures, measures relating to animal welfare, public 
health and food legislation, and environmental measures. Although Article 3(h) had 
explicitly called for "the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent 
required for the proper functioning of the common market (...)", the unanimity rule 
required for the harmonisation of legislation (Art. 100, E E C Treaty) appeared a major 
stumbling block for effective decision-making. In the beginning of the 1980s most 
progress in eliminating non-tariff barriers, and in particular the harmonisation of national 
food law, was made by interpretations of existing Community law by the European Court 
of Justice in its famous 'Cassis de Dijon' ruling (Case 120/78 of 20 February 1979). The 
Cassis de Dijon case and similar rulings of the Court introduced the principle of 'mutual 
recognition' in intra-Community trade which 
"(...) signifies acceptance by all Member States of products lawfully 
manufactured and sold in any other Member State, even if such products are 
manufactured on the basis of technical specifications different from those laid 
down by national laws in force in so far as the products in question protect in 
an equivalent fashion the legitimate interests involved" (Commission, 1988a:24). 
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While the member states were free to determine detailed provisions, the principle of 
'mutual recognition' implied an element of policy competition between member states 
(harmonisation avant la lettre). In 1985 the completion of the single market again became 
a major policy focus with the launching of the 'White Paper' programme which entailed 
the elimination of all internal physical, technical and fiscal barriers before the end of 1992 
(Commission, 1985) and the establishment of the four freedoms of movement - of goods, 
persons, services and capital foreseen in the Rome Treaty. The White Paper included more 
than 300 explicit measures, with roughly one third applying to food and agriculture.12 
The internal market objective and the deadline for its completion set at 31 December 1992 
were both included in the Single European Act (SEA). The SEA - which was signed in 
February 1986 and ratified in July 1987 - was the first substantial amendment to the Rome 
Treaty and involved the speeding up and democratising of the decision-making process.13 
Especially important for the elimination of non-tariff barriers was the introduction of 
Article 100A which allowed the Council to adopt harmonisation measures by qualified 
majority vote (see also chapter 9). 
8.5.2 Monetary Compensatory Amounts 
At the start of the CAP it had been decided that common support prices would be set in 
Units of Account (UA), which made common prices directly convertible into national 
currencies since the UA was set equal to the (gold parity of the) us $. While the world 
monetary system was relatively stable at the time when the CAP was created, this stability 
which was based on fixed exchange rates would not last long. Only two years after the 
establishment of common prices, parity changes were announced in France (a devaluation 
in August 1969) and Germany (a revaluation in October 1969). For a number of - partly 
political - reasons, the French government decided that for the calculation of French 
support prices for agricultural products the unamended 'old' exchange rate would be used. 
This implied that the official exchange rate and the green conversion rate - the rate at 
which common prices were expressed in national currency - were no longer equal. Due to 
the common price system, prices of agricultural commodities in the rest of the Community 
were now higher than in France, which made it profitable for French farmers to export 
their produce. In order to prevent such 'unfair' intra-Community trade, French agricultural 
exports became subject to an export tax - a 'negative' monetary compensatory amount 
For example, 94 of the measures applied to the veterinary and plant health domain (Commission 
[ASCR], 1989:25). 
1 3 The Single European Act also extended the competence of the Community to (aspects of) environ-
mental policy, social and regional policy and R&D policy. Later, at the Maastricht summit in December 1991, this 
line was carried through with the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which was fully implemented in November 
1993 and revised and extended the 'acquis communautaire' of the existing Communities. The Maastricht Treaty 
envisaged a more active role of the Community in consumer protection, public health, education and training, the 
establishment of trans-European transport, telecommunications and energy networks, industrial policy, an 
extension of EU powers in the social and environmental policy domain, and a further increase in R&D policy. 
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( M C A ) -, and imports became subject to a subsidy of an equivalent amount.14 Because the 
introduction of M C A S formed a threat to the unity of the market, they were to have a 
temporary character: France was allowed a two-year period to return to the common price 
system. Eligibility for M C A payments was restricted to those products with a functioning 
intervention buying mechanism or closely related products. The German government which 
feared the political consequences of lowering agricultural (producer) prices, was - in 
addition to one year of M C A payments - allowed to compensate its farmers through 
reduced V A T payments over a three-year period. The currency realignments in 1969 were a 
forerunner of what was yet to come: in May 1971 as a result of continuing pressures to 
revalue, the D-Mark and the Dutch guilder were allowed to float. However, since the fixed 
green conversion rates used by Germany and the Netherlands differed from the (floating) 
official exchange rates, a system of variable M C A S was introduced. Following the 
suspension of the us $-gold convertibility in August 1971, the devaluation of the dollar 
and the realignment of EC-currencies under the 'Smithsonian agreement' in December 
1971, M C A S were introduced for all member states. Though the Gold Standard was 
abandoned, the Commission decided to maintain the link between the Unit of Account and 
the dollar link which implied that from now on M C A S depended on member state currency 
movements vis-a-vis the dollar. In 1973 the UA was redefined and linked to the 'joint 
float' of EC currencies: M C A S became fixed and subject to change only when a currency 
was revalued or devalued in the 'joint-float'15. 
Remarkable is the extent to which the M C A system allowed C A P support prices in 
different member states to diverge. During the 1970s the gap between the highest and the 
lowest prices was often greater than that which existed before the price harmonisation in 
1967, with Britain at the lowest and Germany at the highest level (Harris et al , 1983:194). 
The extent to which M C A S were used differed strongly between member states: while 
Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg had modest positive M C A S throughout the period 1975-
1986, others, notably the UK, Italy and France applied strongly negative M C A S , especially 
in the period 1977-1979, with the other member states following in between (see for 
detailed figures appendix 8.5a and b). Apart from these price divergences which were 
sharply at odds with the unity of the market principle, the M C A system also formed a 
major budget item, with peaks of 12.1% (1977) and 10.0% (1978) in the period 1973-80 
of total EAGGF expenditure.16 The Commission insisted on the elimination of MCAs, but 
none of its proposals to this end appeared acceptable to the member states. 
In essence, the use of MCAs returned some sovereignty over agricultural price policy to 
member states and effectively implied an - albeit partly - 'renationalisation' of the C A P . 
While green conversion rates were in principle fixed by the Council on a proposal of the 
The MCA was called negative since the French intervention price level was below the common 
intervention price level. 
1 5 See for successive changes in the MCA system, see, e.g., Harris et al. (1983); Strijker (1986); Tracy 
(1989); Ostermeyer-Schlader (1990); Fearne (1991); Silvis and Mookhoek (1994); Colman and Roberts (1994). 
1 6 MCA data derived from De Hoogh (1980). For EAGGF data, see appendix 8.4. 
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Comrnission, in practice a member state could largely determine whether and to which 
extent its green conversion rate should be adjusted. The following passage taken from 
Fearne (1991:57) is particularly illustrative in this respect: 
"(...) Britain was able to maintain a (relatively) cheap food policy within the 
CAP by refusing to devalue the 'green'pound in line with the market rate (...). 
A similar position was adopted by Italy, a large importer of 'Northern' products, 
which progressively sought to satisfy the Italian farm lobby via structural 
measures and direct aid from the Community budget. The ambiguity of 
Germany's maintenance of relatively large positive MCAs, as a net food 
importer, reflects the importance of the farm vote in Germany and the relative 
prosperity of Germany (...). Denmark (...) adopted a policy of directly linking the 
'green' krone to the market rate, in order to satisfy domestic farmers and exploit 
the benefits of jointly financed export refunds on high-priced CAP products. (..)" 
The creation of the European Monetary System (EMS ) in March 1979 not only meant 
that the 'joint float' Unit of Account was replaced by the 'basket' unit E C U for fixing the 
common (intervention) price levels. It was also decided that any new M C A S created after 
the E M S agreement would be phased out over a period of two years, provided that this 
would not lead to a decrease in support prices in national currencies for positive M C A 
countries (Harris et al, 1983:196). M C A S were based upon the percentage difference 
between a country's fixed rate in E C U (the so-called currency central E C U rate) and its 
green conversion rate; in addition a number of arbitrary deductions ('franchises') were 
applied, M C A S were fixed for the E M S countries, and subject to change only in case of a 
reshuffle in the parity rates between members of the E M S or a re- or devaluation of green 
conversion rates. Now a revaluation of one currency within the E M S would increase its 
positive M C A or reduce its negative M C A , but would also increase the negative M C A S or 
reduce the positive M C A S of other member states. The opposite would happen with a 
devaluation. As Harris et al. (1983: 203) point out the "agri-monetary factor led to an 
upward pressure on Council price decisions because of its asymmetric bias": member states 
with depreciating currencies could establish price increases by simply devaluating their 
green conversion rates, whilst for countries with appreciating currencies price increases had 
to come from common price increases since changes in conversion rates would always lead 
to a drop in support prices. 
The agreement that the phasing out of M C A S would not lead to a decrease in support 
prices in national currencies for positive M C A countries, made the lowering or even 
freezing of common prices difficult. In March 1984 a 'solution' was found with the 
introduction of the switch-over mechanism which enabled the dismantling of all existing 
positive M C A S and prevented the birth of new positive M C A S , without causing major price 
decreases in the positive M C A countries. From now on common support prices became tied 
to the strongest currency in the Community and monetary gaps were calculated as the 
difference between a country's green conversion rate and a new hypothetical green E C U 
with the green E C U set at such a level so as to eliminate the possible creation of positive 
M C A S . The switch-over mechanism removed the need for revaluation of green conversion 
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rates. However, this went at the cost of creating larger negative M C A S and inflation 
(Colman and Roberts, 1994:97; Cornmission, 1994:22). Since negative M C A S had to be 
removed automatically vvithin a certain time period, the switch-over mechanism actually 
led to increases in support prices in national currency, except for the country with the 
strongest currency. These price increases were only partly counterbalanced by cuts in 
common prices ( C E C , 1990:67). The gap between the real or central-rate E C U and the green 
E C U could only increase: by the end of 1992 the difference had already risen to 19.5% 
(Colman and Roberts, 1994:97) which implied that if green E C U S were to be abolished 
common support prices would fall with a similar percentage. 
The completion of the Single European Market by the end of 1992 and the abolition of 
intra-Community border controls necessitated - again - a reform of the agri-monetary 
system. While green conversion rates and the switch-over mechanism were retained, some 
significant changes were made. For each member state a single green rate was to apply for 
all commodities (as well as other C A P policies financed by the E A G G F Guarantee Section) 
which implied the abandonment of differing rates between commodities. To avoid 
significant monetary gaps, green conversion rates would follow official exchange rate 
movements more closely in a system of automatic adjustments. The monetary crises in 
1992 and 1993 which led to the widening of the E M S margins of fluctuation to 15% in 
August 1993 which made that all currencies became floating which fixed the switch-over 
factor and led to the suspension of the automatic adjustment system. 
The economic implications of M C A S and non-tariff barriers are in principle the same as 
a system of border protection. Both factors can be held responsible for violating the 'law 
of one price', as is confirmed by a recent study by Zanias (1993).17 Apart from changes 
in opportunity costs, the transaction costs of the agrimonetary system and the existence of 
non-tariff barriers as measured by administrative costs for both trading industries and 
member state governments and the Community can be judged considerable.18 
8.6 The welfare impact of the CAP 
The net budget expenditures which are the result of the C A P say little about its overall 
opportunity costs (entgangene Nutzeri) or welfare effects. Part of the net economic cost of 
the supporting primary producers is borne indirectly by consumers in the form of higher 
food prices. The C A P has not only had a distortionary impact of the behaviour of farmers, 
consumers, agribusiness or taxpayers, but it has also led to invisible income flows between 
countries. For food importers (the U K , Greece, Spain and Portugal) had to pay a higher 
Zanias (1993) tested the 'law of one price' hypothesis for four commodity markets by means of co-
integration analysis, using monthly data for the period 1980/1983-1990. For wheat the importance of MCAs in 
obstructing intra-Community trade are most clear. For milk the use of 'MCA-modified' time series did not 
establish the market integration result, because non-tariff barriers and/or imperfect competition seem to play a 
larger role. For potatoes and pig carcases the 'law of one price' is more likely to hold; however, different tests 
show mixed results. 
1 8 The MCA system has also led to artificial trade flows - 'carousel' trade - in which traders try to 
take advantage of inconsistencies in the MCA system. Furthermore, the MCA system incurs costs through the 
monetary risk of (future) arbitrary changes in MCAs (see also Harris et al., 1983: 211). 
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price for their imports than the world market price they would have paid in the absence of 
the Community. For the major food exporters (France, Denmark, the Netherlands) the 
reverse applied: they faced a higher price for their exports than they would have earned 
without the C A P . Subsequent research has shown that the welfare consequences of the 
C A P ' S market and price support system have indeed been considerable, not only with 
respect to the size of the 'hidden' income transfers between member states (e.g., Koester, 
1977; De Hoogh, 1980), but also in its differential welfare impact on farmers, consumers 
and taxpayers (e.g., Buckwell et al , 1982). For an overview of different studies on the 
costs and benefits of the C A P , see Demekas et al , 1988. For more recent figures, see 
Commission, 1994; and Folmer et al, 1995). The differential welfare impact of the C A P 
between member states was strengthened by the existence non-tariff barriers to trade and 
the emergence of Monetary Compensatory Amounts ( M C A S ) . 
8.7 Reform proposals and reforms of the CAP 
During the period 1960-1968 most effort and attention had gone to the establishment of 
Common Market Organisations. The structural policy part, which had been regarded as 
essential to the C A P by the member states and the early C A P proposals Commission, had 
not got well off the ground. Yet the conditions for a common structural policy seemed to 
be satisfied: in its 1962 package the Council had stipulated that structural policy would "as 
far as possible" constitute one-third of the Fund's available resources (Official Journal 30, 
1962; Tracy, 1989:256), while the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
( E A G G F ) had explicitly created the possibility of financing "common measures adopted in 
order to attain the objectives set out in Article 39[l](a) of the Treaty". However, the C A P ' S 
market and price policy had addressed all objectives mentioned in Article 39 ( E E C Treaty) 
except for this first one. Yet the lack of explicit policy attention for technical progress -
which was the focus of objective la - did not seem to affect agricultural productivity 
growth. Instead, steady productivity growth and relative immobility of factors of 
production and labour in particular had - in combination with slow consumption growth -
led to growing surplus and disposal problems which already in 1967 seemed to necessitate 
a major policy adjustments. Some argued that the problems facing the C A P were 
aggravated by 'inadequate' agricultural structures. "Ensuring the rational development of 
agricultural production and the optimal utilization of the factors of production, in particular 
labour" (part of objective 39[l]a) seemed to offer a way out of the structural problems 
which were chasing the C A P ; not, however, to increase productivity, but to relieve budget 
pressures and to 'redefine' the E C ' s trade relationships with third countries. 
8.7.1 The Mansholt Plan and more modest proposals for reform 
The answer to the increasing criticisms and pressures for reform was the so-called 
Mansholt Plan (Commission, 1968). The Mansholt Plan contained detailed proposals for an 
integrated common structural policy which would not only complete the C A P , but also 
would relieve the growing surplus problems. The solution proposed was to modernize 
agriculture, to improve the competitiveness of farms, and thereby to reduce existing 
differences between farm incomes and incomes earned in the rest of the economy as well 
Chapter 8 139 
as between farmers. For the period 1970-80 the Plan envisaged a decrease of the 
agricultural labour force by 50% (5 million people) and the taking out of production of 6 
million hectares (a decline from 71 to 65 million hectares). The policy instruments to 
reach these structural changes comprised the cessation of farming by elderly farmers; the 
setting up of 'modern production units' whose structure would enable an optimal combina-
tion of factors of production; vocational training and the dissemination of socio-economic 
information for farmers; and more appropriate pricing policies to bring domestic produc-
tion more in line with domestic demand (Harris et al , 1983:42; Tracy, 1989:267; Van der 
Stelt-Scheele, 1994:102). Yet approval of the Mansholt Plan by the Council failed to 
materialize. It was not until March 1972 that a diluted version of the original Plan was 
approved by the Council in the form of three socio-structural Directives (see further 
section 8.8). The socio-economic directives were supplemented by the introduction of an 
'objective' method of price-fixing taking 'viable' modernised farms as the basis for price 
increases (Tracy, 1989:267). 
The Mansholt Plan was followed by more modest plans for reform which were either 
not acceptable for the Council or accepted in a strongly diluted version. The most 
important proposals in the period 1970-80 are the Improvement Memorandum 
(Commission, 1973) which introduced the 'objective' method of price-fixing and addressed 
the environmental issues associated with the C A P ; the Stocktaking report (Commission, 
1975); and Mediterranean Agricultural Problems (Commission, 1977) which addressed the 
C A P ' S bias toward 'northern' products, the problem of (growing) regional income 
disparities and the future problems of the applications for membership by Greece in 1975, 
and Spain and Portugal (for a discussion of these proposals for C A P reform, see, e.g., 
Fennell, 1987a).19 
8.7.2 Co-responsibility, quotas, and other palliatives 
In 1980-81 the Commission once again emphasized the serious market imbalances 
caused by the open-ended price guarantees and proposed the use of the producer co-
responsibility concept: if production exceeded a certain level (a 'guarantee threshold') a 
levy or support price cut would apply (Commission, 1980; 1981). Through the co-
responsibility concept and to counteract the surplus problem, farmers were made liable for 
paying part of the costs of surplus disposal. In the 1980 Reflections paper by the 
Commission this co-responsibility concept was even presented as a fourth pillar to the C A P . 
The co-responsibility concept had already been applied in a somewhat different form in 
the milk sector as a producer levy on total production, with modest rates ranging from 0.5 
to 3% from 1977 until 1981, and with levy proceeds used to promote the sale of dairy 
products. In 1982/83 'guarantee thresholds' for cereals, rapeseed, milk and processed 
" Academic economists also contributed to the ongoing debate on CAP reform. More than once, pleas 
for the introduction of a (decoupled) support scheme of direct income transfers had been made (see, e.g., Van 
Riemsdijk, 1973; Koester and Tangermann, 1977) or changing the relative prices between agricultural products to 
redress surplus problems (e.g., the Wageningen Memorandum, 1973; the Siena Memorandum, 1984). See also 
Pelkmans (1985). 
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tomatoes were introduced. This decision can be regarded as the first more serious attempt 
to reduce the surplus problem, although at the same time support prices were raised by 
more than 10% (see table 8.1). For cereals, production in excess of the guarantee threshold 
would lead to an automatic cut of 1% in intervention prices per million tonne of excess, 
up to a maximum of 5%. However, the Council could still adapt its price proposals after 
exceedence of the threshold which obviously reduced its effectiveness (Tracy, 1989:315). 
Another report (Commission, 1983) followed which again stressed the need for restrictive 
price policy. In March 1984 some progress was made by the acceptance of a package 
which involved an average common price decrease of 0.5% for 1984/85, the extension of 
the guarantee threshold system to durum wheat, sunflower seed and raisins, the revision of 
the agri-monetary system (see section 8.5.2), and most importantly, the introduction of a 
quota system in the dairy sector. However, the effectiveness of the scheme was weakened 
by the fact that one of the two possible options for member states did not directly apply to 
individual producers as was originally intended20. Its effect on reducing the dairy surplus 
was also less than expected because some countries exceeded their national quotas 
(Germany and the Netherlands), or did not apply the system altogether (Italy), and quota 
appeared to be set rather generously (Tracy, 1989:320). In addition to the quota 
arrangements, support prices for most commodities were cut (an average of -1.8% in 1985) 
or frozen (1986). In 1986 the threshold system for cereals was replaced by a co-
responsibility levy similar to what had been applicable to the dairy sector. Furthermore, 
the intervention period for cereals was limited to a shorter period, along with the 
'rationalization' of beef and milk product buying-in arrangements. 
8.7.3 Stabilisers and the agricultural reference framework 
In February 1988 the Brussels European Council agreed on a major package deal 
(known as the 'Delors-I package') which involved, inter alia, the introduction of additional 
stabilisers, the establishment of an effective ceiling on EAGGF Guarantee expenditure and a 
fourth 'own resource', as well as a reform of the Community's structural funds. One of the 
elements of the stabiliser package was the introduction of a system of maximum 
guaranteed quantities (MGQS) for cereals and guarantee thresholds for, inter alia, oilseeds. 
The MGQ system for cereals entailed an automatic cut by 3% in the intervention price for 
the following year and a 3% additional rise in the co-responsibility levy in the current year 
when production exceeded a certain predetermined level. In addition to these 'automatic' 
stabilisers, 'structural' stabilisers were introduced which included the set-aside of arable 
land; extensification; the conversion of production to non-surplus products or activities 
relevant to rural society; and early retirement (CEC 1988:86; 1991:97; see also section 8.8). 
Part of the Delors-I package was the approval of the first 'Financial Perspective' a 
five-year spending plan broken down by main categories within fixed ceilings to reinforce 
budgetary discipline. One of the elements of the Financial Perspective was the introduction 
Under Formula A quotas would be applied at the level of individual producers, whose penalty 
('superlevy') for excess production would be 75% of the target price. Under Formula B quotas were related to 
dairies which had to pay a 100% penalty, but were enabled to offset excesses against deficits among farmers. 
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of an 'agricultural reference framework' which stipulated that E A G G F agricultural expendi-
ture (Section Guarantee) was not permitted to rise by more than 74 per cent of the growth 
rate of E U G N P , to be complied with each year. If the Commission would expect a Council 
decision to go beyond its proposal and thereby exceed the reference framework, the 
Commission could request that the final decision be taken at a special session of the 
Council with both the Finance Ministers and the Agriculture Ministers. The reference 
framework was not without importance since it implied a hardening of the soft budget 
constraint which had applied to E U agricultural policy until then. At the Edinburgh 
European Council of December 1992 it was decided to prolonge the reference framework 
till 1999. 
8.7.4 The MacSharry reform and the GATT Uruguay Round 
The more firm policy steps taken in the 1980s (the 1984 quota scheme, the 1988 stabi-
liser decision) did not take away the pressures for more fundamental reform of the C A P 
and did not have the intended effect on surplus reduction. Although farmers as a total had 
been made financially 'co-responsible' for the surplus problem, one of the problems of 
quantity thresholds and co-responsibility levies was that the incentives for individual 
producers to reduce production were inadequate to give sufficient reduction at the 
aggregate level. Another problem was that by the end of the 1980s, the palette of policy 
measures in operation under the C A P had become much larger than it had been in its early 
days. The overview given in table 8.3 serves as an illustration. The growth in additional 
policy instruments had increased both the C A P ' S intransparency and its adrninistrative costs. 
Though the initial choice for price supports as income support mechanism could be 
criticised because of its inefficient nature, the subsequent amendments of the C A P increased 
rather than reduced these inefficiencies. Furthermore, large differences can be observed 
between C A P commodity regimes in terms of protection and price instability. The -
tentative - classification based on these two criteria by Koester and Tangermann (1990) is 
illustrative in this respect (see table 8.3). 
But a more significant change - 'radical reform' in E C jargon - was on its way. One of 
the crucial catalysing factors was the G A T T Uruguay Round which had placed the 
liberalisation of agriculture as one of the major topics on its agenda. 
The unwillingness of the E C to significantly reform its agricultural policies had 
appeared a stumbling block for the Round's successful completion in December 1990. The 
proposals for reform of the C A P presented by Commissioner MacSharry in February 1991 
have to be placed against the background of the ongoing Uruguay Round of the G A T T and 
domestic pressures for further reform, which were partly budget driven.21 
In its analysis of the problems faced by the C A P , the MacSharry Plan (Commission, 
1991, 1991a) in particular stressed two factors: that "between 1973 and 1988 the volume 
of agricultural production in the E E C increased at 2% per annum, whereas internal 
For the economic effects of the MacSharry reform, see, e.g., Josling and Mariani (1993); Colman 
and Roberts (1994); Helmar et al. (1994). For the effects of the Uruguay Round Agreement, see, e.g., Swinbank 
(1996); Tangermann (1996). 
Tab le 83 S u m m a r y o f EC -agr icu l tura l po l icy ins t ruments i n use (s i tuat ion medio 1988) 
Efficiency of regulations: an EC perspective 
Commodity Import regulations Internal Market Support Export regulations Price instability Rate of nominal protection 
Cereals Variable Levies Intervention purchases (mandatory) 
Co-responsibility Levy 
Export refunds Low Medium 
Oilseeds Customs Duties Milling subsidies (deficiency payments) 
Co-responsibility Levy 
Export refunds Medium Zero 
Sugar Variable Levies 
Import Quotas 
Common market prices for specified quantities 
Production quotas 
Intervention purchases (mandatory) 
Co-responsibility Levy 
Export refunds Medium High 
Fruits and 
vegetables 
Customs Duties 
Variable Levies 
Withdrawal from the market, compensations Export refunds High Medium 
Beef and 
veal 
Customs Duties 
Import Quotas 
Variable Levies 
Special Trade Agreements 
Intervention purchases (optional) 
Private storage aids 
Production premiums 
Export refunds Medium Medium 
Sheep meat Voluntary Restraint Agreements 
Import Levies (maximum 20 percent) 
Variable premium (deficiency payments) 
Annual premium 
Private storage aids 
Intervention purchases (optional) 
Export refunds Medium Medium 
Pig meat Variable Levies Intervention buying (optional) Export refunds Medium Low 
Eggs and 
poultry 
Variable Levies Export refunds High Low 
Milk Variable Levies Production quotas 
Intervention purchases of dairy products (manda-
te?) 
Private storage aid 
Subsidies for disposal 
Special sales schemes 
Co-responsibility levy 
Export refunds Low High 
Tapioca Customs Duties 
Voluntary Restraints 
- - High Low 
Corn gluten - - - High None 
Source: Koester and Tangermann, 1990, p.68-69. 
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consumption grew by 0.5% only per annum" and that "80% of the support (...) is devoted 
to 20% of farms which account also for the greater part of the land used in agriculture". 
The latter figures did not came out of the blue: similar results had earlier been found in 
independent academic research (e.g., Hayes and Schmitz, 1988; Brown, 1990). But the 
unequitable distribution of C A P benefits amongst farmers formed a second major pretext 
for reform, also because the unequitable distributive effects seemed to have been sharpened 
rather than softened by the prior reform measures (co-responsibility levy and quota 
arrangements), which had penalised small and large producers by the same amount per 
unit of production. 
Proposals for the arable sector formed the heart of the MacSharry package and 
comprised substantial reductions in price support levels, compensation for sales revenue 
losses through a system of (direct income) acreage payments based on historic average 
yields and base area per region. Compensation would be 'modulated' in that small farmers 
would receive full compensation, whereas farmers beyond a certain size would only get 
partial compensation (Swinbank, 1993: 361-362; Commission, 1994:70-71).22 
Furthermore, compensation would be linked to set-aside measures, while existing 
stabiliser arrangements and co-responsibility levies would be withdrawn. In the final 
agreement of May 1992, the threshold price for cereals was set considerably higher than 
intended (155 against 121 E C U per tonne). Following a major lobby of larger farmers 
(especially from the U K ) the modulation part was drastically changed as well. Instead 
small-scale farms (with a production less than 92 metric tons of cereals, oilseeds and 
protein crops) were exempt from setting land aside. Member states were allowed to 
régionalise the hectare aid payable to growers under the oilseeds regime established in 
December 1991. For protein crops (peas, field beans, sweet lupins) compensatory aids per 
hectare replaced the minimum price arrangements. The main changes in the livestock 
sector applied to beef and sheepmeat. Intervention prices for beef would be reduced by 
15% in three steps. For beef and sheepmeat, compensation payments were limited to a 
fixed number of animals based on historical herd sizes and limited by quota. Modest 
changes were agreed for the dairy sector, involving a reduction in general E C quotas and a 
3% reduction in the intervention price for butter by 1994/95. Other major products, 
notably sugar, fruit and vegetables, wine, olive oil, pigmeat and poultry were not included 
in the MacSharry reform package. Table 8.4 provides a summary of the main changes 
following the MacSharry reform. In addition to the measures relating to market and price 
support, the MacSharry reform also included accompanying measures to encourage 
'environmentally-friendly' farming, to promote the afforestation of agricultural land and to 
encourage the early retirement of farmers over 55 years of age. The MacSharry reform did 
not affect the basic support mechanisms. However, the reductions in support prices 
significantly weakened their effectiveness, as the 'floor' in the market as represented by 
the intervention price was now considerably lower. Due to the compensatory payments the 
new system would be even more costly to the budget than the 'old' C A P . 
A 'small' farmer is defined on a regional basis in terms of the area of cropped land on which 
compensation payments are made (see, e.g., Swinbank, 1993:363). 
Table 8.4 Summary of the MacSharry CAP reforms 
Commodity regimes Cuts in support Compensation and other gains Production control 
Cereals • Target price cut by 29% from • 
1991/92 buying-in price 
Per hectare compensation payments available 
provided set-aside is implemented 
m Annual set aside required for produc-
ers to be eligible for compensation 
payments 
• Price reduction phased in over 3 • 
years from 1993/4 
Compensation payments based on historical 
yield levels for regions of the EC 
Co-responsibility levy abolished from 1992/3 
• 
• 
Minimum set-aside area 15% of total 
arable hectarage 
Set-aside area to be rotated (the same 
land can be idled only once every six 
years) 
Oilseeds and pulses • N o price support 1993/4 onwards • Per hectare payments are available but cut 
from 1992/3 levels 
• Controlled by same set-aside scheme 
as cereal production 
Sheep • Payment of ewe premium restricted • 
by producer quota 
Capital value of sheep quota • Full payment of ewe premium set at 
maximum of 500 ewes in lowlands, 
1,000 ewes in LFAs 
• Producer quotas based on number • 
of ewe premiums paid in 1991 
Lower feed grain costs • 50% of premium paid for ewes above 
these limits up to producer quota 
Beef • Intervention price cut by 15% from • 
1993/94 (over 3-year period) 
Beef and suckler cow premium increased but 
made contingent on stocking levels 
• Beef premium limited by regional 
ceiling equal to number of premiums 
paid in 1991; if exceeded, producer 
payments reduced per rata 
• 350,000t. limit set on intervention • 
purchases by 1997 
An extra extensification premium available if 
stocking rates below minimum level 
Capital value of suckler cow quota 
Lower feed grain costs 
• Suckler cow premiums restricted by 
producer quota 
Dairy • 3% cut in butter intervention price • 
by 1994/5 
Possible future quota cuts compensated by 
redeemable bond 
Co-responsibility levy abolished from 1992-
193 
• Quotas to be cut by proposed 2% by 
1994/5 
Use of quota system for another 10 
years 
Source: Colman and Roberts, 1994, p. 110; with minor corrections based on CEC, 1995. 
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Furthermore, support under the MacSharry regime became much more transparent than 
it had been before. Whether this can be seen as an advantage for farmers is questionable. 
One of the goals of the MacSharry reform was to achieve a greater market orientation 
via a reduction in price support. While the budget consequences of the new system of 
lower price support-cum-compensation payments were considerable, the MacSharry 
agreement paved the way for the completion of the Uruguay Round of G A T T negotiations. 
The effects of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture for the C A P mainly relate to 
market access, domestic support, and export subsidies23. 
In short, the Final Agreement envisaged 20 % reduction in the overall Aggregate 
Measurement of Support ( A M S ) , 36% reduction in import tariffs on average (and at least 
15% per tariff line), 36% reduction in export subsidy expenditure, and 21% reduction in 
the volume of subsidised exports over a six-year implementation period, starting in 1995 
(e.g., Europe Information Service, 1993; Swinbank, 1996). While the immediate effects of 
the Agreement on Agriculture are likely to be modest and while its implementation over 
several years allows considerable time for adjustment, the Agreement will have two 
important effects on the C A P . The most immediate effect is the replacement of variable 
import levies by new bound rates on import tariffs, to be reduced in five annual equal 
steps, with special provisions applying to cereals and rice, and fruit and vegetables. The 
second main effect is the effective constraint placed on the subsidisation of exports. 
The A M S reduction has no immediate implications, since contrary to the draft proposal, 
the Final Agreement stated that the A M S would be a simple aggregate for the farm sector 
as a whole, and allowed trade-offs between product sectors. Furthermore, the A M S 
calculated over the 1986-90 base period measures the A M S of the 'old' C A P . Set-aside and 
headage premiums are 'decoupled' and hence exempt from reduction commitments and 
A M S computations (e.g., Swinbank, 1996:397). Decoupled domestic support measures are 
allowed provided they "do not grant support to a specific commodity in excess of that 
decided during the 1992 marketing year" (Article 13 of the Agreement). Tariffication, the 
reduction of tariffs and the minimum access clause will not markedly enhance market 
access into the E U , mainly because of the initial tariff levels set, and Special Safeguard 
Provisions (ibidem: 406). 
8.8 EC structural policy 
Market and price policies have been responsible for the bulk of all E C agricultural 
budget expenditure. Structural policies have accounted only for a minor share of E A G G F 
expenditure throughout the C A P ' S existence. On average Guidance expenditure has ranged 
from 3 to 5 per cent of total agricultural budget from the early 1970s until the late 1980s 
(see also appendices 8.4 and 8.6). The fundament for structural policy measures as part of 
the C A P can be found in Article 39[l](a) of the Rome Treaty (see section 8.2). 
Furthermore, Article 41(a) had opened up the possibility of coordinating, financing and 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture consists of three parts: (i) measures on market 
access, domestic support, and export subsidies; (ii) the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; and 
(iii) the Ministerial Decision Concerning Least-Developed and Net-Food Importing Developing Countries. 
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even creating special institutions in the fields of vocational training, agricultural research 
and agricultural extension. What ties these structural policy aims together is their focus on 
agricultural factors of production rather than production. 
Member states have been sovereign in their decision whether or not to participate in a 
specific programme. Furthermore, the legal - directive - status of most structural policy 
decisions under the C A P gives member state governments the possibility to tailor measures 
to their specific domestic circumstances. Most structural policy measures have been 
established under a co-financing rule according to which the member states are to pay at 
least 50% of total expenditures, with the rest eligible for reimbursement by the 
Community. Joint financing reduced the directly visible budgetary costs for member states 
and the Community. Moreover, agricultural production increases resulting from structural 
improvements were subject to the ordinary E A G G F Guarantee provisions which rested on 
the principle of financial solidarity. The combination of joint financing arrangements at the 
structural policy level and full Community financing of 'safety net' measures taken at the 
product market level held an incentive for member state governments to overspend on 
structural policy (e.g., De Hoogh, 1980). Structural policy measures taken under the C A P 
may therefore have strengthened rather than reduced the surplus problems mentioned 
earlier, and may have been responsible for the increase in E A G G F Guarantee expenditure. 
The overall economic importance of structural policies, as reflected by improvements in 
structural economic conditions and/or a reduction of the income disparity between 
agriculture and the rest of the economy, is difficult to quantify. In the following an 
overview of the most important developments in the structural policy domain is given. 
Although most attention focused on the setting up of the C M O S , by 1964 a first 
structural policy programme was established under Regulation 17/64. This programme 
enabled individuals and organisations to apply for a E A G G F financed grant by up to 25 per 
cent of investment costs pertaining to the production and marketing of agricultural 
products, ranging from land reparcelling and irrigation projects to the setting up of 
marketing structures for milk products, meat, fruit and vegetables and wine (Harris et al , 
1983:219). Regulation 17/64 lasted until 1979 and - in retrospect - can be regarded as one 
of the more successful structural policy programmes in the period 1964-1980, both in 
terms of total projects approved and in programme budget expenditure. The character of 
the early structural policy programmes had been typically ad hoc. The Mansholt Plan 
(Commission, 1968) aimed at a more integrated common structural policy, but the 
proposals failed approval by the Council. In March 1972 a strongly diluted version of the 
original Mansholt Plan was approved by the Council in the form of three socio-structural 
Directives. Directive 72/159/EEC permitted member states to enable full-time farmers to 
modernise their farms on the basis of a development plan, with aid given in the form of a 
grant or interest rate subsidy. A condition for eligibility was that on completion of the plan 
an income comparable to other occupations in the economy could be reached. Under 
Directive 72/159 the Community would reimburse the member state up to 25% of the 
associated costs. Directive 72/160/EEC aimed to encourage the cessation of farming and the 
reallocation of utilized agricultural land for structural improvement, and permitted member 
states to grant an annuity or lump sum payment to farmers in the age category 55-65 who 
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would leave agriculture. Directive 72/161/EEC provided for the establishment of socio-
economic guidance services and retraining schemes for farmers. Contrary to Regulations 
which have direct applicability and force of law, Directives must be implemented by 
supplementary national legislation and give the member states considerable flexibility in 
application, although the implementing legislation has to be approved by the Commission. 
One of the problems of the three socio-structural directives was their limited 
effectiveness: until 1980 almost 160,000 development plans had been approved, but only 
20% had applied to typical problem regions. About 65,000 farmers had opted for the 
outgoers' scheme and had thereby released 875,000 hectares of land, yet little of it went to 
farmers who had submitted modernisation plans (Tracy, 1989:326; Van der Stelt-Scheele, 
1994:104). Another problem was the time lag between acceptance of the Directives and 
their transposition into national legislation (Tamminga et al , 1990). Directive 72/159 was 
mainly used by the northern member states; the Directive on socio-economic guidance was 
hardly used. An idea of the effectiveness of the socio-economic Directives can also be 
derived from the support granted over time (see for a summary by member state, appendix 
8.6). 
In 1975, a fourth socio-structural measure known as the 'Mountain and hill farming 
and farming in less favoured areas' (LFA)-Directive 75/268/EEC came into effect. The L F A 
Directive aimed to support farming in mountain areas; to help farming in small areas with 
natural physical handicaps and to maintain a niinimum level of population and to conserve 
the countryside in certain other less-favoured areas predominantly dependent on 
agricultural activity. The LFA-Directive not only introduced the concept of discrimination 
between regions, but also direct income support in the form of annual subsidies 
('compensatory allowances') usually based on the number of livestock per farm. It 
provided the basis for a variety of exceptions to C A P measures, part of which was yet to 
come (e.g., the co-responsibility levy and the dairy superlevy scheme). It also modified the 
requirements for farms that applied for a modernisation programme under Directive 72/159 
(Harris et al , 1983:224). 
The concept of regional aid introduced under the L F A Directive was to become an 
important element of structural policies: it formed the heart of the so-called Mediterranean 
package (Commission, 1977a) and the 1979 proposals on the regional approach to 
agricultural structures which aimed to integrate agricultural development activities within 
the rural economy (Commission, 1979; see also Harris et al , 1983: 225). The 
'Mediterranean Package' can be regarded both as a reaction to the complaints of Italy and 
France that C A P support - and the flow of benefits - was one-sidedly biased toward 
'northern products', and as a preventive measure vis-a-vis the expected problems from the 
Community's future enlargement with Greece, Spain and Portugal (Harris et al , 1983: 
225). The structural policy part of the package, which was meant to improve agricultural 
structures in specific regions, took the form of special investment programmes for 
irrigation, rural infrastructure, afforestation, agricultural processing and marketing. In 1985 
so-called Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (Regulation 2088/85) were established to 
help the southern regions of the Community to face up competition from Portugal and, 
particularly, Spain (Tracy, 1989:329). 
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In the course of time, the early structural policy measures were replaced and extended 
by new measures, with Directives being gradually substituted for Regulations in order to 
enhance programme effectiveness. In 1977 the marketing and processing part of 
Regulation 17/64 was succeeded by Regulation 355/77. The socio-economic directives 
were replaced in 1985 by Regulation 797/85 which relaxed the criteria for investment aids 
by replacing the strong (future) income requirements of the development plans by an upper 
limit which entailed that improvements should not raise income above 120% of a 
'reference income'. It also strengthened the link with market policy and introduced 
protection of the environment and forestry as eligible types of investment (Tracy, 1989: 
327). Furthermore, Regulation 1760/87 introduced 'conversion' schemes to encourage 
farmers to convert from surplus to non-surplus products and 'extensification' schemes to 
reduce production per hectare - for cereals, beef and wine producers. 
The bulk of Guidance expenditure over the period 1975-1989 has been spent on 
programmes related to farm investment and the modernization of farms, and less favoured 
areas, as table 8.5 and table 8.6 make clear. Table 8.5 shows the cumulative payments 
until end 1989, while table 8.6 shows the annual development of commitment 
appropriations. The latter figure covers expenditure during the financial year plus liabilities 
extending beyond the year - for various structural policy measures. 
Table 8.5 
EAGGF Guidance expenditures, 1975-1989 (million ECU) 
Farm investment 
Modernization 
Dir 72/1 59/ E E C ; 
Reg ( E E C ) 797/85; 
Reg(EEC)2328/91 
Outgoers' 
scheme 
Dir 72/160/EEC 
Socio-economic 
guidance 
Dir 72/161/EEC; 
Dir 797/85/EEC 
LFA 
Dir 75/268/EEC 
Dir 797/85/EEC 
LFA 
miscellaneous1 
Related to 
E E C market' 
organizations 
1230.6 9.0 65.4 1734.3 598.9 480.3 
Source: C E C 1990, p, 
Situation end 1989. 
. T/91. Key: ' See appendix 8.7, for an overview of specific measures and programmes. 
Following the February 1988 Brussels Summit, a greater emphasis was laid on 
structural policy arrangements to reform the C A P . The measures taken included mandatory 
set-aside for all member states except Portugal and a renewed early retirement scheme. 
The set-aside arrangement laid down in Regulation 1094/88 allowed farmers to set aside 
20 per cent of their arable land for at least five years. However, the legal framework left 
the member states considerable leeway to vary conditions of participation in the set-aside 
scheme, including the payments per hectare. The early retirement scheme was also based 
on direct income per hectare and, additionally, a payment per farm. The Community's 
contribution was - again - subject to the relative prosperity of the region involved. 
However, the decision whether or not to introduce the scheme was left to the member 
states (e.g., Manegold, 1988; 1989). 
Table 8.6 EAGGF Section Guidance: commitment appropriations, 1978-1988 (million ECU) 
Type of measure 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Projects for the improvement of 114.4 200.7 140.5 169.7 184.9 226.8 238.4 313.9 371.2 307.9 280.7 
agricultural structures Reg (EEC) 355/77 
General socio-structural measures 30.9 58.6 92.6 116.0 92.5 156.3 114.5 102.3 108.3 146.1 262.0 
Regionalized measures 34.6 98.4 210.4 260.9 327.7 375.9 356.3 356.5 298.8 364.1 517.3 
of which Dir 75/268 144.5 135.8 136.4 118.1 229.2 260.7 301.1 
Market-related measures 99.1 95.5 133.0 129.1 132.5 106.9 87.2 80.1 75.1 122.4 119.8 
Key: 1978-1985 EUR 10; 1986-8 EUR 12. Figures in nominal prices. 
Source: CEC, various issues. 
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The Brussels Summit also decided to reform the existing structural funds: from now on 
the E A G G F Section Guidance, the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Fund for 
Regional Development (EFRD ) would share and concentrate development efforts on five 
objectives in strategic multi-annual programmes. The reform also entailed the doubling of 
financial resources over a five-year period. From now on E A G G F Guidance Section 
expenditures had to be in accordance with at least one of the objectives 1, 5a and 5b. 
Objective 1 applies to the promotion of structural adjustment in regions whose 
development is lagging behind - i.e. regional G D P less than 75% of the Community 
average. Objective 5a applies to improvements in agricultural structures and the processing 
and marketing of agricultural and forestry products, while objective 5b specifically 
envisages the development of rural areas, i.e. smaller areas selected on the basis of criteria 
such as agricultural employment and income in regional output, population density, degree 
of remoteness and environmental pressures.24 Since the reform Guidance expenditures 
have markedly risen since 1991, both in absolute terms and as a relative share, to stabilise 
around 8-9% of total agricultural budget expenditures (appendix 8.4). Table 8.7 shows the 
development in commitment appropriations by objective since 1987. 
Table 8.7 
EAGGF Guidance expenditure: Commitment appropriations, 1987-1994 (million ECU) 
Objective 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Objective 1 
(regions lagging behind) 
402.2 555.2 862.1 1081.2 1440.8 1634.7 1599.2 1904.3 
Objective 5a 
(agricultural structures) 
536.8 624.8 574.1 743.8 631.3 701.3 923.9 1131.6 
Objective 5b 
(rural areas) 
23.3 44.0 260.2 475.8 508.6 271.8 
Transitional measures 2.4 56.7 75.9 63.0 61.7 9.8 
Source: CEC, various issues. 
The structural fund reform did not markedly change the content of the structural policy 
measures, however. In 1991 Regulation 797/85 was replaced by Regulation 2328/91 which 
grouped together measures covering improvement and modernization of farms, aid to 
young farmers, reorientation of production, continuation of farming in LFAs and 
environmentally sound farming practices. Furthermore, Regulation 355/77 was replaced by 
Regulations 866/90 and 867/90 on improving the processing and marketing conditions of 
agricultural, respectively forest products. In order to promote the use of the new measures 
2 4 Regulation (EEC) 3730/87 provides that - within the framework of multi-annual programmes -
projects supported by these funds should aim at least one of five priority objectives of which three apply to the 
EAGGF Guidance Section (see Regulation (EEC) 2052/88). 
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the Council further extended the possibilities for set-aside ( C E C , 1992:96-99). 
The MacSharry reform of May 1992 has increased the use of structural policy 
measures (see also above). The set-aside arrangements and premium schemes 
accompanying the price reductions are, however, borne by the E A G G F Guarantee Section. 
8.9 'National' agricultural policies 
Most of the C A P ' S structural policy budget has been allocated to the improvement of 
production and marketing structures, the modernization of agricultural structures, support 
for less favoured areas and regional schemes. Only a limited part of Guidance expenditure 
has been spent on agricultural advice and extension, vocational training, and agricultural 
and food-related R & D policies. The reason for this seemingly neglect is that these policies 
are still decided, funded and provided by the member state themselves. This also holds for 
policy measures relating to agricultural education; accounting; animal health, plant health 
and pest control; infrastructure with a sizeable impact on agriculture - reparcelling, land 
transfers, drainage, soil improvement, and irrigation; compensation for natural disasters; as 
well as early retirement and social security schemes. Agricultural policy measures 
formulated at the member state level are mostly complementary to policy measures 
decided at the Community level. It is no exaggeration therefore to speak of a two-tier 
decision structure in the E U agricultural policy domain.25 
8.9.1 Bounds set by the EEC Treaty 
The discretionary powers of the member states for taking anticipatory measures to 
counteract or supplement policy measures taken at the Community level are limited by 
common rules on so-called state aids and competition (Art. 92-94, E E C Treaty). Following 
Article 92[1] a policy measure is to be considered as state aid and incompatible with the 
common market, if (i) granted by a member state or through state resources in any form 
whatsoever, (ii) it distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods; and (iii) affects trade between member 
states (e.g., Swann, 1984:146 ff.; Quigley, 1988:242; Commission, 1990:4). When the 
Common Market Organizations (CMOs) were set up, the Treaty provisions on competition 
had been declared also applicable to agricultural production and to trade in agricultural 
products. Explicitly incompatible with the Common Market are income support; 'operating 
aids' (i.e. measures without lasting structural improvement in production methods); and 
aids to the disposal of agricultural products (with the exception of advertising and 
publicity campaigns) (Commission, 1987; C E C , 1988:107). 
In fact, the European Union is characterised by a multi-tier decision structure, consisting of multiple 
local (municipal), regional (provincial) and national (member state) governments, and the supranational decision 
"top" structure of the European Community. The two-tier decision structure in the agricultural policy domain 
therefore has to be viewed as no more than an acceptable simplification of reality. See also appendix 8.7. 
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There are two main categories of exemption under Article 92: aids which are definitely 
exempted (Art. 92[2]) and aids which may be exempted (Art. 92[3]). Article 92[2] applies, 
inter alia, to aids of a social character granted to individuals (e.g., consumer subsidies) 
provided that products are treated equally whatever their origin; to aid to compensate for 
natural disasters; and - before 1990 - to aids given to regions bordering the former G D R . 
Under Article 92[3] member states may, for instance, assist economically depressed 
regions or sectors, and support the development of certain economic activities such as job 
creation and retraining. As a general rule state aids in these fields should be transparent 
and not excessive. With respect to state aids to agriculture, the limits for granting national 
state aids are to a large extent determined by the C A P . However, for those products not 
covered by a C M O , member states have been allowed to maintain national aid schemes 
(Harris et al , 1983:231). Exemptions are also made with respect to schemes for the 
conservation and improvement of the environment, in particular aids "offsetting restrictions 
and constraints against the use of fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides, and specific 
cropping practices (...)" ( C E C , 1988:110)26. As yet the Commission has also allowed 
certain forms of tax relief, aid financed by parafiscal charges, short-term general interest 
subsidies and state guaranteed (soft) loans. Moreover, on the basis of Article 93 [2] and 
only 'in extraordinary circumstances' a member state may also specifically request the 
Council to regard national aid as compatible with the Common Market, even when Article 
92 dismisses the measure as non-compatible. Such demands, however, require unanimous 
vote from the Council. 
In practice, there has remained considerable confusion over what is and what is not 
permitted: the giving of state aids has led to a substantial amount of jurisprudence by the 
European Court (see, e.g., Quigley, 1988). Part of the confusion can be attributed to the 
difficulty to distinguish between so-called 'general measures' and 'specific' state aids. The 
term 'general measures' in the E E C Treaty refers to economy-wide policies retained within 
the sovereignty of the member states, such as measures relating to fiscal (tax), monetary 
(interest and exchange rate) and social security policy. These economy-wide polices are 
generally not regarded as state aid. However, when such economy-wide policies distort the 
conditions of competition, the Commission - in its role of ensuring that state aid provisions 
are respected (Art. 93) - may make recommendations to the member states for their 
elimination or, if necessary, submit proposals to the Council to take measures (Articles 
101-102, T E U ; see, e.g., Commission, 1990: 4 ff.). Since most of these 'general measures' 
can be expected to affect the competitive environment at least to some extent, the dividing 
line of what does and what does not belong to state aids therefore is rather obscure. For 
instance, while general infrastructural policy measures like the building and maintenance 
of roads, bridges and dikes are allowed, agricultural-specific measures such as land 
improvement, irrigation, drainage and reparcelling, and all investments in human capital 
(agricultural R & D , education, vocational training, etc.) would theoretically be incompatible 
with the state aid provisions. In practice, however, they are part of the discretionary 
Article 92[3] in principle allows for other forms of state aids as well. However, this requires 
approval by the Council by qualified majority on the basis of a proposal formulated by the Commission. 
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powers of the member states. The general line taken by the Commission is that state aids 
should be "(...) implemented in the common interest, which is usually the case as long as 
the aids in question do not distort the operation or the objectives of the common agri-
cultural policy and as long as they do not disrupt the harmonious development of 
agriculture in competing Member States" (Commission, 1989 [ASCR]:114). 
8.9.2 'National' agricultural policy expenditures 
Evidence on (member) state aids in agriculture is scarce, incomplete and not easily 
comparable, due to - among other things - different definitions of the agricultural policy 
concept. While estimates differ greatly in size, sources agree that agricultural budget 
expenditure by the individual member states is considerable when compared to C A P 
expenditure (e.g., Commission, 1981; Commission, 1982; Commission, 1989a; 1990; 
1992c). Recent evidence on state aids in agriculture - reported in tables 8.9 and appendix 
8.8 -, confirms the pattern found in earlier studies on the same topic (see table 8.9). Both 
in absolute terms (table 8.8) and as a percentage of Gross Value Added ( G V A ) in 
agriculture (appendix 8.8), national aids have to be judged considerable and fairly constant 
over time.27 Table 9 reports the results of the only major external - i.e. not undertaken by 
the Commission itself - study on state aids in agriculture. It not only shows that state aids 
have been relatively stable over the period 1975-80, but have tended to decrease compared 
to total E A G G F expenditure. It should be noted that more recent studies exclude important 
categories of state assistance, such as research aid, land improvement, and selective 
regional financial assistance. Moreover, these figures are taken from the obligatory 'aid' 
inventory provided to the Commission by the member states. However, member states may 
have strong incentives to shirk, i.e. not to state their full expenditures on state aids, which 
makes that figures probably underestimate rather than overestimate real state aid 
expenditure. The cited studies do not take into account social security measures in the 
agricultural policy domain. Older figures (Commission, 1981; Duchene et al, 1985) show 
that state provided social security expenditure in agriculture is extensive: in 1978 social 
security accounted for a 6.5 % share in the total value of agricultural production, against 
7.6 % for the rest of state aids and 7.2% for E A G G F expenditure28. 
Although the time period 1975-80 lies already far behind, it can be doubted - inter alia 
on the basis of the more recent evidence just cited - whether state aids on agriculture have 
aUminished to such an extent to dismiss their impact as insignificant for agricultural policy 
formation. 
Note also that early retirement and social security schemes have not even been taken into account. 
2 8 The imputation of social security measures to agriculture has shown to be controversial. Strictly 
taken, social security measures belong to the category of economy-wide policies and should not be included in the 
state aids calculation. 
Table 8.8 National aids to agriculture and fisheries, 1981-1990 (yearly averages, in million ECU) 
B DAN FRG3 GR E 2 F m I 2 L u x 2 NL 2 P UK EC 
Period 81-86* 185 309 1525 6 - 3335 317 2541 23 477 - 1328 9727 
Period 86-88' 171 239 2367 150 220 2206 171 3288 17 534 158 779 10030 
Period 88-90 227 275 2839 207 187 2244 114 3411 18 543 176 765 11006 
Key: Figures are taken from the "aid" inventory supplied by the member states. Applies to all products covered by Annex II of the Treaty. 
Figures contain grants; tax reliefs; aid financed by parafiscal charges; interest subsidies; and a number of direct benefits provided by 
member state governments such as training courses. Excludes research aid; land improvement; selective regional financial assistance; and s-
ocial security. * In constant 1987 prices. 1 Figures may include some EAGGF guidance money for some member states but not such as to 
alter the order of magnitude. 2 Based on national accounting data or long term extrapolations (Netherlands) - not comparable with figures 
for other member states . 3 German agriculture aid figures include aid given by way of VAT advantages. 
Sources: Commission, 1990, p. 44; ibidem, Technical Annex: pp. 8,9,15; Commission, 1992c, pp. 69-80. 
Table 8.9 National aids to agriculture, including research, 1975-1980 (in million ECU) 
Countries B DAN FRG F IRE 1 Lux NL UK EC-total E A G G F 1 
1975 101.3 134.0 1589.4 2241.0 176.6 2595.9 14.4 200.5 1493.7 8546.9 4707 
1976 115.6 158.2 1513.4 2770.6 215.1 1810.5 21.9 236.3 1206.1 8047.7 5805 
1977 144.9 177.1 1568.2 2950.5 239.2 1942.4 28.9 258.5 931.9 8241.6 7127 
1978 197.5 224.7 1670.5 2239.7 297.3 2067.1 16.3 288.5 685.9 7687.7 8996 
1979 236.2 277.2 1670.4 2515.4 281.3 2164.8 18.5 307.5 855.4 8236.7 10844 
1980 229.7 273.9 1636.5 2731.6 360.9 2882.2 N B 330.0 1075.5 9520.3 11918 
Key: Total EAGGF expenditure, figures taken from appendix 8.4. 
Sources: Commission, 1984, pp. 174; 177. 
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In accordance with more recent evidence, the data for the 1975-80 period show impor-
tant differences between member states which can only partly be attributed to difference in 
country size and the relative importance of the agricultural sector in the economy. The 
spread of national expenditures on agriculture over different categories is large and the 
type of support given differs widely between member states (see, e.g., Commission, 1984; 
C E C , 1987), which serves as another indication that agricultural policy preferences vary 
considerably across member states in the Community. 
8.10 Conclusion 
The original design of the C A P which dates back to the period 1958-1962 has faced 
several amendments in the course of time and has resulted in a broad amalgam of policy 
measures. Part of the successive changes in the policy instrument mix of the C A P are 
directly related to this design characterised by product-tied support and high common price 
levels. Surplus disposal problems and large budgetary outlays have forced the C A P to seek 
for new directions, with varying success. At the same time, the welfare impact of the C A P 
has shown to be huge, as measured by income and wealth transfers between countries 
(e.g., Koester, 1977; Folmer et al , 1995), but also between socio-economic groups within 
member states (e.g., Buckwell et al, 1982; Demekas et al , 1988; Commission, 1994; 
Folmer et al , 1995) and between farmers (e.g., Brown, 1989; 1990; Commission, 1991). 
Moreover, the form and nature of agricultural policies in the current European Union is 
less 'common' than had been intended in the Treaty of Rome and the subsequent working 
out of the C A P . Not only has the unity of the market principle been violated by the 
introduction of Monetary Compensatory Amounts and the persistence of non-tariff barriers, 
but the design of the C A P has provoked a tendency toward greater spending than would 
have occurred under nationally funded agricultural policy schemes, and conflicts with the 
spirit of the Community 'ideal'. Furthermore, the existence of 'national' agricultural 
policies within the European Union, which - together with the C A P ' S structural policy 
provisions - complement the C A P ' S market and price policies, have considerably diluted the 
Community nature of support. Apart from the normative question whether this is a 'good' 
or 'bad', or the more positive question how this affects the overall efficiency of 
agricultural policies within the Union, it should be noted that the scope of discretion for 
member states to formulate their own policies opens up possibilities for satisfying domestic 
electoral demands and pressures from organised interests. There seems no doubt that the 
large differential welfare consequences of the C A P - not only for the distribution of income 
and wealth between consumers, farmers and taxpayers, but also within the group of 
farmers itself - have had an impact on the formation of national agricultural policies. The 
analytical - political economy - framework to analyse the politically driven interactions 
between the national and the E C policy level and their effect on policy formation remains 
to be determined. 
Appendix 8.1 Self-sufficiency in agricultural commodities, selected years 
Community, size EUR-6 EUR-9 EUR-10 ETJR-12 
Year(s) 1956/60 "68/69" "72/73" "73/74" "80/81" "84/85" "85/86" "88/89" "89/90" "91/92" "93/94" 
"1968" "1972" "1973" "1981" "1984" "1985" "1988" "1989" "1991" "1993" 
Cereals, total 85 92 97 92 103 118 110 113 120 120 126 
wheat 90 109 112 104 118 129 124 123 127 133 141 
barley 84 101 112 106 114 124 119 118 131 123 122 
grain/maize 64 69 56 66 90 77 95 101 94 108 
Potatoes 101 100 101 101 102 102 101 101 100 100 101 
Sugar 104 103 116 91 136 101 123 124 128 135 
Wine 89 97 101 99 102 100 104 91 112 115 97 
Oils and fats 25 56 70 65 65 
Milk products 
Fats 102 117 
Proteins 113 118 
Fresh milk 100 100 100 100 101 101 101 102 101 
Butter 101 112 119 101 119 134 115 121 
Margarine 102 102 101 102 102 104 
Cheese 100 103 103 102 107 107 107 107 106 
Concentrated milk 156 154 150 140 177 187 153 148 
Whole-milk powder 139 191 208 411 342 270 272 211 
Skimmed milk powder 97 124 137 142 128 145 153 122 
Meat, total 95 94 93 95 102 102 102 102 101 102 105 
Beef/veal 92 89 86 91 105 108 107 104 101 108 107 
Pigmeat 100 100 100 101 101 102 102 103 103 104 106 
Poultrymeat 93 99 99 103 110 107 105 105 104 105 108 
Sheepmeat/goatmeat 80 63 76 80 83 82 81 87 
Eggs 90 100 100 102 102 102 102 101 102 
Key: = three year averages, e.g. "1985" = 1984, 1985, 1986. 
Sources: Data for 1956/1960;"72/73"; "73/74"; "80/81" taken from Meester, G. and D. Strijker, 1985, p. 37. Rest of data taken from CEC, various issues. 
Appendix 8.2 Deflated producer prices in EC agriculture 1980-1994 
EUR 10 
deflated 
1985= 
100 
EUR 12 
deflated 
1985= 
100 
EUR 15 
deflated 
1990= 
100 
Crop 
products 
Animals 
and 
animal 
products 
Total Crop 
products 
Animals 
and 
animal 
products 
Total Crop 
products 
Animals 
and 
animal 
products 
Total 
1980 114.5 112.8 113.6 114.4 111.0 112.6 
1981 111.9 112.2 112.1 112.3 110.2 111.2 
1982 111.1 122.3 111.8 112.6 110.2 111.3 
1983 110.8 107.3 108.9 111.4 105.7 108.3 
1984 107.1 104.1 105.4 107.8 103.1 105.3 
1985 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1986 98.2 94.7 96.3 99.3 94.6 96.8 
1987 94.4 91.1 92.6 95.2 90.5 92.6 
1988 90.6 90.7 90.6 92.1 89.6 90.7 
1989 91.9 95.1 93.6 93.0 93.6 93.3 
1990 91.7 86.8 89.0 92.6 84.9 88.5 100.01 100.0 100.0 
1991 92.3 79.3 85.3 98.6 93.0 95.5 
1992 78.9 77.7 78.3 85.8 90.2 88.7 
1993 81.3 85.6 83.9 
1994 83.9 84.5 84.3 
Source: Eurostat Agricultural Prices. Price Indices and Absolute Prices 1981-1990; 1983-1992; 
CEC (1995) 
Appendix 8.3 Producer Subsidy Equivalents in EC agriculture, 1979-1995 
Year Crops Livestock products All products 
Gross total Gross Net total PSE Net Net total PSE Net 
PSE percentage (million Ecu) percentage (million Ecu) percentage 
(million Ecu) PSE (%) PSE (%) PSE (%) 
1979 8430.2 41.2 27466.6 45.3 35896.8 44.3 
1980 4088.8 18.2 27514.1 42.7 31602.9 36.4 
1981 5807.2 23.6 24338.3 34.5 30145.5 31.7 
1982 9077.3 32.1 25297.0 32.8 34374.2 32.6 
1983 7128.1 25.6 29807.3 37.1 36935.5 34.2 
1984 5933.6 17.9 30619.6 36.7 36553.3 31.4 
1985 10896.6 37.0 34122.9 40.7 45019.6 39.7 
1986 22423 66 41026 44 63449 50 
1987 24634 67 37444 41 62078 49 
1988 18423 51 40044 44 58467 46 
1989 13610 38 40433 42 54043 40 
1990 19252 51 45427 45 64679 46 
1991 24299 61 42591 43 66890 48 
1992 20676 56 43293 43 63969 47 
1993 23843 58 42958 45 66800 49 
1994e 23138 58 45453 46 68590 49 
1995p 24023 53 50119 47 74142 49 
Source: OECD (1988-1996) Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade. Monitoring and Outlook 1988-1996 
Key: e = estimate; p = provisional. Total PSE (TPSE) = Q (P d - P w ) + D - L + B, 
with Q p = level of production; P d = domestic market price P w = world price; D = direct payments; L = 
levies on producers; and B = all other budgetary support. 
Percentage PSE = 100 (TPSE) / [Q p (PJ + D - L] (at domestic prices). 
For methodology, see Cahill and Legg (1989). 
Appendix 8.4 Financial aspects of EC agricultural support, 1970-1996 
Community, size EC-6 EC-9 EC-10 
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
EAGGF expenditure, nominal value 
(million UA or ECU) 
2804 1814 2425 4004 3366 4707 5805 7127 8996 10844 11918 11556 13056 16540 
EAGGF expenditure, real value 1 
(million UA or ECU) 
10981 6605 8267 12601 9431 11478 12766 14155 16341 17883 17442 15415 15795 18539 
EAGGF expenditure as % of EC bud-
get 
- - - - - 83.5 73.9 77.9 79.2 75.5 73.0 64.6 63.1 66.7 
Guidance expenditure as % of 
EAGGF expenditure 
7.19 13.36 6.89 4.73 7.69 3.91 3.76 4.17 3.60 3.72 4.87 4.99 4.98 4.40 
Community, size EC-10 EC-12 EC-IS 
Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 2 
EAGGF expenditure, nominal value 
(million UA or ECU) 
19023 20464 20911 23876 28888 27297 28402 34542 34981 38246 35683 39968 44903 
EAGGF expenditure, real value 1 
(million UA or ECU) 
20118 20464 19802 21719 
EAGGF expenditure as % of EC budget 69.9 72.9 65.1 66.7 70.3 66.7 64.0 58.9 59.4 58.6 59.6 53.0 54.7 
Guidance expenditure as % of EAGGF 
expenditure 
3.55 3.52 3.38 3.95 4.95 6.50 6.14 5.82 7.76 8.85 7.25 7.39 8.76 
Key: 1 in constant 1985 prices (GDP deflator). 2 preliminary draft budget. 
Sources: C E C , various issues. European Economy, Annual Economic Report, various issues. Herlihy et a l , 1989, p.121. 
Appendix 8.5a Average MCAS, period 1975-1986 (figures for January, in %) 
Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 198S 1986 
B 2.7 2.0 1.4 1.4 3.3 1.9 1.7 - -3.1 - - -
DAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 - -
FRG 12.0 10.0 9.3 7.5 10.8 9.8 8.8 8.3 8.4 9.8 1.8 1.8 
F -7.2 0 -17.5 -19.4 -10.6 -3.7 0 - -5.3 -4.4 -2.0 -
GR - - - - - - - - -23.3 -4.5 -3.6 -33.9 
IRL -10.5 -4.8 -23.5 -4.1 -2.0 - - - - - - -
IT -4.1 0 -19.2 -22.5 -17.7 -2.3 -1.0 -1.8 -2.3 - - -4.5 
LUX 2.7 2.0 1.4 1.4 3.3 1.9 1.7 - -3.1 - - -
NL 2.7 2.0 1.4 1.4 3.3 1.9 1.7 4.3 5.4 5.8 1.8 1.8 
UK -13.8 -6.4 -38.5 -31.6 -27.0 -3.5 12.1 8.0 - 7.6 -3.6 -3.5 
Key: - = not available or non-existent. Source: Ostermeyer-SchlOder, 1990, p. 55. 
Appendix 8.5b Average MCAs, period 1971-1985 (figures for May1, in %) 
Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
B 0 4.0 2.5 2.7 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.4 3.3 1.9 0 -2.5 -1.7 0 0 
DAN - - 1.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.3 1.0 0 
FRG 3.0 5.7 6.9 12.0 10.0 9.3 9.3 7.5 10.8 9.8 3.2 5.2 13.0 9.8 1.8 
F 0 1.9 1.5 -12.8 -1.4 -14.9 -13.2 -17.0 -15.3 0 0 0 -8.1 -4.4 -2.0 
GR - - - - - - - - -6.1 -11.9 -9.8 
IRL - - -5.8 -15.4 -6.9 -25.4 -3.4 -10.7 0 0 0 0 -2.3 0 0 
IT 0 0 -14.4 -15.0 0 -17.0 -13.1 -26.1 -11.2 0 -1.0 -6.6 -2.3 -1.8 -2.3 
LUX 0 4.0 2.5 2.7 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.4 3.3 1.9 0 -2.5 -1.7 0 0 
NL 0 4.0 2.5 2.7 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.4 3.3 1.9 0 2.0 8.4 5.8 1.8 
UK - - -5.8 -15.4 -12.7 -40.6 -34.7 -39.9 -14.6 1.7 12.9 16.9 3.1 3.7 1.0 
Key: - = not available or non-existent. 1 1976: October; 1977,1978,1979,1981,1983,1984: April. Source: Strijker, 1986, p. 35. 
Appendix 8.6 Aid granted under the EAGGF Guidance Section, 1964-1994 (in million ECU) 
Structural programme type B DAN F FRG GR IRE IT LUX N L P Sp UK EEC 
Individual projects1 136 46 405 503 - 73 668 9 139 - - 135 2114 
Reg 17/64 
Farm investments 175 241 1366 782 141 227 310 40 183 457 410 376 4708 
Dir 72/159 
Reg 797/85 
Reg 2328/91 
Socio-economic guidance' 2 2 32 4 - 2 2 - 1 - - I 46 
Dir 72/161 
Dir 797/85 
Less-favoured areas 81 - 1807 2544 761 825 358 68 6 238 446 1509 8643 
Dir 75/268 
Dir 797/85 
Marketing and processing 111 87 601 649 590 316 1113 4 108 272 484 281 4616 
Reg 355/77 
Reg 866/90 & 867/90 
Regional schemes' 10 25 301 68 43 32 744 12 8 22 62 1327 
'direct' - - 120 - 86 144 12 - 52 414 
'indirect' 
Market-related schemes' 27 55 350 321 12 32 248 9 36 - - 133 1223 
and others 
Key: Reg = Regulation; Dir = Directive. Figures are not adjusted for inflation. 1 Figures until end 1986. 
Source: Figures until end 1986 derived from Tracy, 1989, p. 327. Figures 1987-1994 based on CEC, various issues. 
Appendix 8.7. Structural policy schemes under the EAGGF Guidance Section 
Schemes for less-favoured areas, miscellaneous 
Dir 78/628 / E E C & Reg ( E E C ) 2195/81 Drainage in Ireland 
Dir 78 /627 / E E C Vines in Southern-France 
Dir 79 /359 / E E C Grubbing-up of vines in Charentes 
Dir 79 /173 / E E C Irrigation in Corsica 
Dir 7 9 / 1 7 9 / E E C Drainage in Ireland/N-Ireland 
Reg ( E E C ) 1820/80 Programme west of Ireland 
Reg ( E E C ) 270/79 Advisory Services in Italy 
Reg ( E E C ) 1821/80 Programme, Greenland 
Reg ( E E C ) 1054/81 Stock farming, Ireland/N-Ireland 
Dir 81/527 / E E C Programme, French overseas departments 
Reg ( E E C ) 1939/81 Programme, Western Isles of Scotland 
Reg ( E E C ) 1940/81 Integrated Programme, Lozère 
Reg ( E E C ) 1942/82 Programme, Northern Ireland 
Reg ( E E C ) 1975/82 Programme, Greece less favoured regions 
Reg ( E E C ) 1944/81 Stockfarming, Italy 
Reg ( E E C ) 2966/82 Advisory Services in Greece 
Dir 79/174 / E E C Programme, France (inundation Hérault valley) 
Reg ( E E C ) 3828/85 Programme, Portugal (development of agriculture) 
Reg ( E E C ) 2088/85 IMP 
Reg ( E E C ) 1400/86 Stockfarming in less favoured areas, France 
Reg ( E E C ) 3606/86 Emergency action less favoured areas, Ireland 
Schemes related to EEC market organizations 
Reg ( E E C ) 1163/76 Vineyard conversion 
Reg ( E E C ) 2511/69 Citrus fruit plan 
Reg ( E E C ) 1035/72 Producers' groups, fruit and vegetables 
Reg ( E E C ) 1696/71 Hops producers' groups 
Reg ( E E C ) 3796/81 Producers' groups fisheries 
Reg ( E E C ) 456/80 & Reg ( E E C ) 777/85 Vineyard abandonment 
Reg ( E E C ) 458/80 Vineyard restructuring 
Reg ( E E C ) 270/79 
Reg ( E E C ) 389/82 Producers' groups, cotton 
Dir 77 /391 / E E C & Dir 82 /400 / E E C Eradication bovine brucellosis, 
tuberculosis, leucosis 
Dir 80/1096 / E E C Eradication swine fever 
Reg ( E E C ) 1353/73 Improvement of beef cattle production 
Reg ( E E C ) 100/76 Producers'organization in the fisheries sector 
Dir 78 /627 / E E C Vineyards South of France 
Reg ( E E C ) 1360/78 Producers' groups and their associations 
Reg ( E E C ) 2239/86 Vine-growing structures in Portugal 
Reg ( E E C ) 895/85 Vine-growing structures in Greece 
Reg ( E E C ) 1654/86 Frost damage olive trees 
Source: CEC, various issues. 
Appendix 8.8 National aids as % of Gross Value Added in agriculture 
B DA FRG 3 GR E 2 F IR I 2 LUX 2 N L 2 p UK EC 
1981-86 7.3 8.0 9.8 n.a. n.a. 12.1 13.2 9.0 12.0 7.2 n.a. 14.0 n.a. 
1986-88 8.0 7.6 20.3 2.6 1.5 9.3 6.8 12.9 16.4 7.2 10.8 8.9 10. 
0 
1988-90 8.5 8.1 20.0 3.2 1.3 9.0 4.4 12.9 15.5 6.4 10.1 8.6 9.6 
Key: See table 8.8. 
Sources: Commission, 1990, p. 17; Commission, 1992c, p.31. 
Appendix 8.9 Economy-wide and sector-specific policies in agriculture 
Relevant decision-making 
level 
Economy-wide Agriculture-specific 
European Union Internal customs duties; 
External tariffs; 
Common Agricultural Policy; 
EU & member states 
(joint decisions) 
Ag R&D 
Ag extension 
Ag vocational training 
Member state Value added tax; 
Income tax; 
Exchange rate; 
Social policy; 
Public health policy; 
Ag Extension; 
Ag Vocational Training; 
Ag R&D; 
Ag Tax Expenditures; 
State Ag Extension; 
Ag Vocational Training; 
Ag R&D; 
Ag Tax Expenditures; 
Region / locality Local tax; 

C H A P T E R 9 
EC AGRICULTURAL POLICY FORMATION: 
DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 1 
9.1 Introduction 
The impact of the European Community on the functioning of its agricultural and food 
economy is, and has been, pervasive. Not only have the economic and social conditions in 
agriculture in the E C member states been influenced by the positive trade effects of the 
Community's customs union and the further abolishment of remaining trade barriers under 
the 1985 Single European Market programme. But at least equally important was the 
establishment of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP ) . The explanation of E C agricultural 
policy formation first and foremost requires a thorough understanding of its supra-national 
decision-making structure2. 
For a number of reasons Community decision-making is strikingly opaque, due to, inter 
alia, (i) the relatively large number of policy actors involved; (ii) the physical and psycho-
logical remoteness of E C decision-making centres from the member states; (iii) policy- and 
sector-specific variations in E C decision-making rules and bodies. While these arguments in 
essence are true for the entirety of E C decision-making, they particularly hold for the 
formation of the C A P . Moreover, since 1958 successive enlargements (widening) and 
changes of the E C ' s institutional structure (deepening) have markedly altered the 
institutional environment in which decisions are taken. Recent major changes in this respect 
have been the completion of the Single European Market, the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union, and the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland. 
This chapter primarily focuses on the C A P ' S decision-making system. Section 2 sketches 
the main features and responsibilities of the E C ' s major decision-making bodies, notably the 
Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. Section 3 discusses the relationship 
between the member states and the Community which can be characterised as joint 
decision-making. Section 4 highlights the different stages of the annual price review as a 
major example of how E C agricultural decision-making proceeds in practice3, and describes 
the role of the Economic and Social Committee ( E C O S O C ) , the Special Committee for 
Agriculture (SCA ) and the Committee of Permanent Representatives ( C O R E P E R ) . Section 5 
addresses the issue of decision-making speed in the agricultural policy domain. The chapter 
concludes with some remarks on agricultural policy implementation. 
1 An earlier and shorter version of this chapter appeared as Meester and Van der Zee (1993). 
2 The labels European Community and European Economic Community are used interchangeably. 
Officially the name 'European, Economic Community' has been replaced by 'European Community' in the Treaty 
on European Union (Title II, Art. G(A), TEU). 
3 For overviews of the EC agricultural decision-making process, see Harris et al. (1983), Tracy 
(1985); Fennell (1987); Swinbank (1989); as well as a series on EU agricultural policy-making in the French 
Agra-Europe, volumes 1988, 1989, 1990. For the CAP price review, see Collins et al. (1990); Fearne (1991); 
Nugent (1994). EU decision-making in general is dealt with by, inter alia, Nugent (1994); Wallace et al. (1996). 
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9.2 The structure of EC agricultural decision-making 
The European Community shares five major institutions: the Council, the Commission, 
the European Parliament (Assembly), the Court of Justice, and the Court of Auditors. The 
organisation and functions of these institutions are set out in Articles 137-188 of the Rome 
Treaty. Other - minor - bodies are the Economic and Social Committee (EcoSoc) and the 
Committee of the Regions4. The importance of the Court of Auditors has been reinforced 
by the Treaty on European Union, especially with respect to its powers for supervising the 
Commission5. While EC agricultural policy decisions are formally taken by Community 
institutions, the process of policy formation and implementation involves various other 
actors, ranging from national ministries and intervention agencies to organised interests, 
both at the national and the Community level. The structure and (potential) influence of 
organised interests on agricultural policy formation is discussed in chapter 10. In the 
following section the main decision-making actors, i.e. the Council, the Commission and 
the European Parliament, are described. 
9.2.1 The Council 
The Council is the primary legislative body of the Community. Its two functions are 
decision-taking and ensuring the coordination of the general economic policies of the 
member states (Art. 145, Rome Treaty). The Council decides on the main policy features. 
In agriculture this amounts, inter alia, to decisions on the type of agricultural market 
organisation, the fixing of target price levels, structural and social policy, and in part also 
trade policy. The Commission, however, has the exclusive right of initiative. Though the 
Council may request the Commission "to undertake any studies the Council considers 
desirable for the attainment of the common objectives, and to submit to it any appropriate 
proposals" (Art. 152, Treaty of Rome), it is dependent on the willingness of the 
Commission to put proposals before it. Without a proposal from the Commission the 
Council cannot take any decision. The Commission's proposal is formally and also 
materially the basis of the subsequent negotiations. 
The Council is made up of representatives of the governments of the member states, i.e. 
ministers and junior ministers (Art.2, Merger Treaty EC). Its composition depends on the 
subject under discussion. Most frequent are the meetings of the General Affairs Council 
(external relations, including foreign trade (GATT ) and association arrangements) and the 
The Commission and the Court of Justice have been common to the Communities since the 1957 
Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities; the Council and the European 
Parliament since the Merger Treaty which entered into force on 1 July, 1967; the Court of Auditors was 
established by Treaty in 1975. The Committee of the Regions has been established under the Treaty on European 
Union, as the more fully equipped successor of the Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities 
(founded in 1988). 
5 The Court of Auditors "(...) is not a court in the normal sense ofthat word but an independent body 
which not only audits the books of Community Institutions and subsidiary organisations - as any auditor would do 
- but has also powers to investigate Community spending at any point and in any institution - Community or 
national if the latter is operating on behalf of the former. It is also empowered to conduct investigations and to 
make reports on matters within its competence at the request of one of the Community Institutions" (Fennell, 
1987: 71). 
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Agriculture Council. Both Councils meet at least once a month as a rule. The EcoFin 
Council (ministers of economic affairs and finance together) and the Internal Market 
Council meet roughly every 1-2 months. Other Councils meet only a few times per year, 
e.g., Industry, Fisheries, Transport, Labour and Social Security, Research, Development 
Co-operation and Environment. Council meetings are held in Luxembourg during the 
months April, June and October; otherwise they take place in Brussels. 
Relatively young is the European Council which had its first European Summit in Paris 
in 1974, with regular follow-ups in the following years. It was constitutionally embedded 
in the Single European Act (SEA ) . The European Council meets at least twice a year, and is 
composed of the heads of state or government of the member states, together with the 
Commission President, and during part of the meeting with the President of the European 
Parliament. It has served to find solutions to serious issues of contention, to break the 
deadlock of discussion in the Council and to move the Community forward to new prior-
ities. The European Council has considerable political power. Under the Treaty on 
European Union it has been formally given the power to 'define the general political 
guidelines' for the development of the Union (Maastricht Treaty, Title I, Art. D). In 
practice, it has given general political orientations to various specific Council meetings. 
The European Council can take formal decisions, and follows the same procedures as every 
other Council meeting. 
The Council, whatever its composition, is chaired by one of the member states in half-
yearly rotation. The Presidency involves not only the formal Council meetings, but also 
every committee, group or working party meeting that is related to it. It is rather important 
for the direction in which policy develops; it acts as an honest-broker and mediator in 
Council-bargaining and may engineer political initiatives. 
The Council meets on the initiative of the Presidency or on request by the Commission 
or a Council Member. Participants in the meetings of the Council are the Presidency, the 
representatives of the member states (ministers) and a representative of the Commission. 
The Council is assisted by a General-Secretariat, a full-time secretariat of permanent 
officials (numbering 2170, figures December 31, 1992) which is independent of both the 
Commission and the member states. This Council-Secretariat has the important function of 
providing continuity of procedure and, through its services, of defending the rights of the 
Council. It provides documentation, advice and background material in the eleven official 
languages6 for the committees that process the draft legislation before formal discussion 
and decision-making by the Council, and it prepares the reports of the committees to the 
Council meetings. 
Community legislation comprises regulations, directives and decisions. A regulation is 
of general application in all the member states and binding in its entirety (Art. 189, Rome 
Treaty). A directive is binding 'as to the results to be achieved upon each Member State to 
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and 
methods' (Art. 189). The national administrations must enact the appropriate legislation 
The official EC-languages are: Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, 
Spanish, Swedish and Finnish. 
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necessary to give the directives legal status. A decision (a legal term not to be confused 
with decision as used in common parlance) is binding only to the legal entity to which it is 
addressed. The hierarchy in Community legislation is essential to its understanding. Basic 
Council regulations (directly derived from Art.43) apply for an ^determinate time and 
require the advice of the European Parliament. On the basis of these regulations the 
Council can either delegate regulations to itself, or to the Commission. Most of the 
agricultural price support measures are based upon regulations, because they concern 
Community policies, which have replaced national policies of the member states. A large 
part of the legislation under the Single European Act is based upon directives, because it 
concerns harmonisation of national legislation of the member states (food law, veterinary 
and phytosanitary measures). 
In principle, decision-making in the Council proceeds by vote. Its voting procedure is 
based on the simple majority rule, unless otherwise provided in the Treaty (Art. 148). The 
great majority of Council legislation on the C A P is based on Article 43, which requires 
qualified (weighted) majority voting. The current weighting is shown in table 9.1. For 
developments over time, see appendix 9.1. Political rather than economic arguments seem 
to have predominated the distribution of votes. A qualified majority requires at least sixty-
two (and 10 member states). A blocking minority is twenty-six votes (or 6 member states 
if the Council does not act in accordance with the proposal of the Commission). Following 
the 'compromise of Ioannina' a decision will be reconsidered if 23 to 25 votes are cast 
against a proposal. 
In practice, however, at least one large member state is needed. In some cases, where 
no Commission proposal is needed, the voting procedure requires a qualified majority (54 
votes) of at least six member states. 
In the past, however, unanimity (frequently) prevailed over the qualified majority rule, 
on the grounds of the vital interest argument which dates back to the Luxembourg 
Compromise of January 19667. Since the S E A unanimity has lost its prime. In three cases it 
is still important. First, unanimity applies to policy issues that have not already been 
embodied in the Treaty (Art. 235). Second, urianimity is required if the Council wants to 
alter a proposal of the Commission. If the Commission refuses to put forward a new 
proposal, decision-making is not possible. If the Commission refuses to include a 
modification wanted by the vast majority of the Council, the Council still can adopt it, but 
only by unanimity. 
The Luxembourg Compromise meant the settlement of the 'empty chair crisis' in 1965, the most 
serious constitutional crisis since the Community's inception, when the French withdrew from Community activi-
ties for six months (e.g. see Mayne, 1968). It established the principle that a Member State, in discussions of an 
issue on which majority voting applies, may not be outvoted on a matter which it declares to affect its vital 
national interest. If vital interests are at stake the Council will try to reach acceptable solutions within a certain 
period of time. Difference in interpretation of the latter phrase led to a view held by France - and later on by the 
U.K, Ireland, Denmark and Greece - that the search for acceptable solutions had to be continued until unanimity 
was reached in the end. Other Member States disagreed and held the view that after a reasonable period of time 
and consultation, the qualified majority rule still applied. The vital interest-argument has been used most by the 
U.K. and Germany, while France has notably never used i t 
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Table 9.1 
Economic key figures and voting relations in the EU by member state 
Member state GDP" 
(billion ECU) 
Population 
(million) 
GDP per 
capita 
(PPS b) 
Votes 
Commission 
Votes 
EP 
Votes 
Council 
Austria 155,5 8,02 17718 1 21 4 
Belgium 180,0 10,10 17946 1 25 5 
Denmark 115,5 5,20 17815 1 16 3 
Finland 71,5 5,08 14387 1 16 3 
France 1068,6 57,78 17434 2 87 10 
Germany*' 1631,4 81,34 17147 2 99 10 
Greece 76,7 10,41 9998 1 25 5 
Ireland 40,4 3,57 12826 1 15 3 
Italy 847,3 57,14 16228 2 87 10 
Luxembourg 10,7 0,40 25422 1 6 2 
Netherlands 264,0 15,34 16308 1 31 5 
Portugal 72,3 9,89 10935 1 25 5 
Sweden 158,1 8,75 15590 1 22 4 
Spain 408,4 39,18 12330 2 64 8 
UK 804,8 58,28 15717 2 87 10 
EUR-12 348,6 15835 - - -
EUR-15 5747,4 370,4 - 20 626 87 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (1995) Basic Statistics of the Community. 32th ed. 
Luxembourg. 
K e y : ( a ) Gross Domestic Product at market prices; 0 0 Purchasing Power Standard in Ecu; ( c ) For vote 
numbers, see Official Journal C241 (29 August 1994); figures were officially revised after the 
Norwegian referendum by the Council on 1 January 1 9 9 5 ; ( d ) 1-1-1994). 
No unanimity means non-acceptance of the modified proposal. In such cases the Commis-
sion needs the help of only one member state to change the Council's proposal into its 
desired direction. In practice, however, the decision procedure in the Agriculture Council is 
that the Commission accepts the final Presidency compromise as its final proposal in order 
to realise a qualified majority. The right of initiative and the aforementioned decision-
making procedure give the Commission some power vis-à-vis member states that refuse to 
agree with Community decisions for political reasons. Third, unanimity is required for 
decisions concerning the harmonisation of Community legislation, but only with regard to 
indirect tax and social security measures. Since the ratification of the Single European Act 
most other harmonisation measures are decided by qualified majority (Art.lOOA, SEA). 
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9.2.2 The Commission 
The initiation and design of policies is primarily the task of the Commission in its role 
of ensuring the proper functioning and development of the common market. In principle, 
the Commission is free to set the direction of policy and the priorities for Community 
action, which explains its predicate of 'motor of European integration'. However, its 
independence of action is constrained by the decision-making rules as laid down in the 
Treaty. One important limitation is that the Commission can only propose and not take the 
final policy decisions; the latter is the responsibility of the Council of Ministers8. One has 
to bear in mind, however, that the Commission does not put forward any proposals to the 
Council which it suspects have no chance of being accepted. The Commission will take 
clear notice of the views of member state governments regarding needed (future) policy 
action. Still, the Commission has some degree of freedom in setting its policy priorities, 
which makes it an interesting lobbying target for organised interests. 
Each year the Commission formally announces a legislative programme for the 
oncoming year. This policy agenda may be extended as a result of decisions taken at the 
summits of the European Council during the year, which under the Treaty on European 
Union has been given the power to 'define the general political guidelines' for the develop-
ment of the Union or, in practice, to give general political orientations to specific Councils. 
Furthermore, the Council presidency has some scope of manipulating the agenda and for 
pushing the Commission into a certain direction. The Commission has started to discuss its 
annual work programme with the European Parliament (European Parliament, 1991). 
Formally, the Commission has four areas of responsibility (Fennell, 1987:17; and 
Art.155, Rome Treaty): (i) it has to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty are applied 
(role of watchdog); (ii) it has to make recommendations or give opinions on matters arising 
out of the Treaty; (iii) it has its own power of decision and must participate in the formula-
tion of measures taken by the Council and the Parliament; (iv) it exercises the powers 
conferred on it by the Council. In practice, the major part of the Commission's workload is 
the day-to-day management and the implementation of legislation. Where Council decisions 
provide the primary legislative framework, the drafting and execution of implementing, 
secondary, legislation is in most cases delegated to the Commission. The width of its 
policy margin is a question of competence. 
The Commission is headed by 20 Commissioners, two of which come from each of the 
larger member states, and one from each of the small member states. The Commissioners 
are nominated and appointed by common accord of the 15 member governments, in the 
past for a four-year term, in 1993 for a transitional two-year term and from 1995 on for a 
five-year term (parallel to the term of office of members of the European Parliament). 
Their performance is judged by the member state governments and the European Parlia-
ment. The latter has the power to dismiss the Commission by a two-thirds majority of the 
Note that in a limited number of cases the Commission can autonomously take decisions, either in 
its management role by the Treaty (competition policy, national aids), or within the primary legislative framework 
set by the Council, e.g. in the implementation of (agricultural) policy by the management and/or regulatory 
procedure (Art. 155, Treaty of Rome). 
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votes cast and a majority of members9. The Parliament, however, has no right to dismiss 
individual Commissioners. The appointment by common accord emphasizes the 
Community base of the Commission, as does its independence of action in the 
Community's public interest (Art. 157, Rome Treaty; Art.10, Merger Treaty). Since 
Commissioners are nominated by member state governments national electoral 
considerations can still play a role. For a member state government can hardly be expected 
to appoint a Commissioner with strongly divergent political views. Although a 
Commissioner is supposed to act independently from the home government that has 
nominated him, in practice this Treaty provision seems to have been interpreted less 
strictly. In the past some governments (e.g., the UK and the F R G , cf. Nugent, 1994) have 
almost openly criticised their Commissioners for failing to defend their country's interests. 
Diverging political preferences between a Commissioner, as revealed by bis policy actions, 
and the political views of the home government can in extreme cases lead to the 
replacement of a Commissioner10. 
Each Commissioner is allocated an area of responsibility under the Treaty and is 
assisted by a Cabinet, a small staff of advisers who can intervene on his behalf at all levels 
of the Commission's bureaucracy. The Commissioners meet weekly. The Cabinets perform 
the important role of line of communication to the member states and entry point for 
ideas11. The main division within the Commission is between the Commissioners and their 
Cabinets and the administrative departments, twenty-three Directorates General (DGS ) , each 
of which deals with one or more policy areas and nine other administrative services 
(Secretariat-General, Juridical Service, Bureau for Official Publications, Eurostat, etc.). The 
Commission staff numbers about 18,000, one-quarter of whom are involved in 
interpretation and translation12. 
The Commission's most important executive powers concerning agricultural policy are 
the day-to-day market management and the preparation and adoption of 'secondary 
legislation', i.e. detailed provisions for the implementation of Council decisions (Art. 155, 
Rome Treaty). Secondary legislation may involve decisions regarding the level of import 
Dismissal of the Commission has to be regarded as a measure of last resort; till now it has never 
been used. 
1 0 An example is Lord Cockfield who was replaced by the UK government under Thatcher since he 
would have thrown British interests for a scramble as the major designer of the 1985 internal market programme. 
Other countries have been more reticent with national interference with respect to the composition and activities of 
the Commission. The extension of a Commissioner's tenure from four to five years under the Treaty on European 
Union can be interpreted as a relative widening of his discretional powers and independence with respect to the 
Council and national member states. 
1 1 See Donnelly (1993) for a detailed general description of the role of the Cabinet in the policy-
making process. 
1 2 In 1992 total permanent staff numbered 13,979 permanent and 743 temporary posts in 
administrative service (of which 1614 in translation), supplemented by 1,159 permanent and 191 temporary in 
research; and 463 in the Bureau for Official Publications, 76 at the Centre for the Development of Vocational 
Training (Berlin) and 67 at the Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Dublin) 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1993). 
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levies and export refunds; measures in order to stimulate the disposal of market stocks; 
provisions concerning intervention policy. Especially important are the powers of the 
Commission concerning export refund policy, both from a budgetary and a trade policy 
perspective. The Commission is also responsible for the disposal of agricultural commodity 
surpluses. Actions in this area range from major 'deals' with third countries, such as the 
cheap butter, beef and grain sales to the former Soviet Union in the 1980s, to various 
disposal schemes for specific buyer segments within the E U itself, such as the disposal of 
skimmed milk powder in pigfeed and poultryfeed, 'Christmas' butter, concentrated butter 
and bakery butter. The pursuit of the delegated executive powers is subject to Council 
decision (87/373/EEC), known as the 'comitology' decision. The Council can prescribe 
three different committee procedures for the Commission to adhere to: (i) a Management 
Committee procedure; (ii) a Regulatory Committee procedure; and (iii) a Consultative 
Committee procedure. In general, agricultural market and price policy as well as structural 
policy fall under the Management procedure. 
Management Committees (Comités de Gestion) exist for each product falling under a 
market regime. Management committees were set up to ease the considerable technical 
work involved in the day-to-day management of the Commission and the member states. 
When the Commission wishes to issue a Regulation it normally has to submit its proposal 
to the relevant Management Committee for opinion. The Management Committee can only 
give its opinion by vote (in favour, against, or absence of opinion); it has no power to 
reject or accept draft legislation. Opinion is reached on the basis of the aforementioned 
qualified majority rule. Whatever the outcome, the Commission may proceed with its 
proposal. In the case of a negative opinion the Council regulation prescribes one of the 
following two options: either the Commission suspends the application of the measure for 
one month or for a period fixed in a Council decision to that effect, with a maximum of 
three months. In both options the Council may override the Commission's decision. 
However, the Commission regulation will be applied automatically, if the Council does not 
take a decision within the aforementioned period. In practice, negative opinions have been 
rare, for the Commission usually adapts its proposal hearing the ideas of the Management 
Committee and if the opinion is negative it is quite difficult to organise a qualified 
majority in the Council to reach an alternative decision. Management Committees consist 
of officials from each member state and are presided over by a representative of the 
Commission. The Management Committees for cereals and sugar meet on a weekly basis; 
Committees for other products meet less frequently (e.g., dairy, beef). Apart from the 
Management Committees a number of other committees exist. Consultation of some of 
these committees is mandatory, e.g., the Committee of the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund; the Committee for Agricultural Structural and Rural Development. 
Their procedure is in essence the same as the Management Committee Procedure. 
Under the Regulatory Committee Procedure the Commission can only fix measures if a 
positive advice is given by the Committee. If not, the proposal is referred to the Council. 
The Council can decide with qualified majority within three months; if the Council does 
not act within this period, the Commission may as yet fix the proposed measure (the filet-
procedure). The Council can also vote against the adoption of the proposal with a simple 
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majority; now the Commission cannot fix anything (the contra-filet-piocedxxe). The 
Regulatory Committee procedure mainly applies to dossiers concerning the Single 
European Market, i.e. food law, veterinary and phytosanitary legislation13. 
Under the Consultative Committee Procedure the Commission has to take account of 
the advice of the committee as much as possible. Consultative or Advisory Committees 
have been established to foster links between the Commission and various organised 
interests. Members of an Advisory Committee are appointed by the Commission on 
proposals from the interest groups. These committees have no formal power; they are 
consulted on the application of the rules in a specific policy domain, on the day-to-day 
operation of the market regimes, and on early drafts of Commission proposals and function 
as a useful contact point with the special interests organised at EU level. 
In its role of watchdog of the Treaty the Commission also supervises the implemen-
tation of Community legislation by the various national intervention agencies and govern-
ment bodies. It should be kept in mind that the autonomous decision-making capacity by 
the Commission regarding the day-to-day management of the C A P does not interfere with 
the major decisions taken by the Council, such as the (annual) fixing of C A P price levels, 
milk quotas, green conversion rates and general price support arrangements. 
Committees for the Implementation of Regulations have already existed since 1968, and consist of 
representatives of the member states as well. Their work applied to veterinary problems and problems on 
foodstuffs in intra-Community trade, for example in live animals and meat (Economic and Social Committee, 
1984: 666;668). 
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9.2.3 The European Parliament 
At first sight, the powers of the European Parliament (EP) look rather impressive: (i) it 
has extensive budget responsibilities; (ii) it can dismiss the Commission (i.e. the Commis-
sioners) by a two third majority of the votes; (iii) it may pose written and oral questions to 
the Commission and may call it to account in plenary or in committee debates; (iv) it can 
pass resolutions; (v) it is called upon to deliver opinions on draft legislation of the 
Commission under the consultation and, more recently, the co-operation procedure14. In 
practice, its two most important powers are the budget and the consultation authority 
(Fennell, 1987:23). However, the Parliament still lacks powers of compulsion and, as a 
result, its influence on E C decision-making is, though it has grown over the years, rather 
limited. For many Council decisions, inter alia with regard to the C A P (Art.43.2), the 
Parliament only has to be consulted: the Council can ignore the formal opinion of the 
Parliament if it thinks fit. The Commission has the same right, but in practice it may bear 
the Parliament's views in mind in revising a draft proposal submitted to the Council. 
Mainly for draft legislation concerning the establishment of the internal market and also 
for some other legislation, a co-operation procedure has been established between the 
Council and the Parliament under the Single European Act (Art.6, S E A ) 1 5 . In this pro-
cedure, a second reading is added on to the consultation procedure. If the Parliament 
rejects in the second reading the Council opinion of the first reading, then the Council can 
only approve a proposal in second reading by unanimity. The co-operation procedure, 
which was established under the Single European Act, originally applied to, inter alia, 
issues concerning the single European market (Art. 100A), some social and regional policy 
matters and R&D programmes. The 1991 Treaty on European Union has extended the co-
operation procedure to proposals in the domain of environmental policy, the European 
Social Fund, and transport policy. For agriculture, the co-operation procedure mainly 
applies to food law. For all legislation based on article 43 - i.e. the C A P as well as for 
instance many veterinary and phytosanitary regulations, regulations concerning animal 
welfare and quality policy in agriculture - the consultation procedure has been maintained. 
Under the Treaty on European Union the co-operation procedure has - partly - been 
replaced by a co-decision procedure (Art. 189b). The essence of co-decision is that both 
Council and Parliament have to approve a proposal before it can be adopted. In case of 
disagreement a Conciliation Committee - consisting of representatives of both Council and 
Parliament - is established, which has the task of reaching agreement on a joint text. The 
latter has to be approved by the European Parliament (absolute majority) as well as the 
Council (qualified majority). The co-decision procedure has replaced the co-operation 
Since the Maastricht Treaty the European Parliament has similar rights as the Council in requesting 
the Commission to take appropriate action for the attainment of common objectives (cf. Title II, Art. 138b). 
1 5 The impact of the SEA on the powers of the EP has fallen short of Parliament's aspirations as 
expressed in its 1984 draft on European Union (Corbett, 1989:371). However, it has allowed the Parliament to 
play a greater role in the adoption of Community legislation, not only by the cooperation procedure, but also by 
the assent procedure - acquiring a positive vote of more than half the MEPs for the entry of new member states 
and for association agreements - and the 'information' procedure (see Corbett, 1989; Fitzmaurice, 1988). 
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procedure in issues relating to, inter alia, the establishment and functioning of the single 
market, as well as Research and Technological Development ( R & T D ) framework 
programmes, consumer protection, culture, public health, education and training, environ-
mental action programmes and the establishment of trans-European networks. Under the 
Treaty on European Union (Title II, Art.l38B) the Parliament can request the Commission 
to submit proposals with respect to issues arising from the Treaty which gives the 
Parliament the right of initiative in some E U policy domains. This situation will be recon-
sidered in 1996-97. Both the co-operation and the co-decision procedure - which de facto 
amounts to a veto right - have strongly added to the legislative powers of the Parliament. 
The increased influence of the Parliament on E C decision-making is, for example, shown 
by the number of amendments to single-market laws made under the new co-operation 
procedure: in the period between the introduction of the S E A in 1987 and November 1991 
the Commission accepted 1,052 of the Parliament's 1,724 amendments, and of those the 
Council agreed to 719 (Mazey and Richardson, 1993a:ll). Although most of these amend-
ments are of a piece-meal, technical nature, they are proof of the Parliament's increasing 
importance. 
However, neither the co-operation, nor the co-decision procedure currently apply to 
issues falling under Article 43 of the Rome Treaty covering the C A P ; co-decision is 
currently used for issues regarding food law. Still the Parliament has found effective ways 
to influence the agricultural decision-making process. It can (i) drag its feet, e.g., in cases 
where the Council takes a political decision before it has consulted the Parliament, and (ii) 
put pressure on the Commission to include changes and propositions from the Parliament 
in its proposal to the Council. 
The Parliament has far-reaching budgetary powers16. It shares the influence and 
control over the Community budget with the Commission and the Council (Art.203, Rome 
Treaty). It adopts the final budget and can reject the draft as a whole by majority of its 
members and two third of the votes cast. The timetable of budget negotiations is so 
arranged that the financial year corresponds to the calendar year. Each EU-institution has to 
draw up estimates of its expenditure before July 1 each year, which is followed by a 
preliminary draft of the Commission to be presented to the Council before September 1. 
The Council may change the preliminary draft, but once adopted the draft is forwarded to 
the European Parliament, on October 5 at the latest. During a second reading the Council 
can modify or reject a parliamentary amendment or proposal. The altered draft is again 
submitted to the Parliament. It can amend or reject modifications and has to adopt the 
budget before the start of the new financial year on January 1. In practice, as a result of 
conflicts between the Council and Parliament, this date has not been met several times. 
The division of budgetary powers between the Council and the Parliament has been and 
still is a highly delicate issue politically (e.g., Fennell, 1987:70). An important issue is the 
distinction between compulsory - those policy matters that directly arise out of the Treaty 
provisions - or non-compulsory expenditure. With respect to compulsory expenditures -
16 For a detailed survey of EU-budgetary policy making, see e.g. Shackleton (1989). 
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which comprise agricultural market and price support measures ( F E O G A Guarantee expendi-
ture) -, the Parliament only has the right to propose modifications to the draft budget. Such 
modifications have to be accepted in the Council by qualified majority; otherwise they are 
rejected. Since the Maastricht Treaty, however, the Council has engaged itself in an active 
dialogue with the Parliament on compulsory expenditure decisions. 
With regard to non-compulsory expenditures, the Parliament may amend the 
expenditure level up to half the maximum. In this situation the Council has to accept the 
amendments or reject them by qualified majority. If necessary, a new rate may be fixed by 
agreement between the Council and the Parliament. The maximum allowable increase of 
the non-compulsory part of the budget is determined by the Commission on a yearly basis. 
With the acceptance of the multi-annual Financial Perspectives at the 1988 Brussels 
Summit, its budgetary powers have increased somewhat, since the Perspectives and the 
'agricultural reference framework' are subject to approval by the Council, the Commission 
and the European Parliament. 
Since 1979 the members of the European Parliament (MEPS ) have been directly elected. 
Although nationally elected for a period of five years, the 518 members do not sit by 
country but rather by political groups. The Parliamentary Bureau, composed of the Parlia-
ment's President and 14 vice-presidents, is responsible for the day-to-day running of the 
Parliament and decides upon its programme. The parliamentary year starts in March. Once 
a month the Parliament meets in full session in Strasbourg. In March and October 
additional part sessions are organised to consider opinions on agricultural prices and the 
annual budget. Each important subject area is represented through a committee (of which 
there are 18 in total) that deals with all the preparatory work on the subject coming before 
the Parliament. The plenary sessions are open to the public, committee meetings, however, 
are not. 
9.3 Joint decision-making 
Decision-taking authority and policy responsibilities are divided between the Commu-
nity and the constituent member state governments in a hierarchical manner, which makes 
the Community akin to federalist systems17. The supranational Community shows more 
resemblance to the German than to the us federalist model (e.g., Scharpf, 1988; 1994). 
Where in the us the federal government and the states are expected to discharge of then-
legislative, fiscal and administrative responsibilities independently, in Germany legislative 
and fiscal powers are almost exclusively exercised by the federal government. Under 
German federalism - or what Scharpf (1994:221) calls 'interlocking federalism' - the 
federal government usually needs the agreement of state governments in formulating 
policies. Policy decisions depend on the consent of both houses of the federal legislature; 
Following Riker (1964:11) a political system is federal if it has two characteristics: (i) it has a 
hierarchy of governments, meaning that at least "two levels of governments rule the same land and people," each 
with a delineated scope of authority so that each level of government is autonomous in its own, well-defined 
sphere of political authority; and (ii) the autonomy of each government is institutionalised in a manner that makes 
federalism's restrictions self-enforcing (see also Weingast, 1995:4). 
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only one house of the federal legislature (the Bundestag) consists of directly elected 
representatives, while the other (the Bundesrat) is made up of indirectly elected repre-
sentatives of the Länder governments. Furthermore, for policy implementation the federal 
government relies to a great extent on the administrative systems of the Länder. 
Both German federalism and E C supranationalism are characterised by joint decision-
making: decision-making by one level of government is influenced by the other and vice 
versa. Community decision-making is highly dependent on the agreement of national 
member states, whereas member states face restrictions in their scope of authority by 
Community legislation. However, the correspondence between 'Community 
supranationalism' and German 'interlocking federalism' is not a perfect one-to-one 
matching. The Community's legislature consists of two bodies, but none of these are 
directly elected via European elections: the (College of) Commissioners is nominated by 
the member state governments under a system of co-optation and appointed "by common 
accord of the Governments of the Member States" (Art. 158, Rome Treaty), and can 
therefore best be described as a 'political bureaucracy', while the Council consists of 
national ministers who usually are selected (not elected) after direct elections at the 
national level. 18The ministers act both in a role of representatives of (the interests of) 
their member state governments and as representatives of Community interests as members 
of the Council. The Commission and the Council cannot act without one another: the 
Commission generally cannot take policy decisions and the Council cannot take any policy 
decision without a proposal of the Commission. While the European Parliament formally is 
part of the Community's legislature, in practice its formal role in E C agricultural policy 
formation is almost negligible. The Commission in its executive role of day-to-day manag-
ement of the C A P is highly reliant on the administrative systems of the member states: not 
only the Management Committee structures, but also for the actual implementation of the 
C A P by the national ministries of agriculture, national intervention agencies, as well as 
customs and excise authorities. Finally, the Community has extremely limited fiscal 
powers: not only are taxes collected by the member states which 'contribute' to the 
Community budget, but more importantly, the Community faces a balanced - overall -
budget restriction, and since 1988, an agricultural budget constraint under the reference 
framework. 
9.4 The annual agricultural price review 
A major example of how agricultural decision-making develops in practice is the annual 
price review. Formally, the price package has to be decided upon before 1 April each year, 
which is the start of the marketing year. It not only deals with the fixing of prices, but also 
with other measures, e.g., agri-monetary measures for many commodities, the changing of 
intervention conditions, stricter quality criteria, and the like. Proposals for reform are also 
considered during the price review negotiations, cf. the milk quotas decision in 1984 and 
the decision on the 1992 MacSharry package on 'the development and future of the C A P ' . 
1 8 The democratic content of decision-making under the C A P is much weaker than under German 
'interlocking federalism', if measured by the influence of directly elected politicians. 
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However, in recent years the Council has also taken more important decisions in the 
second half of the marketing year. 
Examples are the strong reduction of milk quotas19 and the change of the beef regime 
in December 1986; the agreement on stabilizers and set-aside in February 1988; and the 
reform of the oilseeds regime in October 1991. Often proposals put aside earlier that year 
are added to the package. Often the composition of the package is altered in such a way 
that it can satisfy the policy demands of all member states (package deals). With fifteen 
member states the total package size is much larger nowadays than it was at the start of the 
C A P . 
The annual price review consists of several stages which comprise drafting the proposal 
(section 9.4.1), mandatory consultation (section 9.4.2), discussion at Council working and 
C S A level (section 9.4.3), and final decision-taking by the Council (section 9.4.4). A 
schematic overview of the agricultural decision-making process is given in figure 9.1. 
9.4.1 Drafting the proposal 
The annual price review starts in autumn with a discussion within the services of the 
Commission, the initiative being taken by the responsible Commissioner. During this first 
round many influences can play a role: suggestions of the responsible Cabinet and 
Directorate General, other Commissioners, the European Parliament, member states, third 
countries, public opinion and all kinds of organised interests. In general, the way in which 
proposals are developed depends to a large extent on the preferences and personality of the 
Commissioner: "When the Commissioner is assertive (..), he can dominate the process 
along with his Cabinet. 
When the Commissioner is less assertive, the locus of policy formation is centred much 
more on DG-Agriculture" (Moyer and Josling, 1990:31). In the preparation of the draft 
proposal the Directorate General can be assisted by national experts. For this purpose, ad 
hoc working groups can be formed and one or more Advisory committees can be 
convened. Though nominated by the member state governments a titre personnel and not 
representing any specific interests, the influence of the Expert committees cannot be 
neglected. 
19 See Petit et al. (1987) for a detailed account. 
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Figure 9.1 EC decision-making in the agricultural policy domain 
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According to Nugent (1994:102) they are usually better placed than the Advisory 
committees, not only because "consultation with the expert committees is usually 
compulsory in the process for drafting legislation", but also "because they can often go 
beyond offering the Commission much needed technical advice, to alerting it to probable 
governmental reactions to a proposal and, therefore, to possible problems that may arise at 
a future decision-making stage if certain views are not incorporated." Another useful 
contact point for the Commission in the drafting stage is the staff members of the 
Permanent Representations (REPS), e.g., the Agricultural Counsellor or his adjoint. The 
importance of the REPS in this respect seems to have increased lately20. The REPS also 
function as an intermediary - 'a hatch' - in establishing informal contacts between 
organised interests and Commission officials. 
After close scrutiny of the draft by the Commission's legal staff, a second round of 
negotiations takes place in the 'College of Commissioners' and is prepared by the 'Chefs 
de Cabinet'. During the negotiations not only a balance has to be found between the 
differing interests and responsibilities of each Commissioner, but already also between the 
often conflicting national interests of the member states. One can think of agricultural 
interests that conflict with E U external relations, development policy, environmental policy 
and last but not least, the Community budget. Conflicts of interest within the Commission 
arising from 'national ties' should not exist. However, a Commissioner is also interested in 
a good relationship with his 'home country'. Community proposals that conflict with 
national interests can put a Commissioner into an awkward position; consider for example 
the severe criticism the German Commissioners experienced in 1987, having assented to a 
proposal on the lowering of cereal prices and MCAs, which was out of line with the 
German position. The Commission debates the draft proposal, either at one of the weekly 
meetings or by handling it according to the written circulation procedure. The Commis-
sioners may, by simple majority vote, approve, modify or reject the proposal. If accepted, 
the proposal is released and sent to the Council and the Parliament. 
9.4.2 Mandatory consultation 
The policy proposals of the Commission are, once drafted, sent to the European 
Parliament and, in some cases, to the Economic and Social Committee ( E C O S O C ) for 
advice. The Parliament's advice in the form of an Opinion is mandatory in the sense that 
the Council cannot enact legislation without having consulted the Parliament. Although the 
Council does not need the approval of the Parliament to proceed with its decision-taking, 
the consultation - single referral - procedure gives the Parliament some scope for policy 
influence. It can either try to persuade the Commission to amend its proposals before the 
Council has acted21 or try to delay the decision-taking process. The latter possibility is not 
This was, inter alia, confirmed by the former Dutch Agricultural Counsellor Van Poppel (personal 
communication as well as interview in Oogst, August 20, 1993). 
2 1 Article 149 of the Treaty of Rome states that "as long as the Council has not acted, the Commission 
may alter its original proposals, in particular where the Assembly has been consulted on that proposal". (See also 
Nugent, 1991: 131). 
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without limitations, since the Parliament has to 'cooperate loyally among Community 
institutions' (Court of Justice, 1980 Isoglucose Case (138/79)). The traditional consultation 
procedure does not give the Parliament the right to amend policy proposals. Still the 
Parliament can try to influence the policy direction casu quo policy content in its 
discussions with the Commission (President and/or Commissioner) during the plenary 
sessions of the Parliament and during its - recently established - yearly debate on the 
Commission's annual work programme. However, given the fact that the simple 
consultation procedure applies to most agricultural policy issues (at least within the 
framework of the C A P ) , the influence of the Parliament on agricultural policy developments 
is rather limited. 
The Economic and Social Committee ( E C O S O C ) is the second 'consultative assembly' of 
the Union, E C O S O C functions both as a consultative body for the Commission and the 
Council and as a forum in which representatives of socio-economic (sectional) interests can 
exchange views, E C O S O C is a 'tripartite' body consisting of employers (Group I: industry, 
public enterprises, banks, insurance companies, etc), workers (Group II, trade unions), and 
various interests (Group m: farmers, small and medium-sized enterprises, consumers, 
environmental groups, etc.). In some policy domains - notably agriculture, transport and 
social policy - the consultation of E C O S O C is mandatory (Art. 198, Rome Treaty). As a 
result of the Single European Act mandatory consultation has been extended to issues 
concerning research and technology, the environment as well as the internal market. With 
respect to agricultural policy E C O S O C is asked for Opinions "on almost all the proposals 
drawn up by the Commission, either because such consultation is required under the 
Treaties or because the Commission or the Council consider it advisable to have the views 
of the assembly (..) before they take decisions." (Economic and Social Committee, 1984: 
696). The influence of E C O S O C on Union policy-making, however, is limited, since both 
the Council and the Commission are only obliged to consult, but not to act upon the views 
of E C O S O C . Moreover, most of its Opinions in the agricultural policy domain are taken 
without unanimity, which diminishes its potential influence. The fact that members of 
E C O S O C are not appointed by national interest groups - or Euro-groups, but by their 
national governments in a personal (often part-time) capacity, also seems to contribute to 
its lack of influence. The Opinion of E C O S O C is not as vital for progress in policy-making 
as is the Opinion of the Parliament. In practice, the Council has considerable leeway to 
escape the Opinion of E C O S O C : it can set a time-limit as short as ten days for the 
submission of an Opinion. If the Opinion has not arrived within the time-limit, nothing 
prevents the Council from proceeding. It often occurs that proposals are referred to E C O S O C 
when an agreement among principal decision-takers has already been reached. 
9.4.3 Discussions at Council Working group and CSA level 
The preparations for discussion in the Council evolve at three levels. They normally 
start with a first reading of the proposal in the Council Working Group. The Council 
working groups consist of experts of the member states, are chaired by the Presidency and 
are attended by the Commission; they investigate the details and the technical aspects of 
the proposal, offer suggestions for adaptation and report areas of consensus. All findings 
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are recorded by the Council Secretariat and go together with the (adapted version of the) 
proposal for a second round of discussion to the Special Committee on Agriculture ( S C A ) , 
often denoted by its French acronym C S A (Comité Spécial Agriculture) which handles in 
principle the preparation for the agricultural Council meetings of matters concerning 
agricultural prices, structure and incomes; the preparation of other proposals in principle 
takes place in the Committee of Permanent Representatives22 ( C O R E P E R ) . 
C O R E P E R deals, inter alia, with proposals for harmonisation of legislation, budgetary 
matters, fisheries and commercial questions concerning third countries. Financial aspects 
are first dealt with in Agrifin, which is a working group under C O R E P E R . The C O R E P E R and 
the C S A are the highest organs at civil servant level for the preparation of the Council 
agenda. In these Committees remaining questions come up for discussion, in particular 
questions of political choice, but also diagonal interrelationships between the various 
products or types of policy. The Committees directly report to the Council. If agreement on 
an issue is reached, it only requires formal A-point approval by the next Council. Other 
proposals (known as B-points) will be put to the Council either for guidance on particular 
aspects or for overall discussion and decision. 
Occasionally an extra round of negotiations is organised at the intermediate level 
between the C S A and the Council. This High Level Group consists of the directors-general 
or their deputies of the fifteen agricultural ministries and the director-general for 
agriculture of the Commission. In the recent past, it has cleared the way for a number of 
important and far-reaching decisions, notably the superlevy in 1984, the stabilisers in 1988 
and the MacSharry-package in 1992. 
9.4.4 Final decision-taking 
Decision-taking in the Council itself also can take several rounds. The Presidency is of 
major importance in finding, together with the Commission, a package of measures 
acceptable to each member state. The usual procedure is as follows: after several discussion 
rounds the Presidency presents a paper in which solutions for the main problems are 
indicated. Ideas for such a paper are generated in a number of ways: often the Presidency 
undertakes a tour of the member states' capitals for a series of consultations. Besides, 
formal and informal bilateral meetings may take place in Brussels or in the capitals 
between the member states as well as between the member states and the Commission. 
'Bilaterals' can also be organised during the Council meeting itself. An important 
instrument here is the 'confessional procedure': the Presidency and the Commission ask the 
member states individually to come up with those issues they consider of prime import-
ance. After this consultation procedure the Presidency puts forward a revised paper for 
agreement. If a qualified majority of the Council and the Commission approve the 
proposal, the Council will formally adopt it. At this stage the 'vital interest' argument -
and its legitimisation by the Council - in theory can block decision-making, but in practice 
2 2 Formally the COREPER is divided into two parts, COREPER II (the Permanent Representatives) 
and COREPER I (the Deputies). The distribution of dossiers is decided by COREPER II. For a recent analysis of 
COREPER and the Permanent Representations of the Member States, see Hayes-Renshaw et al. (1989). 
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only delays it. However, the Presidency always aims at evading such a situation and tries 
to arrive at a decision that is most acceptable to all member states and to the Commission, 
if necessary leaving some member states room to vote against without blocking the 
decision making process. 
9.5 Decision-making speed: from initiation till acceptance 
The agricultural decision-making process, from the formulation of a Commission 
proposal till the acceptance of the proposal by the Council, is time-consuming and can 
include several Council meetings in a row, especially if reform proposals are involved (cf. 
decision-taking on the 1991 MacSharry proposals took a year and a half, from the 'leaked' 
Commission paper of Christmas 1990 till the formal Council decision June 30, 1992). 
The length of the meetings of the Agriculture Council has attracted much attention 
('marathon sessions'). To the layman the Agriculture Council meetings seem a battle of 
attrition in which the minister who "stays awake the longest comes off best". It cannot be 
denied that fatigue plays a role in accepting issues that beforehand were opposed. In 
explanation of the length of Council meetings several aspects play a role. First, the difficult 
search for an acceptable package for all member states involved, including 'bilaterals', 
'confessional procedures' and the time-consuming revision of the proposal. Important 
during this search is to create the certainty at the end of the process that the final 
compromise will not lead to additional claims of one or more member states. Second, the 
marathons are quite important to suggest to the grass-roots that a hard and long bargain 
was driven and the minister has done his utmost to sell his case dearly. Only by acting 
accordingly a minister can return home with the message that some unpalatable things are 
included in the final package which could not be stopped. Third, the marathon form is 
chosen to keep the ministers in Brussels (or Luxembourg). The alternative, an interruption 
of one or more days, has the negative side-effect that ministers can be influenced by their 
grass-roots and will enter a new round of negotiations loaded with fresh energy and 
arguments; to give in becomes even harder. Fourth, the marathon is an appropriate means 
to arouse heavy pressure from outside to arrive at a decision, coûte que coûte. 
Despite the often lengthy and painful nature of the decision-making process, especially 
the negotiations within the Council, decision-making performance in terms of continuity 
and decisiveness is rather high. In recent years the number of formal decisions taken by the 
Agriculture Council amounts to a 100 per annum of which the annual price review alone 
covers 50 to 60 decisions. Many of the decisions taken are of a routine nature concerning 
the prolongation of existing rules. Other decisions comprehend a more fundamental reform 
or a new policy area (e.g., the MacSharry package which consisted of some 25 
regulations). 
However, especially in the past the Community's institutional design (formal rules and 
decision-making competence) and built-in habits have caused piece-meal and slow deci-
sion-making. The recent shift in Council decision-making practice towards the use of the 
qualified majority rule instead of the unanimity rule seems to have led to increased 
decision-making efficiency and a speeding-up of the decision-making process in general 
(for an analysis of EC decision-making speed in general, see Sloot and Verschuren, 1990). 
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Another factor that may have added to increased decision-making speed is the 
strengthening of the position of the Commission vis-a-vis the Council during the last 
decade. The Commission has not only acted as a pioneer in promoting the completion of 
the single market, but it also has been increasingly successful in getting its way by aiming 
at acceptable and feasible political compromises. This process is enhanced by 'pre-cooking> 
the proposals within the Cabinets, between the Commissioners and wilhin the Commission 
services before putting them forward to the Council. Moreover, the E C ' s enlargement and, 
as a consequence, the sharpening contrasts between the agricultural sectors of the various 
member states (e.g., differences in natural resources; labor quality; income and wealth 
position; product coverage; differences in climate casu quo growth seasons) have caused 
the package size to increase, which leaves the Commission with more leeway, and hence 
power, in formulating and balancing the packages. 
Despite this increase in decision-making speed, necessary reform steps have been taken 
at a very late stage, when market and/or budget situations had become untenable. 
Examples in the agricultural policy domain are the introduction of the superlevy system in 
the dairy sector in 1984; the introduction of the stabilizers; and the budgetary measures 
taken in 1988. It is only under extreme political and financial pressures that these policy 
adaptations have been accepted. The recent 1992 MacSharry package with respect to struc-
tural reform of the C A P is no exception to this rule. 
9.6 Policy implementation 
The decision-taking phase is followed by the phase of implementation. A major role in 
this process is reserved for the Commission and the national executive bodies. The 
Commission issues the necessary technical and managerial regulations and directives by 
means of the Management Committee procedure. The member states have to incorporate 
the European decisions in national law, to inform the agro-industry and take up the actual 
administration. 
Many Council decisions taken within the domain of the Common Agricultural Policy 
only provide a general legislative framework. The day-to-day management of the C A P , as 
well as the preparation and adoption of detailed provisions, is delegated to the Commission 
(Art. 155, Rome Treaty) in accordance to guidelines set by the Council. The Commission 
shares its responsibilities in this market management with the member states under the 
Management Committee procedure. Management committees are made up of specialists 
from ministries and intervention agencies of the member states. They operate in an 
advisory capacity to the Commission only by providing Opinions on draft legislation put 
forward by the Commission. Management Committees have no power to reject or accept 
any of this draft legislation. Decisions of the Management committees are especially 
important to the food processing industry and trading interests. Their influence on 
Management Committee is limited, which is due not only to the composition of the 
Committee but also to the narrow margins set by the Council within which the 
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Commission and the Committees have to operate23. 
A related, but separate issue is the speed of transposition of E U legislation into national 
legislation. Transposition rates tend to differ greatly between member states. This 
particularly holds for the incorporation of Community directives into national law24. 
Different transposition rates also exist for Council and Commission regulations, which is 
due to the fact that in most member states regulations are converted into special 
implementing provisions25. The resulting, albeit temporary, differences in legislation 
between countries can easily lead to subtle differences in the competitive environment, 
creating profit opportunities for certain farmers and agro-industries vis-a-vis their 
competitors in other E U member states. Organised interests can actively try to delay the 
transposition process for their own benefit. 
In practice, it also happens that national authorities, deliberately or accidentally, fail to 
implement E U legislation altogether. An example is the non-compliance of the milk quota 
regime in Italy (which falls under a regulation arrangement). The way in which the 
Commission supervises the national intervention agencies' compliance in implementing 
Community legislation is not always well-balanced, probably because of a lack of 
monitoring capacity26. Obviously here lies an important role for the Court of Justice in 
the action for failure to act which can be brought by Community institutions or (other) 
member states. 
Nevertheless, a Management committee could - informally - ask the opinion of important interest 
groups. For example, Kroon (1992:52) reports the suspension of a Management Committee meeting in order to 
give the opportunity to a Euro-group (FEDIOL) to give its advice. 
2 4 A directive is binding 'as to the results to be achieved upon each Member State to which it is 
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods' (Art. 189, Rome Treaty). 
2 5 For example, at the beginning 1992 around 80% of the proposals of the 1985 White Paper 
programme had been resolved by the Council and about 61% had found its way into national law. The transposi-
tion rate in the animal and plant health domain was about 92%. Of the Directives regarding pharmaceuticals 7 out 
of 15 had not been transposed. (Agra Europe 4/92: 3-4). 
2 6 As Grant (1993:28) notes here lies an additional role for organised interests as the Community is 
dependent on 'whistle blowing' by public-interest groups to let it know when Community decisions are not being 
implemented properly. 
Appendix 9.1 The shifting inter-country distribution of Council votes over time 
Member states EC-6 EC-9 EC-10 EC-12 EC-15 
Austria _ . . 4 
Belgium 2 5 5 5 5 
Denmark - 3 3 3 3 
Germany 4 10 10 10 10 
Greece - 5 5 5 
Finland - - - - 3 
France 4 10 10 10 10 
Ireland . 3 3 3 3 
Italy 4 10 10 10 10 
Luxembourg 1 2 2 2 2 
Netherlands 2 5 5 5 5 
Portugal - - - 5 5 
Spain - - - 8 8 
Sweden - - - - 4 
United Kingdom - 10 10 10 10 
Qualified Majority 12 41 45 54 62 
Unanimity 17 58 63 76 87 
Blocking Minority 6 18 19 23 26 
Source: Swinbank, 1989:308; own calculations. 
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ORGANISED INTERESTS AND EC AGRICULTURAL POLICY FORMATION 
10.1 Introduction 
Although the legislative and executive powers of the Community ultimately lay with its 
decision-making bodies, this does not imply that these are the sole actors involved in 
policy-making. During the policy-making process they interact with and face influences 
from inside the Union - domestic organised interests, including regional and local 
authorities, companies - and outside the Union: third countries, trading blocks and foreign 
organised interests. Attempts to influence the E C policy debate and policy outcome through 
the lobbying of its key decision-making actors is and has been a pervasive element of E C 
policy-making. 
This chapter discusses the interest group dimension of E C agricultural decision-making. 
Its contents are as follows. Section 2 sketches the diversity in interest group organisation at 
the level of the European Union and the ways in which organised interests interact with 
Community bodies. Section 3 typifies the E C agricultural decision-making arena on the 
basis of the policy community/policy network concept developed in political science 
literature. Section 4 describes the formal (advisory committee) and informal (ad hoc) 
lobbying structures and strategies in the E C agricultural policy domain. Section 5 provides a 
detailed overview of the involvement and representation of Euro-groups in the agricultural 
policy domain. Section 6 addresses the possible impact of the successive reforms of the 
C A P as well as the effects of the 'deepening' and 'broadening' of the European Union on 
the character of the E C agricultural policy community. 
This chapter draws on results and insights from recent political science literature on E C 
lobbying practices, on a survey among 74 selected Euro-groups with a clear interest in E C 
agricultural policy-making (for a questionnaire and response rate, see appendix 10.1), and 
on in-depth interviews with a selected number of civil servants from the Directorate-
General Agriculture ( D G VI) of the Commission and E C lobbyists representing various 
sectoral interests in the E C agricultural policy domain in Brussels as well as The Hague. 
The interview part was predominantly used as a check on research material found 
elsewhere and is not reported here. 
10.2 Organised interests and EC policy formation 
The creation of the European Community entailed a transfer of legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers from the national to the supra-national level as well as a geographical 
relocation of the decision-making arena in some policy domains, including agriculture. 
Apart from the role assigned to the Economic and Social Committee - which can and, in 
certain cases, has to be consulted by the Council or the Commission (Art. 193-198, Treaty 
of Rome), the Treaty of Rome is almost silent on the position of organised interests in the 
Community's decision-making process1. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the 
Only in the ECSC Treaty (1951) an explicit provision was made for the High Authority to consult 
"(..) Governments, the various parties concerned (undertakings, workers, consumers and dealers) and their associ-
190 Organised interests and the CAP 
role of organised interests in EC policy-making is negligible. Especially in those policy 
areas in which the Community became the main decision-making centre, lobbying activities 
to influence EC policy-making could obviously be performed best in the direct physical 
vicinity of the major Community institutions. The same held for the gathering of informa-
tion on EC policy developments. Some organisations reacted by opening an office for direct 
- at the spot - representation in Brussels - being the domicile of the Commission and the 
Council -, whereas others preferred to lobby the Community institutions from their national 
main office by occasional representation. However, since most special interests were 
organised along national lines, the bringing under EC jurisdiction of parts of the agricultural 
policy domain (narrowly defined) implied that they would have to compete for policy 
influence with organised interests from other member states. Where these interests had a 
similar direction, it seemed obvious that speaking with one voice would increase the 
chances for influencing Community policy decisions. The expected economies of scale of 
unified concerted action with respect to pressurising EC bodies can be regarded as an 
important factor behind the formation of transnational - EC-wide - interest groups2. The 
Commission explicitly encouraged the formation of these Euro-groups by expressing a 
clear preference for dealing with Euro-groups rather than with nationally and sub-nationally 
organised groups3. This preference was more explicitly shaped by the setting-up of an 
extensive Advisory Committee network. Membership of the Advisory Committees is 
restricted to representatives of Euro-groups. For the Commission, Euro-groups have an 
advantage over other groups in that they could - potentially - serve as a sieve to filter for 
various national viewpoints. At the same time, Euro-groups facilitate national interests to 
acquire a more acceptable 'Community hat' to approach Commission officials. In neo-
functionalist integration theory Euro-groups were even regarded as the natural 'allies' of 
the Commission in the process of European integration against disintegrative, nationally-
oriented forces (e.g., Haas, 1958). As a result there would exist a natural tendency for the 
Commission to deal with Euro-groups. During the mid-1970s the strong Euro-group 
preference of the Commission relaxed, which facilitated the access for interests with a 
national or sub-national organisational base. In principle, the Commission takes a neutral 
stance vis-a-vis the lobbying activity of organised interests: 
ations, and any experts (..)" and "undertakings, workers, consumers and dealers, and their associations, shall be 
entitled to present any suggestions or comments to the High Authority on questions affecting them". 
2 This is not to say that there were no European interest groups at the time the EEC was founded. 
Two waves of European interest group formation had already occurred, the first in reaction to the creation of the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, the other with the creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). See also Averyt (1977:71) and Schmitter and Streeck (1991:276). 
3 The Commission has actively stimulated the formation of COPA (e.g., Averyt, 1977: 79; Petersen, 
1979: 222), and also played an initiating role in the formation of BEUC (Schmitter and Streeck, 1991: 277). For a 
glossary of abbreviations, see appendix 10.2. 
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"While the Commission tends to favour European (confederations over 
representatives of individual or national organizations, it is nevertheless com-
mitted to the equal treatment of all special interest groups, to ensure that every 
interested party, irrespective of size or financial backing, should not be denied 
the opportunity of being heard by the Commission." (Commission, 1992a: 5). 
Up till now there have been no explicit rules with respect to the accreditation and 
registration of interest groups or a prescribed code of conduct4. To safeguard neutrality, 
the current official strategy followed by the Commission is neither to grant any privileges 
to interest groups (regarding entry to Commission buildings or access to information), nor 
to give associations an official endorsement by granting them consultative status in order 
to stimulate a dialogue as open as possible (Commission, 1992a:4). In practice, however, 
the effectivity of the avowed neutrality can be questioned.5 
Roughly, Euro-groups can be divided into two categories: broadly encompassing 
industrial, commercial and agricultural business interests organised in peak organisations, 
and more specialised, sectoral organisations, representing the interests of a specific 
industry or profession. The first category of encompassing 'umbrella' organisations have a 
broad membership base which usually consists of national associations. Most of these 
umbrella organisations formed directly after 1958. Examples are U N I C E (industry, 1958), 
E U R O C H A M B R E S (chambers of commerce, 1958), C O P A (agricultural producers, 1958), 
C O G E C A (agricultural cooperatives, 1959), C I A A (food and drink industries, 1959), F B C E 
(banking, 1960), and B E U C (consumers, 1962). A few umbrella organisations formed not 
until the beginning of the 1970s, e.g., E T U C (1973, covering employee interests) and 
S E P L I S (1973, representing the liberal, independent and social professions)6. 
The more specialised, sectoral Euro-groups representing the interests within a segment 
of a specific product chain (e.g., the tomato processing industries, the olive oil industries, 
the butter processing industries, the sugar traders, the woodworking machinery 
manufacturers) or profession (e.g., lawyers, medical specialists, veterinarians) emerged 
especially in those policy fields in which the Community became the prime legislative 
body. Some of these specialised, sectoral Euro-groups have individual firms as their direct 
members. Sometimes sectoral Euro-groups draw their members from only a few member 
states, sometimes interest coverage extends to non-EU member organisations as well. 
However, the lobbying of formal E C decision-making bodies in E C policy-making is not 
restricted to Euro-groups. National interest groups may lobby on their own account. Many 
private and public firms do the same. Some - mostly large trans-national - firms have their 
own lobbying apparatus in Brussels, while others hire external professional representation 
4 Unlike, for instance, the situation in the US where since 1946 lobbying has been subject to strict 
regulation under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act. 
5 For instance, some Euro-groups appear to get considerable financial aid from the Commission, e.g. 
ETUC (Collie, 1993:223) and EEB. 
6 See appendix 10.2 for an explanation of Euro-group abbreviations and an overview of Euro-groups 
in the agricultural policy domain. 
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to set out and defend their interests (e.g., legal advisers, Public Relations/Public Affairs 
firms, and consultants). Even local and regional authorities have special Brussels-based 
lobbying offices (see appendix 10.3), as do certain third country groups (e.g., the E U 
Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce). 
According to a conservative estimate by the Commission (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1992:4) the number of interest groups in Brussels is approximately 3,000 
with up to 10,000 employees working in the lobbying sector. Over 500 of these groups are 
European or international federations7, with (generally) national associations as constituent 
members. Furthermore, there are around 50 bureaus representing regional and local author-
ities; some 200 individual firms with direct representation; some 100 consultants 
(management and public relations with Brussels-based bureaus); and about 100 law firms 
specialised in European Union law in Belgium alone. Interest group presence and represen-
tation in Brussels is strongly biased in favour of industrial and commercial employers' 
interests. Around 25 per cent of all Euro-groups are related to agriculture and food 
production; other industrial and commercial producer interests represent about 50 per cent 
the legal and banking professions (services) around 20 per cent, and the remaining 5 per 
cent are made up of consumer, worker and environmental interests. 
10.3 Lobbying influence and CAP decision-making 
In essence, the relationship between the formal legislative and executive decision-
making bodies of the Union8 - i.e. the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, 
and the Economic and Social Committee, and - recently - the Committee of the Regions, 
and organised interests involved in E C policy-making can be viewed as one of mutual 
interest and mutual dependence. The two major goals of organised interests in E C policy-
making process are (i) influencing E U legislation and policy developments through the 
supply of selective information and expertise, and (ii) the gathering of relevant informa-
tion on Community legislation and policy developments. The second objective has to be 
considered as a sine qua non for effective performance of the first objective. 
For the Community interest groups are important for monitoring and signalling problem 
areas in which policy action may be needed; for assessing which policies will actually 
work (practical feasibility); and for assessing whether policies proposed are acceptable and 
feasible politically. Furthermore, the Community, and especially the Commission, has a 
demand for factual - technical, sector-specific - information, both in the policy design 
stage - to facilitate the drafting of legislation - and in the policy implementation stage. The 
eminent role of the Commission in initiating Community legislation and policy on the one 
Formally recognised by the Commission. The Directory of European Community Trade and 
Professional Organisations lists 540 organisations which satisfy the following criteria (Commission, 1992:6): (i) 
they have a permanent secretariat or other organisational structure at European level, (if) their members consist of 
national or European associations with a minimum of three, the majority of which originates in the EU; (Hi) the 
organisations as such are non-profit-making and have objectives relevant to the development of the Community. 
8 Chapter 9 also mentions the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors. Given the nature of their 
tasks and functions, their responsiveness to direct lobbying has to be judged negligible. 
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hand, and the small size of its administrative services compared to the size of national 
bureaucracies - a randomly chosen ministry in the average-size member state has more 
employees - on the other, imply that the demand for 'outside' information and expertise is 
large, especially when compared to national policy-making bureaucracies. Not only is the 
size of the E C bureaucracy - the Commission's administrative services and the Secretariat-
General of the Council - small. But also the horizontal coordination between the different 
Directorates-General within the Commission can be considered as weak, which increases 
the degree of compartmentalised decision-making. Moreover, most Directorates-General 
lack standard operating procedures for processing policy issues, and are strongly dependent 
upon national experts and other outsiders for information and expertise (Mazey and 
Richardson, 1993:11). Political scientists have pointed out that most E C policy-making 
occurs in relatively loose, open, and extended issue networks rather than in stable, 
exclusive policy communities. This practice diverges from national patterns of policy 
formation: in many E U member states policy communities or corporatist arrangements tend 
to dominate (e.g., Mazey and Richardson, 1992: 111-112; Schmitter, 1981: 297). The 
relative high accessibility is related to the strong need on the part of E C decision-makers 
for outside information and expertise. The existence of loose, open issue networks also 
implies that the policy agenda - the policy initiative stage - is rather open to outside 
influences. As a result the agenda itself is relatively unpredictable and intransparent 
compared to national policy agendas (e.g., Mazey and Richardson, 1993:206). The latter is 
also related to the lack of parliamentary steering with respect to the initiation of policies. 
Organised interests can therefore try to steer to the process of policy design through the 
supply of selective information or try to influence the preceding stage of agenda-setting by 
the Commission by advancing possible solutions for pressing problems or suggestions for 
modifying existing legislation. Especially Euro-groups, but also interest groups organised 
at member state level and large firms, have a pivotal position as transmitters of 
information. 
However, decision-making in the E C agricultural policy domain has generally been 
regarded as an exception to the open-issue-network 'rule'. Smith (1990), Butt Philip 
(1983), as well as Mazey and Richardson (1993) have argued that the E C agricultural 
policy-making arena can best be typified as a policy community rather than as an open, 
loose extended issue network. This is not surprising given the fact that agriculture in most 
member states is characterised as one of the sectors with a strong corporatist tradition with 
strong links between farm groups and agricultural ministries (e.g., Cox, Lowe, and Winter, 
1986; Frouws, 1993). The policy community character of E C agricultural decision-making 
has been favourably influenced by the E C ' s political-institutional framework: these include 
both the sector-specific decision-making rules, the daily management of the C A P with its 
various formal advisory and consultation structures, as well as the support arrangements 
under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP ) . Its bureaucratic apparatus - the Directorate-
General Agriculture (DG Vl) - belongs to the biggest administrative services of the 
European Commission and has firmly institutionalised bonds with the national ministries of 
Agriculture. Operating procedures within the E C agricultural policy domain are relatively 
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well-developed ('standardised') and have a much longer tradition than in most other policy 
areas under jurisdiction of the E U . This particularly concerns the information exchange in 
committee structures - between civil servants from the agricultural ministries of the 
member states in Council working groups, C O R E P E R and C S A ; between the Commission 
and the representatives of the agricultural ministry and intervention agencies within the 
Management committee structure; and between the Commission and Euro-groups in the 
Advisory committee structure. It also holds for the more informal contacts with organised 
interests at national and E C level in different stages of the decision-making process, 
ranging from regular consultation to ad hoc contacts regarding specific policy issues. As a 
result the problems in monitoring the agenda seem to be less severe, at least for those 
special interests located within the agricultural policy community and concerning the 
agricultural policy agenda set by the agricultural Commissioner, his cabinet and D G vi. 
The E C agricultural policy arena is relatively insulated from other E U policy networks: 
the accessibility of D G V I via other Directorates-General is limited, and, vice versa, other 
Directorates-General don't seem to be eager to inform D G V I of their policy initiatives, 
even if the latter could have an impact on agricultural policy9. The fact that Agriculture 
Council meetings are restricted to the agricultural ministers only and not subject to a 
higher Community decision-making authority - like the College of Commissioners -
enhances this relative insulation (although this feature holds for all Councils). The role of 
the European Parliament is smaller than in other E U policy domains due to the compulsory 
nature of most of C A P ' S expenditures. The fact that a large part of the current policy 
domains have only recently come under E U jurisdiction strengthens the policy community 
argument. Agricultural policy has been subject to E C decision-making almost from the E C ' s 
inception which meant that decision-making practices had to be developed in relative 
isolation. For the development of the agricultural policy community the nature and 
instrumentation of the C A P has also been important. The C A P has originally been set up as 
to protect farmers' rather than consumers' or taxpayers' interests. The thrust of the 
agricultural policy objectives mentioned in the Treaty specifically addresses the agricultural 
sector and its (working) population. These policy objectives already reflect the policy-
making bias towards producer and, to a lesser extent, agro-industrial interests at the 
relative neglect of consumer and other interests. Notably, consumer interests are mentioned 
only in one of the five agricultural policy objectives stated in the Rome Treaty, viz. "to 
ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices" (Art. 39, subsection 5). The 
subsequent working out and instrumentation of the C A P , following the 1958 Stresa Confer-
ence, as a system of intervention price and variable import levies has strengthened this 
bias even more. Since the Community's inception the administrative services of the 
Commission have closely worked together with organised farmer interests. The first 
Agricultural Commissioner Mansholt has actively stimulated the formation of the farmers' 
This enhances the intransparency and unpredictability of the agenda on matters outside the 
competence of DG V I , but still within or relating to what we call the broad agricultural policy domain, involving 
politicised agricultural trade issues (DG I, External Relations), development issues (DG V I I I , Development), or 
environmental issues (DG X I , Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection). 
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(Euro-) peak organisation of national farmers' organisations C O P A . For the Commission 
C O P A has functioned as a double-edged sword, witness Averyt (1977:79) "(...) C O P A was 
mainly a device by which the Commission could communicate to the farmers and give 
itself legitimacy by showing to the public that it was consulting with 'Community' farm 
representatives." Although C O P A - C O G E C A has enjoyed a privileged relationship with D G V I , 
many other Euro-groups have been 'insiders' to the E C agricultural policy domain since the 
C A P ' S inception as well. The nature of the relationship of these vested interests with E C 
bodies combined with the compartmentalised nature of the E C decision-making system 
have led to relatively high entrance barriers for outsider organised interests. In the 1960s 
and the 1970s during which the C A P was firmly established this policy community 
character was especially strong. It was only in the mid-1980s that the policy community 
began to show signs of disintegration (see also section 10.6). 
10.4 Lobbying opportunities in the policy design stage 
The interaction structure between the Commission and organised interests in E C 
agricultural policy-making can basically take two forms: (i) formalised contacts in 
committee structures, and (ii) informal contacts on an ad hoc or regular basis, outside the 
'official' Committee structures. Committee structures were primarily set up to assist the 
Commission in its decision-making tasks through the provision of opinions and expertise. 
In the policy design stage two committee structures are of special importance, notably 
Advisory (Consultative) committees and ad hoc expert committees. 
10.4.1 Formal lobbying structures: Advisory Committees 
Consultative or Advisory committees act in a consultative capacity to the Commission 
only and have no formal powers (see also section 9.2.2).10 Each Advisory committee 
covers a specific policy area and represents the organised interests in that area. Its 
membership is restricted to Euro-group representatives. Advisory committees are convened 
and serviced by the Commission; they are chaired either by a representative of the 
Commission or by one of its members". Most Advisory committees in the agricultural 
policy domain are set up parallel to the common market organisation for a particular 
commodity (vertically-based). Some advisory committees cover a wider, more general 
scope and are organised on a horizontal - cross-sectoral - basis. Important examples are the 
Advisory Committee on Foodstuffs; the Scientific Committee on Food; the Scientific 
Veterinary Committee (see also appendix 10.4). The tasks of the Advisory committee are 
laid down in a Commission decision. For example, the Advisory Committee on Live 
Plants (Art.2): 
The legal basis of such an Advisory Committee can usually be found in a statement in the preamble 
to the basic Regulation covering the particular commodity or subject matter concerned. Its provisions can be found 
in a specific Commission Decision. 
1 1 Note that DG VI has a special unit "Relations with non-governmental organizations", which takes 
care of the organisation of the agricultural Advisory Committees. 
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"1. (..) may be consulted by the Commission on any problem concerning the 
operation of Regulations on the common organization of the market in live trees 
and other plants, bulbs, roots and the like, cut flowers and ornamental foliage, 
and in particular on measures to be adopted by the Commission under those 
Regulations. 2. The chairman of the Committee may indicate to the Commission 
the desirability of consulting the Committee on any matter within the latter's 
competence on which its opinion not has been sought. He shall do so, in 
particular, at the requests of one of the interests represented. " 
The membership of an agricultural Advisory committee generally consists of producers 
and cooperatives of the sector; the trade and industry organisations; and trade unions, 
consumer groups, or other interested parties. Its seats are usually allocated in the 
proportion 50-25-25 per cent. Representatives of C O P A - C O G E C A participate in all 
agricultural Advisory committees. The agro-industrial, commercial and trade interests 
usually are represented by a member of one of the more specialised (branche) Euro-groups 
and although the C I A A - as the representative organisation of the national horizontal peak 
organisations of the food processing industry and the specialised commodity-based agro-
industrial organisations - plays a coordinating role in the composition of the agro-
industrial representation, its direct involvement in committee structures cannot be 
compared with that of C O P A - C O G E C A . The composition of the committees is also strongly 
in (numerical) favour of C O P A - C O G E C A , and in the absence of other representative farm 
groups usually takes 50 per cent of the committee's seats. 
The Advisory committee structure may have particular advantages for the Commission 
as Harris et al. (1983: 28) have pointed out: it (i) ensures that the arbitration of different 
national viewpoints takes place at one remove from the Commission itself; (ii) enables the 
Commission to be seen to have consulted interests in all member states; (iii) ensures that 
the viewpoints expressed are general rather than particular, and that the strength with 
which the viewpoints are put forward is necessarily diluted to take account of differing 
national considerations. This, of course, is a result of the broad coverage of interests which 
implies that the width of viewpoints can be rather extreme and unanimous agreement is 
only likely to be reached on the most general policy issues. 
In general, Euro-groups regard the direct policy influence of meetings of the Advisory 
committees as negligible; this founding was confirmed both by interviews and answers to 
the questionnaire. Most Euro-groups do not wait for an Advisory committee meeting to 
lobby the Commission. This is not only due to the limited frequency of most Advisory 
committee meetings (a few times a year), but also to the fact that Commission officials 
seldomly use the committee structure to discuss pressing policy issues. They often 
approach the Advisory committee meetings as a matter of routine, rather than as a means 
to get informed on the stance of Euro-groups on tie subject of new legislation. 
Steenbergen (1992:20) reports that Advisory committee meetings are often used by the 
Commission to communicate and explain decisions already taken. For Euro-groups the 
Advisory committee structure serves both as a platform which offers the opportunity to 
meet and exchange points of view with other organised interests, and as a 'carte d'entrée' 
for establishing further (ad hoc) contacts with the Commission. 
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The advisory committees set up by D G V I are not the only committees dealing with 
matters relating to the agricultural policy domain. Other Directorates-General have set up 
equal structures. Furthermore, the Intergovernmental Conference at which the Single 
European Act was adopted specifically requested that "the Council [would] give the 
Advisory Committee procedure in particular a predominant place" in internal market 
legislation adopted on the basis of Article 100A (Bradley, 1992:705). Important examples 
are the Food Law Consultative Committee and the Scientific Committee on Food ( D G m, 
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs); the Customs and Fiscal Consultative Committee 
( D G X X I , Customs Union and Indirect Taxation); the Committee on Commerce and 
Distribution ( D G xxill, Enterprises' Policy, Distributive Trades, Tourism and Social 
Economy); the Consumer Consultative Committee (Consumer Policy Service); the 
Payment Systems Users Liaison Committee; and the Committee for Veterinary Medicinal 
Products ( D G HI) , to mention only a few. These more horizontally-based committees 
generally seem to have a larger impact on the policy-making process than their D G V I 
counterparts12. 
The Advisory committee structure seems to have strengthened the policy community 
character of EC agricultural policy-making arena, for it not only gave Euro-groups 
exclusive access - a 'carte d'entrée' - to the Commission, but it also formed an incentive 
for coordinated action between their national member organisations in order to formulate 
coherent and well-considered positions regarding policy proposals. 
10.4.2 Informal 'ad hoc' lobbying structures 
Lobbying outside the 'official' committee structures constitutes the second major 
channel for potential influence during the policy design stage. In this informal lobbying 
arena Euro-groups do not enjoy the exclusive position they have in the advisory committee 
structure; instead they face competition for influence from other national groups as well as 
individual firms. Informal lobbying can take the form of ad hoc contacts regarding a 
specific policy issue and contacts on a more regular - ongoing dialogue - basis. They range 
from contacts with the officials of administrative units responsible for a particular policy 
area to the Director-General, the Cabinet and the Commissioner himself. For most routine 
lobbying the Euro-group's Secretary-General and his Secretariat (staff) are responsible. 
When important policy issues are discussed the political leadership, i.e. the President or 
the executive board consisting of representatives of the national member organisations, 
may have a lobbying role as well. For instance, the Praesidium of C O P A has frequent 
contact with the Commissioner and the highest Commission bureaucrats (the directors-
general and their adjoints). One of the topics discussed at these meetings is the content of 
the agricultural price proposals for the oncoming market year. In terms of policy influence, 
informal lobbying seems to be more effective than lobbying in formal committee structures 
- a hypothesis which was confirmed by several interviewees and respondents to the 
questionnaire. 
Especially the Food Law Consultative Committee (mentioned by Steenbergen, 1992:19) and the 
Committee for Veterinary Medicinal Products (personal communication, 11/3/94). 
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Informal lobbying access and modes of interaction between organised interests and the 
Commission can differ greatly, not only between D G S , but also between different 
administrative units within the same D G . The initiative for establishing the lobbying 
contact most often stems from the part of the organised interests rather than the 
Commission. For issues concerning the Common Agricultural Policy, D G vi is the relevant 
institution for access. For issues concerning the harmonisation of food legislation or, more 
generally, the internal market, this is D G in (Internal Market and Industrial Affairs). Other 
lobbying targets may be D G X X I I I (Enterprises' Policy, Distributive Trades, Tourism and 
Social Economy) for issues concerning retail and wholesale trade; the Commission's 
Consumer Policy Service for consumer affairs; D G I (External Relations) for extra-Union 
trade; D G VIII (Development) for development aid projects; and D G X I (Environment, 
Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection) for environmental issues. 
The Commission itself can also establish lobbying contacts with groups; it is likely to 
do so if the proposed policy has large consequences in terms of resource allocation and 
(re-)distribution of income and wealth, and therefore is politically hazardous13. Contacts 
with national interest groups may be important to sound out their sensitivity to a first draft 
proposal, and may be vital for assessing the consequences of a proposal in terms of 
administrative and political feasibility. It may also occur that civil servants of the national 
ministries become involved in this process, either as a kind of intermediary in establishing 
the contact or as interlocutor. 
10.4.3 Multiple channel interest representation 
Some scholars, e.g., Averyt (1977); Sargent (1987); and Kirchner and Schwaiger 
(1981), have argued that many Euro-groups suffer from structural weaknesses due to a 
lack of resources, poor staffing and insufficient organisational capacity. Moreover, Euro-
groups would largely react to an agenda set by the Commission (e.g., Grant, 1993:31). 
Others, however, have argued the opposite, viz. Greenwood and Ronit (1992:72) "(..) our 
claim is that the generalization of Euro-groups being weak and fragmented, and of little 
significance, cannot be sustained". The question whether Euro-groups are weak and 
incapable of 'delivering' seems to depend strongly to their degree of autonomy vis-a-vis 
their national member organisations. Relative autonomy is not only important with respect 
to the availability of lobbying resources in financial and manpower terms, but has also 
implications for the lobbying result as reflected by policy influence. Intransparent division 
of responsibilities and decision-making structures between the Euro-group and its member 
organisations as well as internal decision-taking procedures based on the unanimity rule, 
can significantly hinder the formulation of strategies to 'canvass' EC bodies. It can also 
lead to unnecessary dilution of common positions, making them too general to have any 
For example, Averyt (1977: 83-84) has already observed that "Unfortunately for the Eurogroup's 
fate, the evidence shows that the higher the stakes and the bigger the issue, the more inclined a commissioner will 
be to make his own contacts with national groups, to find out for himself what is going on at the national level, 
instead of trusting the Eurogroup to do this for him. The conclusion is that Eurogroups will be used by the 
Commission more often for secondary issues and problems." 
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influence impact. 
Euro-groups are not the only interest mediators in the E C agricultural policy domain. 
As has been elucidated before, in specific cases it can be rational for a member of a Euro-
group to lobby on its own account. For instance, a national farmers organisation can - and 
usually will - choose to communicate its points of view to its home government in order 
to influence the (bargaining) position taken by the member state in Council working 
group, C S A ( C O R E P E R ) , and Council negotiations, and leave the Commission and the 
European Parliament as lobbying targets for C O P A . It can also lobby these Community 
bodies itself or choose to go both ways. Sometimes member organisations advocate the 
common position of the Euro-group at their respective national governments as part of a 
concerted action. Some large multi-national food processing companies - e.g., Unilever, 
Ferruzzi, and Nestii - have their own lobbying representation in Brussels, which gives 
them an even wider scope for multiple channel lobbying. They can attempt to influence 
the policy-making process directly, use a national lobbying organisation, C I A A or a more 
specialised commodity-specific Euro-groups. 
The multiple-lobbying-channel option can be regarded as a means to get one's view 
promoted by every means in order to increase the chances of influencing the final policy 
decision. The choice may also stem from a 'natural' reluctance from the side of national 
member organisations to allow much discretion to the Euro-secretariat regarding important 
policy issues. The importance of having an own Brussels-based lobbying office is 
confirmed by the evidence that even in the agricultural policy domain more and more 
Euro-group members have started to do so. Examples of Dutch national interest groups 
with a recently established Brussels-based representation are the Vereniging van 
Bloemenveilingen Nederland (private body representing the interests of flowers' auctions), 
the Produktschap voor Vee en VJees (semi-public body for livestock and meat), and the 
(former) Landbouwschap (umbrella organisation of Dutch farmer organisations and farm 
workers' organisations). 
10.5 Lobbying opportunities in the final decision-taking stage 
Final decisions are taken in the Council of Ministers. The discussion in the Council 
evolves at three levels. Starting with a first reading of the proposal in the Council Working 
Group - which investigates the details and the technical aspects of the proposal and offers 
suggestions for adaptation - and following a second more global 'political' round of dis-
cussions in the Special Committee on Agriculture (or the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives), the policy proposal finally arrives at the Council of ministers, either as 
an A- or B-point. Lobbying attempts are most effective if directed during the negotiations 
at Working Group or C S A level. They can best be addressed to the responsible civil 
servants of the national ministries taking part in the negotiations. Influencing the policy 
position of the member state governments, which should already have started during the 
drafting stage, can best be performed by nationally organised interests - national peak 
organisations or individual firms - rather than by Euro-groups. Often such lobbying efforts 
are ad hoc, but regular (structured) 'consultation' between organised interests and the 
member state governments (including their bureaucracies) also occurs. Chances for 
200 Organised interests and the CAP 
organised interests to influence decision-taking during this final decision-taking stage are 
comparatively small, since the negotiations of the Council take place behind closed doors 
and are restricted to the ministers and a small staff of advisers from each member state. 
During these Council negotiations organised interests and national ministerial delegations 
may still use opportunities to exchange information about their points of view in relation 
to the ongoing state of affairs in the Council. It is clear that lobbying activity at this stage 
generally has a defensive character, because major amendments of the policy proposal 
cannot be considered. Other, usually less effective, means of interest representation are the 
sending of a - general - position paper to the General-Secretariat or the Presidency in the 
hope its content will be circulated among the ministers as well as massive protest marches 
and/or blockades in front of the Council in Brussels or Luxembourg. In an earlier stage of 
the process the Council Presidency may be an interesting lobbying target, in particular 
since it co-determines the sequence of agenda points coming up for discussion in the 
Council and has some scope for influencing the policy debate. The larger Euro-groups all 
have occasional meetings with the Council Presidency to exchange views14. 
Altogether, targeted lobbying attempts can best be addressed during the first - drafting -
stage of a policy proposal. If a member state government can be persuaded to adopt the 
interest group's view as the 'national position', the chances for influence on the final 
policy outcome are still relatively good. Yet, a member state cannot alter a draft proposal 
on its own, and it has to convince other member states and try to persuade the 
Commission to take its argument into account, either during the technical discussions in 
the expert working group or during the more politically-oriented negotiations at CSA-Ievel. 
10.6 Euro-groups in the EC agricultural policy domain: an overview 
The relative distribution of Euro-groups involved in the EC agricultural policy domain 
does not markedly differ from the overall distribution with a strong bias to and over-
representation of producer interests. What strikes the eye is the absolute Euro-group 
number. About 180 Euro-groups have a direct interest in EC agricultural policy-making 
(Commission, 1989; 1992; own counting). The majority of Euro-groups in the EC 
agricultural policy domain was founded in the period 1957-1965, shortly after the signing 
of the Rome Treaty (see appendix 10.5 for an overview of the structural development of 
Euro-groups in the post World-War-II period). 
Table 10.1 gives an overview of the broadly encompassing peak organisations in the 
agricultural policy domain. The most important umbrella organisations in the primary 
production stage are COPA, which represents the organised farmers' interests at Community 
level (having a membership of 31 national agricultural organisations), and COGECA, which 
represents the interests of 17 national farmer cooperative organisations, COPA and COGECA 
have a joint secretariat, with a permanent staff of 49 (1993 figures) which makes it one of 
the biggest Euro-groups in Brussels. C O P A - C O G E C A represent the interests of their member 
For example, COPA has had such meetings since 1970 (Averyt, 1977: 81; personal communication 
May 1993). Eurocommerce continues a tradition, established by its predecessors CECD, FEWITA and GEDIS, of 
meeting with each new Presidency (personal communication, May 1993). 
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organisations in both horizontal and vertical policy issues which is reflected in its 
organisational structure. It not only has specialised 'joint working parties' for almost every 
commodity category (cereals, milk and dairy products, eggs/poultry, rice, seeds, potatoes, 
etc.), but also 'special working parties' dealing with horizontal policy matters (agricultural 
structures, biotechnology, fiscal and legal questions, etc.). This practice of 'all-inclusive' 
representation differs strongly from the way in which the agro-food industry or trading 
interests at Community level are organised. It also contrasts with how farmers in the 
United States have organised themselves. In the US almost every group of agricultural 
producers at primary production stage has its own lobbying apparatus. They are the 
equivalents of the Joint working parties in C O P A - C O G E C A , but with the important difference 
that they are autonomous, self-supporting, and independent in their lobbying actions which 
makes their potential influence basis with respect to vertical policy issues considerably 
stronger. Examples are the American Soybean Association, National Association of Wheat 
Growers, the National Corn Growers Association, the American Sugarbeet Growers 
Association, the National Milk Producers Organization, the National Pork Producers 
Council, the National Peanut Growers Group, the Catfish Farmers of America, the 
American Honey Producers, and the American Beekeeping Federation. 
The other broadly encompassing organisations in the E C agricultural policy domain 
primarily deal with horizontal technical and political issues. Most of these policy issues cut 
across the whole sector, and either apply to the general commodity level (food, 
feedingstuffs) or factor level (agricultural workers, workers in the food industry, 
environment). Examples of such horizontal legislation ranges from the labelling and 
advertising of foodstuffs, the use of food additives (colours, preservatives), to measures 
relating to food hygiene. The most important umbrella organisation at the food processing 
level is the C I A A , the confederation of the food and drink industries. The membership base 
of C I A A is broader than most Euro-peak organisations, since it represents both the national 
horizontal peak organisations covering the general interests of the food processing industry 
as well as the specialised commodity-based Euro-groups of the agro-industry (as affiliated 
members). More specific but less important in terms of policy influence are I D A C E (dietetic 
food industry) and E H P M (health product industry). 
The commercial-and-trade interests in the food policy domain are represented by 
C E L C A A , which has various specialised Euro-groups as its members, and E U R O C O M M E R C E , 
which is the most important general peak organisation in the wholesale, retail and external 
trade policy area. Other umbrella organisations in the field of commerce and trade are C E -
C O D E , U G A L (retailing), and G E A M R (dietetic retailing), C L D only acts as a mailbox for its 
members (e.g., U G A L ) and does not exert any lobbying influence itself. 
The interests of the agricultural workers at the primary agricultural production level are 
represented by E F A . The interests of the workers in the food processing sector are defended 
by E C F - I U F . Both E F A and E C F - I U F are affiliated members of the Euro-peak organisation of 
trade unions E T U C . Some occupational groups have their own organisation, e.g., the 
veterinarians, the young fanners and the agro-engineers. Consumer and environmental 
interests have no specialised agricultural counterparts; the E C agricultural policy domain is 
part of their total lobbying effort. There are three consumer organisations at Union level. 
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The most important is the B E U C . E U R O C O O P represents the interests of the consumer co-
operatives and C O F A C E represents the family organisations at Union level. Environmental 
interests are represented by, inter alia, the E E B and the Euro-group for Animal Welfare. 
Tables 10.2a-c show the structure of the more specialised Euro-groups in the E C 
agricultural policy domain. Most of these organisations are product-specific and cover 
specialised vertical interests in a specific segment of the product chain. Most of these 
specialised Euro-groups are affiliated to one of the aforementioned broadly encompassing 
umbrella organisations. Table 10.2a and 10.2b show the Euro-groups which represent the 
interests of the producers in the various stages of food production. The tables distinguish 
between a primary production, a food processing, and a trading segment15. 
Table 10.1 Encompassing umbrella organisations in EC agricultural policy-making 
Interest group category Level Name of organisation 
Producers/employers Primary producers COPA; COGECA; 
Food and agricultural processing 
industries 
CIAA; (UNICE); JDACE; EHPM; 
Agricultural input industries -
Agricultural trade 
specific retail 
CELCAA; EUROCOMMERCE; 
CECODE; 
UGAL; (CLD); GEAMR; 
Employees Trade unions 
Occupational group 
EFA; ECF-IUF; (ETUC); 
CEJA; FVE; FAVE; 
Consumers BEUC; COFACE; EURO-COOP; 
Cause groups EEB; FACE; L; 
Sources: Commission (1989); Commission (1992). 
Key: Abbreviations in bold indicate an umbrella organisation with Euro-groups as affiliated 
members. For an explanation of abbreviations, see appendix 10.2. 
Table 10.2c shows the Euro-groups representing the input manufacturing industry; the 
feed and fish processing industries, and the food additives industry. Note that although 
farmers as a producer group are not explicitly mentioned here, they are important buyers 
of all kinds of inputs (agricultural machinery, fertilizers, pesticides, feedmgstuffs, etc.) and 
as such may have lobbying goals in these (sub)policy domains as well. The food 
In principle, a further distinction between first and second stage processing could be made, i.e. 
between the processing of raw agricultural products and processed food products. The CAP, as defined in Article 
38(1) of the Treaty of Rome, had originally been confined to the first category of agricultural products being 
"products of the soil, of stock farming and of fisheries and products of first stage processing directly related to 
these products (so-called Annex II products). In 1966 a parallel trade system was introduced for the second-stage 
products. These so-called Non-Annex II products are eligible for export refunds under the Management Committee 
procedure (see also Harris et al., 1983: 243-245). 
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processing industry is the major buyer of the category of food additives (the two last 
columns of table 10.2c). It is clear that the representative Euro-groups may sometimes 
have coriflicting objectives with respect to the (future) direction of E C agricultural policy. 
Consumer, worker and environmental interests are not included in the tables 10.2a-c, since 
they are organised as broadly umbrella groups which gives them a stake in almost every 
sub-policy domain. 
Table 10.2 reveals some significant patterns in the interest organisation at Community 
level. Firstly, most Euro-groups deal with the processing and trading of agricultural 
products. The number of organisations representing the agricultural input manufacturing 
industry is relatively small. Moreover, the input manufacturers have entered the Euro-
lobbying scene relatively late (see appendix 10.5). Secondly, the interests of the primary 
producers are grosso modo not promoted by specialised sectoral organisations, but by the 
encompassing umbrella organisations C O P A and C O G E C A . Furthermore, it catches the eye 
that the product categories eligible for C A P market support are well-represented. Especially 
the cereals, dairy, oilseeds and sugar sector have a well-developed lobbying structure 
throughout the whole product chain. More lightly structured market regimes, for example 
flowers and plant bulbs, are mainly represented at the trading level. The same holds for 
extra-Community import products like tea, coffee, and cocoa. Other commodity interests in 
this category, notably the fruit and vegetables (tomatoes!), and potato industry, are well-
organised throughout the whole product chain. 
Recently, some Euro-groups have shown a tendency toward greater co-operation and 
even integration of lobbying efforts, e.g., in the sugar chain [between C E F S and A S S U C , and 
to a lesser extent, C I B E (Kroon, 1992)] and the cereal chain (the 1988 merger between the 
wheat and the maize starch association). The Euro-groups representing the starch industry 
also try to concentrate their lobbying strength, which is reflected by the co-operation 
between U F E and A A C . Most Euro-groups in the agricultural policy domain have a 
Brussels-based lobbying office which enhances their flexibility of operation and increases 
the access opportunities towards the E C bodies. A minority of Euro-groups continues to 
operate from elsewhere, e.g., Paris, London or Bonn (see appendix 10.2). Most often this 
is due to the fact that their membership base, and therefore their lobbying scope, is 
broader than the E U . Often (financial) resources are a constraining factor as well. However, 
some Euro-groups state to have a preference for operating from abroad [witness "living too 
close to the sun burns" (..)] and/or seem not convinced of the advantages of having a 
Brussels office [witness: "It is not because you are in Brussels that you fax, phone, or visit 
more often E C bodies" ( C L I T A M , response to questionnaire, May 1993)]. 
Table 10.2a Euro-group structure in the EC agricultural policy domain by product category 
Cereals Sugar Potato Oilseeds/ Poultry/ Meat/animal fats, 
Product chain, level olive oil eggs proteins 
Primary production COPA; COGECA CIBE; COPA; ASSOPOMAC; COPA; COGECA; COPA; AEMB; COPA; 
COGECA COPA; COGECA COGECA; COGECA; 
Processing AAC; C; AFG; UEITP; ANGO; AMAFE; 
CEEREAL; API; UFE; FEDIOL; ANGO; 
COFALEC; ASPEC; FEDOLIVE; CLITRAVI; 
EUROMAISIERS; CEFS; FEFAC; COBCCEE; 
EUROMALT; EUTECA; IMACE; EURA; 
FEFAC; GAM; IEIP; UNEGA; 
M; N; 0 ; PAO; IFA; 
SEMOULIERS; 
UARCEE; 
UNAFPA; 
Trading COCERAL; ASSUC; AVEC; 
UNISTOCK; 
- wholesale UCOPOM; EUWEP; AECGV; 
- retail H; 
Related products AIBI; ASSOGLACE; ECSA; CAOBISCO; CAOBISCO; EFAPIT; 
CAOBISCO; CAOBISCO; D; CTMCEE; FEBP; (FAFPAS); 
COFALEC; EDMMA; EUR- CIMSCEE; UECBV; 
ECSA; FEBP; OGLACES; ECSA; UEEA; 
UICPG; ENSCA; UENCPB; 
UPLAC; UICPG; 
Nota bene: for source and key, see table 10.2c. 
Table 10.2b Euro-group structure in the EC agricultural policy domain by product category 
Product chain, level Butter/cheese/ milk 
(dairy) 
Beer Wine/cider/ 
vinegar 
Fruit/ 
vegetables 
Flowers/ 
bulbs 
Trees/ 
wood 
Coffee/cocoa 
tea/tobacco 
Primary production COPA; COGECA COPA; 
COGECA; 
COPA; 
COGECAI; 
COPA; 
COGECA; 
COMASSO; 
COPA; 
COGECA; 
CCPF; F; 
COPA; J; 
COGECA; 
COPA; 
COGECA; 
Processing ASFALEC; 
ASSIFONTE; 
ASSILEC; 
TRANSBEUROP; 
CBMC; 
CEGROBB; 
AICV; 
CPIV; E; 
FIVS; 
(AIJN); 
(UNESDA); 
AIFLV;IEIP; 
AIFLDjAIJN; 
CICILS; 
EUVEPRO; 
OEICTO; 
OEITFL; 
CEI-BOIS; AFCASOLE; CAEC; 
ECF; EHIA; 
ETC; EUCA; 
Trading 
general 
wholesale 
retail 
EUCOLAIT; 
UNECOLAIT; 
E; K; CICILS; 
CIMO; 
FRUCOM; 
EUCOFEL; 
CIBEP; 
UNION FLEU-
RS; 
FEUPF; 
ECCTO; 
ETC; Q; 
ETV; 
G; 
Related products AIBI; 
ASSOGLACE; 
CAOBISCO; D 
EDMMA; 
EUROGLACES; 
FEBP; UICPG; 
EUROMALT; 
N; UPLAC; 
(FAFPAS); 
Nota bene: for source and key, see table 10.2c. 
Table 10.2c Euro-group structure in the EC agricultural policy domain by product category 
Product chain, level Agricultural 
machinery 
Fertilizers/ 
Pesticides/ 
Pharmaceutics 
Feed Fish Food enzymes/ 
proteins 
Other food 
additives/ 
spices 
Industrial production CEMA; DSA; EBMA; CJDE; aPF; AIPCEE; AMFEP; BLA; ECAMA; 
EFMA; EFPA; FEDIAF; CLITAM; AMAFE; EFAMA; ELC; ESA; 
FEDESA; FEFAC; EUROPECHE; EAPA; ELC; FEDIMA; 
GIFAP; FEFANA;OFCA; EUVEPRO; FRUCOM; 
UNICELPE; INEC; NATCOL; 
Trade 
- wholesale 
- retail 
CLIMMAR; EFIA; 
UCEPCEE; 
CEP; 
EFAPIT; 
EUWEP; 
H; 
AECGV; 
Own classification based on: Commission, 1989; and Commission, 1992. Key: Each column refers to a specific product category, while each row indicates the relative position 
of a Euro-group in the product chain. The row category 'related products' reflects those interests which either use the product as an ingredient in their own production process or 
provide the necessary equipment or variable inputs. Each entry represents an interest group at EU-level; groups are separated by a For official names, registered office and 
year of foundation, see appendix 10.2. Single letters also refer to organisations and can be traced back in appendix 10.2 by looking at the end of the entries: e.g., Association of 
Cooperative Banks in the EEC (1970.B) -A-. ') Only for tobacco. 
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Most of the Euro-groups representing specialised industrial and trade interests have a 
small staff, often consisting of a Secretary-General, an executive assistant and one or more 
secretaries. Some Euro-groups have a combined secretariat, sharing the same Secretary-
General ( F E D I M A and C A O B I S C O ; C I M S C E E and C I M C E E ; C O C E R A L , E U R O M A I S I E R S and 
U E E A ; O E I T F L , A I F L D , O E I C T O ; F A F P A S , A I F L V and T R A N S B E U R O P ) or office building (the 
last triples). Most Euro-groups compensate this by delegating issues to their national 
members or affiliates in special working groups or ad hoc committees. Clearly, with a 
relatively small staff these Euro-groups have a hard task monitoring and lobbying the 
policy process, especially during the agenda-setting and draft proposal stage, and as a 
result tend to produce a reactive lobbying style. However, this feature does not hold for 
the broadly encompassing umbrella organisations which generally have a larger staff and 
more resources, e.g., C O P A - C O G E C A , C I A A , C E L C A A , B E U C , and E U R O C O M M E R C E I 6 . 
10.7 The stability of the EC agricultural policy community 
Until the 1980s the E C agricultural policy community17 has been dominated by 
producer interests, especially farmers (represented by C O P A - C O G E C A ) and to a lesser extent, 
other agro-industrial interests. During the 1980s, this stable policy community has begun 
to show signs of désintégration. Especially the environmentalist movement, but also 
organised consumer and third country interests tried to get a stronger foothold on the E C 
agricultural policy agenda, with considerable success. The recent MacSharry reform of the 
C A P has to be seen as the outcome of the growing influence of these what used to be 
'outsider' interests. But also before the MacSharry reform there have been signs of 
decreasing political power of farmers and a disintegration of the agricultural policy 
community. 
The extension of Community jurisdiction under the Single European Act (SEA ) and the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU ) , the accession of new member states and the relative 
hardening of the budget constraint as a result of the 1988 Delors package implied that 
more than before choices had to be made with respect to the allocation of the agricultural 
budget among the different categories of agricultural commodities, causing increasing 
competition for support between agricultural producer groups. Competition for influence 
was also reflected by tensions within the farmers' Euro-peak organisation C O P A - C O G E C A 
which had increasingly difficulty in formulating common positions acceptable to their 
national member organisations. While the lobbying power of C O P A - C O G E C A has decreased, 
the specialised commodity-specific Euro-groups representing food and agro-industrial 
interests and nationally-based farmer groups seemed to have gained in influence power. 
This is another indication that the tight E C agricultural policy community has started to 
To give an impression of the internal organisation of the secretariat of a horizontally-oriented Euro-
group, EUROCOMMERCE has a Secretary-General, five advisers responsible for a specific field of action, two 
translators and one secretary. It has several specialised committees, i.e. a Food Committee; an Environment 
Committee; a Fiscal Affairs Committee; an International Trade Committee; a Logistics and Physical Distribution 
Committee. 
1 7 For terminology, see chapter 6, appendices 6.2 and 6.3. 
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disintegrate into various partly competing sub-agricultural policy communities, arranged 
along broad commodity lines with actors having stakes in various - often overlapping -
sub-policy communities. The fact that national groups have increasingly decided to open 
up a Brussels lobbying office can be interpreted as further evidence in this direction. 
The impact of the White Paper programme, the S E A and the T E U on the content and 
scope of E C agricultural policy-making has been confined to the harmonisation of national 
legislation, i.e. food law, veterinary and phytosanitary measures and, though important in 
the completion of the internal market, neither the S E A , nor the T E U intended any structural 
change of existing C A P arrangements. The extension of the policy domains under 
Community jurisdiction, however, meant that the Agricultural Commissioner and the 
Directorate-General Agriculture were to face increasing pressures from within the Commis-
sion (e.g., D G xi, Environment; D G I , External Relations) to redress the fundaments of its 
agricultural policies and to take - more than it had in the past - into account the environ-
mental, foreign trade and other concerns. The most important effect of the S E A on agricul-
tural policy formation was a general shift towards the use of the qualified majority rule by 
the Agriculture Council. This shift can also be seen as a 'natural' response to the 
Community's enlargement in 1986 which made the achievement of unanimity and the 
construction of package deals more time-consuming. The accession of Spain and Portugal 
did not only favour the use of the qualified majority vote in the Council, but also laid 
considerable additional pressure on the allocation of the agricultural budget via (i) 
temporary transitional accession arrangements and (ii) a strengthening of the claims of 
southern E C member states to redress the alleged bias in support towards Northern 
commodities and - hence - stronger Community support of the traditionally lightly 
structured C A P arrangements of Mediterranean agricultural commodities. 
In retrospect, the success of the agricultural producer lobby seems to have largely been 
based on both the presence of a relatively soft budget constraint which enabled annual 
price increases for most agricultural product categories, and - till the end of the 1980s -
the use of the unanimity rule by the Agriculture Council which implied the frequent use of 
package deals and thereby increased the scope and chances of lobbying influence. 
Furthermore, the initial design of C A P commodity support schemes had a strong Northern 
bias due to the dominance of Northern member states. This meant that the character of the 
lobbying was relatively homogeneous with respect to its agricultural policy preferences in 
the 1960s and 1970s compared to the 1980s when influence from the Southern E C member 
states in agricultural lobbying organisation had gradually found its way. 
Appendix 10.1 
An opinion survey among selected Euro-groups in the EC agricultural policy domain 
Euro-groups were selected on the basis of the list stated in appendix 10.2 and a preliminary 
assessment of representativeness based on secondary sources. The survey was conducted by means 
of a written questionnaire which was mailed in early May 1993. Questions asked are given below. 
The response rate was 47 out of 74 questionnaires sent (63,5%). However, answers typically 
related to less sensitive information. Question 5 was not answered by roughly half of the 
respondents. Answers to the questionnaire has been used as an additional source of information. 
Content of the questionnaire: 
FZ\93\survey 
Date 
Addressee 
Dear .. , 
Herewith I would like to ask your cooperation in answering a few questions on your organisation as part of a survey on 
Euro-groups in agriculture. The underlying questionnaire is intended to get an overall view of the organisational 
structure, means and aims of non-governmental organisations at the European level in the agricultural policy domain. It 
covers a sample of Euro-groups related to agriculture (including trade, industry and consumers) as published in the 
Directory edited by the EC Commission (1992). The research forms part of a PhD-dissertation on EC-agricultural policy-
and decision-making. Your answers will be used for the purpose of this research only. 
1. What is the total number of national umbrella organisations and/or private companies/industries per country your 
organisation is representing? 
2. Is your organisation strictly focused on EC policy-making or does it cover a wider field of interest? 
2. How large is the permanent staff of your umbrella organisation? (i.e. number of staff and number of secretaries). 
3. What is the term of office of the President and the General Secretary of your organisation? 
4. Does your organisation publish a periodical/journal covering its policy views? 
5. What are the yearly outlays of your organisation, including expenditures on personnel? 
6. In which way is the time available for contacting/lobbying allocated among the different Community bodies, in per 
cent of the total time your organisation spends on external formal/informal contacts: 
Commission 
European Parliament 
Council 
Permanent Representations of the member states. 
7. Do you have any contacts with national ministries or other national government bodies or do you leave these 
contacts to the national member organisations? 
8. How much of the total time available is approximately spent on internal communication (among the national 
members and your Euro-office) as compared to the former external contacts (in percentages)? 
9. Does your organisation play a role in one/more consultative committees at Community level? Which committee(s)? 
10. Does the fact that your organisation is located in Brussels office lead to any clear advantages in gathering informa-
tion/lobbying. Which? 
(For organisations located outside Brussels: 
10. Does the fact that your organisation is not located in Brussels office lead to any clear disadvantages in gathering 
information/lobbying. Which?) 
11. Your organisation is not located in Brussels. Why is this the case? Are there any serious plans to move to 
Brussels in the near future? If so, when?) 
I would highly appreciate your cooperation. Of course your information will be handled in strict confidentiality. For fur-
ther/ remaining questions you could contact me on telephone no. ++31-8370-
Yours sincerely, 
Ir. Frans A. van der Zee (Address: ..) 
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AAC - European Cereals Starch Association (1988, B; 4) (7) (see also end of this list, under note 1) 
AECGV - European Association of the Meat Wholesale Trade (1958, Paris*) (1) 
AEEF - European Association of Refrigerating Companies - Common Market Comm (1960, B;*) (1) 
AEIAR - European Association of Institutions for Rural Structure (1965, B) 
AEMB - European Association of Livestock Markets (1983, B; 8) 
AFCASOLE - Association of the Producers of Soluble Coffee of.. the EEC (1959, Paris; 7) (7) 
AFG - Association of Glucose Producers of the EEC (1968, B) 
AIBI - International Association of Industrial Bakers (1956, Paris;9*) 
AICV - Association of the Cider and Fruit Wine Industry of the EEC (1969, B) (7**) 
AIFLD - European Organisation of the Dehydrated Fruit and Vegetable Industries (1968, B;5) 
AIFLV - Association of the Industry of Fruit and Vegetables in Vinegar, Brine and Oil and of Similar Products of the 
EEC (1959, B;7) (7) 
AIPCEE - Association of the Fish Industries of the EEC (1959, changing) 
AUN - Association of the Industry of Juices and Nectars from Fruits and Vegetables of the EEC (1958, B) (7**) 
AMAFE - Association of Manufacturers of Animal-derived Food Enzymes (1979, Horsholm) (2**) 
AMFEP - Association of Microbial Food Enzyme Producers within the EEC (1978, B) (2) 
AMUFOC - Association of Forage Seed Breeders of the EEC (1969, B) 
ANGO - Trade Association for Oilseeds, Oil, Vegetable and Animal Fats and their Derivatives of the EEC (1958, B) 
API - Association of the Producers of Isoglucose of the EC (1977, B) (7) 
ASFALEC - Association of Preserved Milk Manufacturers of the EEC Countries (1959, Paris) 
ASPEC - Association of Sorbitol Producers within the EC (1977, B) 
AssrfONTE - Association of the Processed Cheese Industry of the EEC (1964 Bonn;9) 
ASSILEC - Association of the Dairy Industry of the EEC (1959, Paris -> B) (7) 
Association of Cooperative Banks of the EEC (1970, B) -A-
Association of Delegates of the Professional Organizations of Producers and Pickers of Medicinal and Aromatic Plants in 
the EEC (1959, B) (6) -B-
Association de l'Industrie de la Choucroute et des Produits similaires de la CEE (1968, Bonn;3) (**) 
Association of Small and Medium-sized Millers of the EEC (1959, Bonn) -C-
Association of the Ice Cream Industries of the EEC (1961, Paris) (**) -D-
ASSOGLACE - Association of Independent Manufacturers of Ice Cream and Allied Products and Manufacturers of Ice 
Cream Equipment for the EEC (1963, B) 
ASSOPOMAC - Association of Certified Seed Potato Suppliers (1964, Bonn) 
ASSUC - Association of Professional Organizations of the Sugar Trade EEC Countries (1959,B) (1) 
AVEC - Association of Poultry Processors and the Poultry Import and Export Trade of Countries of the EEC 
(Copenhagen, 1966) 
BEUC - European Consumers' Organization (1962, B) 
BLA - Liaison Bureau of the European (EEC) Unions of Aromatic Products (1961, B) 
CAEC - Committee of the European Coffee Associations (1926, London*) (**) 
CAOBISCO - Association of the Chocolate-, Biscuit- and Confectionery Industries of the EEC (1959, B) (7) 
CBMC - Working Community of Common Market Brewers (1958, B) (7) 
CCPF - Central Committee of the Forest Ownership in the EEC (1961, Liège») 
CECODE - European Centre of the Retail Trade (1965, Köln*) (4) 
CEEREAL - European Breakfast Cereal Association (1992, B;7) 
CEES - European Committee for the Study of Salt (1958, Paris;5) (**) 
CEFS - European Committee of Sugar Manufacturers (1954 Paris->B*) (7**) 
CEGROBB - European Community of Wholesale Beer Trade Associations of Member Countries of the EEC (1959, Paris 
**) 
CE1-BOIS - European Confederation of Woodworking Industries (1958, B*) 
CEJA - European Council of Young Farmers (1958, B) 
CELCAA - European Liaison Committee for Agricultural and Food Trades (1979, B) 
CEMA - Groups of Agricultural Machinery Manufactures (1962, Paris*) 
CEP - Federation of National Organizations of Fish Wholesalers, Importers and Exporters of the EEC (1963, changing) 
CIAA - Confederation of the Food and Drink Industries of the EEC (1959, B) 
CD3E - International Confederation of European Beet Growers-Common Market Committee (1958, Paris*) 
CIBEP - Commission for the Common Market for International Trade in Flower Bulbs and Plants (1960, Hillegom, 
NL*) (1) 
CICILS - International Pulse Trade and Industry Confederation EEC standing Committee (1963, Paris) 
CIDE - European Dehydrators Association (1959, Paris*)CILC - International Linen and Hemp Confederation (1959, 
Paris*) 
CIMCEE - Committee of the Mustard Industries of the EEC (1960, B;6) (7) 
CIMO - Confederation of Importers and Marketing Organizations in Europe of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables (1972, B) (1) 
CIMSCEE - Comité des Industries des Mayonaisses et Sauces Condimentaires de la CEE (1961, B;7) (7) 
CIPF - International Straw, Fodder and Peat Trade Confederation EEC standing Committee (1966, Paris;6*) 
CLD - Liaison Committee of the European Retail Trade Associations (1980, B) 
CLIMMAR - EEC Committee for the International Liaison Centre of Agricultural Machinery Traders and Repairers 
(1953, Nieuwegein NL *) 
CLITAM - Liaison Centre of the Industries for the Treatment of Seaweeds in the EEC (1973, B) (2) 
CLITRAVI - Liaison Centre for the Meat Processing Industries in the EEC (19581701, B*) (7) 
COBCCEE - Committee of Butchery and Cooked Meats Organizations of the EEC (I959[66], B) (1) 
COCERAL - Committee of the Cereals and Animal Feed Trade of the EEC (1958, B) (1) 
COFACE - Confederation of Family Organizations in the European Communities (1959[69,79], B) 
COFALEC - Committee of Bread Yeast Manufacturers of the EEC (1959, Paris;8*) 
COGECA - General Committee of Agricultural Cooperation of the EEC (1959, B) 
li For sources and key, see end of the list. 
COMASSO - Association of Plant Breeders of the EEC (1977 Bonn) 
Committee of the European Economic Communities for the Industry and Trade in Wines, Aromatic Wines, Sparkling 
Wines and Liqueur (1959, B) -E-
Commiltee of Forest Tree Nurseries in the EEC (1962, Miltenberg/Main) -F-
Confédération Européenne des Détaillants en Tabac (1970, Luxembourg;6*) (**) -G-
Confederation of Poultry and Game Retailers in the EEC Countries (1970, Wemmel, B; 4) (1) -H-
Committee of Professional Wine Growers in the EEC (1959, Paris) (6) -I-
COPA - Committee of Agricultural Organizations in the European Community (B.1958) 
COPA/COGECA Working Party for Non-Edible Horticultural Products (1956, B) -J-
COSEMCO - Seed Committee of the Common Market (1958, B) 
CPIV - Permanent International Vinegar Committee - Common Market (1957, Bonn*; 9) 
DSA - European Information Bureau on the Development of Animal Health (1983, B) 
EAPA - European Animal Protein Association (1988, B) (**) 
EBMA - Association of European Butylated Hydroxytoluene Producers (1987, B) 
ECAMA - European Citric Acid Manufactures Association (1982, B) 
ECCTO - European Community Cocoa Trade Organisation (1974, London;4) (**) 
ECF - European Coffee Federation (peak of EUCA and CAEC, 1980, Amsterdam) 
ECSA - European Chips and Snacks Association (1961, London) (7) (**) 
EDMMA - European Dessert Mixes Manufacturers' Association (1982, B) (**) 
EEB - European Environmental Bureau (1974, B) 
EEC Wine & Spirit Importers Group (1973, Amsterdam *) (**) -K-
EFA - European Federation of Agricultural Workers' Unions within the Community (1958[1975], B) 
EFAPIT - Euromarket Federation of Animal Protein Importers and Traders (1961, Hamburg;6*) 
EFEMA - European Food Emulsifier Manufacturers' Association (1973, B) (2) 
EFIA - European Fertilizer Import Association (1981, B) (**) 
EFMA CMC-Engrais - European Fertilizer Manufacturers' Association (1987, B; 7) (**) 
EFPA - Association of European Phosphat Producers (1985, B) 
EHIA - European Herbal Infusions Association (1980, Hamburg;6*) (7**) 
ELC - Federation of European Additives and Food Enzymes Industries (1983, Rijswijk NL) 
ENSCA - European Natural Sausage Casings Association (1962, Hamburg) (7**) 
ESA - European Spice Association (1984, London;8*) (**) 
ETC - European Tea Committee (1960, Amsterdam*7) (7) 
ETV - Europäischer Tabakwarengrosshandelsverband (1973, Köln;6) (**) 
EUCA - Federation of Coffee Roasters' Associations (1967, B*) (7) 
EUCOFEL - European Union of Fruit and Vegetables Wholesalers (1958, B*) (1) 
EUCOLAIT - European Union of Trade in Milk and Derived Products (1959, B) (1) 
EURA - European Renderers Association (1968, Rotterdam) 
EUROCOMMERCE - Retail, Wholesale and Trade Representation to the EC (1992, B) 
EURO COOP - European Community of Consumer Cooperatives (1957, B) 
EUROGLACES - Association of the Ice Cream Industries of the EEC (1961, Paris*) (7) 
EUROMÂ1SIERS - Group of Associations of Maize Processors of EEC Countries (1959, B;7) (7) 
EUROMALT - Working Committee of the EC Malting Industry (1959, B;8) (1) 
EUROPECHE - Association of National Organizations of Fishing Enterprises in the EEC (1962, B) 
EURO-TOQUES - Communauté Européenne des Cuisiniers (?, Paris) (1) (**) 
EUTECA - European Technical Caramel Association (1978, London -> B*) (2) 
EUVEPRO - European Vegetable Protein Federation (1977, Vilvorde, B) (7) 
EUWEP - European Union of Wholesale with Eggs, Egg-products, Poultry & Game (1959,Bonn) (1) 
FACE - Federation of Hunting Associations of the EEC (1977, B) 
FAFPAS - European Federation of Associations of Manufactures of Frozen Food Products (1974, B) (7) 
FAIBP - Federation of the Associations of the Broth and Soup Industries of the EEC (1958, Bonn) (7) 
FAVE - Association of European Federations of Agro-Engineers (1974, Bad Honnef;2*) 
FBCE - Banking Federation of the EEC (I960, B)FEBP - Association of National Organizations in the Bakery and 
Patisserie of the EEC (1960, B) (1) 
FEDESA - European Federation of Animal Health (1987, B) (**) 
FEDIAF - European Pet Foods Industry Federation (1975, B*) (7) 
FEDIMA - Fédération des Industries de Matières Premières et des Améliorants pour la Boulangerie et la Pâtisserie dans 
la CEE (1969, B) (7) (**) 
FEDIOL - EEC Seed Crushers' and Oil Processors' Federation (1957, B) (7) 
FEDOLIVE - Federation of the Community Olive Oil Industry (1969, Rome;5*) 
FEEDM - Fédération Européenne des Emballeurs et Distributeurs de Miel (1989,chang.) (**) 
FEFAC - European Federation of the Compound Feed Manufacturers (1959, B) 
FEFANA - European Federation of Manufacturers of Feed Additives (1963, Bonn->B*) 
FEUPF - European Federation of Florists (1960, Torino*) (1) 
FVE - Federation of Veterinarians of the EEC (1961(1975], B) 
FIVS - International Federation of Wines and Spirits (1951, Paris *) (**) 
FRUCOM - European Federation of Importers of Dried Fruit, Preserves, Spices and Honey (1960, changing) (1) 
GAM - Group of the Millers' Associations in the Countries of the EEC (1959, B) (7) 
GECE - European Savings Banks Group (1963, B) 
GEAMR - European Union of Associations of Health Food Stores (1963, Oberursul, Germany) (3) 
GIFAP - European Group of the National Associations of Manufacturers of Agrochemical Products (1960, B) 
Group of Cereal Cooperatives of the EEC (1959, Paris) (5) -M-
Group of the Hop Trade of the Common Market (1960, Pfaffenhofen/Ilm;5) -N-
IDACE - Association of Dietetic Foods Industries of the EEC (1959, Paris) (7) 
IEIP - European Institute of the Pectin Industries (1968, Rijswijk NL*) (2) 
IFA - International Fructose Association (1980, Basel*) (**) 
IMACE - Association of the Margarine Industries of Countries of the EEC (1958, B) (7) 
INEC - Institut Européen des Industries de la Gomme Caroube (1979, Kreuzungen) (2) (**) 
Liaison Committee of Rice Starch Manufacturers of the EEC (1960 Wijgmaal/Leuven) - O -
- L -
OEICTO - Association of European Tomato Processing Industries (1963[1977], B;9) (**) 
OEITFL - Association of European fruit and vegetable processing industries (1978, B) (7) 
OFCA - Organization of Manufacturers of Cellulose Products for Foodstuffs in the EEC (1964, Rijswijk, NL;3*) (2) 
PAO - Federation of Associations of Oat- and Barley Millers in the EC (1965, Bonn;5*) 
SEMOULIERS - Union of Associations of Semolina Manufacturers of the EEC (1961, Rome) (7) 
SETA-UITA - European Committee of Food, Catering and Allied Workers' Unions within the (IUF) (1958[75], B) 
TRANSBEUROP - European Federation of Butter Processing Industries (1982, B) 
Trans-Continental Tobacco Corporation (?, Paris) (1) -Q -
UARCEE - Union of the Associations of Rice Processors of the EEC (1961 Paris;8*) 
UCEPCEE - Union of the Fertilizer Trade of Countries of the EEC (1960, London;6) 
UCOPOM - European Potato Wholesale Union (1952, The Hague*) 
UEAES - European Union of Alcohol, Brandies en Spirits (1959, B) (7) 
UECBV - European Livestock and Meat Trading Union (1952, B*) 
UEEA - European Union of Export Abattoirs, of the Livestock and Meat Trade (1965, B;6*) 
UEITP - European Union of the Potato Processing Industries (1963, changing*) (7) 
UENCPB - European Union of Traders in Leather and Raw Hides (1961, Paris*) 
UFE - Union of Professional Groups of the Potato Starch Industry of the EC (1960, Groningen;4) (7) 
UGAL - Union of Food Purchasing Groups (1963, B*) (4) 
UIDA - International Federation of Grocers' Associations (1927, Bern) (4) (**) 
UIPCG - International Union of Confectioners, Pastrycooks and Ice-Cream Makers (1954, Luxembourg*) (**) 
UNAFPA - Union of Organizations of Manufacturers of Pasta Products in the EEC (1960, Bonn) (7) 
UNECOLAIT - European Federation of Dairy Retailers (1959, London*) (3) 
UNEGA - European Union of Melters and Manufacturers of Animal Fats (1958, Paris-B;8*) 
UNESDA - Union of the Aerated Drinks Associations of the EEC-Countries (1959, B) (7) 
UNESEM - Eur Union of Natural Mineral Water Springs of the Common Market (1959, Paris;6) (7) 
UNICE - Union of the Industries of the EC (1958, B) 
UNICELPE - European Association of Single Cell Protein Producers (1974, B) 
UNION FLEURS - International Union of Wholesale Flower Trade (1959, Düsseldorf) (1) 
Union of Associations of Fishmeal Manufacturers of the EEC (1962, Bremen;6) -P-
UNISTOCK - Organization of Cereal Storage Firms in the EEC (1969, Rotterdam*) 
UPLAC - Union of Dried Yeast Producers of the Common Market (1967, Paris;2) 
Notes: 
1. AAC is a merger of EWSA (EEC Wheat Starch Manufactures' Association, 1959, Bonn) and AAM (Association of 
Maize Starch Industries of the EEC, 1959, B). 
2. EUROCOMMERCE is a merger of CECD (European Retail Association, 1979); FEWITA (Federation of European 
Wholesale and International Trades Associations, 1979); and GEDIS (European Multiple Retailers Association, 
1965). 
Sources: Commission (1989); Commission (1992); own observations. 
Key: Between brackets: year of foundation [year of restructuring]; office (B=Brussels); * = extra-EC members; # = 
number of EC member states of which interests are represented. Between the second brackets: # = affiliated membership 
of: (1) CELCAA; (2) ELC; (3) CECODE; (4) CLD; (5) COGECA; (6) COPA; (7) CIAA. Single letters at the end of an 
entry of an organisation without abbreviation are used in tables 10.1 and 10.2. For example, Association of Cooperative 
Banks in the EEC (1970.B) ... -A-. -A- is used as a shorthand to refer to the organisation. 
Appendix 10.3 
Brussels-based representations of local and regional governments 
Country Local and regional offices 
France Brittany 
Grand Est" 
Grand Sud b 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
Pays-de-la-Loire 
Picardie-Essex 
Rhône-Alpes 
Germany Baden Württemberg 
Bavaria 
Berlin 
Bremen 
Hamburg 
Hessen 
Lower Saxony 
Nord Rhein Westphalen 
Rheinland-Pfalz 
Saarland 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Spain Andalucia 
Catalonia 
Galicia 
Isias Canarias 
Murcia 
Pais Vasco 
Valencia 
Belgium Brussels 
Flanders 
Wallonia 
Denmark Alborg 
Arhus 
Odense 
United Kingdom Birmingham 
Cornwall 
Essex-Picardie 
Greater Manchester 
Highlands and Islands 
Kent 
Northern Ireland Centre 
Scotland Europa 
Strathclyde 
Welsh Bureau 
* Lorraine, Alsace, Burgundy, Champagne-Ardennes, Franche-Comté 
b Acquitaine, Corsica, Languedoc-Roussillon, Midi-Pyrénées, Provence-Alpes-Côtes d'Azur 
Source: Mazey and Mitchell, 1993, p. 106-107. 
Appendix 10.4 Advisory Committees in the EC agricultural policy domain 
Advisory Committee on Beef and Veal 
Advisory Committee on Cereals 
Advisory Committee on Cereals, special Rice section 
Advisory Committee on Cork 
Advisory Committee on Cotton 
Advisory Committee on Eggs 
Advisory Committee on Feedingstuffs 
Advisory Committee on Feedingstuffs, special section on the approximation of laws 
Advisory Committee on Flax and Hemp 
Advisory Committee on Flax and Hemp, special Silk-worm section 
Advisory Committee on Fresh and processed fruit and Vegetables 
Advisory Committee on Hops 
Advisory Committee on Hops, joint working party 
Advisory Committee on Live Plants 
Advisory Committee on Milk and Dairy Products 
Advisory Committee on Oils and Fats 
Advisory Committee on Oils and Fats, section Olive and Olive Oil 
Advisory Committee on Pigmeat 
Advisory Committee on Poultrymeat 
Advisory Committee on Raw Tobacco 
Advisory Committee on Raw Tobacco, joint working party 
Advisory Committee on Seeds 
Advisory Committee on Seeds, special section Harmonization of legislation 
Advisory Committee on Sheepmeat and Goatmeat 
Advisory Committee on Social questions affecting farmers and the members of their families 
Advisory Committee on Sugar 
Advisory Committee on Sugar, joint working party 
Advisory Committee on Wine 
Advisory Veterinary Committee 
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities (1993) 93/C 96/01. 
Appendix 10.5 
The development of Euro-groups in EC agricultural policy (absolute numbers) 
Period of 
foundation 
Primary 
agricultural 
producers 
Agribusiness 
(processing 
and trade) 
Agribusiness 
(input industry 
and trade) 
Horizontal trade 
groups; banks; 
employers 
Consumers; 
environmentalists 
.. - 25.3.1957 1 7 1 1 
25.3.1957-1960 7 41 2 1 4 
1960-1965 3 29 5 4 3 
1965-1970 15 1 1 1 
1970-1975 11 2 2 
1975-1980 1 9 3 2 
1980-1985 1 9 1 1 
1985-1990 5 2 
1990-1993 2 
Source: own calculations based on Commission (1989); Commission (1992). Double counting as a result of 
interim changes in legal status has been evaded where possible. 
C H A P T E R 11 
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY FORMATION IN THE E U : 
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE ENDOGENOUS POLICY APPROACH 
11.1 Introduction 
Conventional neo-classical economics analyses of E U agricultural policy formation have 
left several interesting questions unanswered. For instance, why is it that the C A P ' S instru-
mental design has been so different from what one would expect on the basis of essential 
welfare economics notions and insights from Tinbergen's theory of economic policy? Why 
have price support levels throughout the C A P ' S existence been kept so high, despite 
growing domestic surplus problems and an increasing destabilization of agricultural world 
markets as a consequence? Furthermore, what is the rationale behind the lack of coherency 
and limited size of the structural policy part of the C A P as opposed to its market and price 
policies? 
An endogenous policy model could in principle solve these and other related questions 
by providing a framework for testing hypotheses empirically. This chapter discusses the 
possibilities and limitations of such an approach. It starts with an overview of the earlier 
political economy research on the Common Agricultural Policy (section 2). Section 3 
addresses a number of reasons why endogenising supranational policy decisions is difficult. 
The next sections deal with the possibilities and limitations of applying political economy 
models to explain policy formation under the C A P : models of bureaucracy (section 4); 
voting models (section 5); and interest group models (section 6). Section 7 discusses the 
impact of discretionary policy powers of the member states and the joint - 'interlocking' -
nature of E U decision-making for the construction of an integrative endogenous policy 
model. Section 8 concludes. 
11.2 Political economy research on the CAP: a short review 
Many studies on the economics and politics of the Common Agricultural Policy ( C A P ) 
are of a descriptive-analytical nature (e.g., Harris et al., 1983; Neville-Rolfe, 1984; Bowler, 
1985; DucMne et al., 1985; Fennell, 1987; De Hoogh and Silvis, 1994; and chapters 8-10). 
Insofar as they make an attempt to explain the evolution of the C A P , this usually is done 
from a historical-interpretative perspective. Studies that take a political economy perspec-
tive on the development of the C A P are scarce. Existing political economy accounts of the 
C A P can be divided into two categories: (i) 'first-generation' explanations with attempt to 
translate early public choice ideas to the agricultural policy domain, however, without a 
formal theoretical basis and no rigorous empirical tests of hypotheses; and (ii) 'second-
generation' models in the endogenous policy theory tradition that try to identify the 
determinants of the C A P in a more formal way. These latter applications have only started 
to emerge at the end of the 1980s. First, however, the earlier political economy literature 
on the C A P is discussed, not only because it draws the attention to the different political 
economy perspectives used to explain the same policy developments, but also because the 
results of this earlier research may serve as a useful input to an endogenous policy theory 
of E U agricultural policy. 
216 Limitations of the endogenous policy approach 
11.2.1 'Non-formal' political economy studies 
Early political economy explanations of agricultural policy formation in the Community 
have largely focused on the C A P ' S particular political-institutional structure - as reflected by 
existing decision structures and procedures as part of the E E C Treaty and subsequent C A P 
legislation - and the possibilities for reform. According to Tracy (1984, 1989) the historical 
development of the C A P has been almost inevitable due to the fact that politicians have to 
operate within the narrow constraints of their political inheritance, their electoral goals and 
the presence of various contending interest groups. In line with Tracy, Petit (1985, 1989) 
emphasizes the dynamic nature of E C policy-making. In the short run political institutions 
can be seen as the main 'regulators' of conflicts of interest. In the long run, however, 
trends in economic variables tend to dominate agricultural policy formation. Petit et al. 
(1987) use this framework to explain the introduction of the dairy quota scheme in 1984. A 
similar eclectic non-formal case study approach is used by Moyer and Josling (1990) in 
their explanation of agricultural policy reform in the E C and the us. They extend Petit's 
framework by incorporating political interests (e.g., stability and legitimacy) as well as 
outside political influences (public opinion, lobbies), and by accounting for possible 
(exogenous) economic shocks. 
Schmitt (1984) argues that because of the C A P ' S principle of financial solidarity member 
states are more inclined to give in to proposals for agricultural price increases than 
otherwise. The fact that decisions of the Agriculture Council do not require any direct 
consent of the Finance Council, makes the inclination in favouring the agricultural interests 
even stronger. Moreover, the prevalence of log-rolling evoked by the frequent use of the 
unanimity rule encourages the member states' demands for policy. Koester (1978) evaluates 
the unanimity and the majority rule in terms of Buchanan and Tullock's (1962) concept of 
social interdependence costs. Social interdependence costs consist of 'likely external costs' 
- policy externalities to individual member states of collective (supranational) decisions -
and the costs of reaching a supranational consensus1. Koester argues that the likely 
external costs of majority voting are higher compared to the unanimity rule. The unanimity 
rule gives member states the opportunity to obtain Community concessions, thus mitigating 
the disintegrative forces in the E C . Evidently, the costs of reaching a consensus are higher 
under the unanimity rule. However, the unanimity rule is superior because of lower overall 
costs. Haase (1983) points out that the concepts of 'likely external costs' and the 'costs for 
reaching a consensus' are hard to quantify empirically which makes their use in judging 
proposals for C A P reform hazardous. Senior Nello (1984) discusses the form of and ways to 
improving the decision-making process, using the social interdependence approach and the 
'markets and hierarchies' approach (Williamson and Treece, 1979) which views the C A P as 
a form of contract that can be explained by transaction cost analysis. The C A P has been 
designed as an incomplete cartel, leaving some decisions - such as the control over farm-
investment aids and taxation - in national hands. At the same time, however, the principle 
Policy externalities are defined as the costs and/or benefits of a transaction that are incurred or 
received by other members of society but not taken into account by the parties to the transaction, i.e. external to 
their decision-making process. 
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of common financial responsibility was adopted, yet without the necessary financial con-
straints. A merger contract therefore could have avoided many problems, such as the 
introduction of Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCAs) and their use for domestic policy 
objectives, which increased the fear for a 'renationalisation' of the CAP. 
Several authors agree that the reason why most C A P reform proposals that appeared from 
the drawing boards of the Commission and academia in the 1970s and early 1980s found 
little or no acceptance, was their neglect of the motives of the actors involved in the 
political decision making process and the way the decision-making process functions (e.g., 
Schmitt, 1984; Senior Nello, 1984). Hagedorn (1983, 1984, 1985) argues that C A P reform 
proposals were infeasible politically because the analysis ignored the costs of democratic 
legitimation and the necessary institutional innovations. The size of fixed investments and 
liabilities of the average family farm make that the mobility of farmers is relatively small 
and exit is a rather extreme option. Agricultural land has to be regarded as an immobile 
factor of production, the same holds for most farm capital (especially buildings, but to a 
lesser extent also equipment with a low salvage value) and even most farm labour, due to 
the dominance of the family farm in E U economies. As a result farmers have a strong 
incentive to political 'voice' in order to protect their positions. 
According to Senior Nello (1984), feasible ways to overcome resistance to C A P reform 
can be found in making the decision-making process more transparent, by changing voting 
rules at EC level to lessen the dominance of producer over consumer and taxpayers 
interests, by sticking to long-term economic (policy) strategies (a 'political invisible hand'), 
and by using alternative policies such as direct income compensation. Pleas for the use of 
direct income compensation had also been advocated earlier by, e.g., Van Riemsdijk, 1973, 
Koester and Tangermann (1977), and Koester (1981). Runge and Von Witzke (1987) come 
up with a number of possible 'institutional innovations' of the C A P : the return to majority 
rule in combination with side payments based on direct national income assistance to 
compensate potential losers; the introduction of more institutional checks and balances with 
respect to budget expenditure; and the a priori fixation of member states' net transfer 
positions.2 Koester (1991) argues that the institutional reform of the C A P should include 
the introduction of a uniform ad valorem tariff rate instead of the variable levy system, and 
a change in the C A P ' S financing and support system by making the EC responsible for 
efficiency improving measures, and the member state governments for the income 
redistributional objective. 
11.2.2 Endogenous policy models 
The absence of formal analyses on the determinants of the C A P and the interactions 
between EC agro-political and economic markets led Burrell (1987:6) to comment that: 
They argue that institutional change can be viewed as a process of supply and demand, with 
decision time, distribution of agricultural income, budget expenditure, and net transfer effects as explanatory 
factors. 
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"Despite the undisputed documentary value of thfe descriptive chronological] 
approach [..], its style is inevitably narrative rather than analytical. The need 
for a more rigorous treatment of the politics of the CAP leading if possible to 
some testable predictions and new problemsolving insights is currently a major 
challenge to the policy economist." 
One of the first steps towards a more full-fledged endogenous policy model of EC 
agricultural policy formation is Fearne (1989). He 'endogenises' the annual price-fixing 
process under the assumptions that (i) decision-makers show satisficing rather than 
optimizing behaviour (Simon, 1957)3, (ii) the EC as a decision-making system reacts 
discontinuously rather than continuously in seeking the best possible policy outcome, and 
(iii) interest group bargaining is ultimately reflected in price policy decisions. Fearne's 
endogenisation concept belongs to the kind used in the P P F literature. The policymakers are 
assumed to react to changes in two targets: farm income and C A P budget expenditure. 
Changes in support prices are explained by variables that account for the difference 
between desired and actual levels of the target variables. Farm income and agricultural 
budget expenditure had already been hypothesized by Von Witzke (1986) as being the 
major detennining factors behind agricultural price decisions, while Runge and Von 
Witzke (1987) had pointed out that the C A P ' S specific institutional structure made price 
support levels relatively higher and less downwardly flexible. The difference between 
Fearne's explanation and earlier attempts to explain the Community's agricultural price 
policy relates to the use of an explicit political economic behavioural structure, which had 
been absent in Von Witzke's (1986) ad hoc specified reaction function approach. The 
empirical part of Fearne's analysis, however, is rather crude. 
The model advanced by De Gorier et al. (1990) in which agricultural policies are the 
result of politician-voter interaction is, though more sophisticated, in essence similar to 
Fearne's model. For a given budgetary situation, pre-policy endowment incomes are the 
main determinants of agricultural policy preferences. Policy price preferences are revealed 
through the Council decisions on common price decisions. The differences in agricultural 
price policy preferences between EC member states are determined by taking MCAs as a 
proxy. While the contributions by Fearne, and De Gorier et al. differ from their predeces-
sors in that they offer a crude micro-behavioural politico-economic structure behind the 
determination of policies, their approach is rather elementary and far from subtle, 
especially from an empirical perspective. From a model-theoretical view both models 
consciously neglect the activities of major groups of actors involved in C A P decision-
making which greatly biases the interpretation of their final results. 
Field and Fulton (1994) have advanced a formal bargaining model of EC agricultural 
policy formation that explicitly takes the two-tiered nature of C A P decision-making into 
account and explains the common 'internal price' for cereals as a two-stage Nash bargain-
ing game. In the first stage of the game "the government of each member country 
3 Simon's satisficing concept entails that individuals "behave rationally, but only limitedly so...", 
because of lack of information and limited cognitive abilities. Hence some interpret satisficing behaviour as being 
at odds with the rationality assumption. 
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examines the benefits and costs to itself and to political parties, regions, and interest 
groups within the country" which yields to an objective function for each member state. 
The second stage takes place at the supranational level, where compromises and bargains 
among member states are settled; member state governments are assumed to reach 
consensus under a ujianimity rule. The approach taken by Field and Fulton acknowledges 
that the EC cannot be modelled as a unitary central government, but that full account has 
to be given to its multi-tier decision structure. Their empirical analysis is illustrative in that 
it tries to link 'real-world' policy developments with what one would expect on the basis 
of the model. However, it does not offer empirical estimates of member state objective 
functions or the final outcome in the second stage. Furthermore, the importance of package 
deals in EC policy-making and the possibility of trade-offs between policy objectives and 
instruments is neglected and the role for interest groups at the supra-national decision-
making level is completely denied. The latter is questionable for two reasons: first, the 
Commission is an attractive target for lobbying especially in the initiation and design 
phase of EC agricultural policy formation. Second, the 'democratic deficit' and more in 
particular the lack of power of the European Parliament with respect to compulsory budget 
expenditure - of which agriculture is the most important category - potentially enlarges the 
influence scope for (agricultural) interest groups. The argument that Euro-groups are weak 
and ineffective does, even if correct as an hypothesis, not imply that the influence power 
of interest groups at the EC level is absent altogether. 
Similar to the two-tier framework advanced by Field and Fulton is Moravcsik's (1993, 
1995) non-formal liberal-intergovernmentalist approach. Although designed to explain the 
process of European integration, as a reaction to the neo-functionalist explanations of 
European integration of the 1960s and 1970s, it advances the more general argument that 
EC decision-making can be seen as two-stage process, of economic policy preference 
formation at the national level, and inter-state bargaining at EC level which can be 
interpreted as a strategic interaction process between member states and institutional 
delegation (pooling) of sovereignty.4 Preference formation at the national level is 
primarily determined by the costs and benefits of policy co-ordination and economic 
interdependence as perceived by domestic social groups. It can be interpreted as the 
summation ('aggregation') of various pressures through political institutions, and depends 
therefore on the identity of important societal groups, the nature of their interests and their 
relative influence on domestic policy. Inter-state bargaining is determined by "the relative 
intensity of national preferences, the existence of alternative coalitions and the opportunity 
for issue linkages" (Moravcsik, 1993:480). In line with Field and Fulton, Moravcsik 
supposes that bargaining is influenced by past bargains, whereas bargaining itself takes 
place under conditions of imperfect information and uncertainty. The CAP can be seen as a 
Moravcsik's contribution can be ranked within the international political economy literature which 
has its roots in 'traditional' political science (see, e.g., Keohane and Hoffman, 1991). This literature should not be 
confused with the new political economy of trade and protection as described in chapter 3, however. His theory is 
'liberal' in the sense that it assumes that "private individuals and voluntary organizations with autonomous 
interests, interacting in civil society, are the most fundamental actors in politics." 
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policy domain where interstate bargains have been "(...) possible only on the basis of 
lowest common denominator log-rolling agreements in individual sectors, with the costs 
passed on to consumers and taxpayers. Direct pressure from producer interests in the E C 
has created and maintained a system of high agricultural prices and managed trade, 
regardless of the preferences of politicians" (ibid.:490). 
Less explicitly concentrated on endogenising the behaviour of policy-makers or the C A P 
decision-making process are the contributions by Tyers (1990); Mahe et al. (1991); and 
Johnson et al. (1991) (see also chapter 7) which analyse the political feasibility of 
alternative agricultural reform programmes of the C A P by means of the P P F approach. 
Whether the results of these studies yield meaningful indications of political feasibility can 
be doubted: the assumption that derived policy preference weights of existing policies are 
constant and can be employed to explain the applicability of a shift in policy regime is 
questionable (see also chapter 7). Furthermore, the studies fail to explicitly address the 
underlying political economy rationale for the proposed shifts in agricultural support 
regimes. 
11.3 Endogenous policy theory and supranational decision-making 
Recent applications of endogenous policy theory to the C A P are not as illuminating as 
one might have hoped for. Either formal theoretical analyses have been overly simplified 
in order to enable empirical analysis, for example by excluding important categories of 
actors, or empirics have been added onto the analysis in a loose and casual manner that 
does not attain the standard of Popperian refutability. Generally empirical evidence is 
advanced in an ad hoc manner to illustrate rather than corroborate the appropriateness of 
the model or derived hypotheses. The observed gap between political economy theory and 
empirical analysis is not exclusively restricted to political economy research on the C A P 
(e.g. Dunleavy, 1991; Green and Shapiro, 1994). 
Part of the failure to come up with a convincing empirical application of endogenous 
policy theory to the C A P can be attributed to the absence of an all-inclusive political 
economy framework that goes beyond the partial focus of the political economy models 
identified. Such a framework should be sufficiently flexible to include the multiplicity of 
actors encountered in 'real-world' agricultural policy formation (such as voters, 
bureaucrats, various interest groups and different political parties) and their behaviour - as 
reflected by motives, goals, means and activities, and yet be tractable and solvable at the 
same time. It can be severely doubted whether such a framework will ever emerge. The 
number of politico-economic actors and the complicated interaction structure and multiple 
cross-linkages between actors make that the game-theoretical dimensions of such a model 
would easily conflict with requirements of analytical tractability and solvability. In the 
absence of a full-inclusive explanatory framework, the only credible research strategy is to 
search for dominant political-institutional characteristics and take these as the point of 
departure for a conscious choice between the existing classes of political economy models. 
In essence, this is what is done - albeit implicitly - in part of the priorly discussed formal 
contributions to 'explain' the C A P . 
However, as our evaluation of voting and interest group models in part I has shown 
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empirical application of these models is not without problems, even in the absence of the 
complexities of supranational decision-making. These objections can be assumed to hold a 
fortiori for a situation with supranational decisionmaking. The sui generis character of the 
E C ' s political-institutional design and of E C agricultural decision-making in particular 
render direct application of one of the archetypal political economy models difficult. 
Moreover, existing political economy analyses of the C A P have as a general rule neglected 
both its structural policy part and the separate 'national' agricultural policies formulated 
within the jurisdiction of the member states. Recent political economy research on 
agricultural policy formation has shown that predatory and productive policy formation 
should be analysed as being jointly determined (cf. chapter 7). Ignoring this joint determi-
nation process could lead to misleading results from a positive-analytical perspective and 
to biased policy prescriptions from a normative point of view. The presence of two 
autonomous decision-making entities - at the member state and the Community level -
make the case that the C A P cannot be analysed in isolation even stronger. 
The remainder of this chapter consists of two parts. The first part evaluates the 
applicability and suitability of existing political economy models to explain the E C 
agricultural policy formation and its developments in the course of time as //the 'national' 
policy dimension is absent altogether and the politico-institutional context can be regarded 
as stable over time. It should be realized that this is a strongly simplifying assumption. 
For in reality, the Community's politico-institutional environment has been subject to 
major changes which have had an independent impact on the development of the C A P . Not 
only have decision-making rules changed over time - e.g. the empty chair crisis in the mid 
1960s and the successive use of the unanimity rule, or the change to the use of qualified 
majority voting as a result of the S E A -, but the number of decision-makers and/or their 
relative political power has shifted considerably as well, for instance as the result of the 
accession of new member states. Furthermore, there have been important changes in the 
scope of decision-making authority of the Community over time, brought about by the 
Single European Act and the Treaty on European Union. 
The following discussion will be based on the results of part I of this thesis on the 
empirical applicability of voting models and interest group models. Figure 11.1 
summarizes the existing strands in political economy modelling in a schematic overview. 
As has been elaborated earlier, the distinction between voting and interest group models is 
not as clear-cut as terminology used suggests. 
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Political economic models: a schematic overview 
POLITICAL ECONOMIC MODELS 
i I 
VOTING MODELS 
(politicians / voters) 
SPATIAL VOTING 
MODELS 
PROPORTIONAL 
VOT1NG MODELS 
POLITICAL BUSINESS 
CYCLE (PBC) MODELS 
INTEREST GROUP MODELS 
(politicians, Interest groups) 
INFLUENCE FUNCTION 
MODELS 
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION/ 
VOTE FUNCTION MODELS 
COMPOSITE UTILITY 
FUNCTION MODELS 
MODELS WfTH ASYMMETRIC 
INFORMATION 
MODELS OF BUREAUCRACY 
(politicians / bureaucrats) 
DISCRETIONARY 
POWER MODELS 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT 
MODELS 
suggests. Due to the loose, open definition of the interest group concept, voting and 
interest group models have partly overlapping characteristics: (groups of) voters may -
apart from their ballot - employ other means to influence the polity (cf. proportional 
voting models) or are sometimes even assumed identical to interest groups (cf. vote 
function models). 
The third category of models of bureaucracy has only marginally been addressed before 
(cf. chapter 3), mainly because of its one-sided focus on budget maximisation at the 
relative neglect of the - exogenously determined - policy content and the fact that both 
politicians and bureaucrats as the main actors in this type of models both make up the 
policy supply side. Yet, the specific political-institutional structure of the European 
Community with its relative influential bureaucracy justifies a more extensive discussion 
here. This discussion will primarily focus on Niskanen's discretionary power model. The 
more general class of principal-agent models which build on the informational asymmetries 
between a principal (sponsor) and an agent (bureau) is in essence not very different from 
Niskanen's original model (e.g., Breton, 1995) and is not further discussed here. 
The second part of this chapter discusses the possibilities for an endogenous policy 
analysis which incorporates both the national and the E C agricultural policy dimension. 
11.4 Models of bureaucracy and the explanation of the CAP 
The question whether existing public choice models of bureaucracy can offer any 
explanatory ground for E C agricultural policy formation cannot be answered without a 
Figure 11.1 
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proper identification of the nature of the Community's bureaucracy. Following the 
discussion in chapter 9, it is clear that of all Community bodies the predicate bureaucracy 
is most apt for the Commission. However, from a political economy perspective the 
Commission should not be regarded as a single monolithic entity. The Commission's 
'political' tasks of initiating and directing Union policy (Art8. 149; 155, E E C Treaty) 
predominantly belong to the domain of the Commissioners and their Cabinets. The drafting 
and implementing of Community legislation are the primary tasks for the Directorates-
General which together with the Secretariat-General forms the administrative apparatus of 
the Community. The type of activities, funding and hierarchical structure of the 
Community's administrative apparatus are comparable to those of an average member state 
ministry and as such resemble the archetype bureaucracy. 
The activities and behaviour of (agents in) international bureaucracies are almost a 
blind spot in the public choice literature. Scarce existing studies usually assume that 
international bureaucrats behave like all other bureaucrats. Representative is Vaubel 
(1986:52) who asserts that 
"[...] international bureaucrats have the same utility Junction as national 
bureaucrats and [..] the economic theory of bureaucracy applies to both of them. 
Both try to maximize their power in terms of budget size, staff and freedom of 
discretion and appreciate some leisure on the job. Both enjoy some freedom to 
pursue these objectives because, in many respects, they have acquired an 
information monopoly and because the politicians need their cooperation. " 
Most public choice models of bureaucratic behaviour follow the Niskanen (1971) 
tradition and focus on the budget-output exchange relationship between an agency 
(sponsor) and a budget-maximising bureau (see also chapter 3). In this bilateral monopoly 
relationship, the bureau knows the sponsor's demand for its services and is not required to 
reveal a complete cost schedule. Instead it can make all-or-nothing offers (authority-based 
agenda control) or has informational advantages over the sponsor (information-based 
agenda control). Niskanen's discretionary power model does not give us any clue, 
however, as to what kind of output is supplied: bureaucrats are not assumed to have 
explicit policy preferences, whilst the policy preferences of the sponsor are supposed to be 
exogenously determined. While later contributions have relaxed some of the stringent 
assumptions of Niskanen's original set-up or have adapted the original hypothesis (e.g., 
discretionary budget maximisation [Migué and Bélanger, 1974]), fundamentally different 
alternative frameworks have not emerged. 
Unravelling the budget-output exchange relationship in the E C agricultural policy 
domain might be an interesting ingredient for the overall explanation of agricultural policy. 
Can excessive C A P budget expenditure - which in the past has often been regarded as a 
drag on the balanced and harmonious development of the Community as a whole - be 
explained by the behaviour of bureaucrats as budget-maximising agents? The empirical 
application of the discretionary power model to the C A P appears difficult. Apart from the 
question how the budget is allocated, the existence of joint decision-making structures and 
multiple competing bureaus make the distinction between a monopolistic bureau and 
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sponsor hard to make. At first glance the prime responsible bureau in the agricultural 
policy domain is the Directorate-General for Agriculture ( D G VI ) . However, closer 
investigation indicates that D G vi itself can be considered as consisting of multiple 
competing sub-bureaus. The Directorates, divisions and administrative units each of which 
is responsible for a specific market or structural policy regime all compete for funds and 
authority. The requirement that the overall budget has to be balanced and the fact that the 
Commission has relatively little direct influence over its budget resources adds to the 
existence of competitive pressures.5 Moreover, if a broader definition of agricultural 
policies is taken, other bureaus have a relevant stake in policy-making as well: the 
Directorate-General for Internal Market and Industrial Affairs ( D G HI) for issues regarding 
the harmonisation of food legislation; the Directorate-General for Environment, Nuclear 
Safety and Civil Protection ( D G X I ) for general environmental policy issues6; and the 
Directorate-General for External Relations ( D G I ) for general foreign trade relations. 
Compared to national ministeries the co-ordination between the Directorates-General 
within the Commission is relatively weak and autonomous, which makes that budget 
competition between Directorates-General is not imaginary, and at least more relevant than 
within national bureaucracies. 
Identifying 'the' sponsor is difficult as well. While the drawing up of the Preliminary 
Draft Budget (PDB ) is the responsibility of the Directorate-General for Budgets ( D G X I X ) , 
the College of Commissioners agrees on and proposes the final P D B package to the 'budget 
authority' which is shared by the Budget Council and the European Parliament. The 
influence of the Parliament on the agricultural part of the budget is negligible due to its 
predominantly compulsory character. However, the most important decisions regarding 
agricultural budget expenditure - at least before the 1992 MacSharry reform - are not taken 
by the Budget Council, but by the Agriculture Council in its annual price review. The 
timetables of the budgetary process and the annual price review do not run synchronically: 
while the former starts almost twelve months to the beginning of the financial year which 
starts in January, the latter lasts from September till - at least - the beginning of April 
which marks for some commodities the beginning of the marketing year. Before the 
MacSharry reform, E A G G F Guarantee expenditure, moreover, depended to a large extent on 
developments in supply and demand of agricultural commodities inside and outside the 
Community, and related, on external factors difficult to quantify in advance, such as world 
market price changes and currency movements. The operating appropriations part of the 
budget was therefore difficult to assess, even though its time horizon laid only one year 
ahead. Most of the operating expenditures in the E C agricultural policy domain had a 
Competition for budgets may also be an explanation for why the size of the Community's 
administrative apparatus is relatively modest and has shown low modest growth rate over time. This in particular 
holds for the Directorate-General Agriculture (DG V I ) . According to recent figures the total of civil servants 
working in DG V I is about 850 (e.g., Moyer and Josling, 1990). Growth of personnel seems primarily the conse-
quence of the successive enlargements of the EC and the concomitant increased workload due to a greater 
(geographical) sphere of action. 
6 DG V I is also responsible for environmental and foreign trade issues with a strong agricultural 
component. 
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relatively open-end character. Since 1988 the annual price review has become less 
important. First, agricultural expenditure growth has become subject to a fixed ceiling of 
74 % of the increase in E U G N P growth. Furthermore, the 1992 MacSharry reform has 
engendered a shift from price support to more direct forms of support, such as set-aside, 
afforestation, cattle premiums and direct income support which has made budget 
expenditure more predictable and less dependent on external factors. Finally, the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture poses a clear constraint on export subsidy expenditure 
for the period 1995-2000. 
The budget negotiations 'prefix' the E A G G F and other operating appropriations and are 
decisive for the administrative appropriations. From the perspective of maximisation of 
discretionary budgets (Migué and Bélanger, 1974), the latter category which relates to the 
agency's own operations in terms of salaries and personnel, equipment, accommodation 
and material costs and which is determined in shared responsibility by the Council and the 
Parliament, is more interesting than the operating appropriations part.7 
The Niskanian presumption is that the bureau has complete information about available 
technologies, input quantities and factor prices of the output it produces, and the sponsor 
can only observe the output. It is questionable whether D G VI indeed disposes of such 
considerable informational advantages vis-à-vis the sponsor, for the member states are the 
final responsibles for the actual implementation of price policy and much of the - jointly 
decided and financed - structural policy legislation. The actual intervention buying, private 
or public storage, the paying of direct producer and consumer subsidies, as well as export 
(and if necessary import) refunds, is delegated to national intervention agencies. The 
E A G G F pays a monthly advance to the intervention agencies (labelled 'paying agencies' in 
Community jargon) to cover the operational - not administrative - expenditures. The 
administrative appropriations of the intervention agencies are funded by the national 
governments, with the intervention agency often being an integral, albeit functionally 
independent, part of the ministry of agriculture. 
Since the intervention agencies are involved in the financial transactions as part of the 
implementation of Community legislation, they are relatively well placed for the 
monitoring of real programme expenditures, and have therefore a pivotal position 
regarding (the supply of) information on the true cost schedule. Moreover, they have to 
render account for their activities to both the member state concerned as well as the 
Commission8. In practice this implies that the member state, in casu the agricultural 
minister, will be relatively well-informed about agricultural budget expenditure which 
imdermines the crucial assumption of informational monopoly of Niskanen's discretionary 
power model. 
Cf. the distinction made by Dunleavy (1991: 183 ff.) between different agencies on the basis of 
budget types. 
8 In 1988 the system of EAGGF Guarantee payments (Reg 729/70) between the Commission and the 
national 'paying agencies* has been converted from a system advance payments into a system of reimbursement to 
be made to the paying agencies within two months. This conversion may have even improved the monitoring of 
programming expenditures. 
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But even in the absence of such multiple intricate principal-agent relationships between 
the member states and the Community, it can be doubted whether the bilateral monopoly 
relationship between the bureau ( D G VI ) and its sponsor (either the Budget Council or the 
Agriculture Council-cwm-Commissioners) has sufficient explanatory power. For the bureau 
not only is an important supplier of information about the production of policies (i.e. per-
unit cost and policy volume) in the budgetary process, but it also actively participates in 
the process of policy formulation: a policy proposal is generally conceived at the desks of 
the officials of the responsible Directorate-General and follows a typical bureaucratic-
hierarchical trajectory. Usually policy proposals are accompanied by calculations regarding 
their impact on budget expenditure. 
11.5 Voting models and the explanation of the CAP 
Voting models presuppose a close link between the electoral and the legislative process: 
citizens vote for policy platforms and political candidates formulate policies in order to get 
(re)elected. The sui generis characteristics of E C institutions and of E C agricultural policy 
formation in particular make that the link between the electoral and the legislative process 
is weak and indirect, which causes that the prospects for a meaningful application of 
voting models to E C agricultural policy formation are small. The influence of the European 
Parliament on the content of C A P decisions is limited and its impact on the size of the 
agricultural budget is due to the compulsory nature of E A G G F Guarantee expenditure 
negligible (chapter 9). Contrary to most national parliaments, the European Parliament 
does not function as a reservoir of recruitment for the legislative branch. E C policies are 
formulated by the ensemble of the Council and the Commission. While the selection of 
Commissioners proceeds via a system of co-option without consulting the electorate, 
ministers are generally chosen following direct elections at member state level. In view of 
domestic electoral concerns, Council ministers will in general try to favour those policy 
measures at Community level that have positive net benefits for special interest groups and 
voters 'at home'. On the one hand, the fact that policy measures have to be proposed by 
the Commission and approved by a Council majority significantly weakens the potential 
influence of the 'national' voter on the final policy decision. On the other hand, E C policy 
decisions offer attractive discretionary space for ministers which could be exploited at the 
national political level. They can obscure their political responsibility for decisions taken 
in the Council, especially when these decisions have unfavourable economic effects for 
groups domestically. They can also try to put the blame on "Brussels" and 'externalise' the 
negative domestic electoral impact of unfavourable policies by making the rest of the 
Council and the Commission the political scapegoat and thus protect their domestic 
political reputation. Deliberate 'externalisation' of political costs by individual politicians 
is possible due to the absence of countervailing controlling political powers at the 
Community level. This is enhanced by the fact that (i) some E C decisions require 
unanimity which increases the intransparency of decision-making and the individual 
behaviour of ministers in particular, (ii) Council ministers are accountable to their national 
parliaments only in an ex post manner, and (iii) Council meetings usually take place under 
'restreint', i.e. behind closed doors for the public and the press. If E C policy decisions have 
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clear favourable welfare effects for groups domestically, the reverse is also likely to occur: 
ministers may try to exploit favourable Community decisions by ascribing the outcome to 
their personal intervention in Council decision-making. Downsian rational ignorance and 
the possibilities for obscuring information about E C policy decisions might enable national 
politicians to use Community policies for domestic re-election purposes, not by 
concentrating on salient general political issues, but by offering selective, concentrated 
(redistributive) policy benefits to specific groups.9 In addition to actively obscuring policy 
decisions, politicians could also secure the support of voting groups by choosing policy 
instruments whose redistributive impact is less transparent (cf. the policy obfuscation 
hypothesis by Magee et al., 1989). 
If opportunities for obfuscation are absent, however, it can be severely doubted whether 
farmers as a collective are interesting from an electoral point of view since people vote on 
the basis of several issues besides agricultural policy. But even if agricultural policy were 
the only electoral issue, the farm vote would not be homogeneous due to diverging policy 
preferences as a result of, inter alia, different initial factor endowment and income 
positions within the group of farmers (see also chapter 5). Let us assume, however, that 
the farm vote is homogeneous and is common knowledge for incumbent politicians. Under 
these and some additional strong assumptions the farm vote can be approximated as the 
ratio of civilian employment in agriculture to total employment. The results of this 
exercise, which are presented in table 11.1, show that in the period 1958-1994 the 
potential farm vote has decreased considerably in all E C member states. Table 11.1 also 
shows 1994 civilian employment in agriculture expressed as a percentage of employment 
in agriculture in 1958. The lower this ratio, the stronger has been the decline in 
agricultural employment in the period 1958-1994. The 1994-1958 agricultural employment 
ratio could serve as a proxy for Moyer and Josling's (1990:46) broad notion of the farm 
vote which includes "farmers and their families, but also (...) many others who work in the 
farm support sectors and those whose roots are in farming and who are sympathetic to the 
apparent plight of farmers" (see chapter 5). The stronger the decline in the agricultural 
employment over time, i.e. the lower the ratio, the greater is the broadly defined farm 
vote. If the C A P is interpreted as a means of securing political support at the national level, 
the class of proportional voting models - which includes the Stigler-Peltzman model -
prima facie seems to offer the most promising explanatory framework of the three 
archetype voting models. However, in contrast to the foregoing discussion, proportional 
voting models start from the simplifying assumption that citizens are fully informed, with 
no opportunities to obscure policy measures or, more general, to shirk for politicians. 
' Vaubel (1986:48) has gone one step further by arguing that the EC functions as Europe's 'policy 
dustbin' since it offers national politicians the opportunity to get rid of their 'unpleasant' activities:"(..) interven-
tions which they consider necessary to gain or maintain the support of some interest groups on whose support they 
depend, but for which they do not like to take direct responsibility because part of the cost has to be borne by the 
other supporters of the ruling coalition. If the benefits are highly concentrated, they are recognized by the 
beneficiaries and help to win votes. Fewer votes are lost among the others, if the costs are widely dispersed and 
obscured by the operation of international agencies." 
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Countries B DA FR GR SP F IR IT LU NL P UK 
Farm vote 6.4 20.1 15.7 54.2 37.5 23.7 38.4 34.9 13.8 12.6 43.1 4.4 
1958 
Farm vote 2.5 5.7 3.0 20.8 9.8 4.8 12.0 7.8 2.9 4.0 11.5 2.2 
1994 
1. See key 41.3 38.4 26.0 40.3 25.6 23.5 34.4 22.5 31.6 53.3 35.5 54.8 
Key: Farm vote approximated as civilian employment in agriculture as a percentage of total 
employment. 1. Civilian employment in agriculture: 1994 figures as a percentage of 1958 figures. 2. For 
Belgium, Greece, Spain, Portugal data of 1963 instead of 1958 were used. 
Source: see appendix 11.1 for a detailed overview. 
Political support in this type of models derives from wealth transfers which reduce the 
existing pre-policy income gaps between groups in society. Although deadweight costs are 
supposed to play a role in the wealth transferring process, the important question which 
policy instruments will be chosen or how instruments are used to attract political support 
are not addressed. Furthermore, the broad notion of political support used which underlies 
the assumption of strictly concave support functions makes them very similar to interest 
group models with an influence function. Except for the Stigler-Peltzman model no 
attempt is made to include the resource costs involved in political activity. Furthermore, no 
attention is paid to the fact that agricultural policy is not the only thing bothering people's 
minds. In essence, the proportional voting model is based on the same assumption that 
underlies the farm vote concept, yet in an even stricter form since it assumes that members 
of the 'rural group' or 'agriculture' have identical preferences. But an even more important 
problem is that the support maximising politician is not able to formulate E C policy 
decisions on his own. Though the proportional voting model offers some interesting 
theoretical results, its stringent assumptions, lack of explicit formulation of political 
activities make empirical application of proportional voting models to the C A P difficult and 
not very illuminating for answering questions on changes in policy instrument levels or 
changes in the policy mix.10 
The requirements for application of the spatial voting model are much more restrictive 
than the Stigler-Peltzman and the proportional voting model. In general, application of the 
spatial voting model only makes sense if the policy issue under consideration can be 
ranked in unidimensional issue space and the politico-institutional structure satisfies 
stringent conditions. To avoid cycling results, the application of the spatial model 
A second bargaining stage at EC level would be needed to determine the final policy outcome. 
While this problem could be overcome in a theoretical model, for instance by taking the approach proposed by 
Field and Fulton (1994), this would even more complicate the empirical side of the analysisJn order to avoid the 
difficulties of the direct approach one could try to explain the policy outcome (e.g., prices; protection levels) by 
inter-group income disparity and group size. See also the discussion on interest group models. 
Table 11.1 The shift in the potential farm vote between 1958 and 1994 
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effectively requires a two party democracy, one-party-government system. The EC 's 
decision-making system does not fulfil these requirements. But even if it did, further 
problems would prevent empirical application: not only are agricultural policy decisions 
difficult to rank along an ideological left-right dimension, but the (partly) redistributional 
nature of agricultural policies causes that the single-peakedness condition of voters' 
preferences required for the median voter result will not be satisfied. The political business 
cycle model is not very helpful in explaining agricultural policy formation either. This is 
predominantly due to its macro-focus on inflation and employment which are - though not 
irrelevant - not the crucial factors in deteraiining agricultural policy formation. The 
underlying idea that politicians can strategically alter the policy instrument mix and/or the 
instrument levels - or agricultural budget expenditure in Rogoff s political budget cycle 
variant of the political business cycle model is interesting as an hypothesis. It would 
suggest that the chances for farmers of receiving domestic policy support are larger, the 
closer elections are, but only if farmers are interesting enough as a group electorally. 
However, elections in the member states are usually held at different points in time which 
will have a neutralising effect on national electoral pressures on EC agricultural policy 
decisions and the temptation for national politicians to try to create political budget cycles 
at EC level. The balanced budget requirement is another argument why political budget 
cycles are not likely to occur. 
11.6 Interest group models and the explanation of the CAP 
In the absence of strong parliamentary and electoral influences at the Community level, 
the susceptibility of the Commission and the Council to lobbying and influence activities 
of interest groups is potentially large. This susceptibility is enhanced by the limited size of 
the EC 's administrative apparatus, which makes it - compared to its national counterparts -
more reliant on the expert knowledge and information of organised interests in the perfor-
mance of its legislative and administrative tasks. Interest groups not only serve as 'sparring 
partners' to sound out the political feasibility of policy proposals, but they are also 
important in legitimising and supporting EC policy decisions. The use of interest group 
models therefore seems an obvious choice to describe and analyse EC agricultural policy 
formation. In chapter 7 four basic interest group models were identified: models with an 
influence function, models with a composite utility function, models involving the 
transmission of information, and campaign contribution models. We restrict our discussion 
to the first three types of models, given the fact that campaign contributions play no 
significant role, neither at the EC level, nor at the national level. 
The influence of interest groups on EC agricultural policy formation typically derives 
from lobbying activities and, in particular, the transmission of information. In the process 
of information exchange interest groups not only get to know the Community's agenda in 
a particular policy field, but they may also seek to influence the policy outcome into a -
for them - favourable direction. As a result of this rent-seeking process, the final policy 
outcome may be biased towards certain influential interests. Whether such a bias actually 
occurs not only depends on the activities of the interest group, but also on the competition 
(or collusion) between groups and the susceptibility of policy-makers to influence attempts. 
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The exchange of information between the Commission and organised interests is especially 
large in the process of formulating of detailed regulatory measures such as the harmoni-
sation of food, veterinary and phytosanitary legislation. Transmission of information can 
also be regarded as a major instrument for influencing other non-regulatory policy 
decisions such as periodical adjustments in support levels (e.g., annual prices, quota levels, 
set-aside premiums) and changes in the policy instrument mix. However, both the intensity 
of informational lobbying and its success in influencing the policy decision are hard to 
determine empirically due to the highly intransparent nature of the process.11 But even if 
we have a complete overview of the content and frequency of all information exchanges 
preceding a particular policy decision and assume that other disturbances have been absent, 
it still is difficult to determine which information has been crucial and which irrelevant 
with respect to the content of the final result. Application of the class of interest group 
models involving the transmission of information has therefore to be dismissed as 
empirically infeasible in a 'real-world' context. 
Most suitable for empirical application to the formation of EC agricultural policy are the 
political preference function and the influence function approach. The determination of 
political influence weights through revealed policy preferences - which is the subject of 
most P P F studies - can be useful for assessing the political consequences of a change in the 
level of a single policy instrument or a change in relative levels across commodities. 
However, for the assessment of (the political feasibility) of changes in policy regimes the 
P P F approach appears less suitable (Von Cramon-Taubadel, 1992; Bullock and Jeong, 
1994; chapter 7). This particularly holds for the assumption that revealed preference 
weights with respect to existing policy instruments are constant and can be applied to a 
new set of policy instruments. Measurement of preference weights at different points in 
time therefore need not be very revealing as to the real changes in political preferences. As 
a general characteristic, P P F studies do not tell us how preference weights relate to the 
political activities of groups in society. Furthermore, the neglect of potentially influential 
actors such as the food-processing and agricultural supplies industry may lead to 
misspecification of the P P F model and to biased model results. As a result mainstream P P F 
models are not very useful in explaining why and how agricultural policies have evolved 
over time. 
The influence function approach is theoretically interesting since it draws explicit 
attention to the process of competition among interest groups for political influence and 
the role of deadweight costs for the choice of policy instruments. Empirical applications of 
the influence function model to agricultural policy formation are, however, less 
illuminating since it does not address the question which activities are most effective in 
influencing the policy outcome. The lack of explanatory content is also partly due to the 
form of the dependent variable. Like in empirical applications of the proportional voting 
With respect to regulatory legislation this intransparency is enhanced by the EC's closed procedure 
of writing regulations and directives. It strongly differs from the system applied in the US where the implement-
ing regulations for legislation are drafted and then published in preliminary form to invite comments by interested 
parties before the final version is put into effect (see, e.g., Peirce, 1991). 
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model, the dependent variable typically takes the form of an aggregate measure of 
protection or support (e.g., a nominal or effective protection coefficient) or a (composite) 
government support price for a single commodity or bundle of commodities. Obviously 
such a formulation cannot shed much light on the issue of policy instrument choice. 
Furthermore, the use of structural group characteristics to explain agricultural support 
usually fails to address the link between the influence activities of groups and the policy 
outcome. The highly aggregated level of variables used in this type of analysis obscures 
rather than illuminates the underlying political forces. Yet, it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that variables such as the comparative advantage of agriculture, the share of food 
in disposable income, agriculture's international terms of trade, agriculture's share in the 
economy, or imports financed by agricultural exports, are related to the level of agricul-
tural support and protection levels. However, to claim that the result is a political-
economic 'explanation' of agricultural policy developments is rather pretentious. These 
criticisms also hold for the more sophisticated frameworks advanced by Gardner (1987) 
and Sarker et al. (1993), although the relationship between theory and empirical analysis 
here is less ad hoc and more logically interconnected. The integration of a political 
preference function and non-cooperative group competition for influence a la Becker has 
more overall explanatory potential, but suffers from the same flaws that characterize the 
P P F literature: it ignores important actors and does not address the question of policy 
instrument choice empirically. Furthermore, it assumes that rather than investigates 
whether groups actually compete for policy influence. One could argue that empirical 
analyses naturally and necessarily are a weak reflection of theoretical political economy 
models because of data collection problems. Yet the absence of the ability to test a model 
or derived hypotheses on the basis of empirical data, in order to corroborate or reject it, 
has to be seen as a serious shortcoming. 
11.7 Two-tier policy formation: the CAP and 'national' agricultural policies 
Empirical applications of political economy models to agricultural policy formation in 
the E U have been limited to the C A P , and even narrower, to the market and price part of 
the C A P . On the basis of the empirical facts and figures advanced in the chapters 8-10 and 
the arguments advanced in this chapter, the class of interest group models should be 
considered as most suitable for such an approach. However, the implicit assumption of 
these studies that the 'national' policy dimension can be ignored is questionable. Not only 
might the interconnectedness of the two policy levels yield interesting ingredients for the 
explanation of the C A P . But the existence of a 'national' agricultural policy dimension 
seems hard to reconcile with the aspired 'common' character of agricultural policies in the 
E U and asks for an explanation. 
Agricultural policies formulated at member state - 'national' - level differ considerably 
from Community agricultural policies: while the C A P ' S market and price policies have a 
predominantly predatory ( P E S T ) policy nature as they are intended to redistribute income 
and wealth, measures taken by the member states such as extension, R & D , agricultural 
education, animal and plant health control, and irifrastructural measures have a predomi-
nantly productive ( P E R T ) policy character. Only a minor part of national aids can be 
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viewed as pure predatory policies. Even national early retirement schemes have a 
productive element in that they serve to offer opportunities to younger, better educated 
farmers and thereby increase total factor productivity of the sector and the economy as a 
whole. 
Earlier political economy research has emphasized that predatory and productive 
policies might be jointly determined, and that analysing one of both policy types as if it 
were separate from the other can be misleading (e.g., Rausser and De Gorter, 1988; 
Rausser and Foster, 1990; De Gorter et al., 1992; Rausser, 1992; Swinnen and De Gorter, 
1992b). The results of these studies indicate that jointly determined predatory policies may 
play the role of compensation schemes in the establishment of productive government poli-
cies in order to assure the latter's political viability. However, agricultural policy formation 
in the European Union differs from the 'normal' joint determination case in that it 
involves two autonomous decision levels with different arenas of politico-economic actors 
at both levels, both with respect to composition and aggregate policy preferences. 
Community and 'national' policy decisions are - opposite to what is the point of departure 
in the 'normal' joint determination case - determined at different points in time rather than 
simultaneously. 
Inter-member-state differences in the agricultural policy instrument mix and in the 
setting of instrument levels reveal differences in policy preferences across member states. 
This not only holds for complementary 'national' agricultural policy measures and the 
structural policy measures taken under the framework of the C A P , but also for the use of 
Monetary Compensatory Amounts and the non-tariff barriers. From a political economy 
perspective 'national' agricultural policies have to be regarded as the outcome of a 
political supply and demand process involving, on the one hand, political support and 
domestic (re)election concerns of politicians and their opportunities to shirk and follow 
their own policy preferences, and on the other, the policy preferences and activities of 
voters as well as organised interests.12 Important for the analysis of 'national' agricultural 
policies is that, until the recent MacSharry reform, the net costs of formulating 'national' 
agricultural policies have been influenced by C A P financing arrangements (cf. chapter 8). 
While the direct budget cost of upgrading existing agricultural infrastructure, improving 
agricultural education or agricultural extension had to be borne directly by the member 
state, the financial consequences of surplus disposal caused by the production increases as 
a result of these national agricultural policy measures was borne by the Community budget 
( E A G G F Section Guarantee). Member states could thus take a (limited) free ride on the 
Community budget where the consequences of productive policies were concerned, since 
they had to bear only part of the extra tax burden for surplus 
1 2 It should be noted that a process of 'normal' institutional competition between member states in the 
agricultural policy domain is not very likely, since the essential condition for locational arbitrage - mobility - is 
not satisfied. High fixed investments in farm equipment and land as well as high liabilities - which are partly the 
result of measures taken under the C A P - effectively imply high barriers to exit farming, and make that farmers 
are relatively immobile as a group. Instead farmers have relied on political voice (Hirschman, 1970) to reveal their 
policy preferences. 
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Figure 11.2 EU agricultural policy formation for the two member state case 
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disposal. The overall budgetary and, thereby, political costs of supplying national policy 
favours therefore were relatively low. For the structural policy measures under the C A P , the 
costs of policy provision are even lower. While the decision to participate as well as the 
extent of participation in C A P structural policy programmes has been retained by the 
member states, co-financing rules hold that the Community covers 25% up to 50% of the 
associated expenditures. 
While there are sufficient theoretical arguments that justify the analysis of 'national' 
and E C agricultural policy formation as jointly determined, integrating the two policy 
dimensions in an integrated political economy model which can yield meaningful results 
on the interaction between Community and member state policies, seems too high an aim. 
Figure 11.2 illustrates that even for the imaginary two-member-state-cum-Community case, 
the number of actor categories and influence flows can be regarded as too large to yield a 
model in which the policy outcome can be traced back to the behaviour and activities of 
politico-economic actors. 
A meaningful incorporation of the two decision-making structures in a political 
economy model is the more difficult since the legislative, fiscal and admMstrative 
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branches at the Community and member state level are not completely separated, but 
instead characterised by joint decision-making. Joint decision-making implies that decision-
making by one level of government is influenced by the other and vice versa: Community 
decision-making is highly dependent on the agreement of national member states, whereas 
member states face restrictions in their scope of authority by Community legislation. In 
such an 'interlocking' joint decision-making system, tracing the final policy decisions back 
to the motives and activities of policy participants at both levels is an extremely difficult 
undertaking. 
11.8 Conclusions 
What does the foregoing analysis imply for the empirical applicability of formal 
political economy models to EU agricultural policy formation and agricultural policy 
developments within the European Union? In the absence of a 'full-inclusive' 
encompassing political economy model that can account for the behaviour of the 
multiplicity of actors encountered in the 'real-world', a well-founded choice for one of the 
existing political economy models necessarily implies the exclusion of some politico-
economic actors which may lead to misspecification errors and biased interpretations of 
policy developments. Without 'objective' criteria, the choice between existing political 
economy models therefore remains highly arbitrary. But even if the problems of 
potentially biased results and the difficulty of choosing the 'right' model are ignored, this 
does not mean that the empirical application of theoretical political economy models is a 
straightforward process. The adaptations necessary to transform the theoretical branch of 
political models into empirically workable models significantly weakens their explanatory 
power. Most important in this respect is the limited availability of empirical data that bear 
a clear relationship to the motives and activities of politico-economic actors. The use of 
'structural characteristics' as proxies usually is not very informative as to the ability of 
policy participants to influence the policy outcome. Furthermore, the choice of dependent 
variables has been restricted to support prices or aggregate measures of protection. Yet 
these variables do not illuminate why certain policy instruments have been chosen and 
why some instruments have persisted to exist over time despite their alluded inefficient 
character. Even the most sophisticated applications of endogenous policy theory to the 
agricultural policy domain - of which Gardner (1987) and Sarker et al. (1987) have to be 
regarded as the most prominent examples - have not been able to transpose the issue of 
policy instrument choice to the empirical level. 
Although a convincing application of political economy models to agricultural policy 
formation in the EU has not yet appeared and although the search for such a model might 
prove to be similar to the search for the Holy Grail following the arguments advanced in 
this chapter, it goes too far to dismiss political economic theory or the class of political 
economy models as empirically irrelevant. Especially the insights from 'first-generation' 
political economy contributions in the spirit of Olson, Downs, Buchanan and Niskanen 
have given useful insights in the possible determinants of agricultural policy formation. 
Part of this 'first generation' literature consisted of more qualitatively oriented 
'explanations' of agricultural policy formation of an interpretative rather than of a 'hard' 
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empirical nature. Other contributions in the 'first-generation' literature have taken a model-
based approach, however, without a firm grounding in political economy theory and/or 
clear micro-foundations. The class of theoretical-deductive political economy models -
which may be termed the 'second-generation' literature - have provided us with a fairly 
extended range of hypotheses of what are potentially important factors in policy formation 
and in this respect have contributed to the analysis of agricultural policies as well. Yet the 
gap between empirical applications of political economy models and the state of the art in 
political economy theory and deductive reasoning is large. Most theoretical models have 
focused on analytic innovations rather than on questions of empirical applicability. At the 
same time, they almost all address the need for empirical research to corroborate their 
fundaments and basic propositions. While investing in good empirical research that 
exceeds the ad hoc nature of most of the previous empirical work is a noble endeavour, its 
path is fraught with difficulties as the general evaluation of the two main strands of 
political economy models has made clear. That the complexities of real-world policy-
making can sometimes appear to be unruly and not easily reducible to the properties of a 
tractable, solvable model has been shown in the second part of this thesis. 
Appendix 11.1 Agricultural employment, employment and population, 1945-1994 
Country Population (in 1000) 1945 1950 1955 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1991 1994 
Germany employment in agriculture 5114 3978 3224 2533 1954 1608 1372 1010 927 1035 
total civilian employment 19711 25357 25614 26337 26201 24700 24690 27208 28430 34456 
total population 49843 54606 57606 60462 62101 61322 61423 61418 80170 81338 
France employment in agriculture 7483 5213 4455 3761 3011 2559 1927 1697 1381 1257 1048 
total civilian employment 19711 19167 18787 19327 20154 20938 21113 21154 21438 21782 21810 
total population 39830 42763 45015 47840 50107 52340 53372 54728 55884 56893 57779 
Italy employment in agriculture 8261 6974) 5205 4023 3192 3090 2526 1946 1823 1572 
total civilian employment 19578 20000) 19800 18673 18310 20044 20350 20832 21410 20000 
total population 47516 49640 51491 53940 55180 56829 56836 57452 57746 57138 
Netherlands employment in agriculture 747 495 420 340 309 245 249 286 293 264 
total civilian employment 3766 3933 4384 4450 4576 4781 4932 6066 6444 6631 
total population 9625 11278 11967 12798 13491 13986 14367 14760 15010 15480 
Belgium employment in agriculture 423 233 230 191 144 118 106 101 99 95 
total civilian employment 3382 - 3590 3683 3746 3711 3542 3622 3669 3744 
total population 8512 9079 9290 9632 9757 9842 9856 9902 9987 10101 
Luxembourg employment in agriculture 35 19 16 10 9.5 7,3 6,1 6 6 
total civilian employment 134 132 137 140 146 156 157 181 196 207 
total population 291 311 324 336 353 362 366 372 384 401 
United Kingdom employment in agriculture 1142 1030 715 649 628 575 560 565 
total civilian employment 22501 23658 24609 24643 23271 26452 25752 25163 
total population 50225 52014 53673 56038 55945 56377 57065 57486 58276 
Ireland employment in agriculture 504 407 260 225 189 161 154 140 
total civilian employment 1258 1060 1043 1098 1111 1077 1113 1164 
total population 2847 3069 3355 3508 3538 3519 3569 
Country Population (in 1000) 1945 1950 1955 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1991 1994 
Denmark employment in agriculture 518 489 380 425 1 305 277 215 208 160 151 146 
total civilian employment 2040 2085 1891 2220 1 2264 2385 2473 2458 2669 2630 2573 
total population 4281 4448 4532 4684) 5036 5112 5114 5130 5147 5197 
Greece employment in agriculture 1367 I960 2 1049 1051 972 889 790 
total civilian employment 2663 3616 2 3276 3508 3657 3719 s 3790 
total population 2839 8500) 9410 9847 10004 10120 10410 
Spain employment in agriculture 
total civilian employment 
total population 
5271 
10621 
27977 
4501 
12004 
31077 
3310 3 2228" 1598 
12259 
38809 
1345 
12608 
38994 
1151 
11760 
39117 
Portugal employment in agriculture 
total civilian employment 
total population 
1590 
3280 
8441 
1446 2 
3354 2 
9039 
1004 3 1074" 829 
4376 
10287 
848 
4832 
9859 
514 
4464 
9888 
Austria employment in agriculture 
total civilian employment 
total population 
476 
3570 
8015 
Finland employment in agriculture 
total civilian employment 
total population 
168 
2015 
5078 
Sweden employment in agriculture 
total civilian employment 
total population 
135 
3927 
8745 
Key: Employment in agriculture = civilian employment in agriculture, forestry and fisheries (xlOOO). ' Figures for 1 9 6 2 ; 2 figures for 1 9 6 0 ; 3 figures for 1970; 4 figures 
for 1 9 8 0 ; 5 figures for 1990. Figures for the period 1945-1955: agriculture, forestry, hunting and fisheries. Total working population minus the categories "activities not 
adeq. described" and "unemployed". 
Sources: 1. Commission [AR]: various issues. 2. Eurostat, Statistical Yearbook Agriculture: various issues. 3 . Data for the period 1945-1955: International Labour 
Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics: issues 1953, 1955, 1960. Geneva. 
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S U M M A R Y 
This study explores the relevance and applicability of political economy models for the 
explanation of agricultural policies. Part I (chapters 4-7) takes a general perspective and 
evaluates the empirical applicability of voting models and interest group models to 
agricultural policy formation in industrialised market economies. Part n (chapters 8-11) 
focuses on the empirical applicability of political economy models to agricultural policy 
formation and agricultural policy developments in the European Union. Part I is preceded 
by an overview of arguments and motives for government intervention in the agricultural 
economy in 'conventional' mainstream (agricultural) economics (chapter 2). A further 
delineation of research aims based on a state-of-the-art survey of the political economy of 
agricultural policies is given in chapter 3. 
Why a political economy approach? 
The economics literature is dominated by two - partly complementary - views on 
government intervention in agriculture (chapter 2). On the one hand, there is the farm 
problem view which focuses on the singularities of the agricultural sector and the specific 
characteristics of agricultural markets in particular. According to this view, the government 
should alleviate, and, if possible, solve market and income problems associated with this 
'farm problem'. On the other hand, there is the market failure view. Market failure 
arguments not only refer to public goods such as food security, (guarantee of) food quality, 
agricultural R&D or 'state insurance' against production failures and natural disasters, but 
also to external effects of agricultural production, such as erosion and pollution of air, soil 
and water. 
Both the farm problem and the market failure view implicitly regard the government as 
an omniscient benevolent dictator who has the capacity to take corrective action in an 
adequate and timely manner wherever necessary, with the overall objective of maximising 
social welfare. Both views, however, neglect the fact that government consists of multiple 
agents with partly parallel, partly conflicting motives, which often do not coincide with 
'the public interest'. Furthermore, they ignore that these agents - which make up the policy 
supply side - are subject to lobbying and voting influences. 
Conventional econom(etr)ic models treat government behaviour in an ad hoc and usually 
exogenous fashion. This practice contrasts sharply with the meticulous attention for the 
micro-foundations of consumer and producer behaviour. In the (new) political economy or 
'public choice' approach, however, government behaviour is the explicit object of analysis. 
The political economy approach regards policy as the endogenous outcome of a political 
supply and demand process in which farmers, industrial interests, consumers and other 
politico-economic actors exert policy demand's, for instance by lobbying or going to the 
ballot box, and in which politicians and bureaucrats supply policies in exchange for 
political and budgetary support. The political economy perspective takes, like 'mainstream' 
neo-classical economics theory, methodological individualism as its point of departure. It 
builds on three crucial assumptions: actors behave rationally and are driven by self-interest, 
have stable preferences, and their interaction tends towards equilibrium states. The political 
economy approach provides the methodology for explaining why agricultural policies in 
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mdustrialised market economies have almost universally taken the form of farm(ers') 
support and why policy instruments usually have an indirect and intransparent nature which 
is contrary to what one would expect on the basis of conventional welfare economics 
theory. Agricultural policies often are frequently inefficient, tend to under- or overshoot 
predefined targets, and diverge both with respect to the choice and the setting of policy 
instruments from the implicit recommendations of 'mainstream' neo-classical economics 
theory. 
Empirical applicability of political economy models 
The political economy approach supplies us with the theoretical ammunition for 
explaining agricultural policy. First generation 'public choice' theories have provided us 
with plausible arguments for why agricultural policies have taken the form and content 
they have, but have largely ignored the issue of empirical testing. The first generation 
analyses build on the pathbreaking studies of the founding fathers of public choice, such as 
Olson, Downs, Buchanan and Niskanen, and 'explain' agricultural policy either on the 
basis of qualitative arguments derived from 'theoretical' public choice, or by means of 
statistical regression analysis. In the latter case, the relationship between politico-economic 
theory and the choice of the empirical model is usually a loose one, featuring ad hoc-
specified models without proper politico-economic micro-foundations. The second 
generation public choice models are - more than their predecessors - characterised by a 
strong theoretical-deductive and mathematical basis. Furthermore, these models more 
explicitly try to establish a link between the politico-economic activities of (groups of) 
actors and the final policy outcome. The label empirical applicability may refer to the 
ability to empirically estimate politico-economic relationships, with policy as the 
endogenous variable. Empirical applicability can also refer to empirical testing of 
hypotheses derived from a consistent political economy model. It does not apply, however, 
to the ad hoc manner in which some model studies refer to 'real world' examples to 
support the outcomes of theoretical-deductive models. Part I evaluates the assumptions, 
methodology and limitations of existing political economy models from the perspective of 
empirical applicability. 
Voting models 
The class of voting models - which take the interaction between politicians and voters as 
their focus - includes spatial voting models, proportional voting models and political 
business cycle models (chapter 4). At first glance proportional voting models appear to 
offer the greatest explanatory power. The central thesis of these models is that politicians 
strive for political support and exploit the differences in welfare impact of income 
redistributional programmes supplied to specific voter groups. In most industrialised market 
economies the agricultural population consists of a small and declining minority of the total 
population which does not yield sufficient votes to win the elections. By using the more 
inclusive notion 'political support' the proportional voting approach tries to circumvent this 
problem. An important drawback is that it does not explicitly incorporate the activities that 
make up this political support. Moreover, empirical operationalisation of the political 
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support concept appears difficult. Finally, by its focus on a single policy domain the effect 
of other policy issues and their impact on the behaviour of political-support-maximising 
politicians remains unexplained. The spatial voting model - also known as the median voter 
model - can be regarded as second-best alternative. Yet the median voter model is too 
restrictive for a useful empirical application on agricultural policy formation. This is not 
only due the fact that agricultural policy cannot be ranked on a unidimensional left-right 
scale, but also because more 'realistic' theoretical extensions of the standard model, such as 
the inclusion of multiple issues or extension of the number of parties or candidates to three 
or more, incessibly lead to instable equilibria or do not yield any equilibrium at all. In a 
more-than-two party system strategic behaviour will tend to dominate, which causes that 
the central assumption of sincere voting behaviour - which holds that only policy 
preferences determine voters' choices - cannot be upheld. Furthermore, theoretical 
arguments suggest that the spatial voting model is not suitable for explaining 
redistributional issues. It forms another major objection against the use of the spatial voting 
model, since a substantive part of agricultural policies is explicitly aimed at redistribution. 
Political business cycle models may be illuminating in explaining macroeconomic 
developments and more specifically the political trade-off between inflation and 
employment. They do not, however, yield a workable alternative for the explanation of 
sector policies. 
A fundamental problem that jeopardizes the empirical application of voting models 
concerns the operationalisation of the voter group concept. Potential pitfalls involved in the 
use of analytical distinctions, for instance between the urban and rural population, can be 
illustrated with the notion of the 'farm vote' (chapter 5). In both the interpretative-
descriptive political science and the public choice literature, the farm vote is used to 
indicate the political strength of farmers. Some equate the concept with the labour force 
engaged in primary - first-stage - agriculture or the 'agricultural population'. Others use an 
even broader farm vote capturing the rural population or even those people who "appreciate 
the values and attributes of farm life and sympathize with the agricultural profession", 
including pensioners with a professional agricultural background, people borne on farms, 
and people with a (vague) idealistic notion of agriculture and farm life (see, e.g., Moyer 
and Josling, 1990). However, it is doubtful whether the preferences of these voters for 
agriculture/ agricultural policy are decisive in their electoral behaviour. Furthermore, the 
implicit assumption that the farm vote is homogeneous can be judged as weak. Large 
differences in initial income and wealth positions between farmers, which include 
differences in production factor ownership such as land, buildings, livestock and 
machinery, imply that policy preferences may differ strongly between farmers. The 
systematic evidence for a relative strong party attachment of farmers as an occupational 
group and their preference for right-wing parties frequently found in public opinion 
surveys, does not help us in establishing a clear empirical notion of the farm vote, since in 
these studies the underlying reason for these party preferences usually remains unexplained. 
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Interest group models 
The 'démasqué' of the farm vote concept underlines the importance of organisation in 
attempts to influence government and policy formation. One of the results of the political 
economy of (the organisation of) collective action is that large groups do not easily engage 
in collective action. Individualised selective incentives can help to overcome existing 
dominant free-rider behaviour and can encourage individuals to act in a group-oriented 
way, as Olson (1965) already pointed out. In smaller, so-called privileged, groups 
organisation is usually not a necessary condition to forestall the provision of public goods 
(chapter 6). Olson did not explicitly address the question how the public (group) good was 
to be secured, and which role could be assigned to the government in this respect. Studies 
in the rent-seeking and D U P , but also the Chicago political economy tradition have more 
explicitly focused on the attempts of interest groups to manipulate government, with 
'government capture' as reflected by the creation of (quasi)monopoly positions and/or 
indirect income transfers as a result. With respect to the form of policy instruments 
Chicago political economists assume that political competition ensures that the most 
efficient form of redistribution is chosen ('what is, is efficient'). Virginian political 
economists, on the other hand, perceive policy instrument choices as being determined by 
information characteristics, with politicians having a preference for indirect, inefficient 
instruments to secure voter groups. 
The way in which groups attempt to establish political influence can serve as a basis for 
classifying interest group models (chapter 7). This transmission mechanism is most explicit 
in models in which the transmission of information, respectively political campaign 
contributions play a central role. In both types of models a clear traceable relationship can 
be distinguished between the political activities of groups and the policy decision and/or 
policy outcome, assuming that other influences are absent. Although these models are 
preferable from a theoretical perspective to the two other alternative model classes - which 
take an influence function, respectively a composite utility function as their pivot-, the 
reverse applies if we look at the issue of empirical applicability. Interest group models 
which centre on campaign contributions obviously are relevant only for those countries in 
which politicians/political parties can actually be supported by interest groups. For useful 
empirical applications of such models adequate registration of interest groups and their 
political expenses is a prerequisite. For most European countries as well as the European 
Union such data are not available. Models which take the transmission of information as 
their focus are also difficult to apply empirically. Many, if not all, policy influence can be 
traced back to the transmission of information. However, the registration of these 
informational flows and the ex post determination whether this information could have 
played a crucial role in 'real-world' policy decisions/outcomes has to be judged infeasible. 
Models that take an influence function, respectively a composite utility function as their 
point of departure offer better opportunities for incorporating empirics. There clearly is, 
however, a trade-off between the more explicit inclusion of political activities and the 
impact on the eventual policy outcome. Influence function models provide clearer micro-
foundations for the compelition-for-influence process among interest groups and 
incorporate the resource costs needed for influence activities. Yet, the question which 
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influence activities are involved and how these are related is not addressed. Models with a 
composite utility function focus on the determination of politico-economic (power) weights 
implicitly assigned to socio-economic groups such as consumers, producers and taxpayers 
(in the political preference function [PPF] approach) or social classes (in the interest 
function approach) and measured by means of revealed preference methodology. The P P F 
approach is by far the most popular approach in agricultural economics. Its application to 
the political feasibility of (discrete) changes in the policy instrument mix is, however, 
contestable (see chapter 7). Where the development of agricultural policies is concerned the 
combined P P F - influence function approach in the tradition of Gardner (1987) is most apt 
from an empirical point of view. Yet, most of these models focus on price developments or 
the degree of nominal (effective) protection policy issues in specific agricultural markets, 
and leave the overall explanation of agricultural policies and, most importantly, the issue of 
instrument choice over time untouched. 
Political economy models and the explanation of ETJ agricultural policy 
Part II focuses on the empirical applicability of political economy models to agricultural 
policies within the European Union. This applicability depends, apart from the intrinsic 
characteristics of these models as described and analysed in part I, on the political-
institutional context and the decision-making structure of the European Union. 
Understanding the relevant decision-making characteristics would enable a well-founded 
choice among the available political economy models. The sui generis characteristics of 
supranational decision-making and its institutions are described in chapters 9 and 10. An 
overview of stylised facts and figures of 'real-world' agricultural policy developments is 
given in chapter 8. An evaluation of the applicability of political economy models on 
agricultural policy formation of the European Union is provided in chapter 11. 
The descriptive analysis of the empirics of agricultural policy developments in the 
European Union since the late 1950s predominantly focuses on the changes in policy 
instrument choice. The period between the beginning of the 1970s until the mid-1980s 
shows a tendency toward renationalisation of the Common Agricultural Policy. Not 
explicitly stated as a goal, renationalisation manifested itself through the use of Monetary 
Compensatory Amounts and non-tariff barriers. Moreover, since the C A P ' S inception 
member states have kept some national policy competence in the field of agriculture. These 
'national' agricultural policies are to a large extent complementary to Community policy, 
and predominantly aim at the provision of (quasi)public goods such as agricultural 
infrastructure, education, research and extension. Since 1962 the C A P has been subject to 
pressures for change, from within - often initiated by the European Commission - as well 
as from outside, for example as the result of international trade negotiations. The high 
degree of border protection, the relatively high common price level and the increases in 
agricultural production have led to increasing surplus problems, a high budget burden and a 
distortion of trade relations with third countries. It is from this perspective that most C A P 
adjustments have to be judged: the introduction of co-responsibility levies, guarantee 
thresholds, quotas, budget stabilisers, set-aside and extensification measures, as well as the 
later MacSharry reform. 
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The identification of politico-economic actors, their behaviour (as optimizing actors 
under constraints) and the way in which they interact are fundamental requirements for an 
endogenous policy model. Chapter 9 addresses the formal decision-making procedures as 
laid down in the Treaties of Rome and Maastricht and highlights the role of the 
Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. The annual price review is taken as 
an example. Although the MacSharry reform has changed the nature of the annual price 
review, with a relative shift in attention for institutional prices, direct intervention and 
export refunds toward direct income transfers, it can still be regarded as the most important 
yearly recurring 'package deal' process within the C A P . 
What strikes the eye is the marginal influence of the European Parliament in E C 
agricultural decision-making and the lack of parliamentary scrutiny and review of E C -
decisions at the national level. The 'democratic deficit' at the EU-level combined with the 
relatively modest size of the E U ' s administrative apparatus provide ample opportunities for 
policy influence by interest groups (chapter 10). For the Commission the importance of 
interest groups lies first and foremost in the possibility of the ex ante sounding out of (the 
acceptability of) new policies and in transmitting the information needed in the design of 
complex regulatory policies. Since the start of the C A P "Brussels" has stimulated the 
formation of many Euro-groups with an EC-wide member base. Apart from informal, ad 
hoc contacts with Community bodies, a large number of these Euro-groups also has a 
formal role in E C agricultural decision-making as part of the advisory committee structures 
set up by the Commission. Interest groups organised at the national level try to influence 
EC-agricultural policy-making as well. Contrary to Euro-groups, however, these 'national' 
groups mostly concentrate their lobbying efforts on member state governments and 
ministries. 
Political economy models and the explanation of EU agricultural policies 
The extent to which political economy models can be empirically applied to and offer 
an explanation for the formation and developments in agricultural policies in the European 
Union is the central theme of chapter 11. One important conclusion is that the C A P should 
not be analysed in isolation, but in connection with the 'national' agricultural policies of 
the individual member states. Ignoring this strategically important national policy 
dimension in policy analyses could result in biased and flawed interpretations of (the 
causes of) policy developments. Integrating both policy levels, which can yield meaningful 
results on the interaction between Community and member state policies and which can 
establish a traceable relationship between policy outcomes on the one hand, and the 
motives, ends and politico-economic activities of the actors involved in E U agricultural 
policy formation on the other, seems too high an aim. A flexible, all-inclusive and testable 
model which can explain agricultural policy developments at both levels empirically is not 
available and could not be developed in the context of this research project. 
If we restrict the focus to the applicability of political economy models to the C A P , and 
take the relatively large (potential) influence of interest groups and the limited influence 
powers of the European Parliament on E C agricultural decision-making into account, 
interest group models appear the most obvious choice of the models analysed in part I . 
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However, in establishing an explicit and traceable relationship between the politico-
economic activities of policy agents and the eventual policy result, as well as in the 
explanation of changes in the policy instrument set, even the better empirically applicable 
models still fell short. This does not detract from the value of political economy models as 
such. However, their strength has more to sought in signalling and in their ability to trace 
down possible determinants behind policy changes rather than in 'hard' empirical testing 
and unequivocal explanation of policy developments. 

S A M E N V A T T I N G 
De relevantie en bruikbaarheid van politiek-economische modellen in de verklaring van 
landbouwbeleid vormt het thema van dit proefschrift. In deel I (hoofdstukken 4-7) worden 
de empirische toepassingsmogelijkheden van verkiezingsmodellen ('voting models') en 
belangengroepmodellen ('interest group models') onderzocht, waarbij het landbouwbeleid 
van gemdustrialiseerde markteconomieSn in algemene zin centraal staat. Deel n 
(hoofdstukken 8-11) rieht zieh op de empirische toepasbaarheid van politiek-economische 
modellen op de totslandkoming en ontwikkeling van landbouwbeleid in de Europese Unie. 
Deel I wordt voorafgegaan door een uiteenzetting over de redenen en motieven voor 
overheidsingrijpen in de landbouw in de 'mainstream' (landbouw)economie (hoofdstuk 2) 
en een nadere plaatsbepaling en toespitsing van de probleemstelling op basis van een 
overzicht van de politieke économie van het landbouwbeleid (hoofdstuk 3). 
Waarom is een politiek-economische benadering van landbouwbeleid zinvol? 
In de economische literatuur zijn twee dominante, deels complémentaire, visies op 
overheidsingrijpen in de landbouw te onderscheiden (hoofdstuk 2). De ene visie, die in de 
angelsaksische literatuur wordt aangeduid als 'the farm problem view', stelt de specifieke 
kenmerken van landbouwmarkten en de 'eigen-aardigheden' van de landbouw centraal. De 
overheid dient zieh hierbij vooral te richten op het verzachten en, waar mogelijk, oplossen 
van markt- en inkomensproblemen die voortvloeien uit deze specifieke kenmerken. Volgens 
de tweede visie, die is gebaseerd op de théorie van het marktfalen, is overheidsingrijpen in 
de landbouw vooral te rechtvaardigen op grond van het ontbreken van bepaalde markten. 
Hierbij gaat het niet alleen om publieke goederen als voedselzekerheid, kwaliteit van 
voedsel, landbouwkundig onderzoek of 'staatsverzekering' tegen misoogsten en 
natuurrampen, maar ook om externe effecten van agrarische produktie, zoals erosie en 
verontreiniging van lucht, bodem en water. 
Zowel in de 'farm problem view' als in de théorie van het marktfalen wordt de 
overheid impliciet gezien als een weldoenende dictator die over de mogelijkheden en de 
informatie beschikt om adequaat en tijdig in te grijpen in het economisch procès waar dat 
nodig is, met als achterliggende doelstelling het maximeren van de maatschappelijke 
welvaart. Daarbij wordt voorbijgegaan aan het feit dat de overheid bestaat uit meerdere 
actoren met deels parallel lopende, deels conflicterende belangen en motieven die dikwijls 
niet overeenstemmen met het 'publieke belang'. Deze actoren staan daarbij bovendien bloot 
aan lobby- en steminvloeden. Voorts is de informatie waarover de overheid beschikt net zo 
min als die van andere actoren perfect. 
Het 'gedrag' van de overheid blijft in 'conventionele' economische modellen - die 
gebaseerd zijn op één van beide visies - veelal onderbelicht vergeleken met de aandacht 
voor het gedrag van producenten en consumenten. Zo de overheid geïncorporeerd wordt, 
gebeurt dit meestal op een ad hoc - merendeels exogene - wijze. In de (nieuwe) politieke 
économie of 'public choice' théorie daarentegen is het 'gedrag' van de overheid juist object 
van Studie, een endogene factor. Binnen de politieke économie wordt beleid gezien als de 
résultante van de interacties tussen verschillende typen actoren, waarbij boeren, burgers en 
buitenlui vraag uitoefenen naar beleid met als inzet hun stemgedrag, lobby-activiteiten en 
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andere pogingen om invloed uit te oefenen, op grand waarvan calculerende politici en 
ambtenaren gedreven door (her)verkiezings-, carrière-, bureaupolitieke en andere motieven 
een beleidsaanbod creëren. De politieke économie bedient zieh, net als de 'mainstream' 
neo-klassieke économie, van het methodologisch individualisme en bouwt voort op drie 
cruciale veronderstellingen: actoren vertonen rationeel en door eigenbelang gemotiveerd -
dus niet noodzakelijkerwijs egoistisch - gedrag, hebben stabiele preferenties, terwijl de 
interactie tussen actoren tendeert naar evenwicht. De politieke économie levert daarmee het 
Instrumentarium waarmee verklaard zou kunnen worden waarom landbouwbeleid in 
geïndustrialiseerde markteconomieën zieh niet alleen kenmerkt door ondersteuning van de 
primaire producenten, maar ook waarom de gebruikte beleidsinstrumenten in tegenstelling 
tot wat men zou verwachten op grand van de welvaartseconomische théorie, een indirect en 
veelal intransparant karakter hebben. De wijze van ondersteuning is daarmee vaak niet 
efficient en schiet bovendien soms haar doelstellingen voorbij. De institutionele 
vormgeving van landbouwbeleid wijkt in zijn algemeenheid sterk af van de impliciete 
aanbevelingen van de 'mainstream' neo-klassieke economische théorie. Dit is op zichzelf 
niet verwonderlijk aangezien het politieke besluitvormingsproces in de 'mainstream' 
beschouwd wordt als een datum. 
De empirische toepasbaarhcid van politiek-economische modcllen 
Hoewel de politieke économie de theoretische ammunitie levert voor een verklaring van 
landbouwbeleid, geeft de eerste generatie 'public choice' theorieën vooral plausibele 
argumenten voor de vormgeving en de ontwikkeling van landbouwbeleid, en blijft 
empirische toetsing achterwege. Deze eerste generatie bouwt voort op de baanbrekende 
studies van de 'aartsvaders' van de public choice, zoals Olson, Downs, Buchanan en 
Niskanen, en 'verklaart' landbouwbeleid hetzij op basis van kwalitatieve argumenten 
ontleend aan de 'theoretische' public choice, hetzij door middel van statistische regressie-
analyse. In het laatste geval is de koppeling tussen politiek-economische théorie en het 
gekozen empirische model veelal op losse, ad hoc wijze vormgegeven en blijft de 
expliciete modellering van politiek-economisch gedrag achterwege. De tweede generatie 
'public choice' modellen wordt meer dan daarvoor gekenmerkt door een sterk theoretisch-
deductief en mathematisch karakter. Deze modellen proberen bovendien te komen tot een 
explicietere koppeling tussen de politiek-economische activiteiten van (groepen van) 
actoren en de totstandkoming van beleid. Een logische stap in de verdere verfijning van 
politiek-economische modellen ligt in empirische toepassing en toetsing. Empirische 
toepasbaarheid betreft enerzijds de mogelijkheid van het empirisch schatten van politiek-
economische verbanden, waarbij de relatie tussen beleid en de determinanten van beleid 
centraal staat. Anderzijds houdt empirische toepasbaarheid de mogelijkheid in van 
empirische toetsing van hypothesen afgeleid uit een consistent theoretisch-deductief 
politiek-economisch model. Zij heeft echter geen betrekking op de terloopse verwijzingen 
naar voorbeelden uit de empirische werkelijkheid die in sommige modelstudies worden 
aangevoerd als bewijs voor de juistheid en ter adstructie van de theoretische uitkomsten 
van dergelijke modellen. De veronderstellingen, méthodologie en beperkingen van politiek-
economische modellen worden in deel I onder de loep genomen. 
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Verkiezingsmodellen 
De categorie van verkiezingsmodellen ('voting models') waarin de interactie tussen 
politici en kiezers centraal Staat, is nader onder te verdelen in ruimtelijke 
verkiezingsmodellen ('spatial voting models'), proportionele verkiezingsmodellen 
('proportional voting models') en modellen waarin door de politiek gestuurde conjunctuur-
en/of budgetcycli op de voorgrond staan ('political business cycle models') (hoofdstuk 4). 
De grootste verklaringskracht lijkt uit te gaan van de proportionele verkiezingsmodellen, 
welke uitgaan van de premisse dat politici streven naar politieke steun in ruil voor 
inkomensoverdrachten naar bepaalde groepen. Politici buiten daarmee de verschillen in 
welvaartseffecten van beleid op verschillende groepen politiek uit. In de meeste 
gemdustrialiseerde markteconomieen vormt de landbouwbevolking een kleine en slinkende 
minderheid die op zichzelf genomen niet voldoende stemmen oplevert om de verkiezingen 
te winnen. Het proportionele verkiezingsmodel probeert met het ruimere begrip politieke 
steun dit probleem te omzeilen. De activiteiten waarmee aan deze politieke steun uiting 
wordt gegeven, worden evenwel niet expliciet ge'fncorporeerd in deze benadering. 
Bovendien is het begrip politieke steun moeilijk te operationaliseren en komt niet naar 
voren op welke andere beleidsterreinen de politieke-steun-maximerende politicus zieh rieht. 
Het ruimtelijk verkiezingsmodel - ook bekend als het mediane kiezersmodel - kan 
gezien worden als 'naastbest' alternatief. Het mediane kiezersmodel is echter te restrictief 
voor zinvolle empirische toepassing op landbouwbeleid. Dit komt niet alleen door het feit 
dat landbouwbeleid niet rangschikbaar is op een eindimensionale links-rechts schaal, maar 
ook omdat meer 'realistische' theoretische uitbreidingen van het standaardmodel, zoals 
opname van meerdere issues of uitbreiding van het aantal partijen naar drie of meer, leiden 
tot instabiele evenwichten of überhaupt geen evenwichten opleveren. In een meer-dan-twee 
partijenstelsel gaat strategisch gedrag de boventoon voeren, waarmee de centrale 
veronderstelling dat kiezersgedrag alleen bepaald wordt door beleidsvoorkeuren niet meer 
opgaat. Meer algemeen geldt dat het model niet geschürt is voor het verklaren van 
herverdelmgsvraagstukken, terwijl een substantieel deel van het landbouwbeleid juist 
expliciet gericht is op herverdeling. 'Political business cycle' modellen werpen vooral een 
interessant licht op macro-economische ontwikkelingen en de politieke 'trade-off tussen 
inflatie en werkgelegenheid. Ze bieden evenwel geen werkbaar alternatief voor de 
verklaring van sectorgericht beleid. 
Een fundamenteel probleem dat empirische toepassing van verkiezingsmodellen 
bemoeilijkt betreft de invulling van het kiezersgroepsconcept. De potentiele 'valkuilen' die 
het gebruik van analytische indelingen, bijvoorbeeld in urbane en rurale bevolking, met 
zieh meebrengt, laten zieh goed illustreren aan de hand van het begrip 'farm vote' 
(hoofdstuk 5). De 'farm vote' wordt in de beschrijvende, deels politicologische, deels 
politiek-economische literatuur gebruikt om de politieke macht van rurale of 
landbouwbevolking te duiden. De 'farm vote' wordt soms ruim opgevat: zo rekenen Moyer 
en Josling (1990) niet alleen boeren en hun gezinsleden tot de 'farm vote', maar ook 
degenen die in de toeleverende en verwerkende industrie werken, mensen die duidelijke 
wortels in de landbouw hebben en degenen die sympathiek staan tegenover het 
boerenbedrijf en -leven. Het is echter twijfelachtig of de preferenties van deze kiezers voor 
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landbouw(beleid) de doorslag geven in hun stemgedrag. Bovendien is de impliciete 
veronderstelling van een homogene 'farm vote' moeilijk verdedigbaar. De grote verschillen 
in initiele inkomens- en vermogenspositie van boeren, waartoe ook de verschillen in bezit 
van produktiefactoren zoals grond, gebouwen, veestapel en machines gerekend dienen te 
worden, leiden ertoe dat de beleidspreferenties binnen de 'farm vote' sterk van elkaar 
kunnen verschillen. Ook de aantrekkingskracht op boeren van politieke partijen rechts van 
het politieke midden, die stelselmatig blijkt op te duiken in enqueteresultaten, brengt ons 
niet dichterbij een empirische notie van het begrip 'farm vote', aangezien onduidelijk blijft 
waarom deze partijvoorkeuren zo liggen. 
Belangengroepmodellen 
De ontmaskering van het begrip 'farm vote' geeft tevens het belang aan van organisatie 
in pogingen van groepen 'de overheid' en daarmee de inhoud van het beleid te 
beifnvloeden. Volgens de politieke economie van de (organisatie van) collectieve actie 
komen vooral grote groepen moeilijk tot collectieve actie (hoofdstuk 6). Door middel van 
gemdividualiseerde, selectieve prikkels kan men echter individuen aanzetten om ondanks 
hun relatief verwaarloosbare individuele inbreng in de groep toch hun bijdrage aan 
'collectieve actie' te leveren, zoals Olson (1965) reeds beredeneerde. In kleinere, 
zogenoemde geprivilegeerde, groepen is organisatie doorgaans niet eens nodig om te 
voorzien in de behoefte aan publieke goederen. Olson ging echter niet expliciet in op de 
wijze waarop het publieke (groeps)goed tot stand komt, en welke rol de overheid daarbij 
speelt. Studies in de 'rent-seeking' en ' D U P ' , maar ook de 'Chicago political economy' 
traditie hebben zieh meer expliciet gericht op de pogingen van belangengroepen de 
overheid in te schakelen voor eigen doeleinden ('government capture'), door bepaalde 
(quasi)monopolieposities te creSren en/of indirecte inkomensoverdrachten tot stand te 
brengen. Volgens politiek economen uit de 'Chicago school' zorgt politieke concurrentie 
ervoor dat immer voor de meest effieiönte vorm van herverdeling wordt gekozen ('what is, 
is efficient'). Anderen, onder aanvoering van economen uit de 'Virginia political economy 
school', zien de beleidsinstrumentkeuze vooral bepaald op basis van informatie-
karakteristieken, waarbij politici een voorkeur hebben voor indirecte, economisch 
inefficiSnte instrumenten om groepen aan zieh te binden. 
De wijze waarop groepen politieke invloed tot stand trachten te brengen kan als basis 
genomen worden voor een indeling van belangengroepmodellen (hoofdstuk 7). In modellen 
waarin de overdracht van informatie, respectievelijk politieke campagnebijdragen centraal 
staan, is dit bemvloedingsmechanisme het meest expliciet gemodelleerd. In deze modellen 
kan een traceerbaar verband worden aangegeven tussen politieke activiteiten van groepen 
en de beleidsbeslissing en/of het beleidsresultaat, voorzover mag worden aangenomen dat 
andere invloeden verwaarloosbaar zijn. Hoewel deze modellen vanuit theoretisch oogpunt 
verkiesbaar zijn boven de twee andere typen modellen - die uitgaan van een mvloedfunctie 
('influence function'), respectievelijk een samengestelde nutsfunctie ('composite utility 
function') - ligt dit voor wat betreft de empirische toepasbaarheid precies omgekeerd. 
Belangengroepmodellen waarin campagnebijdragen centraal staan zijn uiteraard alleen 
relevant voor die landen waarin politici/politieke partijen daadwerkelijk financieel 
Samenvatting 275 
ondersteund kunnen worden door belangengroepen. Empirische toepassing van dit soort 
modellen is alleen zinvol indien er sprake is van adequate registratie van belangengroepen 
en hun politieke uitgaven, zoals in de Verenigde Staten. In de meeste Europese landen, als 
ook in de Europese Unie zijn deze gegevens niet voorhanden. Modellen waarin de 
overdracht van informatie centraal staat, zijn eveneens moeilijk empirisch toepasbaar. Veel, 
zo niet alle, invloed op beleid is terug te voeren op informatie-overdracht. Echter, de 
registratie van deze informatiestromen en de bepaling van de vraag of bepaalde informatie 
van doorslaggevende betekenis is geweest voor een concrete beleidsuitkomst is ondoenlijk. 
Modellen die gebaseerd zijn op een mvloedfunctie, respectievelijk een samengestelde 
nutsfunctie, zijn beter in staat de empirie te incorporeren. Dit gaat echter wel ten koste van 
het inzicht welke politieke activiteiten van invloed zijn op het beleidsresultaat. Modellen 
waarin het gebruik van een invloedfunctie centraal staat geven wel een zekere 'micro-
fundering' van de concurrentie om invloed tussen belangengroepen, terwijl de 'resource 
costs' nodig om deze invloed tot stand te brengen kunnen worden meegenomen. Echter, de 
wijze waarop deze invloed precies tot stand komt blijft in het ongewisse. In een door 
Becker (1983) voorgestelde variant speien de kosten van herverdeling een cruciale rol bij 
de instrumentkeuze. In modellen met een samengestelde nutsfunctie zijn politieke 
activiteiten niet expliciet gemodelleerd. Bij deze modellen gaat het primair om het 
vaststellen van de politiek-economische gewichten op basis van gebleken voorkeuren 
('revealed preferences') als uitkomst van het politieke proces van socio-economische 
groepen als consumenten, producenten en belastingbetalers (in de zg. 'political preference 
function' [ppF]-benadering), of sociale klassen (in de 'interest function' benadering). In de 
landbouweconomische literatuur is vooral de P P F benadering populair, waarbij empirische 
bepaling van deze gewichten voorop staat. Toepassing van de PPF-methode op de politieke 
haalbaarheid van verandering in de beleidsinstrumentmix is echter aanvechtbaar (zie 
hoofdstuk 7). Waar het de ontwikkeling van landbouwbeleid betreft heeft de gecombineerde 
P P F - invloedfunctie-benadering in de traditie van Gardner (1987) de grootste 
verklaringskracht in empirische zin. Desalniettemin zijn deze modellen nogal eenzijdig 
gericht op onderdelen van beleid, bijvoorbeeld op prijsontwikkelingen of de mate van 
nominale of effectieve bescherming in bepaalde landbouwmarkten, en wordt het voor de 
verklaring van landbouwbeleid in de tijd belangrijke vraagstuk van de beleids-
instrumentkeuze onberoerd gelaten. 
De politiek-economische determinanten van landbouwbeleid in de Europese Unie 
Deel n rieht zieh op de empirische toepasbaarheid van politiek-economische modellen 
op het landbouwbeleid in de Europese Unie. Deze toepasbaarheid hangt, behalve van de 
intrinsieke kenmerken van deze modellen zoals beschreven en geanalyseerd in deel i, mede 
af van de politiek-institutionele context en de besluitvorrriingsstructuur van de Europese 
Unie. Kennis van deze aspecten maakt het in principe mogelijk een onderbouwde keuze te 
maken uit de beschikbare politiek-economische modellen. De sui generis karakteristieken 
van de supranationale beslmfrorming en de EU instituties worden beschreven in de 
hoofdstukken 9 en 10. Een gestileerde beschrijving van de ontwikkelingen in het Europees 
landbouwbeleid - de 'empirische werkelijkheid' - wordt gegeven in hoofdstuk 8. Een 
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evaluatie van de toepasbaarheid van politiek-economische modellen op het landbouwbeleid 
van de Europese Unie wordt gegeven in hoofdstuk 11. 
De beschrijving van de empirie van het landbouwbeleid in de Europese Gemeenschap 
(hoofdstuk 8) rieht zieh vooral op de ontwikkelingen en de keuze van de gebruikte 
beleidsinstrumenten. Vanaf 1970 tot halverwege de jaren tachtig wordt een zekere tendens 
tot renationalisatie van dit Gemeenschappelijk Landbouwbeleid (GLB ) zichtbaar. Hoewel 
niet expliciet nagestreefd, komt deze renationalisatie onder meer tot uiting in het gebruik 
van Monetair Compenserende Bedragen en non-tarifaire belemmeringen. Bovendien hebben 
de lidstaten niet alle bevoegdheden overgedragen aan 'Brüssel', maar een deel van hun 
vroegere beleidscompetentie inzake landbouwbeleid behouden. Deze nationale component 
in het landbouwbeleid in de E U - dat in hoge mate complementair aan datgene wat op 
Gemeenschapsniveau is en wordt besloten - spitst zieh vooral toe op infrastructuur, 
onderwijs, onderzoek en voorlichting. Het G L B zelf heeft sinds 1962 bloot gestaan aan vele 
pogingen tot verandering, van binnenuit - veelal gemitieerd door de Commissie -, als ook 
van buitenaf, bijvoorbeeld in internationaal handelsoverleg. De hoge beschermingsgraad, de 
relatief hoge gemeenschappelijke landbouwprijzen en de voortschrijdende landbouw-
produktie in de Gemeenschap hebben geleid tot grote overschotten, forse budgettaire lasten 
en verstoringen in handelsrelaties met derde landen. De meeste tussentijdse aanpassingen 
van het G L B dienen dan ook in dit licht gezien te worden: de invoering van 
medeverantwoordelijkheidsheffingen, garantiedrempels, quotaregelingen, budget-
stabilisatoren, braakleggingsregelingen en extensiveringsmaatregelen, alsmede de 
MacShany-hervormingen. 
Een politiek-economische verklaring vraagt om inzicht in de bij de besluitvorming 
betrokken actoren en hun drijfveren. De formele kant van de besluiU'orming rond het E G -
landbouwbeleid komt aan de orde in hoofdstuk 9. Hierin wordt vooral de roi van de 
Commissie, de Raad en het Europees Parlement belicht zoals deze in formele zin 
voortvloeit uit het Verdrag van Rome, respectievelijk het Verdrag van Maastricht. De 
jaarlijks terugkerende besluitvorming inzake het 'prijzenpakket' wordt daarbij als voorbeeld 
genomen. Hoewel het karakter van de jaarlijkse institutionele prijsrondes is veranderd, met 
een verschuiving van de aandacht voor directe interventieaankopen en exportrestituties ten 
gunste van directe inkomenstoeslagen, neemt deze 'package deal' ook het post-MacSharry 
tijdperk nog een belangrijke plaats in. Naast prijsafspraken komen bierbij immers ook 
andere maatregelen, zoals bijvoorbeeld wijzigingen in het agromonetaire stelsel, 
inkomenstoeslagen of braakleggings-regelingen aan de orde. 
Wat opvalt bij de totstandkoming van EG-landbouwbeleid is de marginale invloed van 
het Europees Parlement op de besMlvormirig en de gebrekkigê toetsing van EG-besluiten 
op het nationale parlementaire niveau. Dit 'democratisch tekorf en het in omvang relatief 
bescheiden administratief apparaat van de E G bieden tezamen relatief kansrijke 
mogelijkheden tot beïnvloeding van beleid door belangengroepen. Belangengroepen zijn 
voor de Commissie vooral van belang in het ex ante toetsen van (de acceptatie van) nieuw 
beleid en in de overdracht van informatie nodig voor de formulering van complexe 
regelgeving. Deze meer informele kant van de besluitvorming inzake het G L B wordt 
beschreven in hoofdstuk 10. Hierbij wordt vooral ingegaan op de roi van de 'Euro-
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groepen' (belangengroepen die georganiseerd zijn op EU-niveau). Het merendeel van deze 
Euro-groepen die actief betrokken zijn bij het G L B bestaat al sinds de vroege jaren zestig. 
Vele van deze groepen hebben tevens een formele rol in de door de Commissie opgezette 
en gepropageerde Adviescomite-structuren. De op nationaal niveau georganiseerde 
belangengroepen mengen zieh eveneens in de besluitvorming van EG-landbouwbeleid. In 
tegenstelling tot de Euro-groepen richten deze 'nationale' belangengroepen zieh veelal op 
de regeringen en ministeries van de lidstaten zelf om beleidsbeslissingen op Europees 
niveau te bemvloeden. 
Politick-economische modellcn en de verklaring van EU landbouwbeleid 
De vraag in hoeverre politiek-economische modellen een verklaring bieden voor en 
empirisch toegepast kunnen worden op de ontwikkelingen en de totstandkoming van 
landbouwbeleid in de Europese Unie komt aan de orde in slothoofdstuk 11. Het G L B staat 
niet op zichzelf, maar dient te worden gezien in samenhang met 'nationaal' landbouwbeleid 
van de afzonderlijke lidstaten. Het negeren van deze in strategisch opzicht belangrijke 
nationale beleidslaag in een politiek-economische analyse en beoordeling van 
landbouwbeleid kan tot onjuiste interpretaties van beleidsontwikkelingen leiden. Integrale 
analyse en modellering van deze beide beleidsniveaus, waarbij een zinvolle koppeling kan 
worden gelegd tussen het beleidsresultaat aan de ene kant en de activiteiten van het in 
aantal grote en in motieven en doeleinden zeer diverse gezelschap van actoren betrokken 
bij de totstandkoming van landbouwbeleid binnen de E U , stuit evenwel op onoverkomelijke 
moeilijkheden. Een flexibel, alomvattend en toetsbaar theoretisch model dat de 
landbouwbeleidsontwikkelingen op beide niveaus empirisch kan verklaren en dat deze 
veranderingen terug kan voeren tot het gedrag van politiek-economische actoren is niet 
voorhanden en bleek niet te ontwikkelen. 
Beperken we ons tot de toepassingsmogelijkheden van politiek-economische modellen 
op het Gemeenschappelijk Landbouwbeleid 'sec' en nemen we de relatief grote (potentiele) 
invloed van belangengroepen en de zeer beperkte invloed van het Europees Parlement - en 
daarmee de kiezers - op de EG-besluit^orming in ogenschouw, dan vormen belangengroep-
modellen de meest aangewezen keuze van de in deel I geanalyseerde modellen. In het 
leggen van expliciete traeeerbare verbanden tussen de politiek-economische activiteiten van 
actoren en het uiteindelijke beleidsresultaat, als ook in een verklaring van de veranderingen 
in de beleidsinstrumentkeuze Schieten ook de beter empirisch toepasbare belangengroep-
modellen echter tekort. Hiermee blijft een empirische verklaring van de totstandkoniing en 
ontwikkeling van het G L B buiten bereik. De waarde van politiek-economische modellen is 
daarmee niet ontkracht. Zij ligt echter veel meer in de signalerende en conceptuele sfeer en 
in de mogelijkheid van het traceren van mogelijke determinanten achter beleids-
veranderingen, dan in 'harde' empirische toetsing en een eenduidige verklaring van 
beleidsontwikkelingen. 
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